1) There is a new blog that I recommend: Macroeconomic Resilience. I have commented there recently, and I think that he understands the complexity of markets in ways that most Ph. D. economists don’t. Here is a recent post, and my comment.
One job ago, at a hedge fund that was bearish on financials, we would talk about this all the time. Regulators could have stopped the crisis in the early 2000s had they simply enforced lending standards. The banks would have screamed and ROEs would have gone into the single digits, but the crisis could have been prevented.
But, regulators are to a degree subject to politicians. Politicians, in the absence of any moral compass aside from re-election, are mainly beholden to those that fund their campaigns, when the electorate is without education, or a moral compass as well. Thus, regulations were neutered.
After that, how many businessmen would watch out for the companies they served, instead of what would maximize their pay? There were some bankers that did so and got shown the door. There were other banks owned privately, were conservative, and missed the crisis. It could be done, but the management team or owners had to deliberately sacrifice the short run in favor of missing an uncertain crisis.
Chuck Prince said something to the effect of “When the music is playing, you gotta get up and dance.” to justify doing business in the face of bad credit metrics. Well, yes, in a place where no one cares for the long-run health of the firms, or of society as a whole.
Someone has to care for the long run. Better it be free individuals rather than the government. But if free individuals will not do it, eventually the government will.
2) I have been a fan of Michael Pettis for many years, from his publication of his book, The Volatility Machine. Here is a comment that I posted at his blog, which I highly recommend:
Michael, I ordinarily agree with you on almost everything economic, but I can’t agree on the trills. I believe in asset-liability matching, even at the government level. Try to match term risk and liquidity risk to what is being funded.
I have argued that the debt structure of the US government has been getting too short, and recommended that the US Treasury lengthen its funding policies — I even said that to the Treasury officials that I met with in November.
But trills have exceedingly long duration — the remind me of some structured settlements that I have had to model, but these are perpetuities — even longer for the coupon to grow. Duration looks like it would be north of 40 — it depends on the assumptions used.
A perpetuity growing at GDP rates saddles our posterity with debts that they cannot bear. Cheap debt up front — really costly on the back end.
But, thanks ever so much for your blogging. I learn so much from you. Keep it up.
3) Insurance for those dropping out of school? Sounds really dumb:
This sounds like a product that only dumb insurers would write. Never write insurance where the insured has better knowledge and more control than the insurance company.
4) Many are crying over auction rate preferred securities. But most of the assets that were harmed were owned by corporations, who had investment professionals that chose auction rate preferred securities because they yielded significantly more than money market funds, but with seemingly little risk, and the system worked for around 20 years.
They took above average risks, and now they expect to be bailed out? I have read through many ARPS prospectuses. For those that read them, the risks were clearly disclosed. I do not have a lot of sympathy for those that did not do their job.
5) From the “bitter taste” zone, we learn that foreign investors in US debt lost the most versus investing in the debt of other developed nations in 2009. Should that surprise us when demands for loans accelerated dramatically in 2009? I don’t think so, and most reasonable analysts would agree.