Helping Institutions and Ordinary People Invest Better by Focusing on Risk Control
This is short notice, and for me as well, but I will be on the Ron Smith Show on WBAL 1090, in the 3PM (eastern) hour today.? We will be talking about the bailouts, monetary policy, debt, etc.? If you aren’t in the Baltimore area, you can listen to it here over the Internet.
1) General Growth Properties — another case of too much leverage, illiquid assets, and liquid liabilities.? I live near Columbia and Baltimore, so I know of a lot of property owned by General Growth that was bought when they acquired the Rouse Corp.? I can hear the Rouses in the distance congratulating themselves on a good sale.
For those that haven’t read me much, the deadly trio of too much leverage, illiquid assets, and liquid liabilities is what causes most corporate defaults of financial companies, not lesser issues like mark-to-market accounting.
2) The government thinks it is doing something good, and then it realizes that it is in over its head.? Consider AIG and Fannie Mae.? Where does the bailout end?? The government does not have a team of financial analysts competent to dig into murky balance sheets, and they have the mistaken notion that they must act fast.? Having worked on several takeovers of large financial firms, I can tell you that work done quickly destroys value.? Either there is an underestimate that leads to losing the bid, or an overestimate that leads to overpaying, and an eventual writeoff of part of the investment.
With Fannie Mae and AIG, (and probably Freddie also) the government clearly did not know what it was doing.? What were the main drivers of the loss, and how much worse could they get?? Is this scenario self-reinforcing?? The cursory work led to a bad result that is getting worse.
3) Amazing that we are almost to the end of the first $350 billion of bailout capital.? The government is behaving like a person that just won the lottery, and is profligate with spending, because they’ve never had that much money to throw around with complete discretion until now. As it says in Proverbs 13:11, “Wealth gained by dishonesty will be diminished, but he who gathers by labor will increase. [NKJV]”? Easy come, easy go.? I am not surprised in the slightest that the US Government has mis-estimated the loss exposures.? They don’t have anyone with a concentrated interest (a profit motive) in the result.
4) Here’s another angle in the Fed refusing to disclose what assets they are financing.? If we knew who they were buying from, and what they were buying, the markets would ask the question, “How much more firepower are they willing to expend?”? If the judgment is “little”, market players would sell what the Treasury/Fed was buying, and if the judgment is “a lot”, market players would buy what the Treasury/Fed was buying.
That leads me to believe that the Treasury/Fed doesn’t want to commit a lot more resources to this fight.? If they felt they had a lot more firepower, they would happily disclose their actions, because the private markets would aid their actions.
5) I’ve been talking about it for over a decade, so pardon me if I point at the great pensions disaster.? We have had a lost decade where DB pension money needed to earn 8-9%/yr, and earned around 1%/year.? That gap of 7-8%/yr over 10 years is enough to destroy most well-funded plans at the beginning of the period.? The problem exists for DC plans as well, because as people age, they lose time to compound their money.? Hey, think of this — the dumb guys that put all their money in the stable value fund did much better than those that put their money at risk.? So much for the equity premium in hindsight, but now it’s time to begin committing funds to riskier assets.? (Don’t do it all at once.)
6) At least Mr. Obama can make one market go up — muni bonds.? Wait, that’s not good?!? At least healthy municipalitiestheir borrowing rates improve as higher taxes lead the wealthy to shelter income from taxation.
7) Maybe Obama’s tax poicy could have more bite.? Close down tax havens.? This is something I can get behind.? I like low tax rates, but I don’t like the ability for some to lower their tax rates, and not others.? Let there be a level playing field in the tax code, such that there is no advantage to moving profits offshore.
Now, could Obama enact real tax reform that would be fair, and cause Buffett (and others) to pay taxes on his unrealized capital gains?? He could, but he won’t, because he is a slave of Democratic special interests.
8 ) I understand why the Treasury did it.? They wanted an opaque way of encouraging the purchase of weak banks by stronger banks.? So, they let them absorb tax losses of the acquired bank.? Too bad it is not legal, but legality doesn’t affect our government much these days.
9) Give Spain a hand — they managed to increase capital requirements on their banks during the good times.? Things aren’t perfect now, but Spanish? banks are in decent shape given all of the credit stress.
