Month: December 2007

FOMC, Choose Your Poison

FOMC, Choose Your Poison

We’re not there yet, but we are close.? The FOMC is likely facing inflation problems at the same time that it faces problems in the financial system.? Goods price inflation versus Asset price deflation.? There is a term for this, but it is easy to be marginalized if one uses the S-word too readily.? So I won’t.

On the other hand, I am almost done with James Grant’s Money of the Mind.? Several themes come to mind here regarding government policy in the late 20s and early 30s, most notable that the government tried to force credit onto an economy that had too much credit already.? First they tried to get the private sector to do their bidding.? When the private sector would not cooperate to the desired degree, the government entered the lending business itself.? This probably prolonged the Depression by not allowing bad debts to get liquidated on a timely basis.

But, if I use the D-word with respect to today, it is even worse than using the S-word as far as credibility goes.? So I won’t, except for historical reference purposes.

The thing is, though, the FOMC is running out of options.? Pretty soon, it will have to decide which pain is greater: goods price inflation, or asset deflation.? Given the current political demographics, I believe they will choose goods price inflation, while saying the exact opposite, or doing the intelligent equivalent of a mumble.

Final note: current FOMC policies are a bit of a joke.? The temporary nature of them (TAF), plus the reduction in T-bill holdings, particularly during year-end, when liquidity is needed for the “holidays” of some, is unusual to say the least.? If the Fed is serious about reflation of assets, they need to do a permanent injection of liquidity, and stop messing around with these temporary half-measures.

PS — All that said, if I were Fed Chairman, I would presently aim monetary policy to a yield curve that had a 1% spread between 2-years and 10-years, and then I would leave it there.? There would be screaming for a year, but the excesses would get bled out of the system.? After that succeeded, I would narrow the spread to 0.5%.? The economy would remain stable for a long time.

Reinsurance: The Ultimate Derivative

Reinsurance: The Ultimate Derivative

Some housekeeping before I begin this evening. Here’s my progress on the blog:

  • RSS as far as I can test has no problems.? If you have problems with my feed, please e-mail me any details.? Before you do, try dropping my feed, and re-adding it through Feedburner.
  • My logo was anti-aliased for me by BriG.? Looks a lot cleaner.? Thanks ever so much, BriG!
  • The comment error problem is gone, and I suspect also the same one that I have when I post.? It was a bug in one of my WP plugins that was not 2.3.1 compliant.
  • My descriptive permalinks are still lost, though.

I still need to fix my left margins as well, and make my top banner clickable.? Still, that’s progress.

On to tonight’s first topic: my view on derivatives differs from that of other commentators because I am an actuary (as well as an economist and financial analyst).? In the late 1980s, the life insurance industry went through a problem called mirror reserving.? Mirror reserving said that the company reducing risk through reinsurance could not take a greater reserve credit than the reinsurer posted.

That’s not true with derivatives today.? There is no requirement that both parties on the opposite sides of an agreement hold the same value on the contract.? From my own financial reporting experience (15 years worth), I have seen that managements tend to take favorable views of squishy accounting figures.? The one that is short is very likely to have a lower value for the price of the derivative than the one who is long.

But can you dig this?? The life insurance industry is in this area more advanced than Wall Street, and we beat them there by 20 years minimum.? :D? Given the way that life insurers are viewed as rubes, as compared to the investment banks, this is rich indeed.

Now, as for one comment submitted yesterday: yes, counterparty risk is big, and I have written about it before, I just can’t remember where.? I would argue that the investment banks? have sold default on the counterparties with which they can do so.? That said, it is difficult to monitor true exposures with counterparties; one investment bank may not have the whole relationship.

Also, many exposures are hard to hedge because there are no natural counterparties that want the exposure.? When no party naturally wants? an exposure, either a speculator must be paid to bear the risk, or the investment bank bears it internally.

The speculators are rarely well-capitalized, and the risks that the investment banks retain are in my estimation correlated to confidence.? When there is panic, those risks will suffer.? Were that not so, there would be counterparties willing to take those risks on today to hedge their own exposures.

So, is counterparty risk a problem?? Yes, but so is deadweight loss from differential pricing.

If Hedge Funds, Then Investment Banks, Redux

If Hedge Funds, Then Investment Banks, Redux

Every now and then, you get a reader response that deserves to be published.? Such was this response to my piece, “If Hedge Funds, Then Investment Banks.”? I have redacted it to hide his identity.

