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	<title>Comments on: Debt and Sweat</title>
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	<link>http://alephblog.com/2008/10/14/debt-and-sweat/</link>
	<description>Helping Institutions and Ordinary People Invest Better by Focusing on Risk Control</description>
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		<title>By: David Merkel</title>
		<link>http://alephblog.com/2008/10/14/debt-and-sweat/comment-page-1/#comment-19513</link>
		<dc:creator>David Merkel</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 22 Oct 2008 17:20:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://alephblog.com/?p=1029#comment-19513</guid>
		<description>UrbanDigs  – this is the major story ignored by most of the financial press.  Like all bubbles, the one in Treasury debt will persist until it becomes impossible for the US Treasury to continue to sell the debt in order to pay interest and principal on existing debt.  At that point, nothing will work.  Not sure what would serve as a hedge against that… we can short, but what will we get in return at settlement?

Matt -  the current account deficit should decrease, though the increase in financing for the bailout may swamp improvements from net exports.

Albert, TV – thanks.  Some pieces flow… this one mostly did, though I fell asleep in the middle of writing it.  I’ll try to get out a post on insurance stocks soon.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>UrbanDigs  – this is the major story ignored by most of the financial press.  Like all bubbles, the one in Treasury debt will persist until it becomes impossible for the US Treasury to continue to sell the debt in order to pay interest and principal on existing debt.  At that point, nothing will work.  Not sure what would serve as a hedge against that… we can short, but what will we get in return at settlement?</p>
<p>Matt &#8211;  the current account deficit should decrease, though the increase in financing for the bailout may swamp improvements from net exports.</p>
<p>Albert, TV – thanks.  Some pieces flow… this one mostly did, though I fell asleep in the middle of writing it.  I’ll try to get out a post on insurance stocks soon.</p>
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		<title>By: B Reilly</title>
		<link>http://alephblog.com/2008/10/14/debt-and-sweat/comment-page-1/#comment-19437</link>
		<dc:creator>B Reilly</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 15 Oct 2008 22:12:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://alephblog.com/?p=1029#comment-19437</guid>
		<description>@DaveinHackensack:

Set a higher required capital level and if they want to get it from the private sector I don&#039;t see what the problem is? Surely the issue is that a) banks haven&#039;t been admitting the problems and b) nobody in the private sector wants to put in serious amounts of capital.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@DaveinHackensack:</p>
<p>Set a higher required capital level and if they want to get it from the private sector I don&#8217;t see what the problem is? Surely the issue is that a) banks haven&#8217;t been admitting the problems and b) nobody in the private sector wants to put in serious amounts of capital.</p>
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		<title>By: UrbanDigs</title>
		<link>http://alephblog.com/2008/10/14/debt-and-sweat/comment-page-1/#comment-19436</link>
		<dc:creator>UrbanDigs</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 15 Oct 2008 19:32:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://alephblog.com/?p=1029#comment-19436</guid>
		<description>David,

Great piece! I have been discussing the SHOR THE LONG END OF THE CURVE trade on urbandigs.com for about 4-5 months now. 

I devoted an entire discussion to it yesterday at NOON, and only today found your article:

http://www.urbandigs.com/2008/10/a_new_age_depression.html

3 reasons why the long end could see higher yields in coming years, poppiong the 20 yr secular bull market in treasuries:

1) MASSIVE MASSIVE issuance
2) If credit quality/worthiness of USA gets put into question by the world; forget a downgrade of our AAA rating, I refer to the tradable markets questioning the credit quality..Similar to how the markets downgraded the bond insurers in late 2007, about 6 months before the rating agencies ever officially downgraded them.
3) If our foreign funders decide not to play ball or decide to sell, stop buying our treasuries!

