Day: July 14, 2011

Don’t Play Near the Cliff

Don’t Play Near the Cliff

As a nation or a corporation moves from being a safe credit [borrower] to being an unsafe credit, often the transition is more rapid than one would expect.? Success has many fathers, and people are reluctant to change their views rapidly.? But once the views change, it is very difficult to change them back.

Part of that is due to the construction of the markets.? Relatively little money is “go anywhere” in bonds.? There is significant segmentation.? Bond investors divide into safe and aggressive, with not a lot that can bridge the gap.? The same applies to banks, which have limits on what they can lend to corporate non-investment grade clients.

This problem gets worse with companies, quasi-governments and governments that are “confidence names.”? I never, ever, fully bought into the ratings agencies views on financial guarantors, mortgage guarantors, and the GSEs.? There was always a significant amount of hand-waving, suggesting that:

  • Disaster scenarios were impossible, and
  • There would be support from the government (for the GSEs).
  • Governments can easily raise taxes to pay off bonds.

The group of credits most in question today are governments.? There are a number of stages in-between health and default.

  1. Government has little debt, budget is largely in balance.
  2. Government has moderate debt, budget is slightly inbalanced, but not so much that the interest rate on the debt exceeds the GDP growth rate.
  3. Government has significant debt, budget is in significant deficit, but the interest rate on the debt does not exceed the GDP growth rate, because creditors expect the situation to be transitory.
  4. Government has significant debt, budget is in significant deficit, but the interest rate on the debt exceeds the GDP growth rate, because creditors expect the situation to be permanent.
  5. Default. Forced Exchange. Etc.

Note that the difference between phases 3 and 4 are only in the way a government gets viewed by creditors.? That shift often happens rapidly, and the ratings agencies tend to be lagging indicators.

My counsel to borrowers would be simple: don’t play near the cliff.? Once you move into phase 4, it is very difficult to move back into phase 3.

Now with governments that can print their own currency they might say that they have more flexibility. They do, economically.? They don’t, politically.? There are major constituencies against inflation that would rather force a government into default than tolerate inflation that disproportionately hurts them.

So be wary when lending to entities depending on lender confidence.? That confidence can disappear in an instant, leaving you to hold a depreciated loan with uncertainty as to whether it will be paid off.

 

Reparations

Reparations

The current book I am reading is Lords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the World.? Great book, long book, and I am one-third through it.

Britain and France borrowed a lot of money from the US to fight WWI.? After the Allies won the war, they pushed the costs of the war onto the Germans, partly in an effort to defray their costs of repaying the US.? The Germans could not bear such a load, and it? led to renegotiations, hyperinflation, etc.

Germany needs to be thankful that eventually the victors gave up pressing their demands, and that after WWII, the Americans not only did not ask for Reparations, but sent the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe.? Germany is not as merciful as America in the 1940-50s.

But Germany is not as generous toward the Euro-fringe as the the US was toward Germany.? Much as Greece and others cheated to get into the Eurozone, it is not as if intelligent people could not see the dodge.? The Eurozone was/is a political construct to unify Europe.

Now Germany and the rest of the core extends loans to the fringe at rates that they will not be able to pay back.? Now admittedly Greece has problems, but those are Greece’s problems.? If they are not willing to deal with abnormally early retirement, or tax evasion, that is their problem, and they should feel the effects of their idiocy.

But after reading the history of post-WWI Europe, I am less optimistic that imbalances can be easily addressed.? Better that Germany should support its banks, and let the fringe fail.? It would be the best solution for all involved, after all, currency unions have never worked without political union.

The analogy is not exact, but there is a lot of trouble trying to get other nations to go along when it means making capital outflows.? No one in the euro-fringe is ready to send any significant amount of capital abroad.

Personally, I expect this to end with a smaller Eurozone, minus the fringe.? Then the new Eurozone can fight over smaller issues.

My view is that the Eurozone will implode before China or the US implodes.? Personally, I think the US will be the last of the bunch — that’s? just the way of the US, DV.

My main point is to make clear that the instabilities of Europe need not affect the US much.? I invest money looking at the world as a whole, attempting to make money for clients.

 

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