This is a clean-up post to finish my work on AIG. I caught an error in my work which overstated the degree to which Alico was funded by AIG common stock back at the beginning of 2008. I said it was almost entire, but rechecking, half of Alico’s net worth was backed by AIG common stock. Still ridiculous, but not as much so.
I also corrected the word “centimillion” to be “hectomillion.” Thanks to reader IF, who pointed this out.
There were a few small grammar errors corrected as well. the complete document can be found here. That doesn’t mean the document is perfect. I miss my editor Gretchen from my RealMoney days.
Now, I have started to pass this around to a few other financial bloggers, and my mainstream media contacts. We’ll see if it goes anywhere. One blogger said to me, “You are aware that many of the legit AIG INS subsidiaries were festooned with AIG FP junk?”
I looked at that and my heart sank… what could I have missed? I grabbed the 45 or so statutory statements, and rummaged through the derivative counterparty disclosures, and found that indeed AIGFP was the leading derivative counterparty to the subsidiaries. But after collateral posted, and netting, none of the (almost entirely life) subsidiaries had exposure more than 1-2% of surplus.
So, unless AIG buried AIGFP exposure through structured bonds on Schedule D, or schedule BA partnerships, and didn’t disclose it in the related parties disclosures, the exposure of the OISs to AIGFP was small. Whew.
Now, should I send the article to those that will grill Ed Liddy on May 13th? I like Ed Liddy, so I don’t want to make his life tougher.
Unrelated note: kudos to Dr. Jeff Miller on his piece on economic strength today. ECRI makes me stand up and take notice, their methods are so good. My only short-term misgivings are the continued stress in residential and commercial real estate lending markets. I don’t know how ECRI deals with those.