Day: October 15, 2008

Curves and Corporate Credit

Curves and Corporate Credit

Just a brief note on corporate bonds.? When I was a corporate bond manager 2001-2003, I learned a lot about inverted curves.? It was a tough time.? But what kind of inversion am I talking about?

Ordinarily, when there is little doubt over the creditworthiness of a company, the amount of incremental yield over Treasuries (spread) rises with the length of the security.? This is normal, leaving aside times when the yield curve is flat or inverted, because usually, the risk of default rises with time with even the best securities, because the future is less certain than the present.

The second stage is an inverted spread curve for a given company, which given a positively sloped Treasury yield curve, might leave the corporate yield curve positively sloped, but less so than Treasuries.? This indicates moderate worry over the credit risk of the company in question.? (Note: during a time of credit stress, the Treasury curve is almost always positively sloped, as the Fed tends to loosen during times of credit stress.)

Next is an inverted yield curve, where short term yields are moderately higher than long term yields.? This indicates significant worry over the credit risk of the company.

Finally, there is an inverted dollar (price) curve for the company.? This is where default is viewed as a likelihood.? The prices of the longest-dated bonds reflect current estimated recovery levels after default.? Short-dated bonds may trade near par. (Par: usually $100, also usually the amount of principal remaining to be received.)

This is a qualitative/quantitative way of thinking about the corporate bond market during a time of credit stress.? What percentage of the market falls into each bucket?

  • Not inverted
  • Inverted spread curve
  • Inverted yield curve
  • Inverted dollar price curve
  • In default

The more names in lower categories, the greater the degree of credit stress.? For companies with multiple issues of bonds, it is a simple way of characterizing the market, even in the absence of rating agencies.? (As a closing aside, equity implied volatility tends to rise as a company goes down the list.)

Wait, that’s not quite a close, and not an aside.? That is another way to lookat corporate bonds.? As the implied volatility of the equity gets higher, the more they migrate down the list.? Remember, leaving aside bank loans, usually only stable companies issue corporate debt.? As their prospects get less certain, implied volatility of the equity rises, and their debt moves down the list.

Fixing Securitization

Fixing Securitization

After reading jck’s piece Securitization: Not Guilty, I said to myself, “well said.” He cited a study that showed that misaligned incentives were more to blame than secutritization itself.? (Academic paper here.)? And he cited this clever piece from the seemingly erstwhile blog Going Private.

Here’s my view.? I have lived through the first era of securitization, and I always thought that the equity/originator got off too easily.? They got their money out of the transaction too quickly, allowing themselves to profit if the deal survived for a while, and then died.? The equity of the deal should take the largest risks, rather than the subordinate certificates (most junior aside from equity).

Here’s my solution.? Require that the deal sponsor and originators retain the full equity piece, and that the size be regulated to make it significant.? Further require that the equity is a zero interest tranche, where the excess interest builds up to protect the subordinate securities.? They get paid last out of any residual cash flows of the deal.? The size of the equity piece might vary from 1% of principal on credit card, auto and stranded cost ABS, to 10% on CDOs.? Note that the equity pieces cannot be traded here, they must be owned by the sponsors or originators.

Now, if the equity only gets paid at the end, several things occur:

  • Sponsors/Originators have to be well capitalized.
  • They will be a lot more careful about credit selection, and not accept high-interest risky borrowers.
  • The subordinate certificates will get paid less interest, but with more certainty.

Does this change the nature of securitization?? Yes, and in a good way.? Securitization is useful, but in its initial phases, it suffered from the equity not having enough at risk.? My proposal solves that.? Put the equity at the back of the cash flow bus, such that the originator never makes a gain on sale, and that part of the financial system will be sound once again.

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