Archive for October 20th, 2009

Toward a New Theory of the Cost of Equity Capital, Part 2

Tuesday, October 20th, 2009

When I write a piece, and entitle it “Toward…” it means that I don’t have all of the answers.  Typically I think I am getting somewhere, but the speed of progress is open to question.  That said, good questions and constructive criticism aid me on my way.

From Private Equity Beat at the WSJ: Toward a new theory of the cost of equity capital, on the Aleph Blog. We confess to not being entirely up on the benefits of Modern Portfolio Theory versus Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorems, which is probably why we are journalists and not PE execs. But we nonetheless find this analysis of how to price equity interesting.

From Eddy Elfenbein at Crossing Wall Street: I like the logic, but my question is—what if a firm has little or no debt?

Good question.  The total volatility of a firm can be broken up into three pieces: financial leverage, operating leverage, and sales volatility.  Saturday’s piece dealt with financial leverage and its costs.  An unlevered firm in the financial sense still possesses operating leverage and volatility of sales.  Different unlevered firms have different costs of equity capital because they have different levels of sales volatility, and different degrees of operating leverage.

That will manifest itself in option implied volatility, which is a crude measure of what people would pay to gain and lose exposure to the equity of the company.  The cost of equity should be positively related to that.  More volatile companies should have a higher cost of equity.

Another way to look at it is to ask what is the effect on the firm if the company issues or buys back equity.  How much does the generation of free cash flow change relative to the price paid or received for equity?

Another question:

Doug Says:

October 19th, 20098:25 am

“As for common stocks, they should trade at an earnings or FCF yield greater than that of the highest after-tax yield on debts and other instruments.”

How do you account for the potential for earnings growth in this calculation? The debt investor trades seniority and (in some cases, collateral) for a fixed claim on cash flows. Common stock investors often (but not always) will earn rising “coupons” and get back value much greater than “par” at the end of his/her investment.

I realize that models such as gordon growth take this into account, but you don’t address it in your “debt plus a premium” calculation.

Doug, good point.  The FCF yield, unlike a dividend yield, as used by the Gordon and other DCF models, reflects the ability of the company to reinvest the FCF that is not paid out as dividends.  It reflects growth already in a crude way.  If the ability to grow via reinvestment is below the FCF yield, then the company may as well just sit around and buy back stock.  If the ability to grow earnings is higher (unusual), then the FCF yield will understate prospects.

That’s a crude way of phrasing it, but the FCF yield is a good place to start.

Finally, regarding my thoughts on M-M:  Take Falkenstein’s recent book — high yield tends to underperform with both debt and equity. Or consider that less levered companies tend to return better over the long haul (Megginson, Corporate Finance Theory, page 307.)

M-M, like the CAPM, does not survive the data. Low leverage is a positive factor for returns in both debt and equity, and a decent part of that is the high costs of financial stress for highly levered firms.

Summary

The idea here is to try to view the cost of equity capital as a businessman would, rather than an academic who has little exposure to the world as it operates.  Look to the degree of certainty in obtaining cashflows; the yields on various assets should rise as certainty declines.

Disclaimer


David Merkel is an investment professional, and like every investment professional, he makes mistakes. David encourages you to do your own independent "due diligence" on any idea that he talks about, because he could be wrong. Nothing written here, at RealMoney, Wall Street All-Stars, or anywhere else David may write is an invitation to buy or sell any particular security; at most, David is handing out educated guesses as to what the markets may do. David is fond of saying, "The markets always find a new way to make a fool out of you," and so he encourages caution in investing. Risk control wins the game in the long run, not bold moves. Even the best strategies of the past fail, sometimes spectacularly, when you least expect it. David is not immune to that, so please understand that any past success of his will be probably be followed by failures.


Also, though David runs Aleph Investments, LLC, this blog is not a part of that business. This blog exists to educate investors, and give something back. It is not intended as advertisement for Aleph Investments; David is not soliciting business through it. When David, or a client of David's has an interest in a security mentioned, full disclosure will be given, as has been past practice for all that David does on the web. Disclosure is the breakfast of champions.


Additionally, David may occasionally write about accounting, actuarial, insurance, and tax topics, but nothing written here, at RealMoney, or anywhere else is meant to be formal "advice" in those areas. Consult a reputable professional in those areas to get personal, tailored advice that meets the specialized needs that David can have no knowledge of.

 Subscribe in a reader

 Subscribe in a reader (comments)

Subscribe to RSS Feed

Enter your Email


Preview | Powered by FeedBlitz

Seeking Alpha Certified

Top markets blogs award

The Aleph Blog

Top markets blogs

InstantBull.com: Bull, Boards & Blogs

Blog Directory - Blogged

IStockAnalyst

Benzinga.com supporter

All Economists Contributor

Business Finance Blogs
OnToplist is optimized by SEO
Add blog to our blog directory.

Page optimized by WP Minify WordPress Plugin