Month: June 2008

The rating agencies have been dragged.  When will the kicking and screaming stop?

The rating agencies have been dragged. When will the kicking and screaming stop?

First, an old RealMoney Columnist Conversation post:


David Merkel
Moody’s Downgrades XL Capital Assurance
2/7/2008 3:34 PM EST

When the main rating agencies begin downgrading the lesser guarantors, the big guarantors are likely not far behind. Moody’s just downgraded XL Capital Assurance from Aaa to A3, and Security Capital Assurance From Aa3 to Baa3 (barely investment grade).

Psychologically, the major rating agencies, Moody’s and S&P, have been taking baby steps toward downgrading Ambac, MBIA and FGIC. But first they have to do the lesser guarantors that are in trouble. As I have pointed out before, the major rating agencies are co-dependent with the major guarantors, and that will only throw the guarantors over the edge if hurts them more to leave the guarantors at AAA. That will cost them future revenues to cut the ratings of the major guarantors, but it might save their larger franchises. (Fitch, on the other hand, has less to lose and can downgrade with impunity.)

Now, the effects on the broader insured bond market are probably overestimated. There will be new entrants to take the place of the legacy companies that may have to go into runoff. The holding companies for the major guarantors could die, but a rescue of the operating insurance companies in runoff mode is more likely. Those who own equity in the holding companies or debt claims to the holding companies will not be happy with the results, though.

Watch for downgrades of the major guarantors. Unless a lot of new capital gets pumped into their operating insurance companies, the downgrades are coming, maybe within a month.

Please note that due to factors including low market capitalization and/or insufficient public float, we consider Security Capital Assurance to be a small-cap stock. You should be aware that such stocks are subject to more risk than stocks of larger companies, including greater volatility, lower liquidity and less publicly available information, and that postings such as this one can have an effect on their stock prices.

Position: none

And this comment that I left at WSJ MarketBeat on their article Ambac Falls on S&P 500 Deletion.

Can we get the equity side of S&P to chat with the debt ratings side? Debt ratings always have a bias toward bigger firms, and Ambac is no longer big enough to rate being in the S&P 500.

Quick, name another corporation that is AAA that is not in the S&P 500. Berkshire Hathaway, but that is because the float is small? but wait, Ambac the holding company is only AA, their regulated subsidiaries are AAA.

Are there any AA- or better US publicly traded corporations not in the S&P 500? One AA ? Genentech. Three AA-: MGE Energy, WGL Holdings, and Northwestern Natural Gas? two utilities and a gas pipeline. Decidedly more stable businesses than Ambac.

So, S&P debt ratings, take the hint from your corporate brother, and downgrade Ambac.

Comment by David Merkel June 4, 2008 at 11:07 am

Now, consider this article from the AP, where they say: “Despite raising $1.5 billion in new capital in March, Ambac’s financial flexibility has deteriorated, Moody’s said. A decline in the firm’s market capitalization and high spreads on its debt securities makes it difficult for the company to address potential capital shortfalls.

Also quoting from the post at Accrued Interest, quoting from the Moody’s report, “Moody’s stated that the ratings review was prompted, in part, by concerns about the deterioration in ABK’s financial flexibility since the company’s $1.5 billion capital raise in March 2008, as evidenced by the substantial decline in the firm’s market capitalization and high current spreads on its debt securities, making it increasingly difficult to economically address potential shortfalls in the company’s capital position should markets continue to worsen. Additionally, there is meaningful uncertainty surrounding Ambac’s ability to regain market acceptance and underwriting traction within its target markets.

Now, maybe I’m nuts, but when I think of debt ratings, I don’t want to directly consider the ability to raise new equity capital as a significant factor in my rating decisions.? Why?? Because deterioration can happen slowly, but it doesn’t have to.? Companies the are AAA or AA should be beyond the possibility of having to do a forced equity raise in anything short of a depression.? Aside from that, the decision to raise equity capital is discretionary, and managements rarely do it at the right time — when things are going well.