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I read your latest blog entry with interest because I have worked in the derivatives business and as a part of that helped to set up General Re’s financial subsidiary in 19XX – General Re Financial Products (GRFP). I was one of XX people that started that business from the ground up. I left shortly XXX Buffett arrived on the scene but I still knew a large number of people that remained and I have very good information about what happened there. I may be a bit biased so you should consider where I am coming from as you continue to read.

To be short about it, what happened at GRFP after Buffett took over was a complete mess. I can give you more information on that if you like but I will simply say that what Buffett writes about GRFP, has spin on it. Let me give you a somewhat quick example. Of that $104 million loss he refers to, how much of that could be attributed to salaries and operating expenses? How much of it was due to the forced unwinding of trades on the wrong side of the market? We know that there are high operational costs (these people are paid very well with nice offices, technology, etc.) and that one would expect to pay to get out of these transactions even if they are being marked perfectly correctly. It SHOULD cost money to unwind these trades. So why doesn’t Buffett, who normally gives us so much information, tell us how much of the loss was due to mismarking and how much was due to expected costs? I’ll let you guess at that answer. There’s a lot more to this story but let’s move on…

I am sure you felt safe quoting someone like Buffett – meaning he is likely to get things right almost every time, but even Buffett is not perfect and he has his blind spots. I believe that derivatives may be such a blind spot. I could go into detail about where I see holes in Buffett’s arguments however the bottom line is that I believe the vast majority of transactions done in the derivatives market are plain vanilla transactions that are extremely easy to mark. Did you know that the US Treasury market is now quoted as a spread off of swaps? That is how liquid the plain vanilla instrument is these days. These transactions will certainly not have two traders both booking a profit even though they are on opposite sides of a transaction. Bid/ask spreads in the plain vanilla market are less than 1 basis point per year in yield. I am certain there are exotic transactions that are mismarked for all the reasons that Buffett mentions but how many of these are really out there? My suspicion is that the total number is small enough to not be of any huge concern from a systematic standpoint.

Here is something interesting to consider. Why would the leader of a AAA-rated institution (a financial Fort Knox) that competes in many ways with other large financial institutions wish to lead people to believe that those other institutions may be engaged in a business that is particularly risky?

Just thought I would add my two cents (looks more like 25 cents now).
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For the record, both he and I are admirers of Buffett, but not uncritical admirers.? The initiator of a trade usually has to offer a concession to the party facilitating the trade.? Forced sellers or impatient buyers typically don’t get the best execution.? What my correspondent suggests here is at least part of the total picture in the liquidation of GRFP.? All that said, I still think there are deadweight losses hiding inside that swap books of the major investment banks.

Post 400

Post 400

Time to take a moment to reflect on what?s happened over the last hundred posts (as WordPress counts them), together with what has been going on in my life, and what is in store for the future on my blog.? Ten months is a long time in blog terms.? Let’s start with what I have gotten right and wrong.

Right:

Wrong:

  • National Atlantic
  • Stock-picking generally
  • Blog programming

In general, my macro commentary has been pretty accurate.? At this juncture, being bearish on the dollar and credit have been winners.? No telling when that will change.? That said, my hand has gone cold in the market since value stocks went cold.? Beating the value index is not enough for me, thank you.? National Atlantic is a continuing problem, though it seems to have found buyers around $4.

Now, if someone had told me when I started this blog that more than one-third of my readers would be outside the US, I would not have believed it.? 19% of my readers are from Canada, 7% from the UK and 4% each from Uruguay and the Netherlands.? Hey, thanks for reading me; I hope what I write is relevant to you.? And thanks to the readers from China, Germany, France, Brazil, Singapore, Hong Kong, Australia, Japan, Spain, Italy, India, South Korea, Taiwan, and Bermuda.? I may not be a global traveler, but my blog gets around.

Where? do my readers come from?? In order, Abnormal Returns, The Kirk Report, The Big Picture, Stumble Upon, The Street.com, FT Alphaville, Random Roger, and VIX and More.? Most of the rest find me through search engines (Google) or RSS.? Seeking Alpha (Aleph — Shalom) is another source, and really don’t know how big that is, as well as other syndicators.

