Day: November 16, 2011

At the Cato Institute?s 29th Annual Monetary Conference (VII)

At the Cato Institute?s 29th Annual Monetary Conference (VII)

CLOSING ADDRESS

John A. Allison
Former Chairman and CEO, BB&T, and Distinguished Professor of Practice, Wake Forest University

Problems primarily caused by government policy, loose Fed policy, GSE policies.

Fed jobs: payment systems, bank regulator and monetary policy

Payment system monopoly benefits inefficient small banks.

Regulation: FDIC insurance destroys market discipline.? Financing using FDIC-insured deposits to make real estate loans.

Fed failed to oversee other regulators.

Private deposit insurance a la Bert Ely was possible. (?!)

Now-discredited study Boston Fed on discrimination in lending.? Loosened loan standards as a result.

BB&T fought it and was found not to discriminate.? Still fought it, until Republicans were elected and the investigations was dropped.? Same under Obama administration, until Republicans were elected and the investigations was dropped.

CRA eliminate redlining — banks don’t do well with low-quality lending.? Worked so long as home prices were rising, but gave the rating agencies the wrong loss factors that blew up when the bust happened.

Grossly misregulated during Bush, Jr. Administration — Privacy, Patriot Act, etc.? Only Spitzer caught.? Wasted a lot of management time which lead to less true risk control.

Would eliminate regulations before taxes. (DM: of course, taxes are easier to fuddle)

Regulators don’t catch things proactively.? No surprise, because regulators don’t act during the boom phase because everything is going well.? Describes a junky bank that BB&T passed on, until it went bankrupt.

In the bad times, regulators irrationally tighten.? BB&T no longer will make good loans that they used to.? FDIC was worse now than the early 80s & 90s.? Affects small banks most.

Price controls: no one at Fed believes in it, yet the FOMC triues to regulate interest rates.

Greenspan most regularly ran policy with negative real interest rates, helping to create a bubble, until he finally began his last tightening.? Bernanke inverted the yield curve, banks took more credit risk to compensate, worst loans were made then.

Fed held prices up in the ’20s by holding prices up when they should have been falling.? Hidden asset bubble.? Prices should have been falling in the 2000s with the addition of new labor to the capitalist system from China and India.? The process of inflating incented jobs overseas, aside from home construction jobs.

Fed policy today is destructive and lowering productivity.? Private equity guys he talked to are not changing their hurdle rates.

Current policy robs savers for borrowers.? Humiliating many older savers (DM: makes them take too much risk also).

If Congress can print money via the Fed, they will do so.

Who do enslave via regulation?

Short-term versus the long-term, we pick the short run… leading to inflation away of debts, and loss of responsibility.

Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness… takes a dig indirectly at the gift and estate taxes… free to give it away.? (DM: perhaps it should have been pursuit of virtue, or serving Christ, but that wouldn’t have fit the Founders)

Self-esteem mainly comes from work? (?!)? An encouragement to do your best.? Welfare lowers self-worth.

Q&A

Why should intervention not have occurred in the credit markets?

After making so many mistakes creating too much credit and a pseudo-boom, it was required after that. After that, the bailouts were not predictable.? The losses were not going to be so big.

Makes a mistake saying the insurance industry would not have been affected by the failure of AIG.

Disses Paulson (investment bank unsystematic), Bernanke (Academic) and Geithner.

Should bank executives have personal liability?

No. Thinks capital ratios should be 25%.

Why did they bail out Bear Stearns?

No good reason, thought it would be one-time.

Big rise in the monetary base?

Inflation, Stagflation coming.? No unemployment in a truly free economy. (?!)

 

At the Cato Institute?s 29th Annual Monetary Conference (VI)

At the Cato Institute?s 29th Annual Monetary Conference (VI)

PANEL 4: A PROGRAM FOR MONETARY FREEDOM

Moderator: Alan Reynolds
Senior Fellow, Cato Institute

Stimulus: money away from productive uses and toward the goverment and other unproductive bits of malinvestment like autos and homes.

James Grant

Editor, Grant’s Interest Rate Observer

The cumulative effect of history

Problem in banking not a shortage of capital, but a shortage of capitalism.? Must allow banks to fail.? In old days, unlimited liability made banks more cautious.

