Day: March 7, 2009

Unstable Value Funds? (IV)

Unstable Value Funds? (IV)

This should be my last post on this topic for a while.? I thank those that sent me additional data that agreed with my theses in the piece Unstable Value Funds? (III).? I would like to start by quoting from my piece at RealMoney The Biggest Asset Class You Never Heard Of.

The bonds held in stable value funds can’t be valued at book value, because accounting rules require that they be held at market. The stable value pool goes out and purchases derivatives known as wrap agreements in order to allow the bonds to be held at book value. The wrap agreements agree to pay or receive money if any of the bonds have to be liquidated at a loss or gain respectively, thus making the fund whole for any book-value loss.

Typically, wrap agreements are only done on the highest-rated bonds, AAA, so credit risk is not covered by most wrap agreements. With most wrap agreements, once a payment is received or made by the wrapper, the wrapper enters into a countervailing transaction with the pool to pay or receive, respectively, a stream of payments over the life of the bond that was wrapped equal to the present value of the initial payment when the bond was tapped. The wrapper bears almost no risk in the arrangement; the risks are rated back to the stable value pool, and the stable value pool pays for the gains and losses through an adjustment to the pool’s credited rate. Because wrappers bear almost no risk, wrap pricing in 401(k)-type plans is typically 0.05%-0.10% per year of assets wrapped. The only risk a wrapper faces is that the interest-rate-related losses on a bond in a rising interest rate scenario are so severe that the losses can’t be repaid out of the yield of the wrapped bond. In this case, the wrapper would have to pay without reimbursement.

Interest Rate Risks

Stable value funds attempt to maintain a stable share price, but the assets underlying the fund vary as interest rates, prepayment behavior and credit spreads change. There is almost always a difference between the book value of the assets, expressed by the NAV, and the market value. When the stable value fund has a higher market value than book value, typically it pays an above-market yield. There is a risk that in an environment where interest rates have risen sharply, a stable value fund would have a lower market value than book value, with a below-market yield. In a situation like this, particularly when the yield curve inverts, there is a risk that shareholders in the stable value fund will leave in search of higher yields. If that happens to a high degree, it will worsen the gap between the market value and book value of assets. That gap will be covered by the wrappers in the short run but will reduce the fund’s yield as it pays the wrappers back. It is unlikely but possible to get a death spiral here if more and more shareholders leave the pool and the yield sags to zero. It hasn’t happened yet, so this is theoretical for now. In theory, the wrappers would keep paying once the fund’s credited rate dropped to zero, so no one would lose money unless a wrapper defaulted on his obligation. There probably would be some legal wrangling in such an event; the wrappers might try to get the fund manager to take on some of the liability, or negotiate down the amount owed, leaving policyholders with a loss. In 401(k) plans, there are limitations on transferring funds out of a stable value fund to funds that would offer an easy arbitrage, so the risk of a death spiral is further reduced but not eliminated.

Asset Default Risks

For the most part, stable value funds take little credit risk, but it’s little known that this is not universally true. Some of these funds buy corporate bonds or other, more riskily structured product bonds. Some of them take credit risk in hidden ways. For example, there are some exotic, asset- or commercial-mortgage-backed interest-only bonds that are rated AAA by the rating agencies. The agencies rate them AAA because they can’t lose principal; they have no principal to lose. But if the loans underlying the interest-only bonds default or prepay, the interest stream gets shortened. The sensitivity on these securities to default risk is more akin to BB or BBB bonds, but a manager using them can count them as AAA. If an asset in a stable value fund defaults, the fund probably will temporarily suspend withdrawals while the managers pursue one or two courses of action. If the loss is small, its managers might buy a wrap contract for the loss, which will give a haircut to the yield on the stable value fund for the life of the wrap contract. If the loss is big, they will reduce the NAV and attempt to keep the NAV stable from there. Given the history of money market funds breaking the buck, it is possible that the fund manager might pony up the funds to make the stable value fund whole, but I wouldn’t rely on that.

I want to publicly thank Chris Tobe for writing to me.? He brought me back up to speed on some aspects of stable value that I was not in touch with.? (Any errors here are mine, not his.)? After reading what he sent me, there are two major risks.? One I have described in-depth: credit risk.? The other I described in my RealMoney piece: wrapper risk.

When the market value of assets is lower than the book value of assets, the wrapper covers the difference when withdrawals are made.? But the difference typically gets amortized into the credited rate of the stable value fund, lowering the interest rate credited to pay back the wrapper.

But what if the interest rate were forced to zero?? Then the wrapper would take losses.? Investors take losses is if the wrapper is insolvent when book value is more than market value.? The stable value fund could try to replace the wrapper, but it will come out of the hides of investors, unless the management company bears it.

There aren’t many wrappers today.? Here’s a list:

  • JP Morgan
  • State Street
  • RBC
  • CDC
  • AEGON
  • ING
  • Pacific Life
  • AIG (few buying from them)
  • Rabobank (not accepting new business)

As such, with the current financial stress, wrap fees have doubled.? There is more need for wrap capacity than is currently available.? There is the potential for losses as wrappers could go into insolvency.

