Month: August 2007

Triage

Triage

I’m still working through my portfolio, but I have categorized some stocks:

The Dead — Companies with bad balance sheets, but have been whacked so bad that it is still worth playing

  • Jones Apparel
  • Deerfield Capital
  • YRC Worldwide

Walking Wounded — Companies with okay balance sheets that we feed more cash to

  • Lafarge
  • Industrias Bachoco

Seemingly healthy that might have financing problems — Sold

  • Lithia Automotive
  • Group 1 Automotive

Uncertain as of yet

Barclays plc

Safe New Names Bought

  • PartnerRe
  • Microcap yet to be named when I have my full position on.

More tomorrow. As you can tell, I am positioning my broad market fund more conservatively. I am not optimistic on how we work through the amalgam of debts that might not get paid.

Full disclosure: long PRE IBA DFR JNY YRCW BCS LR

Afternoon Actions

Afternoon Actions

I sold Lithia Automotive in the late morning for the same reason as Group 1 Automotive.? Mid-afternoon, I replaced the position with PartnerRe.? As I commented at RealMoney:


David Merkel
Bought Some PartnerRe
8/16/2007 3:35 PM EDT
  • Trades well below adjusted book.
  • Reserves are conservative even prior to the fact that they don’t discount their reserves.
  • Reasonable P/E multiple
  • Quality balance sheet
  • Quality management team.
  • Conservative asset policy
  • Not overexposed to southeastern property risks.
  • Position: long PRE

    What I didn’t mention was how much not discounting their reserves is worth after-tax: nearly $20/share.? Take out a few other items, and you get an adjusted book value of around $85 on a very strong and diversified reinsurer.? I can live with that.

    Full disclosure: long PRE

    Morning Actions

    Morning Actions

    Bought a little Lafarge and Industrias Bachoco in to the morning’s decline. Eliminated Group 1 Automotive, and began the acquisition of a little microcap trading below book value with no debt. The integrating theme here is holding onto businesses that don’t need external financing, and selling businesses that require external financing, starting with companies that haven’t been hit that badly yet.

    Could the existing financing troubles spill over into auto financing and auto floorplan financing? That’s possible, though I don’t see the transmission mechanism now. The potential trouble with Group 1 (aside from a balance sheet with high intangibles), is that changes in financing terms could dent their earnings stream. Now, I know that the automakers are highly motivated to move the metal, and will aid the financing process, but I don’t think they can be relied on in entire, unless they only selling for Honda and Toyota, which have superior balance sheets.

    The moves so far this morning are cash neutral. We will see how that changes as the day progresses.

    Full disclosure: long LR IBA

    The Collapse of Fixed Commitments

    The Collapse of Fixed Commitments

    I’ve begun portfolio triage here, and am debating what to sell, and buy, if anything.? More in my next post, if I have the strength tonight.? I’m feeling a little better, though the market is not helping.

    Why the collapse of fixed commitments?? Consider what I wrote In RealMoney’s columnist conversation today:


    David Merkel
    Yielding Illiquidity
    8/15/2007 4:02 PM EDT

    Liquidity is the willingness of two parties to enter into fixed commitments, which can be measured by yield spreads, option prices, and bid-ask spreads. At present, the willingness to be on the giving liquidity side of the trade is declining. Even the willingness to do repos, which is pretty vanilla, has dried up. Roughly double the margin needs to be put up now to hold the same position. That dents the total buying power for what are arguably high quality assets — agency RMBS and the AAA portions of prime whole loans. This means that prices fall until balance sheet players with unencumbered cash find it sufficiently attractive to take on the mortgage assets.

    I thought this era of unwinding leverage would arrive, and arrive it has. (That said, I did not expect that mortgage repo funding would be affected. That was a surprise.) I could never predict the time of the unwind, though, and though I have a decent amount of cash on hand, it can never be enough at the time.

    One of the few bright sides here is that most of the real risk is concentrated in hedge funds, and hedge fund-of-funds. (Some pension plans are going to miss their actuarial funding targets dramatically.) Hopefully the investment banks with their swap books have done their counterparty analyses correctly, and didn’t cross hedge too much.