Deutsche Bank vs JP Morgan Chase

  1. 15% capital-to-risk-weighted assets
  2. Leverage — also identical
  3. But DB 42x vs JPM 13x assets/equity
  4. 60x vs 17x — tangible assets /tangible equity
  5. JPM has less callable liabilities

1842 New Orleans — divide bank balance sheet in two; movement: self-liquidating loans and gold against deposits.? Deadweight: surplus — could invest anywhere.? Worked for a generation.

Clarity, simplicity and elegance

Kevin Dowd

Visiting Professor, Cass School of Business

Bailouts just another profit center for banks.

Liquidation would have been better than the bailouts — mentions Mellon

Low interest rates just create another bubble. DM: Hair of the dog

Confidence only comes from strong balance sheets.

Quotes Jackson regarding the Second Bank of the United States

Solution is to eliminate the Fed

Endgames: Monetize the debt, or watch interest rates rise.

Solutions? Gold standard, End Fed, personal liability for bankers.? Constitutional settlement because governments and money don’t mix.? Prohibit bailouts, and intergenerational transfer schemes.

Kurt Schuler
Senior Fellow, Center for Financial Stability

Competitive vs Monopoly issue of currency — why the shift?

Easy way for the Government to make money through seniorage.

Four places today where parallel issuance of notes goes on today: Scotland, Northern Ireland, Hong Kong, and Macau.? 100% segregation of assets in reserves at the central banks, generally.

Where might issuance of competitive notes be legal?? Mostly teensy places, with the exception of the US & Japan (they aren’t sure) and the 4 mentioned above.

Q&A

Raising interest rates to improve matters?? Where to invest?

Gold, silver, TBT

Currency transfer schemes talk, no question

DM: There are lots of these schemes around

At the Cato Institute?s 29th Annual Monetary Conference (V)

At the Cato Institute?s 29th Annual Monetary Conference (V)

 

PANEL 3: TRANSITION TO A NEW MONETARY REGIME

Moderator: Steve H. Hanke
Professor of Economics, Johns Hopkins University

DM: Steve Hanke was a professor of mine when I went to Hopkins.

Targeting NGDP — Cato Institute — 2003 — Nominal Gross Domestic purchases or final sales


Richard H. Timberlake
Emeritus Professor of Economics, University of Georgia

Why did we go off the gold standard?

Dual Mandate is the main problem at the Fed.

Fed very different animal than at its inception.

Legal tender laws — goes back to the Civil war, 2.5x inflation afterward.? Debts paid off with depreciated greenbacks.? Tested by Supreme Court — Salmon Chase, Lincoln’s Treasury Secretary in 1864, was the Chief Justice at the time in 1869, and he changed his mind, on the ability to pay off pre-1862 debts with the greenbacks.

Rankled Grant administration — appointed 2 new justices, and a new case reversed the ruling. 1871

1884 — Congress can issue any currency it likes because it has sovereignty.

1913 — System needed a lender of last resort, thus Fed creation.

1922-1929 — Stabilized the price level, amid a gold standard…

Benjamin Strong dies, and power shifts from the NY Fed to the Board.? New leader opposes speculation; banks needing liquidity could not get it if they had been lending to the stock market. 1929-1933 huge contractions and bank failures.

FDR abandons the gold standard; devalues; collects gold; eliminates gold clauses.

Supreme Court relies on legal tender laws saying that Congress could define money as it chose.? He thinks the precedents should have been re-argued.

Judy Shelton
Author, Money Meltdown

Ruble collapse — Why back to gold standard?

Thinks all candidates should be talking about monetary reforms.

Money should be a stable unit of account and should be liquid.? It should allow us measure value well.? Convey the price signals of the market accurately.

Jefferson wanted a hard currency defined in terms of precious metals.

Offer Treasury Trust Bonds with a an optional conversion feature to gold.? Would receive par back or an ounce of gold.? Priced initially with par of an ounce of gold, no interest paid.

Argues for a balanced budget amendment.

Thinks other nations would mimic the ideas if a US Government gold bond would be issued.

Greenspan proposed this idea 40 years ago.

Lawrence H. White
Professor of Economics, George Mason University

How to go back to the gold standard?

A lot is calculating the proper initial parity with gold.