Naked Capitalism calls it the Monoline Death Watch, and Yves is spot-on.? For financial guarantors, ratings are a slippery slope.? You can go down, but you can’t easily go up.? MBIA and Ambac are close to being in runoff now.? Losing the AAA from either agency will seal that.? Also, once one agency downgrades, the other will quickly follow.? There will be new start-ups, but for now Berky, Dexia, and Assured Guaranty will make hay while the sun shines — they are the new oligopoly, and won’t do structured finance, for now.

PS — If indeed FASB eliminates QSPEs by modifying SFAS 140, and if there are no financial guarantors willing to do structured finance, then what happens to securitization?? It is too useful of an idea to disappear.? I don’t think it will disappear; I just don’t know the form in which it will reappear.? I’ll toss out this idea: Wall Street creates a bunch of small cap companies to own the assets, and the tranches, are simply different levels of subordinated debt.

The Odd Man Out

The Odd Man Out

At present I own a position in the Japan Smaller Capitalization Fund.? One of the things that I talk less about in my investing, is my willingness to allow some professionals closer to the situation manage a small amount of the assets, if they have a good track record, and the area of the global markets is deeply out of favor.? When I do this, it is typically for just one investment, and not more than 5% of the total portfolio.

Japanese small caps?? Definitely out of favor.? When I look at the top ten holdings of the Japan Smaller Capitalization Fund, I can justify holding them on a book value basis, and on an earnings basis, relative to the low interest rates in Japan, they make sense as well.

Now, the fund is trading at a premium to its NAV, so I don’t recommend purchases, at present.? perhaps the ETF SPDR Russell/Nomura Small Cap Japan would be better [JSC].? At a premium of 8% on JOF, I would swap for JSC.? That level would discount the good investing of JOF versus the index of JSC.? Either way, I like Japanese small caps, and I am happy to hold them for a while.

Full disclosure: long JOF

Book Review: When Genius Failed

Book Review: When Genius Failed

One review of a good Roger Lowenstein book deserves another? Perhaps good things come in pairs. 😉

I decided to review “When Genius Failed,” because reading “While America Aged” reminded me of how much I liked Lowenstein’s writing style, simplifying matters for the average reader.

I was an investment actuary when LTCM was founded, and watched out of the corner of my eye, as I saw articles about their success. Being a risk manager, I was a little skeptical over the leverage employed, but I knew of other firms that had records almost as good, employing esoteric strategies of Residential MBS. That was the era of build a better prepayment model, and the returns will flow. (Perhaps today that would apply to default models…)

When LTCM imploded, I had just joined my first investment department. In the panic that ensued, Treasury yields fell, and my boss asked his new mortgage bond manager, me, why prepayments weren’t accelerating. I suggested that the banks could not borrow at Treasury rates, better to look at single-A bank and financial yields, which were considerably higher. (Surprisingly, I got that one right.) A number of the clever prepayment modelers got their heads handed to them during this era.

The implosion affected all fixed income markets, and it was a lesson to me that markets ordinarily recover from crises starting with short maturities, and moving to longer maturities, and with high quality, and moving to lower quality. We had cash flow, and and provided liquidity at a price.

Um, oh yeah, book review.? LTCM suffered from a number of troubles:

  • They were systemically short liquidity.
  • They did not consider the effect of others mimicking their trades.
  • They were internally disorganized; leadership was weak.
  • They intensified their leverage at the wrong time.

The liquidity aspect is significant.? Illiquid assets that are similar to a liquid asset usually yield more, because the cost of trading is much higher, and the possibility of being trapped is higher also.? LTCM bought the higher-yielding illiquid assets, and hedged them with more-liquid liabilities.? This set the stage for the run-on-the-fund.? Almost all run-on-the-bank scenarios occur from institutions where the ability of depositors to demand cash is greater than the ability to raise cash in the short run.

In the same way, many on Wall Street mimicked the trades of LTCM, but they had risk control desks that forced them to kick out the trades when they went awry, which further intensified the pressure on LTCM, because it forced the asset prices of LTCM lower.