    I’m still up for this year, but not by much. Perhaps I liked being intellectually wrong better while I made money on the broad market portfolio. Sigh.

    Position: none

    Could Countrywide fail?? It’s not impossible.? I had an excellent banking/financials analyst when I was a corporate bond manager, and she taught me that if you are a finance company, your ratings must allow you to issue commercial paper on an advantageous basis in order to be properly profitable.? If not, the optimistic outcome is a sale of the company to a stronger party.? The pessimistic outcome is failure.? We last tested this late in 2002 when we accumulated a boatload of Household International debt on weakness after they lost access to the CP markets, but had announced the merger with HSBC.? If you can make 12% in two months on bonds, you are doing well.? Paid for a lot of other errors that year.

    But if Countrywide fails, the mortgage market is dead temporarily.? It would be a help after a year because of reduction in new mortgages, but in the short run, the rest of the market would have to digest the remains of Countrywide’s balance sheet.

    Shall we briefly consult with the optimists?? Exhibit A is William Poole, who is more willing to speak his mind than most Fed Governors, for good and for ill.? He doesn’t see any effect on the “real economy” from the difficulties in the lending markets.? At the beginning of any lending crisis, that is true.? Difficulties happen in the “real economy” when current assets have a difficult time getting financed, and consumer durable purchases and capital investments get delayed because financing is not available at reasonable prices.? By year end, Poole will change his tune.

    Now, I half agree with the Lex column in the Financial Times.? The level of screaming is far too loud for a decline of this magnitude. ? But that’s just looking at the stock price action.? The action in the debt markets in relative terms is more severe, and bodes ill for the equity markets eventually.? Remember, the debt markets are bigger than the equity markets.? Problems in the debt markets show up in the equity markets with a lag, as companies need financing.

    One more optimist: private equity funds buying back LBO debt.? The steps of the dance have changed, gentlemen.? It is time to conserve liquidity, not deploy it.? The time to deploy is near the end of a credit bust, not near its beginning.

    How about the pessimists?? Start with Veryan Allen at Hedge Fund.? He tells us that volatility is normal, and that it often drags the good down with the bad.? The difference is risk control, and the good don’t die, and bounce back after the bad die.? Now let’s look at the rogues’ gallery du jour. Who is getting killed?? Pirate Capital, Basic Capital, and let’s mention the Goldman Sachs funds again because the leverage was higher than expected.? Toss in an Austrialian mortgage lender for fun, not.? Consider those that are trying to remove money from hedge funds.? It may not be as severe as possible, but it could really be severe.? Investors, even most institutional investors, are trend followers.

    Five unrelated notes to end this post:

    1. Could this be the end of the credit ratings agencies?? I don’t think so.? It might broaden the oligopoly, and weaken it, but ratings are an inescapable facet of finance.? Ratings go through cycles of being good and bad, but people need opinions that are standardized about the riskiness of securities.? Go ahead, ban all of the existing ratings agencies now.? Within five years, debt buyers and regulators will have recreated them.
    2. What is funny about this article from the Wall Street Journal is that they mix some residential mortgage REITs into an article on commercial mortgage REITs.? DFR and FBR both are residential mortgage REITs.? There may be more there too, but I haven’t checked.
    3. If you can’t trust your money market funds, what can you trust?? I was always a little skeptical about asset backed commercial paper [ABCP] when it first arrived, but it survived 2000-2003, and I forgot about it.? Now it comes back to bite.? Some programs will extend maturities.? Some backup payers will pay, and some won’t.? Fortunately, it is not ubiquitous in money market funds, but it is worth looking for, if you have a lot in money market funds.
    4. How rapid has this 1,000 point decline in the Dow been?? Pretty fast, though 1,000 points is smaller in percentage terms than it used to be.
    5. Sorry to end on a sour note, but the Asian markets are having a rough go of it, and will make tomorrow tough in the US as well.

    It’s late, so I’m going to post on my portfolio tomorrow.? I’ll give you the skinny now.? I’m evaluating the balance sheets and cash flow statements of stocks in my portfolio, and I am starting with those I have lost the most on, and evaluating their survivability under rough conditions.? I have some good ideas already, but I fear that I am too late; some names are so cheap, though leveraged (DFR is a good example), that it is hard to tell what the right decision is.? I will be making some trades, though, no doubt.

