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	<title>Comments on: We Have a Debt to Discharge</title>
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	<description>Helping Institutions and Ordinary People Invest Better by Focusing on Risk Control</description>
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		<title>By: James Monachino</title>
		<link>http://alephblog.com/2008/11/07/we-have-a-debt-to-discharge/comment-page-1/#comment-19904</link>
		<dc:creator>James Monachino</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 10 Nov 2008 18:50:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://alephblog.com/?p=1113#comment-19904</guid>
		<description>Choose your poison - -

The correction will come and at a price.  We talk about strategies while what is at stake is survival.

As the World Wide Economic slowdown increases and the heat turns up on the middle and working classes, we all will be facing some ugly possibilities. 

Economic solutions don&#039;t always work as with political realities.  Enjoyed the posts and agree that world governments would love to create enough inflation to bail the real estate assets out of the hole they are in.  

Sorry, don&#039;t think that will happen this time around, you have all heard the saying, &quot;pushing on a string&quot; this what the Fed appears to be doing.
 
James Monachino</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Choose your poison &#8211; -</p>
<p>The correction will come and at a price.  We talk about strategies while what is at stake is survival.</p>
<p>As the World Wide Economic slowdown increases and the heat turns up on the middle and working classes, we all will be facing some ugly possibilities. </p>
<p>Economic solutions don&#8217;t always work as with political realities.  Enjoyed the posts and agree that world governments would love to create enough inflation to bail the real estate assets out of the hole they are in.  </p>
<p>Sorry, don&#8217;t think that will happen this time around, you have all heard the saying, &#8220;pushing on a string&#8221; this what the Fed appears to be doing.</p>
<p>James Monachino</p>
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		<title>By: Dave</title>
		<link>http://alephblog.com/2008/11/07/we-have-a-debt-to-discharge/comment-page-1/#comment-19882</link>
		<dc:creator>Dave</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 08 Nov 2008 07:32:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://alephblog.com/?p=1113#comment-19882</guid>
		<description>There is a future, in the past, that does not rely upon the accumulated Debt that is at the heart of the cascading monetary disorder.

http://www.safehaven.com/article-11769.htm

Monetary Reform: Gold And Bills Of Exchange
by Antal E. Fekete

Address before the Civil Society Institute at Santa Clara University, November 3, 2008

How wonderful that it was presented at my MBA alma mater, Santa Clara Univ.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There is a future, in the past, that does not rely upon the accumulated Debt that is at the heart of the cascading monetary disorder.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.safehaven.com/article-11769.htm" rel="nofollow">http://www.safehaven.com/article-11769.htm</a></p>
<p>Monetary Reform: Gold And Bills Of Exchange<br />
by Antal E. Fekete</p>
<p>Address before the Civil Society Institute at Santa Clara University, November 3, 2008</p>
<p>How wonderful that it was presented at my MBA alma mater, Santa Clara Univ.</p>
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		<title>By: David Merkel</title>
		<link>http://alephblog.com/2008/11/07/we-have-a-debt-to-discharge/comment-page-1/#comment-19881</link>
		<dc:creator>David Merkel</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 08 Nov 2008 07:08:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://alephblog.com/?p=1113#comment-19881</guid>
		<description>It is listed here: http://alephblog.com/contact-us/</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It is listed here: <a href="http://alephblog.com/contact-us/" rel="nofollow">http://alephblog.com/contact-us/</a></p>
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		<title>By: Estragon</title>
		<link>http://alephblog.com/2008/11/07/we-have-a-debt-to-discharge/comment-page-1/#comment-19878</link>
		<dc:creator>Estragon</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 07 Nov 2008 22:44:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://alephblog.com/?p=1113#comment-19878</guid>
		<description>A bubble can also be defined as a reversal of the usual interaction of price with supply and demand.  Ordinarily rising prices increase supply and reduce demand.  In a bubble, expectations of continued rising prices instead reduce supply (hoarding) and increase demand (speculation).  It isn&#039;t necessarily the case that they always pop when cashflows don&#039;t cover interest, as interest can be capitalized in bubble conditions.  Bubbles pop when expectations change.

The key determinant is expectations, and expectations are temporal.  A sudden spike in price will be seen as an anomoly, whereas a more persistent rise plays on the normal human tendency to linear extrapolation, and this requires time to become embedded.

