Day: November 28, 2009

The Right Reform for the Fed

The Right Reform for the Fed

Ben Bernanke has an editorial in the Washington Post that attempts to defend the Fed.? Here is my discussion of his editorial:

These matters are complex, and Congress is still in the midst of considering how best to reform financial regulation. I am concerned, however, that a number of the legislative proposals being circulated would significantly reduce the capacity of the Federal Reserve to perform its core functions. Notably, some leading proposals in the Senate would strip the Fed of all its bank regulatory powers. And a House committee recently voted to repeal a 1978 provision that was intended to protect monetary policy from short-term political influence. These measures are very much out of step with the global consensus on the appropriate role of central banks, and they would seriously impair the prospects for economic and financial stability in the United States. The Fed played a major part in arresting the crisis, and we should be seeking to preserve, not degrade, the institution’s ability to foster financial stability and to promote economic recovery without inflation.

1) A fiat money system cannot control inflation without controlling credit.? Bank regulatory powers natively belong to the Fed as a result.? Rather than remove the regulation powers, give them to the Fed exclusively, so that we can watch them fail at the task without any charges of banks choosing their regulators.? There should only be one regulator of banks.? Let it be the Fed.

This is not to say the Fed has done a good job in the past.? Far from it.? But other regulators have failed as well.? Let’s have one regulator, so that we can assign blame when there is failure, and eliminate the errors in the long run.

2) Away from that, since Volcker and Martin, when has the Fed truly been independent?? When has it done something politically unpopular?? When has it done something that angered politicians?? Mr. Bernanke, your Fed has gone with the flow, and prostituted the credit of our nation to satisfy political ends, not protect the value of the currency.

The proposed measures are at least in part the product of public anger over the financial crisis and the government’s response, particularly the rescues of some individual financial firms. The government’s actions to avoid financial collapse last fall — as distasteful and unfair as some undoubtedly were — were unfortunately necessary to prevent a global economic catastrophe that could have rivaled the Great Depression in length and severity, with profound consequences for our economy and society. (I know something about this, having spent my career prior to public service studying these issues.) My colleagues at the Federal Reserve and I were determined not to allow that to happen.

Moreover, looking to the future, we strongly support measures — including the development of a special bankruptcy regime for financial firms whose disorderly failure would threaten the integrity of the financial system — to ensure that ad hoc interventions of the type we were forced to use last fall never happen again. Adopting such a resolution regime, together with tougher oversight of large, complex financial firms, would make clear that no institution is “too big to fail” — while ensuring that the costs of failure are borne by owners, managers, creditors and the financial services industry, not by taxpayers.

3) What the Fed did not do in the past it recommends now, that bankrupt institutions be taken through bankruptcy.? Duh, I recommended that many times in 2008.? There was no reason that any of the bailouts should have happened.? All we needed to do was follow existing law, and if no DIP lender showed up, the US Government could have played DIP lender, in order to liquidate the portions of complex institutions that were systematically important.

The Federal Reserve, like other regulators around the world, did not do all that it could have to constrain excessive risk-taking in the financial sector in the period leading up to the crisis. We have extensively reviewed our performance and moved aggressively to fix the problems.

4) There were regulators that did better, including Australia and Canada.

Working with other agencies, we have toughened our rules and oversight. We will be requiring banks to hold more capital and liquidity and to structure compensation packages in ways that limit excessive risk-taking. We are taking more explicit account of risks to the financial system as a whole.

We are also supplementing bank examination staffs with teams of economists, financial market specialists and other experts. This combination of expertise, a unique strength of the Fed, helped bring credibility and clarity to the “stress tests” of the banking system conducted in the spring. These tests were led by the Fed and marked a turning point in public confidence in the banking system.

5) Why should we believe that the Fed that did not use its powers to the full in the past, will do so in the future?? The Fed has had these experts available in the past, and did not use them.? What should make us think that they will be more successful in the future?? The failure to regulate properly is systematic.? There needs to be a change at the top of the Fed if it is to have a chance of regulating properly.

There is a strong case for a continued role for the Federal Reserve in bank supervision. Because of our role in making monetary policy, the Fed brings unparalleled economic and financial expertise to its oversight of banks, as demonstrated by the success of the stress tests.

