<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss
version="2.0"
xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
> <channel><title>Comments on: In Defense of the Rating Agencies &#8212; III</title> <atom:link href="http://alephblog.com/2008/08/23/in-defense-of-the-rating-agencies-iii/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><link>http://alephblog.com/2008/08/23/in-defense-of-the-rating-agencies-iii/</link> <description>Helping Institutions and Ordinary People Invest Better by Focusing on Risk Control</description> <lastBuildDate>Sun, 12 Feb 2012 22:02:53 +0000</lastBuildDate> <sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod> <sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency> <generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1</generator> <item><title>By: Terry</title><link>http://alephblog.com/2008/08/23/in-defense-of-the-rating-agencies-iii/comment-page-1/#comment-18406</link> <dc:creator>Terry</dc:creator> <pubDate>Sun, 24 Aug 2008 15:00:58 +0000</pubDate> <guid
isPermaLink="false">http://alephblog.com/?p=844#comment-18406</guid> <description>I believe that ratings agencies can perform a valuable service for investors, especially in assessing highly complex securities derivatives.  OTOH, they can be (and seemingly have been) part of deceptive marketing schemes--maybe unwittingly--by dealers to minimize the risk of these derivatives.
I think the proper solution for such a situation is to make the ratings agency financially liable for the ratings they provide.  If an &quot;AAA&quot; derivative turns out to be junk, allowing the rating agency to change its view in a timely manner, the buyers of the security should be compensated by the ratings agencies (&amp; maybe the dealers) for their failure.
This would have two salutory effects:
1.  There would be fewer errors and oversights in rating agency models.
2.  The ratings agencies would be fairly (and more fully) compensated by the dealers for the value-added of their ratings.</description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I believe that ratings agencies can perform a valuable service for investors, especially in assessing highly complex securities derivatives.  OTOH, they can be (and seemingly have been) part of deceptive marketing schemes&#8211;maybe unwittingly&#8211;by dealers to minimize the risk of these derivatives.</p><p>I think the proper solution for such a situation is to make the ratings agency financially liable for the ratings they provide.  If an &#8220;AAA&#8221; derivative turns out to be junk, allowing the rating agency to change its view in a timely manner, the buyers of the security should be compensated by the ratings agencies (&amp; maybe the dealers) for their failure.</p><p>This would have two salutory effects:<br
/> 1.  There would be fewer errors and oversights in rating agency models.<br
/> 2.  The ratings agencies would be fairly (and more fully) compensated by the dealers for the value-added of their ratings.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> </channel> </rss>
