Day: August 24, 2010

Ten More Notes on the Current Market Scene

Ten More Notes on the Current Market Scene

11) I was surprised to read that there is not a perfect market in interest rate swaps.? They are so vanilla, but counterparty risk interferes.

12) There is always a skunk at the party, and who better than Baruch to dis bonds?? I half agree with him.? Half, because the momentum can’t be ignored entirely.? Half, because profit margins are wide.? But rates are low, and unless we are heading into the second great depression, stocks look cheap.? That’s the risk though.? Is this the second Great Depression? (Or the Not-so-great Depression that I have called it earlier.)

13) Housing is a mess.? The US government has been engaged in a delaying action on defaults, while calling it a rescue effort.? The sag in housing prices may lead to a recession.? The FHA is raising the costs of mortgages because their past loans have had too many losses.

14) Commercial Real Estate continues to do badly while some CMBS performs — no surprise that what is more secured does well.

15) The Fed gets whacked on its lack of transparency.? This could be a trend for the future.

16) In the current difficulties in the Eurozone, the ECB is beginning to suck in more bonds, presumably from peripheral Eurozone countries that are seeing their financing rates rise.? As central banks get creative, a simple question for currency holders becomes what backs the money?? It would seem to be governments, which will absorb losses if central banks generate them, and cover it with additional taxes or borrowing (some of which could eventually be monetized).? What a mess.

17) Bruce Krasting is almost always worth a read, and he digs up something that I had forgotten about how interest is credited on the Social Security Trust Funds.? It’s calculated this way:

The average market yield on marketable interest-bearing securities of the Federal government that are not due or callable until after 4 years from the last business day of the prior month (the day when the rate is determined). The average yield must then be rounded to the nearest eighth of 1 percent.

Krasting thinks that’s too high.? I think that is too low, given the true tradeoff that is going on here.? Think about it: when the government borrows from the SSTFs in a given year, a slice of the benefits incurred over that year don’t get “funded.”? The debt claim to back that should match the maturity profile of those future claims.? Medicare would have some short claims, Disability and Supplemental Security slightly longer, but Old Age Security develops most of the assets, and is a long claim.? Say the average person paying in is 40, and they will retire on average at 65.? That is a 25-year deferred claim that will last for maybe 20 years on average, with inflation adjustment.? The US offers no debt that is that long to back such a liability, so I would argue that the proper rate to use would be that of the longest noncallable debt offered by the Treasury.

But here would have been my second twist on this: they should have absorbed the longest marketable securities from the debt markets, and bought and held them.? That would have looked really ugly as the rates looked piddling against current interest costs.? But today, it would reflect the true costs of the borrowing from the SSTFs, and that cost would likely be greater than what was paid to the trust funds.? My guess is that the interest rate paid on the trust funds today would be higher than 5%, maybe higher than 6%, if a fair method had been used.

If there is enough interest, I could try to run the numbers, but the point is academic.? It would not change the total claims against the government plus SSTFs as a whole, but it might have changed the behavior of the government if it had tried to borrow on a long duration basis, competing for funds with private industry.? It would have revealed the true tradeoff earlier, and shown what a trouble we were heading for.

18) On retained asset accounts, this Bloomberg piece makes me say, “Yes, this is a big enough issue to deal with.”? For MetLife particularly, which has its own bank, it would be simple enough to set up a genuine bank account with all of the statutory protections involved.? If there are risks from forgery, that is big.? Even the risks of not being covered by the state guaranty funds is big enough.

My view is this: full cash payment should be the default, and a genuine bank account an option.? If you have one of these checkbooks now, and you want to minimize your risks, do this: write one check for the balance so that it is deposited in your bank account.? Simple enough.? You can protect yourself with ease here, even without legal change.

19) The yen will continue to rally until the Japanese economy screams.? Currency moves tend to last longer than we anticipate, and secular moves force needed economic changes on countries.

20) Consider what I wrote last week on long Treasuries:

I am not a Treasury bond bull, per se, but I am reluctant to short until I see real price weakness.? And some think that I am only a fundamentalist value investor.? With bonds, it is tough to catch the turning points, and tough to grasp the motivations of competitors.? Better to miss the first 10% of a move, than miss it altogether.

Now, I never expect to be right so fast, but with rates gapping lower on economic weakness — the 10-year below 2.5%, and the 30-year below 3.6%, I would simply say this: don’t fight it.? Let the momentum run.? Wait until you see a significant pullback in prices, and then short.? Don’t be a macho fool fighting forces much larger than yourself.? The markets can remain crazy for longer than you remain solvent.