Treasury owns enough gold to re-establish a gold standard at $1600/ounce.

“At least I assume it is there, Fort Knox hasn’t been audited in a while.”

1) Eliminate excess reserve by eliminating interest paid on reserves.

2) Redeem reserves at Fed with gold.

Back M1 100% with gold — $8000/oz, Inflationary, reduction in wealth, etc.? Warehouse notes w/storage fees.

Central bank?? No monetary policy needed.? People would buy and sell gold daily.

Single mandate has not worked well for the ECB.? Inflation there running at 4% or so.

Competing private banks worked better than with central banks.

Or, the Fed could become a currency board in the short run.

Q&A

Taxation of Tsy Trust Bonds?

Shelton: Would confuse some of the issues.? Just get this out there so it can be tried.

Will the gov’t take action?? Guesses as to when?

Shelton, White: No idea.

Would would trust the Treasury w/Treasury Trust bonds?

Shelton: They would be collateralized.

Why is monetary reform important?

Hanke: because the Fed ran a reckless monetary policy, and did not regulate leverage of banks well.

 

At the Cato Institute?s 29th Annual Monetary Conference (IV)

At the Cato Institute?s 29th Annual Monetary Conference (IV)

LUNCHEON CONVERSATION

Robert Zoellick
President, World Bank

Questions from:

Sebastian Mallaby
Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations

Asked about the EU crisis:

Missed his first point.

2) Greek debt forgiveness may come.? 3) EFSF assist Italy and Spain with rollover.? 4) Markets judging governments.? Slow motion run. 5) move toward political and maybe fiscal union.

All liquidity and buying time.? Emerging markets in the G20 look at the EU, and are surprised at the lack of coherence.? Zoellick doesn’t want to see the US get there.

What can Germany do?

Germany’s policies individually are reasonable, but not in aggregate. 2,3) Could provide even more in aggregate to the EFSF or IMF SDRs –> Germany: other Europeans should become more like Germany.

US underestimates Germany’s commitment to the Eurozone.? Merkel building commitment among the German electorate (?!)

What political/fiscal reforms could take place?? Uncertain.

Germany: Markets should not dominate the State (DM: Hegel?), unlike US & UK.

What else can be done?

Italy might be fixable, with a little bit of time.? Spain also.

Isn’t this just a question that reserve assets now appear to be risk assets?

Get countries to recognize the externalities inherent in their policy choices.? Get the emerging markets to move toward flexible exchange rates and independent central banks.

US Dollar will remain the main reserve currency, but may go multipolar to many reserve currencies.

Gold will judge the policies of Central Bankers.? At least Central Banks should look over their shoulder at it.

Q&A

Corruption? Why not exclude those nations the Eurozone that can’t stand the rigor?

US less transparent than the World Bank.

Question comes down to cross-subsidy of the less rigorous.

At the Cato Institute?s 29th Annual Monetary Conference (III)

At the Cato Institute?s 29th Annual Monetary Conference (III)

PANEL 2: FED POLICY AND THE ALLOCATION OF CREDIT

Moderator: Mark A. Calabria
Director of Financial Regulation Studies, Cato Institute

Malinvestment vs capital flowing to most productive sectors of the economy.

Jeffrey M. Lacker
President, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond

Fed’s response led to misallocation of capital.

Monetary expansion was needed to prevent a collapse.

Initial Fed lending was sterilized — equivalent to issuing Treasuries, and lending the proceeds.

Fed could have just bought Treasuries, and not MBS or other securities.? To do otherwise distorts credit incentives.? It creates an appearance of unfairness.

Many contend as a result that credit allocation should not be an aspect of Fed policy. May compromise the independence of the Fed to do so.

Cornerstone of CB independence is control of liabilities.? Assets are more open to choice.? Thus it becomes a path of least resistance in a crisis.? Creates moral hazard, and probabilities of future economic distress.? Threatens CB independence.

Contain the willingness to intervene either by CB habit or law.? Would conflict with lender of last resort, which was more a product of a commodity money era.? Not elastic credit needed but elastic currency.

CB asset policy is an unfinished aspect of Central Banking.? This should be a top priority for action.

Allan H. Meltzer
University Professor of Economics, Carnegie-Mellon University,
and Distinguished Visiting Scholar, Hoover Institution.