    Full Disclosure: long DFR

    The Value of Having a Deposit Franchise (or a Printing Press)

    The Value of Having a Deposit Franchise (or a Printing Press)

    I’m worried.? That doesn’t happen often.? Over the years, I have trained myself to avoid both worry and euphoria.? That has been tested on a number of occasions, most recently 2002, when I ran a lot of corporate bonds.? Ordinary risk control disciplines will solve most problems eventually, absent war on your home soil, rampant socialism, and depression.? I like my methods, and so I like my stocks that come from my methods, even when the short term performance is bad.? Could this be the first year in seven that I don’t beat the S&P 500?? Sure could, though I am still ahead by a few percentage points.

    Let’s start with the central banks.? I don’t shift my views often, so my change on the Fed is meaningful.? But how much impact have the temporary injections of liquidity had?? Precious little so far.? Yes, last I looked, Fed funds were trading below 5%; banks can get liquidity if they need it, but credit conditions are deteriorating outside of that.? (more to come.)? I don’t believe in the all-encompassing view of central banking espoused by this paper (I’d rather have a gold standard, at least it is neutral), but how much will full employment suffer if most non-bank lenders go away?

    Why am I concerned? Short-term lending on relatively high quality collateral is getting gummed up.? You can start with the summary from Liz Rappaport at RealMoney, and this summary at the Wall Street Journal’s blog.? The problems are threefold.? You have Sentinel Management Group, a company that manages short term cash for entities that trade futures saying their assets are illiquid enough that they can’t meet client demands for liquidity.? Why?? The repurchase (repo) market has dried up.? The repurchase market is a part of the financial plumbing that you don’t typically think about, because it always operates, silently and quietly.? Well, from what I have heard, the amount of capital to participate in the repo market for agency securities, and prime AAA whole loan MBS has doubled.? 1.5% -> 3%, and 5% -> 10%, respectively.? Half of the levered buying power goes away.? No surprise that the market has been whacked.

    Second, away from A1/P1 non-asset-backed commercial paper, conditions on the short end have deteriorated.? As? I have said before, complexity is being punished and simplicity rewarded.? High-quality companies borrowing to meet short-term needs are fine, for now.? But not lower-rated borrowers, and asset-backed borrowers.? Third, our friends in Canada have their own problems with asset-backed CP.? Interesting how Deutsche Bank did not comply with the demand for backup funding.? Could that be a harbinger of things to come in the US?

    On to Mortgage REITs.? Thornburg gets whacked.? Analyst downgrades.? Ratings agency downgrades.? Book value declines.? Dividends postponed.? It all boils down to the increase in margin and decrease in demand for mortgage securities (forced asset sales?).

    It’s a mess.? I’ve done the math for my holdings of Deerfield Capital, and they seem to have enough capital to meet the increased margin requirements.? But who can tell?? Truth is, a mortgage REIT is a lot less stable than a depositary institution.? Repo funding is not as stable as depositary funding.? There will come a point in the market where it will rationalize when companies with balance sheets find the mortgage securities so compelling, that the market clears. After that, the total mortgage market will rationalize, in order of increasing risk.? Fannie and Freddie will help here.? They support the agency repo market, but the AAA whole loan stuff is another matter.? Everyone in the mortgage business except the agencies is cutting back their risk here.

    By now, you’ve probably heard of mark-to-model, versus mark-to market.? The problem is that mark-to-model is inescapable for illiquid securities.? They trade by appointment at best, and so someone has to estimate value via a model of some sort.? The alternative is that since there are no bids, you mark them at zero, but that will cause equity problems for those buying and selling hedge fund shares.? This is a problem with no solution, unless you want to ban illiquid securities from hedge funds.? (Then where do they go?)

    There’s always a bull market somewhere, a friend of mine would say (perhaps it is in cash? that is, vanilla cash), but parties dealing with volatility are doing increasing volumes of business, which is straining the poor underpaid folks in the back office.

    Why am I underperforming now?? Value temporarily is doing badly because stocks with low price-to-cash-flow are getting whacked, because the private equity bid has dried up.? That’s the stuff I traffic in, so, yeah, I’m guilty.? That doesn’t dissuade me from the value of my methods in the long run.