This expertise is essential for supervising highly complex financial firms and for analyzing the interactions among key firms and markets. Our supervision is also informed by the grass-roots perspective derived from the Fed’s unique regional structure and our experience in supervising community banks. At the same time, our ability to make effective monetary policy and to promote financial stability depends vitally on the information, expertise and authorities we gain as bank supervisors, as demonstrated in episodes such as the 1987 stock market crash and the financial disruptions of Sept. 11, 2001, as well as by the crisis of the past two years.

6) 1987 and 2001 were failures, not successes.? No policy accommodation should have been given.? Would Martin or Volcker have done it?? Financial firms need to learn to run with more slack capital for disasters.? As for the present crisis, please take credit for the glut of liquidity provided 2001-2004.? The Fed is to blame for that.? The kid gets no credit for saying, “Ma, I broke the window,” when she saw him do it.

7) The Fed should regulate systemic risk, because it creates the systemic risk.? No other reason.? Make the Fed tighten policy when Debt/GDP goes above 200%.? We’re over 350% on that ratio now.? We need to save to bring down debt.

Of course, the ultimate goal of all our efforts is to restore and sustain economic prosperity. To support economic growth, the Fed has cut interest rates aggressively and provided further stimulus through lending and asset-purchase programs. Our ability to take such actions without engendering sharp increases in inflation depends heavily on our credibility and independence from short-term political pressures. Many studies have shown that countries whose central banks make monetary policy independently of such political influence have better economic performance, including lower inflation and interest rates.

Independent does not mean unaccountable. In its making of monetary policy, the Fed is highly transparent, providing detailed minutes of policy meetings and regular testimony before Congress, among other information. Our financial statements are public and audited by an outside accounting firm; we publish our balance sheet weekly; and we provide monthly reports with extensive information on all the temporary lending facilities developed during the crisis. Congress, through the Government Accountability Office, can and does audit all parts of our operations except for the monetary policy deliberations and actions covered by the 1978 exemption. The general repeal of that exemption would serve only to increase the perceived influence of Congress on monetary policy decisions, which would undermine the confidence the public and the markets have in the Fed to act in the long-term economic interest of the nation.

We have come a long way in our battle against the financial and economic crisis, but there is a long way to go. Now more than ever, America needs a strong, nonpolitical and independent central bank with the tools to promote financial stability and to help steer our economy to recovery without inflation.

8) The Fed has been anything but independent.? An independent Fed would have said that they have to preserve the value of the dollar, and refused to do any bailouts.? A transparent Fed would have full transcripts published within a year, not five years.? Testimony before Congress is a joke, because Congressmen use it to play for their own advantage, rather than overseeing the Fed.

I repeat what I have said before — If we had truly independent central bank governors like Volcker, Martin and Eccles, the Fed could work.? The Fed needs to work, or we may as well go back to a gold standard.

Given the? lack of independence of the Fed over the past 23 years, additional Congressional oversight could not hurt much.? Better that the Fed should have tough men as leaders, willing to stand up to the politicians and say no, we won’t inflate.? If we can’t have that, bring back the gold standard.? Gold is impersonal, and bends to the whims of no one.? It is a friend to those that want something fixed to rely on.

We are also supplementing bank examination staffs with teams of economists, financial market specialists and other experts. This combination of expertise, a unique strength of the Fed, helped bring credibility and clarity to the “stress tests” of the banking system conducted in the spring. These tests were led by the Fed and marked a turning point in public confidence in the banking system.
Book Review: Where Keynes Went Wrong

Book Review: Where Keynes Went Wrong

When I was a grad student, I always felt weird about Keynes.? I grew up in a home that was not explicitly “free market” but was implicitly so.? My Dad was a small businessman and my Mom was a retail investor (as well as home manager).? My Dad’s business did well, but it had its share of hard times, including the depression of 1979-1982 in the Rust Belt, where many of his competitors did not survive.? He had to be a member of the local union and run a closed shop, but as an owner, he had no vote in union matters.

I worked for my Dad for two summers.? During one of them, when we went to get parts, the parts dealer said to me,”I’ve heard good things about you.? Even the union steward has heard about you.”? My face and my Dad’s face went white. I was not in the union. After an uncomfortable pause, he said, “Eeeaaah! Got you!” and he laughed.? Dad and I looked at each other, embarrassed but relieved.

My Mom, like Keynes, and like me, has beaten the stock market for most of her life.? There are excess profits available for wise investors, some of which stem from the foolishness of other investors.