This story is not over!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>David,</p>
<p>Great piece! I have been discussing the SHOR THE LONG END OF THE CURVE trade on urbandigs.com for about 4-5 months now. </p>
<p>I devoted an entire discussion to it yesterday at NOON, and only today found your article:</p>
<p><a href="http://www.urbandigs.com/2008/10/a_new_age_depression.html" rel="nofollow">http://www.urbandigs.com/2008/10/a_new_age_depression.html</a></p>
<p>3 reasons why the long end could see higher yields in coming years, poppiong the 20 yr secular bull market in treasuries:</p>
<p>1) MASSIVE MASSIVE issuance<br />
2) If credit quality/worthiness of USA gets put into question by the world; forget a downgrade of our AAA rating, I refer to the tradable markets questioning the credit quality..Similar to how the markets downgraded the bond insurers in late 2007, about 6 months before the rating agencies ever officially downgraded them.<br />
3) If our foreign funders decide not to play ball or decide to sell, stop buying our treasuries!</p>
<p>This story is not over!</p>
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		<title>By: DaveinHackensack</title>
		<link>http://alephblog.com/2008/10/14/debt-and-sweat/comment-page-1/#comment-19434</link>
		<dc:creator>DaveinHackensack</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 15 Oct 2008 18:03:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://alephblog.com/?p=1029#comment-19434</guid>
		<description>&lt;I&gt;&quot;I still don’t understand why (apart from Paulson being ex-GS) the US government are getting a far lower rate of interest on their preference shares than Warren Buffett.&quot;&lt;/I&gt;

Had the government asked for Warren Buffett-like terms, only the banks that really needed the capital would have taken it from the government; that would have defeated the purpose of the government&#039;s plan, which was to recapitalize key banks without stigmatizing the ones that really need it.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i>&#8220;I still don’t understand why (apart from Paulson being ex-GS) the US government are getting a far lower rate of interest on their preference shares than Warren Buffett.&#8221;</i></p>
<p>Had the government asked for Warren Buffett-like terms, only the banks that really needed the capital would have taken it from the government; that would have defeated the purpose of the government&#8217;s plan, which was to recapitalize key banks without stigmatizing the ones that really need it.</p>
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		<title>By: B Reilly</title>
		<link>http://alephblog.com/2008/10/14/debt-and-sweat/comment-page-1/#comment-19425</link>
		<dc:creator>B Reilly</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 15 Oct 2008 07:17:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://alephblog.com/?p=1029#comment-19425</guid>
		<description>With regards to Barclays and the UK not being as coercive:

My understanding (by way of FT Alphaville) is that banks were told to get their capital up to the lower of 9%, and an amount that with stress-test derived impairments would still be above a 7%. 
For example, it looks like the RBS stress test showed a far greater potential for impairments, so have had to raise more capital than Barclays.

What they weren&#039;t told is that it must come from the government. They were told they could do it any way they wanted, but that the government was willing to purchase preference shares and under-write equity placements if they couldn&#039;t get it from the private sector.

This appears to me to be a far better solution than we&#039;ve seen in the US. I still don&#039;t understand why (apart from Paulson being ex-GS) the US government are getting a far lower rate of interest on their preference shares than Warren Buffett.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>With regards to Barclays and the UK not being as coercive:</p>
<p>My understanding (by way of FT Alphaville) is that banks were told to get their capital up to the lower of 9%, and an amount that with stress-test derived impairments would still be above a 7%.<br />
For example, it looks like the RBS stress test showed a far greater potential for impairments, so have had to raise more capital than Barclays.</p>
<p>What they weren&#8217;t told is that it must come from the government. They were told they could do it any way they wanted, but that the government was willing to purchase preference shares and under-write equity placements if they couldn&#8217;t get it from the private sector.</p>
<p>This appears to me to be a far better solution than we&#8217;ve seen in the US. I still don&#8217;t understand why (apart from Paulson being ex-GS) the US government are getting a far lower rate of interest on their preference shares than Warren Buffett.</p>
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		<title>By: Risk and Return</title>
		<link>http://alephblog.com/2008/10/14/debt-and-sweat/comment-page-1/#comment-19420</link>
		<dc:creator>Risk and Return</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 15 Oct 2008 04:19:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://alephblog.com/?p=1029#comment-19420</guid>
		<description>&lt;strong&gt;Todays Links: The View from Here...&lt;/strong&gt;