    Might there be further liquidity troubles in asset classes favored by hedge funds?? Investors tend to be trend followers, so? yes, as redemptions pile up at hedge funds, risky assets will get liquidated.? Equilibrium will return when investors with balance sheets tuck the depreciated assets away.

    Finally, to end on a positive note.? Someone has to be doing well here, right?? Yes, the Chinese.? Given the inflation happening there, and the general boom that they are experiencing, perhaps it is not so much of a surprise.

    With that, that’s all for the evening.? I have more to say, but I am still not feeling well, and am a little depressed over the performance of my portfolio, and a few other things.? I hope that things are going better for you; may God bless you.

    Full disclosure: long DB DFR

    Why I Worry About Inflation Globally

    Why I Worry About Inflation Globally

    Money supply growth is high and inflation rising in much of the developing world. This is leading to inflation in China, Australia, and many other places, as the deflationary effects of adding new labor to the global capitalist labor pool gets outweighed by the hyperactive printing press.

    Central banks are still adding to liquidity, perhaps to bail out banks who have made bad loans to parties on the wrong side of securities trades.? I like CLSA’s Greed and Fear, but don’t argue with what the central banks are doing, instead, try to analyze what they will do from here.

    Two more notes: I don’t see China selling US Dollar assets.? It isn’t in their interest.? What they would more likely do is begin purchasing US corporations, and/or merely slowing/eliminating debt purchases — those would be more than uncomfortable enough.? Second, as I mentioned in my prior post, the risk is not US assets fleeing Asia, but Asian assets fleeing the US.

    With that, have a good night.? I’ll try to get to my two other posts tomorrow.

    The State of the Markets, Part 2

    The State of the Markets, Part 2

    There are several ways I would like to go from here in my short-term plan for this blog.? One is to focus on the stress in credit markets.? Second is to post on the macroeconomics surrounding these changes.? Third is to point at the oddball stuff that I am seeing away from points one and two.? Last would be portfolio strategy at this point in time.? From a conversation with my friend Cody Willard today, where we went over many of these topics and more, what I believe every investor should do right now is look at every asset in his portfolio, and ask two questions:? What happens if this asset can’t get financing on attractive terms, and would this asset benefit from any reflationary moves by the global central banks.? That’s the direction that I am heading.? Tonight, I hope to go through stress in the credit markets, and maybe macroeconomics.? I haven’t been feeling so well, so I’ll see what I can do.

    Let’s start with Rick Bookstaber, who recently started his own blog, after writing a well-regarded new book that I haven’t read yet.? He sees the risks with the quant funds: leverage, similar strategies, and the carrying capacity of the strategies.? Very similar to my ecological view of the markets.? Move over to the CASTrader blog, a nifty blog that I cited on my Kelly Criterion pieces.? He also subscribes to the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis, as I do.? He also makes a carrying capacity-type argument, that the quants got too big for the markets that they were trying to extract excess profits from.? Any strategy can be overdone.? Then go to Zero Beta.? The hidden variable that the quants perhaps ignored was leverage, which affects the ability of holders to control an asset under all conditions.? Leverage creates weak holders, or in the case of shorts, weak shorts.? Visit Paul Kedrosky next.? I sometimes talk about “fat tails,” and yes, looking at distributions of asset returns, they can seem to be fat tailed, but regime shifting is another way to look at it.? Assets shift between two modes:? Normal and Crisis.? In normal, the going concern aspect gets valued more highly.? In crisis, the liquidation aspect gets valued more highly.

    Looking at this article, quant funds were precariously over-levered, and now are paying the price.? Goldman Sachs may understand that now, as its Global Alpha fund moves to a lower leverage posture.? This NYT article points out how fund strategy similarities helped exacerbate the crisis, as does this article in the Telegraph.

    We have continuing admissions of trouble.? AQR, and this summary from FT Alphaville.? Tighter credit is inhibiting deals, which is to be expected.? Some mutual fund managers are underperforming, including a few that I like, for example Wally Weitz, and Ron Muhlenkamp.? Problems from our residential real estate markets will get bigger, until the level of unsold inventories begins a credible decline.