10) Why is the Fed funds rate so low?? The 75 basis fee point forces the effective Fed funds rate from 1.00% to 0.25%.? Though some see the Fed hemmed in here, I think that as they reduce the Fed funds rate, they will also reduce the 75 bp fee.
“Don’t just stand there.? Do something!”
“Don’t just do something.? Stand there!”
The first statement above is quintessentially American.? We are biased to action.? Terrorist attack?? Reaction: Go kill people who were tangentially related to the event, making everyone wary of attacking us again others think that we act with unreasonable blind rage.
Major companies on the rocks?? Act now to prevent certain disaster!? I don’t know — there are administrative remedies in the short-run that can be used to stave off insolvency, without immediately throwing money at the problem — appoint a conservator to get maximum value out of the company for senior bondholders while you wind it down (liquidate).
That’s the way I feel about AIG, GM, Ford, etc., companies that I have had a consistently negative view on well before the crisis began.? Why are we rewarding companies that took on way too much debt to finance their operations?? To save jobs?? Uh, nice thought, maybe, but you could do a cramdown in bankruptcy where everyone gets hit.? The senior debtholders would convert their claims to a reduced amount of new equity, and wiping everyone else out.
So when I read about AIG getting new loans from the US government, and reducing the interest rate on all of the debt, I go back to my initial statements regarding the bailouts.? When you make policy rapidly, you make mistakes.? This has been proven true with AIG.? Now, with the automakers, will we compound the mistake?
Let the automakers fail.? It is one of the few things that will might bring the unions to their senses.? The senior debtholders will bring in new management, and the unions, if they survive, will have to reduce their unreasonable demands that are out of sync with what other auto workers make in a competitive market.? Many auto workers would be able to keep their jobs, but at wages more congruent with the value produced.
The Humility of Realism
The above title is a play on a book title from a politician who deserves to be obscure, but has hit it big, much like Jimmy Carter.? But as Woody Allen said, half of life is just showing up.? By the humility of realism, I am trying to get across the idea that our government should slow down, take a step back, and think hard before acting.? Bring in the same old players experts who are disconnected from the “crisis” and let them consider with seriousness the depths of the problem that we are in.? We are probably facing a second depression.
From my perspective, depressions end when enough of the debt of the nation is paid off or liquidated, so that the financial system can once again issue moderate amounts of credit to high quality borrowers.? But the US Government is presently compounding failure with interest, adding to the total debt of the US by borrowing more, and giving the proceeds to companies that not only are special interests, but have proven that they cannot use it well.
The humility of realism would recognize that the US government cannot borrow its way to prosperity, but must act to conserve, admitting the faults of the past, recognizing that past policy has erred significantly.? I am not holding my breath here, waiting for that to happen.? I expect that the US government will proceed further down its present path, playing favorites with special interests, and continue to apply irrelevant “cures” in the hope that action will end the crisis.
As for me, I am puzzling over what would preserve value for me, and those that I care for in this environment.? That’s not a easy puzzle; in a depression, everything gets whacked.? But as I get more clarity, I will write more.
Links:
Capital structure is relevant.? Promises are significant.? Contracts are definitive.
This will be short (it better be, I’m tired and want to sleep), but I have no end of friends asking me how bad it is out there.? First I tell them my opinion is a minority opinion.? Second, I tell them that debt-laden economies are inherently inflexible.? Third, I tell them that when the banks are compromised, ordinary monetary policy is useless, because there is no way to make a bank that is worried about its solvency lend more.? Fourth, even extraordinary monetary policy may not work, as the Fed tries to target lending markets, and finds that they can absorb bad assets, but can’t readily recycle them.
The aggregate capital structure of the economy is not a matter of indifference.? If there are many debt claims, and firms with debt finance other firms via debt, who finance other firms via debt, etc., then we set up a bunch of financial dominoes, where a disturbance can knock one down and carry others with it.