But how big is this problem for investors?? The stable value marketplace is very big, though the severity of any loss should be small — under 10% of capital on average (some could be worse than 10%).

There are two troubles here.? First, because the stable value industry does not reveal the market value of their assets under management.? The opaqueness adds to the mystery.? Second, because the stable value funds have more accounting flexibility than most investment options, they can wait much longer than a money maket fund, which must declare a credit event if the NAV of the MMF is under 99.5%.? There is not such a threshold for a stable value fund.? The risk is that a stable value fund engages in wishful thinking, assuming that the value of their bonds will rebound, and the rebound does not happen.

Is a loss of 5% horrible, in an investment that is supposed to be safe?? How about 10%?? 20%?? I can’t go over 20%, the fund managers must act by then.

It is likely that losses will be small in the stable value option, but losses are a real possiblity.? Transferring assets to other fixed income options or other stable options could be smart.

Opportunities in Bank Bonds, Part 1

Opportunities in Bank Bonds, Part 1

The following piece was written about two weeks ago for Finacorp clients.? If you are an institutional investor, and would like to be a Finacorp client, please e-mail me.

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Before I get to my main topic, bank bonds, I need to explain my overall theory for this economic crisis. We are presently in a period of debt deflation. This follows a long period where government policy encouraged the buildup of private debt as a ratio of GDP to levels not seen since the Great Depression. Since 1984, the Federal Reserve ran a predominantly easy monetary policy that was quick to bring back the punchbowl the moment the economy showed modest strains.

Under such ?favorable? management of monetary policy, businessmen and consumers bid up the prices of assets, and borrowed money to do it. The additional buying power from leverage set in motion a self-reinforcing cycle that raised asset values, and raised the willingness of lenders to lend progressively more on those assets on favorable terms.

In addition to easy monetary policy, there were other factors that contributed to the increase in leverage. Securitization gave new classes of loans liquidity during the bull phase of the cycle, as leverage built up. Also, bank examiners were increasingly ?hands off? in reviewing the solvency of banks. Derivatives also made the balance sheets of financial institutions more opaque, making regulation more difficult.

Equilibrium is a weak concept in economics. Weak, because most of neoclassical economics relies on the concept that markets tend toward equilibrium. If there is a tendency toward equilibrium, in all my years as a practical economist, that tendency is weak at best. Capitalist economies are dynamic, and equilibria are fleeting. Also, when the government intervenes, it changes the terms of what an equilibrium would be.

But eventually, the unsustainability of the increase in debt would eventually be revealed, and the inability of the assets to service the debt would appear. The value of the assets had been inflated far above equilibrium levels, and a self-reinforcing cycle in falling asset prices began, with a collapse in leverage as defaults grew.

I call this a depression, and it is little different than what happened prior to and during the Great Depression. Monetary policy is tight. Ben Bernanke may not think of it as tight, but his actions are not inflating the nominal value of collateral in order to lessen the debt load. We are facing nationalistic sentiment across the globe, and the international division of labor is breaking down. The only thing different at present is that fiscal policy is as loose as loose can be. Average Americans are blinking at what the government is doing with a sense of moral horror, because those who were imprudent are rewarded by those who were prudent.

How this Affects the Banks

In this environment, bank balance sheets get compromised. The value of loans decline as creditworthiness falls and defaults rise. Also, there are unique securities that were previously thought ?money good.? They trade at low prices because there is a scarcity of buyers who can genuinely buy and hold for the duration of the security. Balance sheets are never big enough or long enough during the bust phase of a cycle, and few risk managers run stress tests severe enough for a bust phase like we are in now.

So, the Government Intervenes

The US Government acts in a wide number of ways in order to fight the crisis. The FDIC takes over failed institutions and sells them off with some degree of subsidy in those banks in deeper trouble. In some situations, where there is a large derivatives counterparty, like AIG, the government acts to protect the stability of the financial system as a whole. Granted, the government should ignore holding companies, and focus on the regulated subsidiaries that are a legitimate interest of the government, but at least in the initial phases of this crisis, the government has allocated funds to holding companies. This is a boon to those that hold holding company unsecured bonds, but expensive to the taxpayers. How long will the largesse continue?

Away from that, we have the distraction of Congress as they try to:

  • Make the banks lend more
  • Control remuneration to employees
  • And control spending on conferences and other normal aspects of business where rewarding talented employees and loyal customers is the norm.

Away from all of this, the Fed tries to heal lending markets at the risk of replacing them. So it goes.

Government Action is not Big Enough, or Effective Enough

The government is a big player in the economy, but not so big that it can dictate terms independently. The economy is larger than the resources of the government; if the government tries to keep the price of a large asset class like residential housing above its equilibrium level, it will fail as borrowers line up for a lot of loans.