    Is 1998 the right analogy for the markets?? FT Alphaville gets it right; the main difference is that the funding positions of the US and emerging Asia are swapped.? We need capital from the emerging markets now; in 1998, it was flipped. Is 1970 the right analogy?? I hope not.? ABCP in credit affected areas should be small enough that the overall commerical paper market should not be affected, and money markets should be okay.? But it troubles me to even wonder about this.? Finally, CDS counterparty risk — it is somewhat shadowy, so questions are unavoidable.? The question becomes how well the investment banks enforce their margin agreements.? My suspicion is that they will enforce them well, particularly in this environment.? But what that means (coming full circle) is that speculators on the wrong side of trades will get liquidated, adding to current market volatility.

    Limits to the Power of Monetary Policy, Part 2

    Limits to the Power of Monetary Policy, Part 2

    Not many of my posts generate a large number of quality responses.? Rather than respond in the comments area, I thought I would make this a separate post.? My views on the Fed are eclectic, and a little quirky, because I am a skeptic about the power of central banking generally, on both the upside and the downside.? I’ve done fairly well as a bond manager using my views of the Fed to add some value.? (I’m not a bond manager now, though I would like to run a bond fund again at some point.)

    First let’s clear the decks.? I am not short.? I am not underinvested in stocks, or private equity.? I am also a “lone wolf.”? I don’t work for anyone.? When I worked for my prior employer, what I posted here and at RealMoney often disagreed with the view of the owner/founder (a genuinely good fellow, and a bright guy).? What I said, I said on two levels.? First, what should be: maintain a tight-ish monetary? policy, because the crisis is nothing the the Fed should be concerned about.? I care about public policy.? I don’t like inflation, which is very understated by the PCE, and understated by the CPI, for reasons that I have stated previously.? I also don’t agree with the concept of core inflation.? If you want to remove volatility, trim the mean, or use a median.? But excluding whole classes of goods is bogus, particularly when their removal lowers the CPI by a lot.

    My view is that the temporary injections of liquidity will fail.? There will be enough demand for additional short term liquidity that the Fed will have to begin making permanent injections of liquidity into the system, and eventually cut the Fed funds rate.? Once you cross the intellectual barrier of providing enough incremental liquidity to keep the system afloat, you have committed to an uncertain course of action that will likely lead to rate cuts eventually.? If the goal of monetary policy shifts, so will the direction of policy, usually.

    Has the Fed lost control of monetary policy?? Yes and no.? Yes, if they continue to do business the way they do now.? No, if they want to get ugly, and restrict the ways the banks do business, either through regulation or through a modification of the risk-based capital rules.? Even so, what can they do about stimulus via foreign purchases of US debts?? Not much, and even the US Treasury would have a hard time there.

    Why have the markets been so good for 25 years? I have five reasons:

    • Demographics — the Baby Boomers entered their most productive years.
    • Easy Federal Reserve — after the overshoot of policy in the early 80s, the Fed was far more activist and willing (particularly under Greenspan) to throw liquidity at problems that should be liquidated by the free markets.
    • Capitalism — Almost every nation is Capitalist now, even if it is crony Capitalism.
    • Deregulation — business benefited from deregulation under Reagan (and no one else).
    • Free-ish Trade — Trade isn’t really free, but many nations are more willing to compete globally, and the deflationary effects of that competition have been a real benefit.

    Finally, I am still thinking about what will benefit from a shift in Fed policy.? I mentioned high quality financials.? To me, that means companies like Hartford (or maybe PRU), which I don’t own at present.? Maybe Wells Fargo?? I’m not sure, but it would have to be institutions that have suffered a real price setback, where a permanent impairment of capital is unlikely.? But what other industries will benefit from lower financing rates?? That is the $64 billion question, and with that, I bid you good night.

    The State of the Markets

    The State of the Markets

    I’m going to try to put in two posts this evening — this one on recent activity, and one on the Fed, to try to address the commentary that my last post generated.

    Central Banking in the Forefront?

