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> <channel><title>Comments on: Of Course not at Par; That&#8217;s Par for the Course</title> <atom:link href="http://alephblog.com/2009/03/31/of-course-not-at-par-thats-par-for-the-course/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><link>http://alephblog.com/2009/03/31/of-course-not-at-par-thats-par-for-the-course/</link> <description>Helping Institutions and Ordinary People Invest Better by Focusing on Risk Control</description> <lastBuildDate>Fri, 25 May 2012 21:31:47 +0000</lastBuildDate> <sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod> <sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency> <generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1</generator> <item><title>By: david foster</title><link>http://alephblog.com/2009/03/31/of-course-not-at-par-thats-par-for-the-course/comment-page-1/#comment-21365</link> <dc:creator>david foster</dc:creator> <pubDate>Thu, 02 Apr 2009 15:41:41 +0000</pubDate> <guid
isPermaLink="false">http://alephblog.com/?p=1568#comment-21365</guid> <description>One thing that would help is for banks to provide investors with much more transparent and granular data about what the assets are, the performance to date, and the assumed future performance of these assets. I thought the recent marathon GE Capital conference call was a good step in that direction.</description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>One thing that would help is for banks to provide investors with much more transparent and granular data about what the assets are, the performance to date, and the assumed future performance of these assets. I thought the recent marathon GE Capital conference call was a good step in that direction.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: David Merkel</title><link>http://alephblog.com/2009/03/31/of-course-not-at-par-thats-par-for-the-course/comment-page-1/#comment-21359</link> <dc:creator>David Merkel</dc:creator> <pubDate>Thu, 02 Apr 2009 00:52:22 +0000</pubDate> <guid
isPermaLink="false">http://alephblog.com/?p=1568#comment-21359</guid> <description>Another way to say it is, if the regulators use MTM, the bank should run at lower levels of leverage to reflect that pro-cyclicality -- i.e., put in a provision for adverse deviation; don&#039;t count on any capital that mysteriously appears due to MTM during the boom phase.
Oh, the insurance regulators force life insurers to do just that.  Could it be that the conservative state insurance regulators did a better job than the Feds on banking? Yes.</description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Another way to say it is, if the regulators use MTM, the bank should run at lower levels of leverage to reflect that pro-cyclicality &#8212; i.e., put in a provision for adverse deviation; don&#8217;t count on any capital that mysteriously appears due to MTM during the boom phase.</p><p>Oh, the insurance regulators force life insurers to do just that.  Could it be that the conservative state insurance regulators did a better job than the Feds on banking? Yes.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: David Merkel</title><link>http://alephblog.com/2009/03/31/of-course-not-at-par-thats-par-for-the-course/comment-page-1/#comment-21358</link> <dc:creator>David Merkel</dc:creator> <pubDate>Thu, 02 Apr 2009 00:40:13 +0000</pubDate> <guid
isPermaLink="false">http://alephblog.com/?p=1568#comment-21358</guid> <description>John Thomas, the regulators are not constrained to using MTM, they can change that any time they want.  It was an industry request to move to MTM for regulatory purposes during the boom phase.  The industry can request the regulators change now -- that doesn&#039;t involve SFAS 157 -- investors deserve to know the state of affairs at their companies.  Regulatory capital is another thing.
In the life insurance industry, we do tests to avoid these scenarios.  If a scenario has surplus go negative, we have to allocate reserves for it, equal to the present value of the deficit.  It&#039;s a good system -- perhaps the banking regulators should adopt it.
The banking industry made too many risky loans on inadequate capital bases.  Their overlending, individually and as a group, created a situation where there is not enough balance sheet capacity to hold long-duration assets.  Thus the prices sag.
I&#039;ve worked for firms that said in a crisis they could write their way out of it.  That rarely works.  The high quality companies get a disproportionate amount of the new business, and those on the ropes don&#039;t make it.
MTM was a best a bit player in this crisis; besides, most of the banks I know have been using the flexibility of SFAS 157 to overmark, not undermark assets.