Keynes was a fascinating man who understood asset markets well, but when trying to consider the economy in general, looked to what would work in the short run.? The author of Where Keynes Went Wrong points out repeatedly from Keynes’ writings his view that interest rates are almost always too high, and that interest rates should only rise when inflation is rising quickly.? Can lowering short term rates juice the economy.? Yes, in the short run, but in the longer run it fuels inflation and bubbles.

The strength of Where Keynes Went Wrong is that it spends a lot of time on what Keynes actually said, rather than the way Keynesianism developed into a branch of Macroeconomics, eventually becoming part of the dominant macroeconomic paradigm — the Neoclassical Synthesis.? I admit to being surrprised by many of the statements Keynes made — granted, the author is trying to prove Keynes wrong so he goes after what is least defensible.

The author dissects the errors of Keynes into a few main headings:

  • Lower interest rates are almost always better.
  • Growth comes through promoting consumption.
  • You can’t trust businessmen to do the right thing when it comes to capital allocation.
  • Government planning is superior to decentralized planning, because experts in government can allocate capital better than businessmen.
  • Crashes require government intervention.? Using the balance sheet of the government will have no long run negative impacts.
  • Markets do not self-correct.
  • Globalization is good, and the nations of the world can cooperate on creating a standard of value independent of gold.

For the most part, those are my words summarizing the author.? After going through what Keynes said, he then takes it apart point-by-point.? The author generally follows the Austrian school of economics, citing Mises, von Hayek, and Hazlitt.

After that, the book continues by taking on the rhetoric of Keynes, both oral and written.? He was one sharp man in being able to express himself — orally, there were few that could match him in debate.? In writing, where time is not so much of the esssence, there is more time for readers to take apart his arguments, and point out the fallacies.? The author points out much of the fallacies in how Keynes would argue his points.

The book finishes by pointing out the paradoxes involved in Keynesianism, e.g., in order to reflate a debt-ridden system, the government must lower rates and borrow yet more.? Also shows how beginning with manipulating the money supply leads to greater intervention in credit, banking, currency, and other economic policies over time, and why the politicians love the increase in power, even if they realize that the policies don’t work.

One surprise for me was how many ways Keynes suggested to intervene in a slump, and how many of them are being used today.

  • Rates down to zero.
  • Direct lending by the Fed.
  • Directing banks to make certain loans.
  • Bailouts.
  • Nationalizing critical companies.
  • Inflating the currency.

The idea of letting the economy contract in any way was foreign to Keynes.? He felt that a seemingly endless prosperity could be achieved through low interest rates.? Well, now we have low rates, and a mountain of debt — public and private, individual and corporate.? Welcome to the liquidity trap created by Keynesian meddling, together with the way our tax code encourages debt rather than equity finance.

I recommend the book; it is an eye-opener.? It makes me want to get some of Hazlitt’s books, and, read the whole of Keynes General Theory for myself.? The book that my professors once praised as a tour de force has holes in it, but better to read it all in context.

Quibbles

The book could have used a better editor.? Too many things get repeated too often.? The book also has two sets of endnotes, one for reference purposes, and one for expanded discussions.? The endnotes that were expanded discussions probably belonged in small type at the bottom of the page rather than as endnotes.? Many of the endnotes are quite good, and it is inconvenient to have to flip to the back to see them.

Also, on page 274, the author errs.? The risk to a business owner is higher after he borrows money.? The total risk of the business is not higher, but the risk to the equity owner is higher.? Whether that risk is double or not is another question.

There’s another error on page 328.? When I buy stock in the secondary market, I am putting my capital to work, but someone else is withdrawing capital from the market.? There is no net investment.? When I buy an IPO, not only do I put my money to work, but there is more investment in the economy (leaving aside the venture capitalists that are cashing out).? It is hard to say when investment in the economy is increased on net.

The table on page 330 is confusing.? The first row should have been set apart to show that GDP is not a government obligation.

Finally, I don’t think that Say’s Law (“Supply creates its own Demand.” Or in the modern parlance, “If you build it, they will come.”) is true, but neither is its converse (“Demand creates its own Supply”).? The two are interconnected, and either one can cause the other.? Markets are complex chaotic systems, and entrepreneurs sometimes produce goods that no one wants.? Similarly, when consumers discover a new product or service, that demand can help create a whole new industry.? Supply and demand go back and forth — the causality doesn’t go only one way.