For the last four months, I have been trying to obtain work or build an asset management business.? Though the latter has been cold, I have received several job prospects, and I should have an announcement soon on what I will be doing.? I have sometimes said that this blog is an option on a business.? That has proven true for me.

Other improvements have been the continuing series on personal finance and book reviews.? Both of those came as a result of reader feedback.

On the negative side, the job hunt has left me little time to contribute to RealMoney.? Most of my blogging is at night, and RM is during the day, when I am trying to work.? I’ll see how much I can contribute to RM in the future.? I owe them a debt of gratitude for inviting me to write for them.? It sharpened my investment writing skills more than I would have expected.

Also on the negative side, I know that I have to do blog repairs.

  • My left margins aren’t quite right.
  • My top banner should lead back to the home page.
  • I need to anti-alias my banner.
  • An error message comes up when comments are posted (the comments do post, though).
  • The same is true when I post articles.
  • My descriptive permalinks are gone.
  • And more…

Anyone with a good lead on PHP programming should e-mail me.? I suspect the changes should not be too great.? Otherwise, I will? slog on, and do it myself.

In closing I want to thank referrers, syndicators, readers, blogs who link here, and especially commenters (even if you don?t agree, but keep it civil.? I end with a question for my readers.? What do you all want from my blog?

  • More on equities
  • More book reviews
  • More macro commentary
  • More personal finance
  • Something else
  • Or, the same mix that you are currently getting

Let me know.? It is a pleasure to write for all of you.

Full Disclosure: Long NAHC

The Nature of a Nervous Bull

The Nature of a Nervous Bull

Cast your bread upon the waters,
For you will find it after many days.
2 Give a serving to seven, and also to eight,
For you do not know what evil will be on the earth.
3 If the clouds are full of rain,
They empty themselves upon the earth;
And if a tree falls to the south or the north,
In the place where the tree falls, there it shall lie.
4 He who observes the wind will not sow,
And he who regards the clouds will not reap.
5 As you do not know what is the way of the wind,[a]
Or how the bones grow in the womb of her who is with child,
So you do not know the works of God who makes everything.
6 In the morning sow your seed,
And in the evening do not withhold your hand;
For you do not know which will prosper,
Either this or that,
Or whether both alike will be good. [Eccelesiates 11:1-6, NKJV, copyright Thomas Nelson]

The point of Ecclesiastes 11:1-6 is that the farmer in Spring, much as he might be hungry, and want to eat his seed corn, instead has to cast his seed into the muddy soil, perhaps planting 7 or 8 crops, because he doesn?t know what the future may bring. If he looks at the sky, wondering if it will rain enough, or whether the winds might ruin the crops, he will never get a crop in Summer or Fall.

That?s the way that I view investing. You always have to have something going on. You can?t leave the market entirely, because it?s really tough to tell what the market might give you. Typically, across my entire set of investments I run with about 70% equity investments, and the rest cash, bonds, and the little hovel that I live in. Private equity is a modest chunk of my equity holdings, so public equities are about 60% of what I own. Domestic public equities are about 45%.

I don?t think of that as particularly bullish or bearish. Even with public equities trading at high price-to-sales ratios, my portfolio doesn?t trade at high ratios of sales, cash flow, earnings, or book value. Together with industry selection, modest valuations provide some support against bear markets.

My tendency will be if the market moves lower from here to layer in slowly using my rebalancing discipline. That?s what I did in my worst period 6/2002-9/2002, and the stocks that I held at the end were ideally positioned for the turn in the market.

So, I never get very bullish, or bearish. I see the troubles in the markets, and I avoid most problem areas, such as in housing-related areas, but I continue to plug along, doing what I do best — trying to pick good stocks and industries (and occasionally, countries.)

Should the FOMC Statement have been a Surprise?

Should the FOMC Statement have been a Surprise?

Here?s the quick answer: no.? The Fed Statement was what I expected.? Read Dr. Jeff?s pieces on the reaction to the Statement; he hits the nail on the head.? No one should have been surprised at 25 bps, no differential change in the discount rate, and an evenhanded statement.? Real GDP is still growing, unemployment is low, and inflation is low also (pardon any differences on measurement issues).

There are too many people who are little better than cheerleaders for the equity markets, and think that the Fed should cater its policy for the good of public equity shareholders.? Forget what you think the FOMC should do.? I gave that up seven years ago, and it was amazing how much better my FOMC forecasting became.

