Day: December 12, 2008

What Do You Have To Hide? (II)

What Do You Have To Hide? (II)

Ding!? Round one ends in the legal fight between Bloomberg, LP, and The Federal Reserve.? The Columbia Journalism Review provides a summary, as does Bloomberg itself.

Some preliminaries:

  • Here’s the original complaint.
  • Here’s the amended and expanded complaint.
  • Here’s a redacted version, showing the changes.? (Please note I scanned two bitmap documents, and did OCR on them, and ran a document compare — there may be some errors here, but I did the best that I could.)? The main expansion of the complaint is the inclusion of a request for documents related to the Bear Stearns rescue.? It also clarifies that it is looking for loan records.
  • Here’s the the Fed’s answer to the amended and expanded complaint.

The Fed’s basic response is that no documents exist for some of the requests, that it has turned over some documents, but is holding onto pages of 231 documents for which they claim to have an exemption under FOIA.? They claim exemptions 4 and 5, which are (from Wikipedia):

  • 4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
  • 5) inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;

This is just my take, and I could be wrong, but it seems to me that the Fed refuses to disclose on the grounds that the documents are sensitive since they contain confidential financial information, or, they involve inter- or intra-agency communication, such as with the Treasury, or inside the Fed itself.? Point 5 seems to be a pretty broad exemption, but it remains to be proven whether the information is of such a nature that only an inter-agency suit could force divulging the data.

I repeat my five points from my last piece on why they might want to hide the information:

  • The Fed is breaking its own rules, and lending on collateral that it publicly said that it wouldn?t lend against.
  • They are playing favorites with institutions, and don?t want that to be revealed.
  • The assets in question are technically in compliance with the rules of the Fed, but are worth far less than the amount loaned against them.
  • Certain banks would be embarrassed by revealing what they own.
  • It?s just a power game, and the Fed thinks it is above the law, particularly during a crisis (that it helped to cause).

As pointed out in the Bloomberg article above, there is a good possibility that they are trying to hide the amount that they have lost already.? Also, as I have pointed out in my last piece on this topic, the insurance industry discloses everything with their assets, and it does not harm them.? It would not hurt banks to do the same, and certainly if it is a matter of this one limited disclosure, the confidentiality of the banks would probably not be materially harmed.

So, Federal Reserve, what do you have to hide?

The Progress of Debt

The Progress of Debt

After I posted this graph, many asked me for the data source:

http://static.10gen.com/clusterstock.com/~~/f?id=4908b4ee796c7a2000ff5a89&ctxt=wwwr1.7.1&maxX=620&maxY=471

So, I tried to replicate it, and got close — my data only begins in 1952, but the shape of the graph from there is similar, though the levels are a little lower.

/www/alephblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/

The debt figures came from the Federal Reserve’s Z.1 report, adding the Domestic nonfinancial sectors and Domestic financial sectors data from the D.3 table.? I think I would reproduce the first graph if I added in the foreign debt, but that is money borrowed by foreign institutions from US institutions.? But, that’s not what I am trying to analyze.? I don’t care about the debts of other countries (for this purpose), only that of the US.

This graph tells two stories:

1) Increasing financial intermediation over the last 56 years, with a small over-reported disintermediation in the mid-70s.? (For this purpose, money market funds are intermediaries.)

2) Relatively stable debt levels until the middle of the Reagan Administration, and then a rapid increase over the next 23 years.? The increase was faster for the second term of Reagan, and for Bush, Jr, and slower for Bush, Sr, and Clinton.? That said, the increase in financial intermediation accelerated during the terms of Bush, Sr, and Clinton.? Securitization was running ahead, and no one was questioning it.

Upshot

From 1984 through 2008, the financial system of the US experienced a quantum leap in terms of size and complexity, which was enabled by regulatory policy and monetary policy.? Monetary policy did not take away the punchbowl, and regulatory policy did not check to see if banks were lending prudently or not.? Both were corrosive in the long term to a fiat currency system in the US.? Both were promoted by politicians, because they accelerated “prosperity” in the US.? Pity that the prosperity was fake in aggregate.

My friend Caroline Baum argues that central banks should fight debt and asset bubbles.? I agree.? Perhaps if central banks should have a dual mandate, it should be to maintain? a certain inflation level (fairly calculated), and a certain debt/GDP ratio, say 150% at maximum.? Ignore labor unemployment, and let people maximize their efforts within a paradigm that would not be given to big booms and busts.

I think this would be a good system, but I am open to comments.

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