The lack of discipline inside LTCM, was a eye-opener for me, and I would not have appreciated it, were it not for Lowenstein’s book.? Financial businesses that last require tight controls on risk taking.

Another thing captured by Lowenstein was the hubris involved as they cashed out some investors in order to “favor” internal investors and close friends.? They levered up at the wrong time.? The cashed-out investors were offended, but they were the ones who did the best of any; they got the good years, and missed the bad year.

Now, beyond that, Lowenstein delivers the attitudes of LTCM and Wall Street, with all of the fear and greed.? It is entertaining reading, and the book is still timely. Even though there is no dominant investment firm that threatens the financial markets, we have the investment banks as a group taking a great deal of risk in their trading and investment banking.? The assets are illiquid, the liabilities are more liquid.? Their balance sheets are opaque.? Many of them are in the same risk posture.? Many of them are more leveraged than they would like to be.? Bear has already fallen, will Lehman fall next?

Just because investors are smart does not mean that they are infallible.? Any investor playing at a high enough level of leverage can be ruined.? This book inoculates investors against perverse risk-taking, and makes them more skeptical about the claims of hot investors.? Not losing money is a big help in making money, and skepticism in investing is usually a plus.

Full disclosure: If you enter Amazon through a link on my site and buy something, I get a small commission, and your costs don’t increase. This is my version of the ?tip jar.? Thanks to all who support me.

Abandon the Playbook; Adopt the Global Playbook; Adjust the Playbooks for Valuations

Abandon the Playbook; Adopt the Global Playbook; Adjust the Playbooks for Valuations

It was 7 3/4 years ago that I modified my value investing method to incorporate industry rotation.? That was probably the most significant change to my methods that I made in the last 16 years.? I did it reluctantly, after an analysis of where I had done best over the prior eight years.? I had many significant wins when I had gotten the industry cycle correct.

I commented recently on industry selection.? I want to make two additional points on that here.

1)? Analyze where an industry gets its demand.? Is it domestic or foreign?? If foreign, then use the global playbook.? Instead of looking at GDP growth, look at the growth from foreign demand.? Decouple your reasoning from the traditional view, because in a global economy, things get messy.

2) Even if an industry is driven primarily by domestic demand, often portfolio managers using the playbook may trash the valuation to levels that should be below trough valuations.? These are long-term opportunities, and should be bought.? VIce-versa for companies that have favorable future growth prospects, but the valuation discounts those prospects, and then some.? Those should be sold, even if they are in industries with good prospects.

That’s all for the evening.? I wrote this piece because active managers haven’t been doing well lately.? Uh, in order to do well, one must be willing to brave the possibility of failing (you can’t hug the benchmark), by taking opportunities that others find distasteful.? I benefit because I don’t care about tracking error; I just buy cheap stocks, in industries where the long run value is not appreciated by most investors.

A Comment on SFAS 159

A Comment on SFAS 159

I am ambivalent about fair value accounting standards because they ruin comparability of financial statements across companies.? Recently, SFAS 159 has come into the news because some securities firms used it to book gains because the market value of debt that they issued had fallen.? Four notes:

1) They had no choice, they had to do it.? Their debt has liquid markets — those are level 1 and at worst level 2? liabilities.

2) Many of the assets that they carry have credit risk also.? The pressures that are leading the prices of their debt to fall, are also causing the carrying value of some of their assets to fall as well.

3) If credit markets for their debt improve, they will have to write those liabilities up to higher values.? Even if creditworthiness stays the same, the passage of time will make the liabilities rises in value as they get closer to the ultimate payoff.

4) In bankruptcy, their obligation to pay par does not change.? It is not as if they can pay the reduced market? value to pay off their debt, except through a deal agreed to by the court and plaintiffs.

Look, I don’t like the confusion SFAS 159 creates at this point any more than the next guy, but the gains here will likely reverse over time, absent bankruptcy.? As an analyst, I strip those gains out of income, and I should strip out losses on the asset side that I think will reverse as well.