The Fed only has three functions:

  • Keep inflation low (as they measure it)
  • Keep labor unemployment low (as they measure it)
  • Protect the security of the depositary financial system, particularly that which is affiliated with the Federal Reserve.

Three functions the Fed does not have:

  • The exchange value of the dollar, except as it affects inflation
  • Affecting the value of the bond market (though they occasionally mess around there trying to affect the shape of the yield curve)
  • Preserving the value of the stock market.

At some level of fall in the stock market, the Fed does care, but only because it affects soundness of the banking system and labor unemployment.? While the stock market is within 10% of record highs, it does not figure into the calculations of the FOMC.? Maybe at a decline of 30% it does matter to them.

Now, this doesn?t mean that the FOMC isn?t going to eventually lower the Fed funds rate to 3% at some point in 2008.? I believe they will still do that, largely because of the effect that falling housing prices will have on the credit of the residential mortgage market, and not just Subprime, but Alt-A, and Prime loans as well.

The thing is, the FOMC is off on a fool?s errand.? The cheap credit that they inject will overstimulate healthy assets, perhaps encouraging healthy US firms to level up using short-term finance, and buy back stock.? It?s one of the few areas of strength left.? What else could absorb the incremental credit?? The US government?? Maybe.

Cheap credit can?t reflate a sector in fundamental oversupply, like residential housing, unless the FOMC were willing to let inflation rip, perhaps leading the value of residential housing to rise, as it did in the ?70s.? More likely though, is that commodities that are in short supply globally would rise, like coal, steel, oil, gold, rare minerals, etc., and only after a while, would housing prices rise, as nominal incomes become large enough, and household formation great enough for the excess supply to disappear.

But inflation would lead mortgage rates to rise, which would cut against the ability to afford housing.? So, let this be a takeaway.? The FOMC is using their powers for other than there stated purposes, but grudgingly.? Their actions may preserve some marginal lenders, but will be inadequate to reflate housing, particularly in the short run.

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Now, I wrote the above while on a plane heading from LA to Baltimore, so I only found out about the Fed’s announcement about their term loan facility when I got home this evening.? Not to be a perpetual pessimist, but I think this idea is more show than substance.? The Fed can discontinue this program after two months.? The Fed has not done a permanent injection of liquidity since May 3rd, and growth in the monetary base is anemic.? All of the growth in broader monetary aggregates is coming from the banks stretching their balance sheets.

This may work in the short run to lower the TED spread, but unless the Fed makes a commitment that they will keep doing this until the market sees things their way, it will not have a major effect on the markets.? I don’t care how many different types of collateral they might take; if they won’t guarantee to take that collateral on favorable terms for a long time, it will amount to nothing by mid-2008.? For a clue to the market’s view, watch the change in 1-month LIBOR versus 12-month LIBOR.? True credibility will be measured by the change in the yield on 12-month LIBOR.

Book Review: The Dick Davis Dividend

Book Review: The Dick Davis Dividend

I must confess that I had merely heard of Dick Davis, but did not know much about him until reading his book. I enjoyed his book, and think it is useful to new investors, and investors that have been unsuccessful in actively managing their own portfolios. I have read the whole book; this is not a review that comes from bullet points suggested by the publisher or author (sent to me and others, I have ignored them). I do have a minor criticism of the book; more on that later.

The Book

The first thing to appreciate about the book is its structure. After learning about the long career of the author, the book begins with a small amount of basic ideas per chapter, moves to progressively larger numbers of ideas per chapter that are less basic, and then returns the way it came, ending with progressively fewer ideas per chapter, but more basic ones.

The second thing to appreciate is the humility of Mr. Davis. His first answer to most investment questions is ?I don?t know,? followed by reasons for and against the proposed course of action, after which he would indicate an opinion if he has one, and then say that he could be wrong, and that it would be good to do further study.

What does the book emphasize?