Who would benefit from this book: Send it to your Congressman, send it to your Senator.? Make sure every member of the Fed gets one, and the fine folks at the Treasury as well.? Beyond that, think of your liberal friends who think of Keynes as a hero, and give them one.? After reading this, I want to add Keynes’ General Theory to the list of books the everyone cites, and no one reads.? (That list: The Bible, Origin of the Species, The Communist Manifesto)

If you want to buy it you can get it here: Where Keynes Went Wrong: And Why World Governments Keep Creating Inflation, Bubbles, and Busts.

Full disclosure: I review books because I love reading books, and want to introduce others to the good books that I read, and steer them away from bad or marginal books.? Those that want to support me can enter Amazon through my site and buy stuff there.? Don?t buy what you don?t need for my sake.? I am doing fine.? But if you have a need, and Amazon meets that need, your costs are not increased if you enter Amazon through my site, and I get a commission.? Win-win.

Book Review: Market Indicators

Book Review: Market Indicators

Every one one us has limited bandwidth for analysis of data.? We pick and choose a few ideas that seem to work for us, and then stick with them.? That is often best, because good investors settle into investment methods that are consistent with their character.? But every now and then it is good to open things up and try to see whether the investment methods can be improved.

For those that use market indicators, this is the sort of book that will make one say, “What if?? What if I combine this market indicator with what I am doing now in my investing?”? In most cases, the answer will be “Um, that doesn’t seem to fit.”? But one good idea can pay for a book and then some.? All investment strategies have weaknesses, but often the weaknesses of one method can be complemented by another.? My favorite example is that as a value investor, I am almost always early.? I buy and sell too soon, and leave profits on the table.? Adding a momentum overlay can aid the value investor by delaying purchases of seemingly cheap stocks when the price is falling rapidly, and delaying sales of seemingly cheap stocks when the price is rising rapidly.

Looking outside your current circle of competence may yield some useful ideas, then.? But how do you know where you might look if you’re not aware that there might be indicators that you have never heard of?? Market Indicators delivers a bevy of indicators in the following areas:

  • Options-derived (VIX, put/call)
  • Volume and Price driven (Money flow, rate of change, 90% up/down days, and more)
  • Where the fast money invests (money in bull vs bear funds, sector fund sizes, and more)
  • Analyzing the likely motives of other classes of investors (margin balances, short interest, etc.)
  • Price Momentum and Mean-Reversion
  • Measuring asset classes and sectors using fundamental metrics? (Fed model, sector weightings, Q-ratio, etc.)
  • Investor sentiment surveys
  • How to use analyst opinions, if at all?
  • News reporting and reactions of stocks to news
  • Odd bits of news (CEO behavior, little things that indicate a qualitative change in the life of a company)
  • Insider buying and selling
  • Commodity market data (COT, etc.)
  • Bond market behavior (credit cycle, Fed moves, Credit Default Swaps, and more)
  • Changes in the capital structure (M&A, equity/debt issuance, etc.)
  • Monitoring the greats (13F filings)

No one can use all of these indicators.? You can probably only use a fraction of these indicators.? But being aware of how others view the market can widen your perspective, and help to reduce negative surprises on your part.

Quibbles

By its nature, since the book cuts across a wide number of areas in 216 short pages, you only get a taste of everything.? I liked this book, but there is room for a second book in this area — one of additional indicators passed over (I have a bunch!), or going into greater depth on the indicators covered.

Who will benefit from this book?

You have to have a quantitative bent, at least to the level of being willing to go out and collect simple data in order to benefit here.? Now, most serious investors do that, so I would say that serious investors can benefit from the “cook’s tour” of market indicators that this book gives, unless they are so serious that they know all of these indicators.? (Like me.)

If you would like to buy the book, you can buy it here: Market Indicators: The Best-Kept Secret to More Effective Trading and Investing.

Full disclosure: This book is unusual for me in two ways.? First, the author (not the PR flack) sent me a copy, with a nice handwritten letter thanking me for my blog and my assistance.? That is why there is the second reason.? Pages 80-81 summarize the longer argument made in my blog post, The Fed Model, where I take the so-called Fed model, and rederive it using the simple version of the Dividend Discount Model, giving a more robust model with reasonable theoretical underpinnings.

I earn a small commission from Amazon for anyone entering Amazon through my site, and buying anything there.? Your price does not rise from my commission.? Don’t buy anything you don’t want to buy if you want to reward me for my writing.? Only buy what you need if Amazon offers you the best deal.

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