Bailing out Bear Stearns was a mistake, and other non-commercial banks, including AIG.? Added to uncertainty of the situation, Fed then increased supply of credit, bought MBS and long-term Treasuries.? Fed acted too soon, if they had waited, they might have been able to do less.

Speculators front-run the Fed.

Fed doesn’t care about exchange rates except in a crisis — US Dollar down 15% recently.

Operation Twist not needed because they acted too soon, economy expanding rapidly now (?!)

Fed is too short-term oriented.

Believes that things will only normalize when housing values fall to their eventual equilibrium levels.

Chart on base velocity vs LT AAA Corp Bond yields.? Current conditions consistent w/ ’20s and ’60s.? Here’s my version, really only consistent with 1932-33 at present.

Greater centralization of the Fed and US Government control over the Fed.

Thinks higher future inflation is highly likely.

Fed has done well when it has followed the Taylor Rule.? Flip-flopping from one aspect of the dual mandate to another has not worked well.

Phillips Curve does not work, and the present Fed uses it for erroneous forecasts.

Fed kept monetary policy too low for too long and created the crisis.

Fed needs to be more accountable for its actions.

George Selgin
Professor of Economics, University of Georgia

Jokes that the Federal Reserve should be done away with, or that it should be significantly modified.

Describes how monetary policy works.? Little need for a discount window a common topic before.

Fed channels liquidity through soundest counterparties — primary dealers.? But if primary dealers are impaired, they become liquidity sponges.? Happened in 2008, so they worked to rescue primary dealers, excluding Lehman. [PDCF?]

Discount window didn’t help because of stigma, and thus the TAF was created.

1) End primary dealer system.? Not needed anymore with modern technology for auctions.

2) End Treasuries only.? Original Fed was not that way; avoid monetization of US debt. Let many parties bid for credit from the FOMC.

Eventual disbanding of FOMC, let a computer do it.

Roger Garrison
Professor of Economics, Auburn University

Natural rates of Interest and Economic Growth

The Fed attempts to expand growth beyond the natural rate of growth, and accelerates it beyond, setting up the conditions for a slump.

FOMC actions every eight weeks; learns once a decade when a crisis occurs.

Taylor Rule has no concept of the natural rate of interest.

Concludes that the Fed oversupplied credit, creating a boom and then the bust we are currently in.

Q&A

Opinions on Nominal GDP targeting?

Meltzer: easy to say, hard to do.? Follow Taylor Rule.? Lacker agrees.

Selgin thinks it is a much better idea.

Garrison: target a zero growth rate. Prices would fall.

 

 

 

At the Cato Institute’s 29th Annual Monetary Conference (II)

At the Cato Institute’s 29th Annual Monetary Conference (II)

PANEL 1: RETHINKING THE GLOBAL FIAT MONEY SYSTEM

Moderator: Mary Anastasia O’Grady
Member, Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal

Comments that the Fed buying MBS reminds her of the Latin American countries that she covers.

Benn Steil
Director of International Economics
Council on Foreign Relations

Central bankers as Churchillian war leaders, rather than dull technocrats.

Y = C + I + G? Economists treat C, I, and G as easy substitutes but they have different effects over time.

Krugman advocated creating a housing bubble, to replace the NASDAQ bubble.? (DM: They are trying to create new bubbles now via QE.)

Sweden and Australian central banks sold foreign assets to buy dollars and euros during their financial crises.

Central banking effective when governments can borrow near the policy rate of the central bank w/a tight correlation.? Implies that the ECB is no longer an effective CB for the fringe.

Central Bankers not particularly effective with fiscal policy.

Can Central Banks act without capital?? Will German taxpayers recapitalize the ECB? Doubtful.

On the Fed:

If the Fed got into trouble (negative net worth), the Treasury would back up, recapitalize it.

Suggests that the Fed should exchange MBS with the US Treasury for Treasuries.? Suggests that MBS will produce significant losses.

George Melloan
Former Deputy Editor, Wall Street Journal

Jokes about what a nickel could buy during the (big Baby Ruth bar) Depression and now (a jellybean).

Talks about post-WWII monetary policy in Britain, and how British Socialism led them astray.? War in Vietnam did much the same thing in the US, leading Nixon to end Bretton Woods.