We can change the way that gains and losses are reported — book, market, model, hybrid… but we can’t change the ultimate cash flows from the business, which is what will ultimately drive the value of the firm.? Be careful and conservative here, as accrual entries get more subjective, they become less trustworthy, and managements on average release more into income from accrual entries than they ought to.

Again, Not Worried About Reinsurance Group of America

Again, Not Worried About Reinsurance Group of America

From the 6/2 RealMoney Columnist Conversation:


David Merkel
Rebalancing Sales, and a Buy
6/2/2008 4:08 PM EDT

Late last week, I had two rebalancing sells, Charlotte Russe and Smithfield. Today, two more, Honda Motor and Nam Tai Electronics. As the market has risen (or, some of my stocks at least), cash has been building up, and I have added some of my own free cash to the Broad Market portfolio. I’m at about 14% cash.

So, it’s time to buy something, though I am waiting on the market to show a little more weakness before I act. But, though dinner may wait, perhaps an appetizer is in order: today I added to my position in Reinsurance Group of America. MetLife finally decides to shed this noncore asset in a tax-free stock swap, allowing current MetLife shareholders to swap their MetLife shares for shares in RGA.

RGA should get a higher multiple as a “pure play” life reinsurer; that will come later. Today was the selling pressure in advance of the new supply. I like the management team at RGA, and think this will allow them the freedom to add value on their own. One other odd kicker… it might allow them to do more reinsurance business with MetLife, because they will be independent and thus truly be a third party.

Position: long CHIC SFD HMC NTE RGA

A few additional notes, for me long only means running with 0-20% cash. I don’t go above 20%; I don’t borrow. Under normal conditions, I like running around 5-7% cash. If the NAHC stake is counted in, (arbitrage gets a pseudo-cash return) then we are at that 20% upper limit.

That leads me to take a few actions — I have bumped up my central band for my holdings by 16%. Translated, the points at which I do buy and sell rebalancing trades has risen 16%, as has my normal position size. Looking back through the years, back to 1992 when I started value investing, my position sizes were 5% of what they are today, and back then I had 10 positions, not 35. There’s been growth. 🙂

My second action was a temporary purchase of some RGA. I doubled my position temporarily, because I think most analysts will smile on the deal, and RGA has always been a good buy at book value.

No telling whether buying at 1.0x book will continue to be a good idea in the future. RGA is a well-run company in an oligopolistic industry. The management is smart and conservative. They have international growth opportunities, and now, possible new business from MetLIfe. The moat is wide here. You can’t reverse engineer the #2 life reinsurer in the US and the World.

So, I’m happy with my position here. That said, I may trade away the speculative part of my holdings in the short run, and I may buy some MetLife as well. MetLife is cheap, though not as cheap as RGA, but I suspect when MetLife offers RGA shares in exchange for MetLife shares, they will have to make the tradeoff sweet in order to get some flexible institutional investors to do the swap. Why? MetLife is a large cap stock that is very diversified. RGA is a midcap that is not as diversified. MetLife is a well-respected brand name. RGA? Who?

Insurance is opaque; reinsurance is doubly so. There are no comparables for RGA. MetLife has Pru, Principal, Lincoln National, and a few more. So, I may speculate on MetLife in order to get some cheap RGA. Most likely, I’ll need to see the terms, but if RGA is up a lot tomorrow, and MetLife is not, I may just do the swap.

Note to my readers: one odd thing about my blog is that I write about a wide number of issues. I know I have been doing more on my stock investing lately, but that is partially due to the lack of news on the macro front. That’s the nature of what I do. I am an investor that pays attention to the global economy. I’m trying to make money off my insights, and not merely report on what is happening. I hope some of it rubs off on my readers also, and that you personally benefit from it. For those who find my blog to be a confusing melange — well, that’s who I am, a generalist whose interests are broad.

But, if you like the individual stock coverage, let me know. If you hate it, let me know also.

Full disclosure: long CHIC SFD HMC NTE RGA NAHC LNC

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