This is why the total debt to GDP ratio matters so much.? Economies stop functioning when they have high levels of embedded debt and a slowdown hits.? That is where we are now, at levels of Debt to GDP that exceed those of the Great Depression.? Until we get that ratio down from 350% down to 150%, normalcy will not return.? Air is leaking out of the debt bubble, and the ability to reflate is not there, because the market value of the assets have sagged to such a level that even a zero Fed funds rate will not raise the market value to the levels where the assets are booked.
People are not reliable; they sin; they default.? Economic systems that are primarily equity financed are better able to deal with the nature of man, because they have more flexibility.? Economic systems that are more heavily debt financed face more problems when someone cannot live up to his promises, because it means that others relying on the performance may not be able to live up to their promises also.
Things are different now.? In past economic cycles, there were sectors of the economy that could be stimulated by the Fed lowering the Fed funds rate.? But now, because of too many fixed committments, there is no sector of the American economy that can absorb more debt, and stimulate everyone else.
Thus the task of levering up falls to the Federal government.? But will they be able to honor all the promises that they have made?? Given that they control the printing press, the answer is yes in nominal terms, but no if in inflation-adjusted terms.
I have lots of models, but I am only one person, so some of my models sit idle becuase I don’t have time to update them.? Well, today, as I was reading Barron’s, I ran across the “Current Yield” column, and read this:
THE STOCK MARKET IS PRICED FOR a recession, but the bond market is priced for a depression. So says Rob Arnott, the brainiac who heads Research Affiliates, an institutional advisory.
That’s not hyperbole. Corporate bonds rated Baa or triple-B, the low end of investment grade by Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s designations, offer the biggest yield premium since the early 1930s, notes RBC Capital Markets.
That’s a problem for pulling the economy out of the credit crisis, but an opportunity for investors. Indeed, investment-grade corporates with near-record premiums arguably offer better return potential than common stocks, especially relative to their risks. “I haven’t seen this many markets offering double-digit opportunities since 1989-90 or ever so briefly in 2002,” says Arnott.
Part of it reflects the sheer weight of numbers. Corporates rated Baa yield about 550 basis points (5.5 percentage points) more than comparable Treasuries, nearly half again the spread in the 2002 post-WorldCom-Enron debacle and twice the average of post-war recessions.
You have to go back to the early 1930s, when Baa corporates yielded 700 basis points over Treasuries, to find a comparable situation. And notwithstanding all the hyperventilation in the media that this is worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, there’s never been such a full-court response to the threat of debt deflation — the $700 billion TARP, the bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the likelihood of trillion-dollar deficits and a doubling in the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet in just over two months.
I know things are bad in the corporate bond market, but I didn’t think it was that bad.? This made me ask, “Hmm… what about my stocks versus bonds model?”? That article is one of my better ones; a lot of time and effort got poured into that.? So, I sat down and re-engineered the model, since, embarrassingly, the original model was lost.
The key question is whether the yield on BBB corporates is more than 3.9% higher than the earnings yield on the S&P 500.? The answer is yes, and that means we should sell stocks and buy corporate bonds.? But, here is the embarrassing thing for me.? The first recent signal to sell stocks and buy bonds came in mid-August, but since I didn’t track the model regularly, I missed that.? Since the original model worked off monthly data, even selling in early September would have preserved a lot of value.? It is not as if corporate bonds have done well since August, but they have done much better than the S&P 500.
Here’s a graph summarizing 2008 via my model:
When the green line goes over 3.9%, it is time to buy corporate bonds. That is not a frequent occurrence; this model gives of signals only a few times per decade. Check out my original piece for more details.
So, with that, I offer my conclusions:
So, be careful out there, and remember that corporate bonds typically do better than stocks in a prolonged bear market for credit.? Yield levels like the present typically bode well for corporate bonds versus stocks.
I’ve been beating the avoid the US automakers drum for six years now.? When I was a corporate bond manager, one of the first things that I did was sell 90% of my Ford and GM bonds that I inherited from the prior manager.? When I began writing for RealMoney, I wrote pieces like this:
| David Merkel Open Letter to General Motors’ CFO By David Merkel RealMoney.com Contributor 12/9/2004 11:11 AM EST |
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Sir: Though I am not as bearish as my friend Peter Eavis on the prospects for your company, I do want to give you some friendly, if unsolicited, advice: Refinance at least half of your 2005 and 2006 maturities while rates remain low.