But there are other factors that make the response of the government weaker:

  • They don?t really understand the crisis that they are in. They will try any Keynesian remedy, even though it won?t work.
  • There is enough disagreement in Congress over what to do, that any approved project is a hash, and not capable of fixing the problems.
  • The Fed will create a bunch of obscure lending programs, but won?t let inflation take hold which might help those with assets that are underwater.
  • There is a limit on what the government can borrow, ill-defined as that is. International lenders will balk, and domestic lenders will look for higher rates.

Taxation capacity of the government is limited as well. Who wants to raise taxes during a severe recession?

So what can we expect today?

Let?s start with the recent past. What have the Federal Government?s actions been with respect to the financial sector so far, and how have bondholders been affected? Here is a non-comprehensive list:


Company

Government Action

Effect on Bonds

Bear Stearns

Forced sale to JP Morgan, with some government asset purchases. Equity gets a seemingly low price.

Bonds are still money good.

Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac

Pseudo-nationalization. Equity gets diluted down to near zero, preferred also. Government backstopping the large losses for now, leaving debt capitalization unaffected.

Senior bonds are money good, and may become pari passu with Treasuries eventually.

AIG

Pseudo-nationalization. Equity gets diluted down to near zero, preferred also. Government backstopping the large losses for now, leaving debt capitalization unaffected.

Senior bonds seem to be money good for now, but increasing losses make that less than certain.

Lehman Brothers

No action. Lehman goes into Chapter 11. Common and preferred are wipeouts.

Senior bonds not money good. Recovery values very low and speculative.

Countrywide

Encouraged a merger with Bank of America

As good as Bank of America, with some small amount of extra legal risk

Merrill Lynch

Encouraged a merger with Bank of America

As good as Bank of America, with some small amount of extra legal risk

Washington Mutual

Encouraged a merger with JP Morgan

JPM did not take on all of the bonds. The bonds taken on is JPM quality, and that not taken on is risky.

IndyMac

FDIC took it into conservation, and is selling off the pieces

No bonds

Citigroup

Large investment from the TARP. Guarantee of a large amount of assets. May need even more?

Government actions have helped the position of the bondholders so far. The question is how much more is the government willing to do?

Bank of America

Large investment from the TARP. Guarantee of a large amount of assets. May need even more?

Government actions have helped the position of the bondholders so far. The question is how much more is the government willing to do?

Downey Federal

Filed for liquidation; US Bancorp buys the operating companies.

Bonds trade near zero

Group of large banks receiving unasked-for aid

TARP money was offered to, even forced on some banks. Since the TARP investment is senior preferred. Warrants go along with the TARP money for shares equal to 15% of the preferred investment. Slight chance of dilution.

Government actions have helped the position of the bondholders so far. The question is how much more is the government willing to do?

There are a few common threads here. In general, where the government intervenes, they do so through preferred and common stock investments, and occasionally buying liabilities in situations of severe stress. Also, aside from the takeovers that went through the FDIC, in general, the government has been bailing out holding companies directly, rather than regulated operating entities, which is an odd way of assuring solvency of the financial sector.

So far, all of these actions support the position of bondholders. When the bailouts began to happen, there was some talk of protecting senior unsecured bonds among policymakers, but nothing formal was set as a policy.

Increasingly, there is talk in the media of why bondholders get off the hook so easily, so this operational hypothesis may come under political pressure, particularly since many bonds are issued at the holding company. The holding company can go under with a low level of impact on the regulated operating entities, which if the regulators have been doing their jobs (cough, cough) they should be able to stand on their own, or sold off to better management teams.

Also, this does not apply to smaller institutions. There is some size level where the regulators say, ?Liquidate and sell off the pieces.? Even for the small banks that got small amounts of TARP money, the regulators will let them go under. TARP 1 was a unique exercise where the money flowed freely with very little in the way of restrictions. That won?t happen again.

If this crisis gets larger, and I think it will, with many entities asking for money, and many coming for second, third, fourth, fifth, etc. allotments of aid, the political will to protect the banks and other financials will erode. Along with that will erode support for holding company bondholders.

Opinion:

In bonds, better safe than sorry. So far government actions have supported bondholders, but that may not persist for a number of reasons:

  • As the crisis gets larger, the resources of the government will get stretched. Already, the government is feeling pinched.
  • Political pressure is building to make the bondholders of bailed out institutions feel some pain.
  • The rationale behind bailing out holding companies is dubious. Eventually policymakers will not bailout holding companies because it does not protect the financial system.
  • So far returns on government actions have been poor, to say the least. The concept that the government would make money on this was laughable at the time, but now it is proven ridiculous.
  • Eventually the government will take larger insolvencies through the FDIC, and bondholders will accept some amount of equity and warrants for their bonds.

Buying financial holding company bonds is a bet on stability of policy, and that the crisis does not grow. There may be some opportunities in buying unsecured bonds of financial companies here, but institutions relying on government support may prove to be poor investments, because the odds of policy shifting against bondholders is moderate. Don?t assume that ?too big to fail? means that holding company bondholders get a free pass.

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