  • Passive investing (ETFs and index funds)
  • Careful selection of active managers.
  • Imitating those carefully selected active managers if one decides to invest in common stocks directly.
  • Avoiding too much trading, because the average investor tends to panic at bottoms, and get greedy at tops. Buying and selling have to be properly timed, because the average investor tends to do worse than the buy-and-hold investor.
  • Be careful with costs on mutual funds. Most aren?t worthy of the fees, and with bond funds, cost advantages are the most durable.
  • Invest for the long haul, realizing there will be bumps along the way, and keep enough excess liquidity on hand.
  • There is no one right person or opinion. Things shift in the market, and trends often last longer than expected.
  • Be wary of news flow; get a thick skin toward the multitude of opinions presented.
  • Asset allocation is the key discipline to risk control; diversify broadly by asset class, country, style, etc.
  • You can?t win every time, but you can tilt the odds in your favor.
  • Use stop losses to limit losses. (I disagree. Use loss points to review your thesis, and if it is wrong, sell. Get a second opinion also. Otherwise, buy more.)
  • Rising dividends beat high dividends
  • Many strategies can work in the market; it?s more a question of when and how you apply them.
  • Macro forecasting rarely works.
  • Buying and holding the equity market tends to work over the long run, so have a core investment in the equity markets.
  • Humility is a core character attribute of good investors. (Be more like Charles Kirk, and less like Jim Cramer… he spends several pages on this.)

Beyond that, Mr. Davis gives lists of good investment books, good investment blogs (I?m not on his list, so it goes), quotations, and active managers. I thought his favorite active managers to be a very good list for those looking for active mutual funds. The investment books were generally classics, though some are too new to tell. As for the blogs, well, we are here today and gone tomorrow. We are only as good as the last few things we publish, so good financial blogging is not something that a book can capture. We vary too much.

Now for my one criticism. The book has one long chapter on index fund portfolios that takes up 20% of the book, and gives 28 models (with sub-models) for ?set it and forget it portfolios.? There are a couple of problems here: first, there are too many strategies here, and many don?t differ enough to deserve separate inclusion. Second, it would be better to spend more time on the factors behind why someone might choose one approach rather then another. What goes into creating a good asset allocation? How much should I have in bonds? Foreign bonds? Foreign equities? Cash? Obscure asset classes? I?m not asking for detailed math, but rules of thumb for average investors to follow, so that they could find a passive strategy that is among those strategies that would be more likely to meet their needs.

But with that one cavil, I can recommend this book to investors, particularly those that have not done well with active management. This book won?t teach you what to do, as much as how to think and discipline yourself. Most investors should limit their options in investing because their emotions and abilities aren?t suited to the violence of the markets.

For investors that do well with active management, you don?t need this book, but you might like it for the stories that he tells, or as a gift for relatives who need to follow a more passive style of investment management.

Full disclosure: I get a modest amount of money if you buy the book through the link above.

Ave Atque Vale et Mea Culpa

Ave Atque Vale et Mea Culpa

I’m going to be gone Monday through Wednesday of next week on business, and my ability to blog will likely be curtailed.? I would simply like to offer two observations.? The first is on the FOMC.? Given the balance of all of the data, I believe that the FOMC will loosen by 25 basis points on Tuesday.? They will issue the standard “two-handed economist” language about troubles from inflation and financial/economic weakness, indicating that the FOMC is vigilant, and that nothing more is coming given present data, because the FOMC is in control.

The markets will be disappointed by 25 basis points, and will get excited by 50.? Language of the statement will matter some, but I can’t imagine that it will be that amazingly different from before.

One other note: I will write more about National Atlantic at a later date, but for now I am just holding my head in my hands and moaning.? I know there are forced sellers in the name, but to be at 40% of tangible book on a short-tailed name is notable.? It indicates that claim reserves at the end of the second quarter would be 50% light, to justify current valuations.

I’m not suggesting that anyone buy the name; for me, if it stays at these levels, it will be my largest personal loss.? I teach my children about investing through my losses.? If things don’t change, this will be lesson one.

Full disclosure: long NAHC

Book Review: The Aggressive Conservative Investor

Book Review: The Aggressive Conservative Investor

I am a fan of value investing in all of its different variations, and so when I run across a book on the topic, particularly from a skilled practitioner, I buy it. I’ll do more book reviews on value investing, but one of the first that I wanted to do was Value Investing, by Marty Whitman.

So, I start looking around for my copy, and I can’t find it. Arrrgh, I can guess what happened. I lent it out, I can’t remember who I lent it to, but the borrower never gave it back to me. Annoyed at myself, I do notice a book that was just as good, The Aggressive Conservative Investor, by Marty Whitman and Martin Shubik. Even better, it is back in print, after being out of print for 20+ years.