With over $50 billion of principal coming due in the next two years, the future of GM (GM:NYSE) is threatened by any increase in bond yields. With the likely weakness in the dollar, yields on Treasury obligations are unlikely to remain this low, in my opinion. Further, though spreads for GM and GMAC are not at historically tight levels, spreads in the corporate bond market are at levels not seen since 1997. Take advantage of the demand (both domestic and international) for yieldy paper while you can. For that matter, do another convert deal. It may put a ceiling over your stock price (but, hey, isn’t there one there now?), but the convertible arbs will give you cheap financing while you figure out how to make your auto operations profitable (and design cars that people crave).
Though your ratings are stable from Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s at present, who can tell how long that will last? GM and GMAC debt are only one notch above junk at S&P, and I can tell you that you will have a hard time selling debt if you ever do get downgraded by S&P. Even if Moody’s leaves you an investment-grade rating, I will tell you that there is not enough buying capacity in the bond market for crossover credits of your size. Your yields would have to rise to the point where equity investors find your bonds an interesting speculation, as was true of auto bonds in mid-2002.
Further, do you want to be subject to the vicissitudes of your cousin Ford (F:NYSE) ? If they catch cold, you may too, at least in the eyes of the ratings agencies. But I digress.
It is always better to seek financing when it is offered, rather than when you need it. Your spreads are not going to get materially tighter, in my opinion, absent a partial refinancing that gives the bond market more confidence in how you will meet your short-term obligations.
I wish you nothing but the best, if for no other reason than as a U.S. taxpayer, I don’t want to bail GM or Ford out.
Sincerely,
David J. Merkel
P.S. To the CFO of Ford: This goes for you as well. The numbers differ, your spreads are currently tighter than those of GM, but you lack one thing that GM has. GM could sell the non-auto financing assets of GMAC in a pinch, which is presently a very valuable franchise that you don’t possess. Refinance while the bond market is friendly.
I also wrote pieces like this:
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David Merkel |
| GM on “Death Ground” | ||
| 11/17/2005 5:15 PM EST |
The last time I used the phrase “death ground” it was with respect to Fannie Mae. It engendered some confusion then so let me explain the term. “Death Ground” is a term from Sun Tzu’s The Art of War. It is when a General faces a situation where an army unit is in nearly hopeless shape, and the General manuevers the unit into a place where flight is impossible, so that the unit will fight to the death, because they have nothing to lose. Soldiers that motivated sometimes win; it is a last-ditch strategy.
That describes GM today. The CEO announced that in a letter posted on the Financial Times website, “I’d like to just set the record straight here and now: there is absolutely no plan, strategy or intention for GM to file for bankruptcy” GM faces a host of issues, revolving around legacy liabilities, poor design, poor marketing (reliance on sales, rather than everyday low pricing), high production costs, low flexibility, and high debt. Almost everything has to go right for GM to survive against much stronger competition; to me, that’s death ground.
That’s not an exhaustive list. Add into that the possible sale of GMAC, which is the crown jewel of GM, and you can sense the desperation. This is not a company to be playing around with on the long side; truth is, the world doesn’t need GM when it has Toyota. Maybe the US government will bail out GM the way they did Chrysler, but I really wouldn’t expect that.
Long GM debt was trading in the mid-60s this morning for a 12%-ish yield. It improved after the CEO’s statements this afternoon; the longs got a gift. I would take the opportunity to lighten up on long positions in GM stock, and any bonds dated past 2010. Take the $10-15 buck haircut off par, lest you have to settle for a recovery in the $30s five years out. (The 2036 7.75% zero-to-fulls are trading in the low $20s. Assuming an interest rate of about 7-9%, and a default 5 years out, that discounts a recovery in the mid-$30s.)
Position: short FNM, long TM
And this:
6/30/2006 8:24 AM EDT
The story of GM over the past few decades has been to sell off desirable assets to fund the core auto operations, close factories and reduce jobs in North America. Its recent round of adjustments is only different because of the desperateness of the situation. Even with the labor concessions being discussed, GM’s cost structure will remain higher than most of its competition.