The same is true on the flip side.  If expectations of declining prices become embedded, there&#039;s a risk of an anti-bubble.  Again though, the formation of the anti-bubble requires two conditions; that lower prices bring lower demand and increased supply, and that this becomes embedded in expectations.  Current policy is obviously designed to avoid the first condition.  If it succeeds, no anti-bubble will form.  If it fails, the passage of time risks causing the second.

As for the debt, we need to remember that what&#039;s happening now isn&#039;t so much the creation of new debt as the transfer of debt from private to public hands.  It&#039;s an open question at this point if and to what extent private debt expands once the immediate crisis is past.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A bubble can also be defined as a reversal of the usual interaction of price with supply and demand.  Ordinarily rising prices increase supply and reduce demand.  In a bubble, expectations of continued rising prices instead reduce supply (hoarding) and increase demand (speculation).  It isn&#8217;t necessarily the case that they always pop when cashflows don&#8217;t cover interest, as interest can be capitalized in bubble conditions.  Bubbles pop when expectations change.</p>
<p>The key determinant is expectations, and expectations are temporal.  A sudden spike in price will be seen as an anomoly, whereas a more persistent rise plays on the normal human tendency to linear extrapolation, and this requires time to become embedded.</p>
<p>The same is true on the flip side.  If expectations of declining prices become embedded, there&#8217;s a risk of an anti-bubble.  Again though, the formation of the anti-bubble requires two conditions; that lower prices bring lower demand and increased supply, and that this becomes embedded in expectations.  Current policy is obviously designed to avoid the first condition.  If it succeeds, no anti-bubble will form.  If it fails, the passage of time risks causing the second.</p>
<p>As for the debt, we need to remember that what&#8217;s happening now isn&#8217;t so much the creation of new debt as the transfer of debt from private to public hands.  It&#8217;s an open question at this point if and to what extent private debt expands once the immediate crisis is past.</p>
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		<title>By: pl</title>
		<link>http://alephblog.com/2008/11/07/we-have-a-debt-to-discharge/comment-page-1/#comment-19876</link>
		<dc:creator>pl</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 07 Nov 2008 22:19:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://alephblog.com/?p=1113#comment-19876</guid>
		<description>what is your email?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>what is your email?</p>
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		<title>By: Darren Hatherell</title>
		<link>http://alephblog.com/2008/11/07/we-have-a-debt-to-discharge/comment-page-1/#comment-19875</link>
		<dc:creator>Darren Hatherell</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 07 Nov 2008 21:30:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://alephblog.com/?p=1113#comment-19875</guid>
		<description>I hear both sides of the argument.  Another highly respected voice I also listen to is David Rosenberg of ML.  David M. and David R. are both very concerned with the situation, but come to different end states (say in 2010) based on (I think) a different view of how much debt the US can take on without significant consequences.  And we all know the US has debt capacity - but how much?  David M. what is your opinion regarding the incremental debt capacity of the US where the current layering on of addition debt results in a certain probability of a &#039;tipping point&#039; as you suggest.  If you can, quantifying this or pointing to how one could approach quantifying this would be a great aid.  

Without this quantification I feel in the middle of a unprovable &#039;beliefs&#039; debate.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I hear both sides of the argument.  Another highly respected voice I also listen to is David Rosenberg of ML.  David M. and David R. are both very concerned with the situation, but come to different end states (say in 2010) based on (I think) a different view of how much debt the US can take on without significant consequences.  And we all know the US has debt capacity &#8211; but how much?  David M. what is your opinion regarding the incremental debt capacity of the US where the current layering on of addition debt results in a certain probability of a &#8216;tipping point&#8217; as you suggest.  If you can, quantifying this or pointing to how one could approach quantifying this would be a great aid.  </p>
<p>Without this quantification I feel in the middle of a unprovable &#8216;beliefs&#8217; debate.</p>
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		<title>By: tv</title>
		<link>http://alephblog.com/2008/11/07/we-have-a-debt-to-discharge/comment-page-1/#comment-19872</link>
		<dc:creator>tv</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 07 Nov 2008 17:31:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://alephblog.com/?p=1113#comment-19872</guid>
		<description>&quot;rthur, anon — Debt liquidation can’t be avoided. Hoover and FDR prolonged and intensified the pain of the Great Depression. Had they let it progress without interference, the Great Depression would have been over in no more than five years.&quot;

YES YES YES YES YES

Their is no way out of the box.  People take a half truth and make a full truth out of Mellons comment. Mellon&#039;s way was the fast way out of the pain. Extremely intense. Buy pain, sell time feeling it.