    Let’s start with the state of monetary policy.? Is it easy or tight?? It’s in-between.? The monetary base is growing at maybe a 3% rate yoy.? The Fed has not done a permanent injection of liquidity in over 3 months.? MZM and M2 are around 5%, and my M3 proxy is around 8%.? But FOMC policy is compromised by the willingness of foreigners to finance the US Current account deficit, and cheaply too.? The increase in foreign holdings of US debt is roughly equal to the increase in M2.? That provides a lot of additional stimulus that the Fed can’t undo.

    So what have the Central Banks done lately? Barry does a good job of summarizing the actions, all of which are temporary injections of liquidity, together with statements of support for the markets.? So why did short-term lending rates to banks spike?? My guess is that there were a few institutions that felt the need to shore up their balance sheets by getting some short-term liquidity.? I’m a little skeptical of the breadth of this crisis, but if anything begins to make me more concerned, it is that some banks in the Federal Reserve System needed liquidity fast.? Also, some banks needed quick liquidity from the unregulated eurodollar markets.? But who?? Inquiring minds want to know… 😉

    So, over at FT Alphaville they wonder, but in a different way.? What do central bankers know that we don’t?? My usual answer is not much, but I am wondering too.? Panicked calls from investment bank CEOs?? Timothy Geithner worrying about systemic risk?? Maybe, but not showing up in swap spreads, yet.? Calls from commercial bankers asking for a little help?? Maybe.? I don’t know.? I wonder whether we’ve really felt enough pain in order to deserve a FOMC cut.? We haven’t even had a 10% correction in the market yet.? Obviously, But some think we’ve had enough pain.? But inflation is higher than the statistics would indicate, and is slowly getting driven higher by higher inflation abroad, some of which is getting transmitted here.? Not a fun time to be a central banker, but hey, that’s why they pay them the big money, right? 🙂

    Speculation Gone Awry, Models Gone Awry

    We can start with a related topic: money market funds. Some hold paper backed by subprime mortgages.? With asset backed commercial paper, some conduits are extending the dates that they will repay their obligations.? Not good, though ABCP is only a small part of the money markets.? Ordinary CP should be okay, even with the current market upset, though I wonder about the hedge funds that were doing leveraged non-prime CP.

    In an environment like this, there will be rumors.? And more rumors.? But many admit to losing a lot of money.? Tykhe. Renaissance Technologies. The DWS ABS fund.? There are some common threads here.? I believe that most hedged strategies (market-neutral) embed both a short volatility bet, and a short liquidity bet, which? add up to a short credit spreads bet.? In a situation like this, deal arbitrage underperforms.? The Merger Fund has lost most of its gains for the year.? Part of the reason for losses is deals blowing up, and the rest is a loss of confidence.? Could other deals blow up, like ABN Amro?? If you want to step up now, spreads are wider than at any point in the last four years, and you can put money to work in size.

    More notable, perhaps, are the extreme swings in stock prices. Many market-neutral strategies are underperforming here.? (Stock market-neutral does not mean credit market-neutral.)? Statistical arbitrage strategies were crowded trades.? Truth is, to a first approximation, even though almost all of the quant models were proprietary, they were all pretty similar.? Academic research on anomalies is almost freely available to all.? Two good quants can bioth start fresh, but they will end up in about the same place.

    Last week, I commented how my own stocks were bouncing all over the place.? Some up a lot, and some down a lot on no news.? Many blame an unwind in statistical arbitrage.? Was this a once in every 10,000 years event?? I think not.? The tails in investing are fat, and when a trade gets crowded, weird things happen.? It is possible to over-arbitrage, even as it is possible to overpay for risky debt.? As the trade depopulates, prices tend to over-adjust.? Are we near the end of the adjustment?? I don’t think so, but I can’t prove it.? There is too much implicit leverage, and it can’t be unwound in two weeks.

    Odds and Ends

    Two banking notes: S&P has some concerns about risk in the banking sector, despite risk transfer methods.? A problem yes, but limited in size.? Second, ARM resets are going to peak over the next year.? The pain will get worse in the real estate markets, regardless of what the Fed does.

    Insider buying is growing in financial stocks, after the market declines.? I like it.? My next major investment direction is likely overweighting high quality financials, but the timing and direction are uncertain.