Consider the ratings agencies that are “inside the wall” and possess more information than other market participants. Even after the changes made, GM’s debt is rated Caa1 (negative outlook) by Moody’s and B (negative watch) by S&P. The ratings on GM’s debt reflect a highly speculative company with an uncertain future. The debt of GM, though the price is up from its lows still reflects significant uncertainty of full payment. Long debt trades in the mid-$70s.
We still don’t know whether the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation will go for the sale of 51% of GMAC. GM has only made a dent in the total liabilities that it faces in pension and health care (active and retiree). Does the PBGC want to lose a claim on one of the more valuable aspects of the firm should it go under?
Finally, sales have been disappointing, and discounting must be resorted to in order to “move the metal.” GM’s offerings have improved of late, but that might only be enough to get someone to buy a GM instead of a Ford. The improvements at GM don’t place the company on the same footing as Toyota or Honda from either a cost or marketability basis.
GM may be able to eke out a small GAAP operating profit in the short run from the changes made. It is still in a lousy competitive position against firms with stronger balance sheets and lower cost structures. My estimate of the long-run outcome has not changed. Avoid the stock and unsecured debt of GM.
P.S. At least GM is showing a little vigor relative to Ford (F:NYSE) , but that’s not saying much. Ford’s situation, if judged by the asset markets (stock, bond and credit-default swaps), has worsened relative to GM. Credit-default swaps now show Ford as more likely to default over the next five years than GM. What a mess.
At the time of publication, Merkel and/or his fund was short GM and Ford, though positions may change at any time.
FInally there is this piece four months ago, where I said: As I have said many times before GM common is an eventual zero.? Same for Ford.? All the errors in labor relations over the years, compounded with interest, are coming back to bite, hard.
Why throw good money after bad?? Why reward exceedingly lousy managers, and unions that have sucked the carcasses of the auto companies dry? Throw in $25 billion.? It won’t be enough.? Toyota and Honda are so much better managed, that they will win anyway.
In 2002, we let 20+ steel companies die.? The valuable assets were bought up, union contracts were torn up, and the industry regained sanity.? The industry is in much better shape today, and able to compete against the rest of the world.
We should do the same with the autos.? Let GM, Ford and Chrysler die.? Let Toyota, Honda, Daimler, Renault, Hyundai, Magna, Kirk Kerkorian (dreamer), etc., bid for the assets in bankruptcy.? Many jobs will be retained, though at fairer levels of compensation.? Remember my piece Rethinking Comparable Worth?? We are facing international comparable worth issues in labor in the auto sector now.
Before there were the possibilities with government bailouts, GM and Ford said they had more than enough cash.? But when the carrot of cheap financing is in front of them, they tell their tales of woe.? Examples from the media:
I could add to the examples in other sectors — MBIA and Ambac seem to be? headed to zero as well.? Another set of examples of too much debt and too little transparency.
But to close on the automakers, I highlight the well-written article at the Curious Capitalist.? The companies are not as critical as their assets, which will be bought by others, and many of the jobs will be retained.? Any bailout will throw good money after bad, and will not preserve the auto industry here in the long run.
Full disclosure: long HMC MGA
Bloomberg sues the Fed for refusing to disclose what sort of collateral they are lending against.? I come at this from having worked in insurance for two decades.? Insurers have to disclose every asset that they own in their Statutory filings.? When I looked at a bank’s call report recently, I was surprised to see only summary data available.? The insurance industry has high disclosure, and it hasn’t hurt them.? Why should the Fed cower, and refuse to reveal what they are lending against?? Five possibilities, and none of them good:
For another example, I would be happy to see who they are lending to in their CPFF program.? Are they lending a lot to AIG through CP?? Anyone else notice that AIG is A-/A3 from S&P and Moody’s which would make them A-2/P-2, and ineligible for the Fed to lend to, but S&P and Moody’s still have them at A-1/P-1.? Weird.
In my opinion, there is no good reason why the Fed can’t disclose the collateral, and the institutions involved.? They assure us that they are being upright and prudent; let them prove it.
