Day: December 10, 2010

Advice to a Friend

Advice to a Friend

Dear Mr. Merkel,

I was sorry to read about the demise of your firm a month ago.? I hope God prospers you in whatever path you pursue now.? I?m writing to you with a few investing questions because I know you actually can evaluate what I?ve done- and from a perspective that I think matches mine (buy dividend-paying value for the long-term), and I really would like to deliberately practice improving my evaluation of companies with testing & feedback.? If, however, my request falls under your own business plan- I understand completely.

4 years ago, I picked several energy stocks using only one metric: P/E ratio.? Since then, I found Graham?s writing on investing and your blog and started thinking that one-stick-measuring for something as complicated as a business is a dangerous game.? Using what?s available to me on Vanguard?s website (plus what I?ve learned from you and Graham), I have a slightly less incomplete model to measure a business.

I know you?re very busy, but if you ever have a chance, would you look at my scoring system and give me some small feedback?? I?m curious about a few specific things:

a) Have I left out any key aspects or ratios?? If so, what?? (and what should they be?)

b) Graham suggests going back years and years when looking at a business.? What is the point where you get such diminished returns that?s it not worth the effort to dig up the numbers?? 3 years? 5 years? 10 years?

c) Follow up to b: does your answer to that question change based on the aspect examined?? (ie: EPS should be?reviewed for the last 5 years but Cash only for the previous year)

d) In my scoring system, have I over- or under-weighted any of the categories?? Have I not been stringent enough in?awarding points?

Naturally, I have many more questions.??But I?ll greatly appreciate any feedback you give me on these.

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I get a lot of e-mail.? I wish I could freeze time, and respond to all of it.? I have been spending time recently clearing out the e-mail box.? I am down to seven flagged messages.

The above message is from a friend of mine, whose father is a close friend of mine.? The father taught me a lot.? He might be my top intellectual influence — he is certainly in the top 5.

I sympathize with my young friend here.? I was once an individual investor myself, and I tried a wide variety of ideas before I settled on my current strategy, which grew out of my value strategy in the mid-90s, when I was much younger.

Before I answer his questions, I will say that for two decades I spent one hour per day at minimum (excluding Sundays) improving my skills.? Investing well takes training.? Simple solutions are rare.? The alternative name for this blog was “The Investment Omnivore,” because I have studied so many things in investing, from so many different angles.

Now for advice to my friend:

You have six criteria, it seems. I will handle them in the order of your spreadsheet.

1) You analyze versus 1 and 3-year price action.? With 3-year price action mean reversion is likely, but with one year price action, momentum tends to persist.? Change the direction of your scoring system on 1 year price performance, because investors tend to lag fundamental improvement in the short-run.? Momentum tends to persist over a year or two.

2) With dividends and earnings per share, your scoring is logical, though there is this difficulty — stocks react to changes in expectations, not data on the announcement date, though surprises change expectations.

3) I use the current ratio as a disqualifier.? I don’t use it for scoring, but for whether it is worthwhile to consider a given company.

4) The same is true for Cash-to-Total-Debt.? Low ratios would disqualify a company, but high ratios would not get points in my opinion.

5) And also for total debt to equity.? I should tell you that one has to consider these matters on an industry by industry basis.? Stable industries can bear more debt.

6) Then you have cheapness — price to book, earnings and cashflow.? With financials and utilities, I use P/E times P/B as a criterion, as Graham did.? With Industrials I use Price-to-Sales.? With Industrials I also look at price to cashflow and free cashflow.

So, my advice for you is this: the key idea of value investing is margin of safety.? The first task of a value investor is to assure safety.? This means using balance sheet statistics that you cut the universe in two — worthy of consideration, and out of the question.

After that, we look at valuation and analyze those companies that are acceptable to find those that offer the best values.? I give more credit to companies that have better growth prospects, but that is a soft criterion.

And after that, price momentum and mean-reversion.? Momentum works in the short run, and mean reversion in the intermediate-term.

Though you might think I am critical of your efforts here, please understand that in the mid-90s I was much like you, struggling with the concepts of value, and trying to come up with a coherent thesis.? I am impressed with your work and not dismissive.

This is a trail that I rode when I was young.? With additional study, you can do better as well.

And I say this to all readers, because there are many who follow simple ideas that fail.? I urge those who read me to read broadly in investing, and pursue the broad ideas that seem to work.

Flavors of Insurance, Part VI (Brokers)

Flavors of Insurance, Part VI (Brokers)

Commercial purchasers of insurance often hire insurance brokers to search for the best coverage from a price and quality standpoint. In return for their services, insurance brokers receive a commission that is a percentage of the premium. Insurance brokers bear no underwriting risk; the primary risk of an insurance broker is that margins get squeezed when P&C rates go soft. This has the countervailing advantage for investors, that after a major catastrophe, the brokers will always do well, because rates rise, and the brokers have no risk of getting tagged for claims.

Part of the story for the insurance brokerages has been the continuing acquisition of small “Mom-and-Pop” insurance brokerages. Twenty years ago, the insurance brokerage space was fragmented. There is still a decent amount of fragmentation today, but now there are major firms that define the sub-industry.

Among the biggest firms, there are sometimes other business lines that form a significant part of the total enterprise. Human resources consulting, benefits consulting, risk management consulting are common ancillary enterprises. Less common are asset management services, and owning insurance companies, but some of the bigger firms do those.

Expense control and discipline in acquisitions are critical aspects of a successful insurance brokerage, as the lack of either one will impair long term earnings power. Our biggest concern with acquisitions is that the prices paid to “roll up” smaller insurance brokerages will eventually rise to levels that make their purchase uneconomic, but the purchases will continue in a foolish attempt to gain market share.

The insurance brokers had a great run of growth through the nineties. Since 2000, their performance has been flat for a number of reasons: underperformance of non-insurance brokerage operations, and slowing organic growth. With P&C premium rates moving from slow positive growth to flat at present, flat performance from the sub-industry for the near term is what we would expect.

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Bringing it to the Present

Some things I got right here, and others wrong.? On net, the group didn’t do much since I wrote the above in 2004.? But almost all of the little companies got acquired, often by private equity, even a few that I thought were garbage.? The big players suffered through the scandal of contingent compensation, while the little players ignored the threat successfully, because the threat from Spitzer and other AGs would not stand up in court.? The big players buckled under the load of bad PR.

So, among the publicly traded companies five remain — Marsh & McLennan, Aon, Willis Group, Brown & Brown, and AJ Gallagher.? I own none of them, and looking at the valuations and soft P&C insurance markets, I have no interest at all.? Short them if you like, though I won’t.

One closing note, contingent commissions have returned.? In any sort of business transaction where there are multiple parties at the table, be aware of who is allied with whom.? Do not assume that there are neutral parties.? Who is paying whom?? If buying from someone, be skeptical about trusting the opinions of “neutral parties” that are paid by them.

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