The big issue was overleverage; the banks played with inadequate capital.  Now asset defaults are overwhelming that capital.</description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>John Thomas, the regulators are not constrained to using MTM, they can change that any time they want.  It was an industry request to move to MTM for regulatory purposes during the boom phase.  The industry can request the regulators change now &#8212; that doesn&#8217;t involve SFAS 157 &#8212; investors deserve to know the state of affairs at their companies.  Regulatory capital is another thing.</p><p>In the life insurance industry, we do tests to avoid these scenarios.  If a scenario has surplus go negative, we have to allocate reserves for it, equal to the present value of the deficit.  It&#8217;s a good system &#8212; perhaps the banking regulators should adopt it.</p><p>The banking industry made too many risky loans on inadequate capital bases.  Their overlending, individually and as a group, created a situation where there is not enough balance sheet capacity to hold long-duration assets.  Thus the prices sag.</p><p>I&#8217;ve worked for firms that said in a crisis they could write their way out of it.  That rarely works.  The high quality companies get a disproportionate amount of the new business, and those on the ropes don&#8217;t make it.</p><p>MTM was a best a bit player in this crisis; besides, most of the banks I know have been using the flexibility of SFAS 157 to overmark, not undermark assets.</p><p>The big issue was overleverage; the banks played with inadequate capital.  Now asset defaults are overwhelming that capital.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: john thomas</title><link>http://alephblog.com/2009/03/31/of-course-not-at-par-thats-par-for-the-course/comment-page-1/#comment-21350</link> <dc:creator>john thomas</dc:creator> <pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2009 21:29:59 +0000</pubDate> <guid
isPermaLink="false">http://alephblog.com/?p=1568#comment-21350</guid> <description>David, you really have no idea on the &quot;cause and effect&quot; of Mark to Market accounting, do you? The very essence is to magnify economic strength or weakness when what the desired effect should be steadying/ minimalizing the swings. M to M artificially restricts capital well past &quot;the true levels&quot; which in turn constricts the economy at a time when it should be the most profitable lending cycle for financials (upsloped yield curves w/ lower priced securitization) this is the BOON period for the banks BUT...M to M has their hands and capital tied...and has choked off the natural recovery stage for these financials. If defaults actually hit the 45% that markets are currently pricing paper at, well let these firms take the losses as they occur, my guess is they will earn enough to stay afloat thru new lucrative loans. To choke off the natural ebb&#039;s and flows of the financials also does the same to the economy...maybe that&#039;s why we haven&#039;t had a meltdown since M to M was thrown out in &#039;38.</description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>David, you really have no idea on the &#8220;cause and effect&#8221; of Mark to Market accounting, do you? The very essence is to magnify economic strength or weakness when what the desired effect should be steadying/ minimalizing the swings. M to M artificially restricts capital well past &#8220;the true levels&#8221; which in turn constricts the economy at a time when it should be the most profitable lending cycle for financials (upsloped yield curves w/ lower priced securitization) this is the BOON period for the banks BUT&#8230;M to M has their hands and capital tied&#8230;and has choked off the natural recovery stage for these financials. If defaults actually hit the 45% that markets are currently pricing paper at, well let these firms take the losses as they occur, my guess is they will earn enough to stay afloat thru new lucrative loans. To choke off the natural ebb&#8217;s and flows of the financials also does the same to the economy&#8230;maybe that&#8217;s why we haven&#8217;t had a meltdown since M to M was thrown out in &#8217;38.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: tradahmike</title><link>http://alephblog.com/2009/03/31/of-course-not-at-par-thats-par-for-the-course/comment-page-1/#comment-21339</link> <dc:creator>tradahmike</dc:creator> <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2009 18:23:32 +0000</pubDate> <guid
isPermaLink="false">http://alephblog.com/?p=1568#comment-21339</guid> <description>Right on, David, you nailed it:
&quot;It is quite possible that we are in a depression, and as such, there are too many assets relative to the ability to fund them — asset values must fall.&quot;
This is the core issue, everyone else is just talking their own book, hoping that things will get better.
Assets will be dirt cheap. Figuring out how to improve the utilization of the excess asset base will be the key challenge in generating better-than-average cash flows in the upcoming Brave New World. IMO.</description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Right on, David, you nailed it:</p><p>&#8220;It is quite possible that we are in a depression, and as such, there are too many assets relative to the ability to fund them — asset values must fall.&#8221;</p><p>This is the core issue, everyone else is just talking their own book, hoping that things will get better.</p><p>Assets will be dirt cheap. Figuring out how to improve the utilization of the excess asset base will be the key challenge in generating better-than-average cash flows in the upcoming Brave New World. IMO.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> <item><title>By: vbrief.com</title><link>http://alephblog.com/2009/03/31/of-course-not-at-par-thats-par-for-the-course/comment-page-1/#comment-21337</link> <dc:creator>vbrief.com</dc:creator> <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2009 11:19:00 +0000</pubDate> <guid
isPermaLink="false">http://alephblog.com/?p=1568#comment-21337</guid> <description>&lt;strong&gt;Of course not at par; that’s par for the course...&lt;/strong&gt;
There are several truths well-known to educated investors that have been glossed over in all of the discussions of mark-to-market accounting....</description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Of course not at par; that’s par for the course&#8230;</strong></p><p>There are several truths well-known to educated investors that have been glossed over in all of the discussions of mark-to-market accounting&#8230;.</p> ]]></content:encoded> </item> </channel> </rss>