There is a common error with contrarian investing.? It is not a question of identifying things that people believe that are wrong, but finding things that people rely on that are wrong.? Reliance is the critical component.? I don’t care about what people think if they don’t have any skin in the game.? When someone relies on a certain result happening (or not happening), then there will be series of behaviors that happen as what he believes in fails, from intensifying the bet in the early phases, to throwing in the towel in disgust at the end.
I’m going to take this idea and twist it a different way tonight.? One thing that the Democrats and Republicans (except Ron Paul) agree and rely on is that they know how to avoid a repeat of the Great Depression.? The textbook answer is:
Ben Bernanke learned this as a young college student, and built it up in his Ph. D. dissertation.? He has the same moral certainty about this that George Bush, Jr. does about fighting terrorism.? And, I’m going suggest that Bernanke, and most of the political establishment (which hasn’t really changed in the last few days) are wrong.
What is a bubble?? My definition: a bubble is a self-reinforcing cycle where monies invested obtain a negative return in aggregate over the long haul.? It is characterized by significant borrowing at low rates to invest in already appreciated assets in order to profit from a momentum-driven market.? When cash flow is insufficient to pay the interest to finance the bubble, the bubble pops, and a self-reinforcing bear market ensues.? When that bear market encompasses most of the financial system, we call it a depression.
What is a depression?? A severe recession where the banks are impaired.? In an ordinary recession, lowering the Fed funds rate can stimulate the banks to lend.? Not so now; the banks are licking their wounds, and letting profits grow by financing at lower rates, and sucking in bailout cash to shore up their balance sheets against future real estate lending losses.
The Great Depression ended when the Debt to GDP ratio dropped below 150%.? When enough debts were extinguished by payoff or default, the system could once again be normal.? Virtually none of the efforts of FDR focused on eliminating debts; in my opinion, he lengthened and intensified the Depression by not encouraging the liquidation of bad debts.? And now we do the same thing.? We perpetuate the misallocation of resources by trying to keep house prices high, by bailing out institutions that should go through the bankruptcy process.? This fails to convert bad debts into equity in newly solvent businesses.
All the US government is doing is creating a bigger bubble.? What will happen when the Treasury auctions fail, or, stretch the yield curve so wide that there is panic.? We don’t want our financial institutions to fail, so we are willing to wager the creditworthiness of the nation in order to save them.? I don’t like that bet.? Many empires have died choking on debt.? Is the US to be next?
When I wrote articles opposing the bailout, I did so because I did not think it would work, and that one-off conservations/liquidations would be preferable, but not optimal.? Optimal to me would be using the bankruptcy code on a expedited basis, wiping out junior capital, and making senior capital take haircuts.
But in the present, we contemplate borrowing to bail out all manner of problems — bail out homeowners, automakers, banks, insurers, guarantors, etc.? The end to this phase will come when the creditors of the US write off their prior lending, and decide not to throw good money after bad.? I have no idea when that time will come, but the dreamy schemes of politicians aiming to solve every financial hurt will help to force such a time to happen.
I enjoyed the pieces by Felix Salmon and James Surowiecki, and Eddy Elfenbein on how stocks work.? I have reproduced their arguments here, together with my thoughts.
Felix Salmon: What’s the relationship, in theory, between a company’s return on equity, on the one hand, and its stock price, on the other? Does a high return on equity mean a rising stock price, or is it a rising return on equity which means a rising stock price? Or, to put it another way: if one company has an ROE which is (expected to be) flat at 4%, and another company has an ROE which is (expected to be) flat at 14%, would you expect the latter to rise more than the former, or indeed either of them to rise at all?
Jim Surowiecki: Your first question, unfortunately, can’t really be answered in the abstract. It’s perfectly possible for a business with high returns on capital to still be overvalued – that is, for its stock price to overestimate the cash flows it will generate over time. In that case, the fact that a company is generating high returns on capital won’t translate into an increase in its stock price. Microsoft’s average return on invested capital, for instance, is consistently good – above 25% — but its stock is just about where it was a decade ago.
This speaks to your second question, which is really about expectations. If the market is accurately forecasting the returns on capital of the low-ROIC company and the high-ROIC company, you wouldn’t expect the latter’s stock price to dramatically outperform the former. But assuming both are fairly valued, the high-ROIC company will have a much higher valuation, meaning it will generate more income for shareholders going forward (in the form of dividends, buybacks, etc.)