So, what’s so great about the book? (Most of this applies to both books.) Marty Whitman has a strong “What can go wrong” approach. He realizes that he, and most other investors, will be outside passive minority investors. We only ride on the bus. The inside active control investors drive the bus, and if we are going to make money with reasonable safety, we have to understand the motives of those that control the companies. They benefit somewhat disproportionately from control. They receive wages and benefits that other shareholders do not receive, can gain cheap outside financing, and limit tax exposures, in addition to other benefits.

Like me, Whitman doesn’t care much for modern portfolio theory. More notable for a value investor, he has a few criticisms for the traditional “Graham-and-Dodd” type of value investing.

  • Typically, it works best for “going concern” situations, and not situations where activism could be necessary to unlock value. (Though, Graham did do things like that in his career; he just didn’t try to teach amateurs about it.)
  • He doesn’t always stick to high quality companies, if enough information can be obtained about the target. Information allows for more risk to be taken.

There are four things that he insists on in equity investments:

  1. Strong financial position
  2. Honest management that is creditor-aware and shareholder-oriented
  3. Adequate disclosure of information relevant to the success of the company
  4. The stock can be bought for less than the net asset value (adjusted book value) of the firm.

If you have these items in place, you won’t lose much, and if the management team makes value enhancing decisions, one can make a lot of money on the stock.

Whitman places a lot of stress on reading through the documents filed with the SEC. They may not be perfect, but managements know that they need to provide adequate disclosure of material information, or they could be sued. A lot gets revealed in SEC filings, and not every investor sees that.

He also places great stress on understanding the limitations of the accounting, whether under GAAP, Tax, or any other basis. Comparing the various accounting bases can sometimes illuminate the true financial well-being of a company. (Note: this is what killed me on Scottish Re. I should have questioned the GAAP profitability, when they never paid taxes.) He lists the underlying assumptions behind GAAP accounting, and explains how they can distort the estimation of economic value. Honestly, it is worse today in some ways than when he wrote the First Edition in 1979. GAAP accounting is more flexible, and less comparable across companies today.

Marty Whitman looks for situations where resources in a company can be used in a better manner, creating value in the process.

  • Is the company too conservatively financed? Perhaps borrowing money to buy back stock, or issuing a special dividend could unlock value.
  • Are there divisions that are undermanaged, or would fit better in another company?
  • Are management incentives properly aligned with shareholders?
  • Would the company be better off going private?
  • Is government regulation a help or a hindrance? (Barriers to entry)
  • Analyzing corporate structures for where the value is.

Beyond that, he explains how to calculate net asset values, as distinct from book values. He describes the problems with earnings as a value metric. He explains the value of dividends and other distributions. He also explains when it can make sense to own companies that are losing money. (Underlying values are growing in a way that the tax accounting basis does not catch.)

It’s a good book. Together with Value Investing, it gives you a full picture of how Marty Whitman thinks about value investing. He is one of the leading value investors of our time, but he has spent more time than most on the underlying theory. For those who want to think more deeply about value investing, Marty Whitman is a highly recommended read. For those wanting still more, read his shareholder letters here.

Full disclosure: if you use the links on this page to buyread books, I receive a small amount of money.

PS — Twelve years ago, I wrote Marty Whitman, begging to be one of his analysts. Though I didn’t get a response, I still admire him and his staff greatly.

Personal Finance, Part 6 ? The First Question

Personal Finance, Part 6 ? The First Question

I should have started out with this question when I began this irregular series, but somehow it slipped my mind. When I talked with my Mom this evening, it came back to me. People come and ask me for investment/financial advice. My first question is:

How much are you willing to learn, and how much work do you want to do?

Depending on the answer, I have several different solutions that I offer my friends. For those that want to do nothing, I tell them to hire a financial planner, and give them a few bits of advice on how to evaluate the planner. For those that want to do a little, I give them a list of things to consider, how to pursue those, and what a reasonable asset allocation would be at Vanguard. For those that want to make it a hobby, I tell them what they need to read and learn in order to choose their own investments, and plan their own financial future.

My advice varies. Most don’t want to do much, and really, they don’t have the temperament for it. For them, finding good advisors and good mutual funds is a must. For the minority, education is where it is at. That is a big part of what my blog is about: learning about the markets. Those who read me know that I have a wide set of interests in investing and related topics. You won’t get personal tailored advice from me, but you will learn a lot about how the markets work.

Once I learned the “first question” my life got easier advising my friends.

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