Floundering indeed.  .Gov risks itself as an entity in founding fathers form by continuing/accellerating the road it currently takes.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;rthur, anon — Debt liquidation can’t be avoided. Hoover and FDR prolonged and intensified the pain of the Great Depression. Had they let it progress without interference, the Great Depression would have been over in no more than five years.&#8221;</p>
<p>YES YES YES YES YES</p>
<p>Their is no way out of the box.  People take a half truth and make a full truth out of Mellons comment. Mellon&#8217;s way was the fast way out of the pain. Extremely intense. Buy pain, sell time feeling it.</p>
<p>Floundering indeed.  .Gov risks itself as an entity in founding fathers form by continuing/accellerating the road it currently takes.</p>
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		<title>By: David Merkel</title>
		<link>http://alephblog.com/2008/11/07/we-have-a-debt-to-discharge/comment-page-1/#comment-19871</link>
		<dc:creator>David Merkel</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 07 Nov 2008 17:13:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://alephblog.com/?p=1113#comment-19871</guid>
		<description>Arthur, anon -- Debt liquidation can&#039;t be avoided.  Hoover and FDR prolonged and intensified the pain of the Great Depression.  Had they let it progress without interference, the Great Depression would have been over in no more than five years.

Look at Japan -- they have stretched a popped asset bubble into a two-decade long morass.  We are doing the same thing now, but starting with a worse balance sheet as a nation.  Japan had room to borrow; FDR had room to borrow.  We don&#039;t.

We can take the pain in a few big doses and return to normalcy sooner, or a bunch of little doses that will leave us floundering for a generation.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Arthur, anon &#8212; Debt liquidation can&#8217;t be avoided.  Hoover and FDR prolonged and intensified the pain of the Great Depression.  Had they let it progress without interference, the Great Depression would have been over in no more than five years.</p>
<p>Look at Japan &#8212; they have stretched a popped asset bubble into a two-decade long morass.  We are doing the same thing now, but starting with a worse balance sheet as a nation.  Japan had room to borrow; FDR had room to borrow.  We don&#8217;t.</p>
<p>We can take the pain in a few big doses and return to normalcy sooner, or a bunch of little doses that will leave us floundering for a generation.</p>
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		<title>By: Mcwop</title>
		<link>http://alephblog.com/2008/11/07/we-have-a-debt-to-discharge/comment-page-1/#comment-19870</link>
		<dc:creator>Mcwop</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 07 Nov 2008 17:06:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://alephblog.com/?p=1113#comment-19870</guid>
		<description>Great post. 

I would add that the chambers are empty too. 

No HELOC cash, tougher to get debt, and no stock market gains to prop up the economy. That is why I feel we are headed to a more severe recession. Those are all things missing, that existed during the past couple of downturns.

The only chamber with something left is government, but that one will go dry by February.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Great post. </p>
<p>I would add that the chambers are empty too. </p>
<p>No HELOC cash, tougher to get debt, and no stock market gains to prop up the economy. That is why I feel we are headed to a more severe recession. Those are all things missing, that existed during the past couple of downturns.</p>
<p>The only chamber with something left is government, but that one will go dry by February.</p>
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		<title>By: Arthur Rypinski</title>
		<link>http://alephblog.com/2008/11/07/we-have-a-debt-to-discharge/comment-page-1/#comment-19869</link>
		<dc:creator>Arthur Rypinski</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 07 Nov 2008 17:00:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://alephblog.com/?p=1113#comment-19869</guid>
		<description>Mr. Merkel-
The views you express in this post are consistent with some of the policy views of Andrew Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury under President Hoover.  In the wake of 1929 stock market crash, Mellon believed that excessive credit creation and unsound lending were behind the bubble.  Mellon favored the liquidation of failed banks and institutions (no bailouts), balancing the Federal budget, and returning to the gold standard at pre-war parities.  this was conventional wisdom at the time. As the depression deepened, the Hoover Administration became progessively less doctrinaire.
Encouraging liquidation had very unpleasant consequences in 1929-1932.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Mr. Merkel-<br />
The views you express in this post are consistent with some of the policy views of Andrew Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury under President Hoover.  In the wake of 1929 stock market crash, Mellon believed that excessive credit creation and unsound lending were behind the bubble.  Mellon favored the liquidation of failed banks and institutions (no bailouts), balancing the Federal budget, and returning to the gold standard at pre-war parities.  this was conventional wisdom at the time. As the depression deepened, the Hoover Administration became progessively less doctrinaire.<br />
Encouraging liquidation had very unpleasant consequences in 1929-1932.</p>
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