That’s why, all things being equal, you want to own shares of companies that generate high returns on capital rather than those of companies that don’t. This is, in a way, self-evident. If you put money into a company, you want it to use that money to generate high returns, higher than you could get elsewhere. That’s what companies that have high returns on capital do: Microsoft earns an additional twenty-five cents for every dollar it invests. By contrast, companies with low returns on capital create less value, and companies that earn returns that are lower than their cost of capital (as was true of Japanese companies between 1990 and the early part of this century) actually destroy value for their shareholders.
Eddy Elfenbein: A company?s share price is the net present value of all future cash flows. A company?s return-on-equity is a measure of profits for the next year relative to present equity, so the two are connected. However, a high ROE does not translate to a rising share price, but a rising ROE should. Regarding your question, I would assume that the market has discounted both stocks? net present value which incorporates ROE. Therefore, I would only expect the stocks to rise at the pace of the risk-free rate plus the equity risk premium.
This may help: ROE can be broken down into three parts; profit margin, asset turnover and leverage. It goes like this:
Profit margin is earnings divided by sales. Asset turnover is sales divided by assets. Leverage is assets divided by equity.
Earnings……….Sales…………..Assets
—————X—————-X————–
Sales…………….Assets………..Equity
Note that the sales and assets cancel each other out to give you Earnings divided by Equity.
David Merkel: The question can be answered in the abstract, with some noise.? With a few assumptions/limitations as disclosed in this article, Quantitative Analysis is not Trivial ? The Case of PB-ROE.? In most mature industries where capital constrains growth, there is a linear relationship between price-to-book and and ROE.??? This is a result of the dividend discount model, given the assumptions of the article that I cited.
There is the inherent assumption that net worth is the limiting factor in doing new business.? If that is not the case, then the model does not work.? If sales is the limiting factors the equation becomes price-to-sales as a function of profit margins.
FS: What’s the relationship between stock price, ROE, and risk-free rate of return? Would one expect ROEs in a country with a zero risk-free rate to be lower than ROEs in a country with a higher risk-free rate? How does that feed in to stock prices, if at all?
JS: You would expect returns on invested capital to be lower in countries with lower risk-free rates (like Japan). Two reasons suggest themselves for this: first, the low risk-free rate may be indicative of lower growth prospects for the economy as a whole. But also, when the risk-free rate is low, the hurdle rate for corporate investments is also lower (because investors’ expectations of what counts as a reasonable return are also lower.) That may make companies more likely to invest in low-return projects. Both factors have something to do with why Japanese firms have underperformed over the last twenty years (and in particular in that 1990-2002 stretch). But I think the most important factors explaining the low ROIC of Japanese firms were their indifference to shareholder value and their willingness to invest in value-destroying projects.
EE: Again, a company?s share price is the net present value of all future cash flows. ROE is the best measure of the growth of future cash flows. How do we discount that? We discount it by the cost of capital which is risk-free rate plus an equity-risk premium. That?s why a lower risk-free rate tends to boost equity prices.
According to the Gordon Model, it should look something like this:
Price = Earnings/(Risk Free Rate + Equity Risk Premium – ROE)
DM: The risk free rate often has little to do with where corporations can source funds.? Eddy talks about the equity risk premium, but that varies over time.? At present that risk premium is high.? If the country in question is in a liquidity trap, like Japan, equity risk premiums are high.? In general, equity risk premiums are a free market, and disconnected from the “risk free rate” represented by short government bonds
FS: How can a company with a positive ROE destroy economic value for shareholders?
JS: The key to understanding how a company with a positive ROE can nonetheless destroy economic value is simply recognizing that equity is not free. It has a cost, just like debt does, a cost that reflects the return that investors demand as compensation for the risks and opportunity costs that owning equities entail. We can debate how to calculate that cost of equity (risk-free rate + market risk premium is a simple solution). But the basic principle is, as I said above, that a company is only creating economic value for its shareholders if it’s earning more than its cost of capital. Again, this is intuitive: if you were the part owner of a company that, on a risk-adjusted basis, was earning less than the yield you could get on a 30-year T-bill, you probably wouldn’t keep your money in that company, because you would effectively be losing money with every day that passed. Shareholders feel the same way, so the share prices of companies that earn less than their cost of capital are unlikely to rise over time. According to a study by the Japanese government, Japanese companies’ return on capital was below their cost of capital for roughly the entire decade of the 1990s through 2002. If you want to know why Japanese stock prices fell precipitously during that period, that’s the biggest reason why: the companies weren’t creating any value for shareholders. And what made it worse was that, as a result of the bubble, expectations were already inordinately high.