Yesterday was one fo the best days ever for the stock markets:

What does it mean? I think it ultimately depends on factors unrelated to the move itself. Econompic provides us with some context:


Obviously large one day moves in and of themselves tell...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Todays Links: The View from Here&#8230;</strong></p>
<p>Yesterday was one fo the best days ever for the stock markets:</p>
<p>What does it mean? I think it ultimately depends on factors unrelated to the move itself. Econompic provides us with some context:</p>
<p>Obviously large one day moves in and of themselves tell&#8230;</p>
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		<title>By: matt</title>
		<link>http://alephblog.com/2008/10/14/debt-and-sweat/comment-page-1/#comment-19414</link>
		<dc:creator>matt</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 Oct 2008 21:28:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://alephblog.com/?p=1029#comment-19414</guid>
		<description>Mr. Merkel:

I am under the impression that the current account deficit is expected to contract over the next 12 months. Doesn&#039;t a large part of America&#039;s financing come from surplus countries who are trying to control their currencies. What happens when their surpluses diminish? Will there be less demand for treasuries at a time when record amounts are being issued? Will the Federal Reserve have to fill in the blanks?

Thanks,
Matt</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Mr. Merkel:</p>
<p>I am under the impression that the current account deficit is expected to contract over the next 12 months. Doesn&#8217;t a large part of America&#8217;s financing come from surplus countries who are trying to control their currencies. What happens when their surpluses diminish? Will there be less demand for treasuries at a time when record amounts are being issued? Will the Federal Reserve have to fill in the blanks?</p>
<p>Thanks,<br />
Matt</p>
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		<title>By: andy abraham</title>
		<link>http://alephblog.com/2008/10/14/debt-and-sweat/comment-page-1/#comment-19405</link>
		<dc:creator>andy abraham</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 Oct 2008 19:07:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://alephblog.com/?p=1029#comment-19405</guid>
		<description>Jim Rogers and Marc Faber have been discussing the last bubble to burst will be US Treasuries... we have been chatting on myinvestorsplace.com this idea...as well as the US dollar... What is your opinion on both...and more so..what can we do to protect ourselves...Please let us know..thanks</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Jim Rogers and Marc Faber have been discussing the last bubble to burst will be US Treasuries&#8230; we have been chatting on myinvestorsplace.com this idea&#8230;as well as the US dollar&#8230; What is your opinion on both&#8230;and more so..what can we do to protect ourselves&#8230;Please let us know..thanks</p>
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		<title>By: tv</title>
		<link>http://alephblog.com/2008/10/14/debt-and-sweat/comment-page-1/#comment-19404</link>
		<dc:creator>tv</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 Oct 2008 18:52:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://alephblog.com/?p=1029#comment-19404</guid>
		<description>This is one of your best pieces David.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is one of your best pieces David.</p>
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		<title>By: Estragon</title>
		<link>http://alephblog.com/2008/10/14/debt-and-sweat/comment-page-1/#comment-19401</link>
		<dc:creator>Estragon</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 Oct 2008 17:25:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://alephblog.com/?p=1029#comment-19401</guid>
		<description>DM - &quot;&lt;em&gt;There is no national reform going on here, but merely a shifting of obligations from private to public hands&lt;/em&gt;&quot;

I suspect this is the single most important point.  There&#039;s no reason to suspect public hands will be any less tempted by the (temporarily) virtuous cycle of credit and asset prices than private, and lots of reasons to suspect public hands will be even more so.  Bubble 3.0?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>DM &#8211; &#8220;<em>There is no national reform going on here, but merely a shifting of obligations from private to public hands</em>&#8221;</p>
<p>I suspect this is the single most important point.  There&#8217;s no reason to suspect public hands will be any less tempted by the (temporarily) virtuous cycle of credit and asset prices than private, and lots of reasons to suspect public hands will be even more so.  Bubble 3.0?</p>
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