    Finally, from the Epicurean Dealmaker (neat blog. cool name too.), how do catastrophic changes occur?? I love nonlinear dynamics, i.e., “chaos theory.”? I predicted much of what has been happening two years ago at RealMoney, but I stated the the timing was uncertain.? It could be next month, it could be a decade at most.? The thing is, you can’t tell which straw will break the camel’s back.? I like being sharp rather than fuzzy, but I hate making sharp predictions if I know that the probability of my being wrong is high.? In those cases, I would rather give a weak signal, than one that could likely be wrong.

    Limits to the Power of Monetary Policy

    Limits to the Power of Monetary Policy

    I posted this on RealMoney on 5/6/2005, when everyone was screaming for the FOMC to stop raising rates because the “auto companies were?dying.”

    /*-/*-/*-/*-/*-/*-/*-/*-/*-/*-/*-/*-

    On Oct. 2, 2002, one week before the market was going to turn, the gloom was so thick you could cut it with a knife. What would blow up next?

    A lot of heavily indebted companies are feeling weak, and the prices for their debt reflected it. I thought we were getting near a turning point; at least, I hoped so. But I knew what I was doing for lunch; I was going to the Baltimore Security Analysts’ Society meeting to listen to the head of the Richmond Fed, Al Broaddus, speak.

    It was a very optimistic presentation, one that gave the picture that the Fed was in control, and don’t worry, we’ll pull the economy out of the ditch. When the Q&A time came up, I got to ask the second-to-last question. (For those with a Bloomberg terminal, you can hear Broaddus’s full response, but not my question, because I was in the back of the room.) My question (going from memory) went something like this:

    I recognize that current Fed policy is stimulating the economy, but it seems to have impact in only the healthy areas of the economy, where credit spreads are tight, and stimulus really isn’t needed. It seems the Fed policy has almost no impact in areas where credit spreads are wide, and these are the places that need the stimulus. Is it possible for the Fed to provide stimulus to the areas of the economy that need it, and not to those that don’t?

    It was a dumb question, one that I knew the answer to, but I was trying to make a point. All the liquidity in the world doesn’t matter if the areas that you want to stimulate have impaired balance sheets. He gave a good response, the only surviving portion of it I pulled off of Bloomberg: “There are very definite limits to what the Federal Reserve can do to affect the detailed spectrum of interest rates,” Broaddus said. People shouldn’t “expect too much from monetary policy” to steer the economy, he said.

    When I got back to the office, I had a surprise. Treasury bonds had rallied fairly strongly, though corporates were weak as ever and stocks had fallen further. Then I checked the bond news to see what was up. Bloomberg had flashed a one-line alert that read something like, “Broaddus says don’t expect too much from monetary policy.” Taken out of context, Broaddus’s answer to my question had led to a small flight-to-safety move. Wonderful, not. Around the office, the team joked, “Next time you talk to a Fed Governor, let us know, so we can make some money off it?”

    PS — ?Before Broaddus answered, he said something to the effect of: “I’m glad the media is not here, because they always misunderstand the ability of the Fed to change things.” ?A surprise to the Bloomberg, Baltimore Sun, and at least one other journalist who were there.
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    And now to the present application:

    My main point in posting this story is to point out the impotence of Fed policy in helping areas of the economy with compromised balance sheets. ?When credit spreads are wide, cuts in the fed funds rate do not appreciably affect the funding costs of firms deep in junk grade.

    Beyond that, temporary injections of liquidity are meaningless, and that is all the major central banks of the world have done, together with words saying they will support the markets. ?Well, what happens after the market digests that, and the temporary injections of liquidity are gone. ?They will expect the Fed to stand and deliver something more permanent. ?Much as I have resisted this thought, and hate it in terms of public policy, the FOMC will cut rates at that point in time, and begin a loosening cycle. ?It’s the wrong thing to do, and won’t achieve the goals intended, but my view of Fed policy is that I must focus on will they will do, not what they should do.

    So you have my change of view here and now. ?The central banks of our world have caved in to an unrealistic fear of what is going on in the fixed income markets. ?The next move of the Fed is to loosen. ?It will happen in 2007. ?Look for the areas of the economy that are healthy, and will benefit from cheap financing, because they will get it. ?The trade: buy high quality financial stocks. ?Time to overweight.

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