One thing I should say, though: Japanese companies have significantly improved their performance in the past five years, and there’s a strong case to be made that, as in the U.S., the recent sell-off of the Nikkei has been massively overdone. In fact, if you think that the transformation of Japanese firms in recent years will be long-lasting (I’m agnostic on the question), then the Nikkei looks very undervalued right now – or at least it did before it rose something like 15% in the last week and a half.
EE: All companies in all industries are in phantom competition with the cost of equity capital. Even though you can?t see it, you?re struggling against it every day. So even if a company manages to squeak out positive ROE, capital will not flow your way if you keep losing to everybody else.
DM: No disagreement here.? Companies must earn more than their cost of capital in order to add value.? This helps explain why low positive ROEs trade at a discount to book value.
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That’s all, and spite of all the discussion here, I own shares of? Honda Motors and the SPDR Russell/Nomura Small Cap Japan ETF,
Full disclosure: long JSC HMC
I regularly read “A Dash of Insight,” and greatly appreciate the commentary of Dr. Jeff Miller.? What I write here is an effort to encourage what he wrote in this piece advising President-Elect Obama.? (I would have my own advice for the President, but there are so many vying for his ear now, that I sigh and say “Let the poor man get on with it.? He will be imprisoned for the next four years, and likely find less capability of doing what he wants than he imagined.”)
How would one implement what Dr. Jeff suggests?? As a bond manager, I was pretty good at price discovery.? I would convene a committee of large holders of the illiquid instruments and ask them what are the largest classes of homogeneous structured securities that no longer have markets now.? Once they agree on the classes (probably the AAA portions of the senior-sub structured ABS, RMBS and CMBS deals), the agent for the Treasury picks a subset of the largest deals, and announces how much of each security (say 10% of each tranche) they will offer to buy.
Market participants are then invited to submit binding offers to sell any amount of the securities up to the maximum.? The Treasury’s agent could require a minimum amount of bids in order for an auction to be valid (say 2-3x the purchase amount).
One tweak I would put in would be to award the bonds to the winning bidders at the price offered by the bidder with the highest bid not receiving bonds.? I used this successfully for years in bond auctions, and though it makes the trader shake his head initially, when I would say, “I’m offering protection against regret in advance, besides, I want aggressive bids.” they would say, “Okay, I get it.”
After the auctions, there would be benchmark prices, yields, and spreads for a wide number of securities, and then the modelers would apply those prices to the mezzanine and maybe the subordinate tranches, which are too small to hold auctions for.
Similar securities might find trading levels as well, but if not, the Treasury could run another set of auctions, and repeat as necessary.? Given the most of the securities auctioned are AAA, at worst, the Fed might have an interest in the short-to-intermediate AAA paper.
If the Treasury followed a procedure like this, it could unjam the securitized fixed income markets, and do so at prices where the taxpayer bears modest losses at best.? I am not as optimistic as Bill Gross or Warren Buffett on this matter.? The point of the auction is to get the sellers to compete against each other, not compete with the government’s agent.
Now, price discovery is a two-edged sword.? FInding the market clearing price will make the markets start moving again, but it also might prove that some financial institutions are inverted (negative net worth), if not insolvent (can’t get enough cash to pay all immediate claims).? If we are willing to stomach the possible insolvencies that this will reveal, then I am game for Dr. Jeff’s proposal.
And, maybe this will show the need for RTC II, successor to the old Resolution Trust Company.? Bad financial institutions need to be conserved/liquidated, so that leverage can be reduced in the financial system of the US.
So, let something like this be tried, but be ready for adverse consequences if the pricing turns out to be worse than anticipated.