Ten Notes on the Current Market Scene

Ten Notes on the Current Market Scene

1) Start with the big one from yesterday.? On of my favorite monetary heretics, Raghuram Rajan, whose excellent book I reviewed, Fault Lines, pointed out how he had gotten it right prior to the crisis, versus many at the Fed who blew it badly.? Rajan suggests that Fed Funds should be at 2-2.25%, which to me would be a neutral level for Fed Funds.? That’s a reasonable level.? The economy needs to work its way out of this crisis, even if it mean failures of enterprises relying on a low short rate.? Entities that can’t survive low positive rates that give savers something to chew on should die.? Mercilessly.? Monetary policy at present is a glorified form of stealing from savers, who deserve more for their sacrifice.

2) Peter Eavis, an old friend, echoes my points on QE, in his piece Government Clouds Value of Investments.? When the government is actively trying to destroy the willingness to hold short-term assets, and engages in QE, it makes all rational calculations on investments a farce.

3) I agree with John Hussman in a limited way.? QE artificially lowers interest rates, which lowers the forward value of the US Dollar.? That doesn’t mean it will generate a collapse; I don’t think it could do that unless the Fed began to do astounding things, like monetize a large fraction of all debt claims.

4) The US Government is so dysfunctional that the baseline budget has increased 4.4 Trillion over the next 10 years.? This is the beginning of the end of the supercycle, and the reduction of America to the influence level of Brazil.? Earnings levels will converge as well, but more slowly.

5) While we are thinking soggy, think of Japan.? Years of fiscal and monetary stimulus have availed little.? Overly low interest rates have fostered an economy satisfied? with low ROEs.? Low interest rates coddle laziness, and encourage stagnation.

6) There are limits to stimulus, whether monetary or fiscal.? There is no magic way to produce prosperity by government fiat.? Stimulus, by its nature, will run into constraints of default or inflation, if taken far enough.? If not, why doesn’t the Fed buy up all debt?? (leaving aside laws) Isn’t QE a free lunch?

7) Deflation is tough; it weighs upon cities, states and other municipalities, who hide their true obligations.

8 ) Hoisington, the best unknown bond manager.? Where do they think long rates are going?? 2% or so on the 30-year.? Makes the current buyers of bond funds look like pikers.? That’s over a 35% gain from here.? If they are right, their fame will be legendary.? Now, that could explain the willingness to fund ultra-long duration debt, because the gains will be bigger still.? What a great confusing time to be a bond investor, until something fails.

9) Or consider the Norfolk Southern 100-year bond deal yesterday.? Quoting the WSJ:

In what bankers hope will be the first in a new round of 100-year bond sales, Norfolk Southern Corp. raised $250 million Monday by selling debt that it won’t have to repay until the next century.

Investor interest was strong enough that the company increased the size of the new sale from $100 million. Market participants said investors had expressed an interest in buying at least $75 million of the debt before the company decided to announce the $100 million deal.

The interest rate on Norfolk Southern’s new debt is 6% for a yield of 5.95%, about 0.90 percentage points more than where the company’s outstanding 30 year debt was trading Monday. It was the lowest yield for 100-year debt bankers could recall, breaking through the 6% yield on the company’s 100-year issue in 2005.

“There is no question, obviously, that you are giving up a bit of liquidity, but you’re getting a pickup of 90 basis points to move out of the 30-year,” said Jeff Coil, senior portfolio manager at Legal & General Investment Management America. “But you’re getting good income on a stable cash credit in a sector where there are only a handful of rails left.”

Mr. Coil said the firm had a “sizeable” order in the deal. There were approximately 20 investors overall.

Moody’s Investors Service rated the new senior fixed-rate bonds Baa1, and both Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings rated them BBB+.

Is 0.90%/year enough to compensate from going from 30 to 100 years?? I think so. The difference in interest rate sensitivity of a 30 versus a 100 are small at a yield of 5-6%, and if you have a liability structure that can handle it, as a life insurer might, it makes a lot of sense.? After all, a life insurer can’t economically invest in equities because of capital restrictions. You could compare it to investing in long dated preferred stock or junior debt, but then if there is a default, the losses are more severe than with a senior unsecured bond.

10) I’ve never found the yield curve model for recession/recovery compelling.? Limited data set, not covering the Great Depression, etc.

More to come.

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