Dollar’s primacy increasingly questioned.

Inflation coming as the Fed creates credit to fund the US government.

Doubts that multilateral currencies like the SDRs of the IMF would work. The Euro proves that.

The US needs monetary reform, but we might need to fail before that comes.? Gold, bitcoins, scrips, barter if things break down.? Fiat currencies are liquid, barter is inefficient.

If the US dollar goes, a lot else will go down as well. (DM: think about Chinese banks.)

Gerald P. O?Driscoll Jr.
Senior Fellow, Cato Institute

Gold standards can be done if the currencies reflect the fair values of the currencies.? I.e. France made its currency too cheap post-WWI, and Britain too expensive.

Gold standards are not always associated with deflationary periods with low growth.

No monetary system survives big wars.

Nixon went off the gold standard when the CPI was at a high 4.2%.? Monetary policy run by the seat of the pants then.

Argues that classical liberalism requires a gold standard.

Q&A

Fiat currencies even larger proportionately in Africa.? Give seniorage as foreign aid to Africa?

O’Driscoll: dollarization is faux gold.? Gold would be better.? Seniorage can’t be given away.? We need it.

Steil: Helps the African countries get along fine.? Dollarization of Panama has not hurt them; they know the US won’t send help.

O’Grady: Argentines tried to find a way to use US Dollars, but wanted seniorage, thus but devalued instead.

Question to Steil on Operation Twist, duration risk to Fed?

Steil: Operation Twist worked for several nations.? 40 bp move would wipe out Fed capital.? ECB purchases of PIIGS debt an alternative to Eurobonds, bailouts, etc.

Isn’t fractional reserve lending the problem?

O’Driscoll: leverage would come from other sources.? MMMFs?

Melloan: Politicization of monetary policy is the problem.

DM: misses the concept that asset-liability mismatches with leverage produces failures.

O’Grady: Wouldn’t a single mandate solve things?

All of the panel expressed doubts on this point.? The Fed needs it to hide, but they would find other ways to do it.

At the Cato Institute’s 29th Annual Monetary Conference (I)

At the Cato Institute’s 29th Annual Monetary Conference (I)

I’m just going to give notes from speakers.

Ron Paul

Inflation running about 4%/yr, would be higher if older standards were used.

Congress derelict in duties of overseeing the Fed.

Little enthusiasm in Congress for auditing the Fed.? More enthusiasm in the hinterlands, especially among students.

Fed facilitates big government; both parties like the flexibility that it gives.? Deficits matter, a lot.? Not much difference between the two parties on that.

Global debt relief is needed; balancing budgets is needed, and the sooner the better.

People feel worse in the US than 9% unemployment; US governments fear-monger for deficits.

Fed’s goal is to liquidate debt with inflation.

Likes that Bernanke is holding press conferences — puts him on the defensive.

Do we want Constitutional government or not?? His main interest is liberty. Does not allow for a central bank; gold and silver as currencies.

Fed will close when they destroy the money, unless closed politically before then.? Legalize competition in currency.? End legal tender laws.? Allow for the creation of private mints, with taxes taken off of gold and silver.

End fractional reserve banking, though Ron Paul admits there are disagreements among libertarians on the topic.

Questions

What is the Fed is audited and it less assets than stated?

 

Where would you regulate competitive money?

The States, once legal tender laws are abolished.

Since the rest of the world has fiat currency, why wouldn’t an international currency spring up?

Legal tender laws.? Also, look at the current trade wars via currency devaluation.

Supercommittee not doing much, will sequestration end?

Probably.? Once defense gets cut, people will get motivated, but they won’t cut spending.? That said there are a lot of frightened, motivated people out there

What about? TIPS?

Not much

Does QE discriminate against the poor (higher prices of consumer goods) in favor of the rich (higher asset prices)? (I asked this.)

Yes, and the rich disproportionately benefit from bailouts, and ordinary monetary policy as well, whoever gets the money first benefits.? QE benefits special interests.

How is the situation different now than in the ’70s?

Things are worse now.? More indebtedness, could have a catastrophic end.? Any reform that ignores monetary policy is not a reform.

Peace, prosperity and limited government… what he wants, and that requires reform of the Fed.

Conference can be followed here in real time.

More to come.

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