Month: August 2012

Book Review: Moods and Markets

Book Review: Moods and Markets

 

To my readers: this is the second time I have written this review. When I pushed the “publish” button earlier this evening, WordPress ate the document. That’s never happened before, so I did not have a backup. As a result, this review is entirely different than the prior one, and I did it using DragonDictate, so it may sound a little more colloquial than other reviews of mine. Let me know what you think, and if you like my reviews please vote them up at Amazon. As always, whether you agree or not, thanks for being a reader of mine.

This book is about the questions every investor wants answers to:

  • Why do I tend to get into and out of the market at the wrong times?
  • Why are professionals prone to the exact same problems?
  • Why do financial crises happen?
  • Is there a way to approximately measure where we are in the overall market cycle?

The author has a theory that he calls “Horizon Preference.” Think of it this way: when the market is near bottom, market players have very short time horizons for investment. They hide in cash. More than that, they choose very generic investments; they stay close to home and keep things simple. Fear drives them back to what they know always works in the very short run, which means any opportunity for gain is lost.

At such a time, only the most risk tolerant and experienced remain holding risky assets. Valuations are low. The party is over, the young have left, and the old guys are cleaning up the room. If you look in a financial newspaper, or out on the web, the headlines you read are pervasively negative. But at a true bottom, you’ll see that things have stopped getting worse.

Then optimism begins. It’s a fitful at first. It is two steps forward and one step back, before it becomes three steps forward and one step back, before it becomes an unrelentingly good trend. But as this happens, moods, headlines, move from disbelief, to doubt, to wonder, to optimism, and to greed. As this happens, market players expand their horizons. They are willing to take on new risks, with new instruments, and in new places. They are willing to pay remarkably higher prices for risky assets. This happens with individual investors, professional investors, bankers make loans, regulators, accountants who have to make the numbers for management, etc.

At the top everything is wondrous. Nothing can go wrong. At the top, the attitude is “We are going to make a lot of money.??It?s as if money is free, and anyone can make it in the markets now. Everyone can be rich, just invest in the market. All of the neophytes are playing in the market. The experienced professionals who have seen a few market cycles have begun to edge out of the market, if not raise significant cash. Risk control is derided as a way of losing money. Real heavy hitters don’t need risk control.

All of the discretionary cash is applied to the markets. Various forms of leverage are applied to personal investments, real estate, and business investments. Because everyone knows things are going to go well, they figure they may as well play it to the hilt.

But at the top, things stop getting better. Then pessimism begins.? It’s a fitful at first. It is two steps back and one step forward, before it becomes three steps back and one step forward, before it becomes an unrelentingly bad trend.? Sadly, during the phase of pessimism, things move down about twice as fast as they went up. It’s frightening, and it should be. Bear markets tend to persist until the bad ideas and investments of the up cycle are liquidated, unless the government steps in to arrest the fall.

The planning horizons of businessmen and investors shrink, as do valuations, until we hit the bottom, and the cycle starts again.

What I have described to you is the basic framework of the book. The author then applies that framework to the housing bubble, the possible higher education bubble, changes to accounting frameworks as rising preferences change, and where we are today in the markets. He gives a tour of the various phenomena inside corporations that take place at different points in the cycle. Optimism breeds complexity, lack of risk management, concept stocks, big projects, and a lot of credit. Pessimism breeds simplicity, renewed risk management, and bankruptcies.

This book will give you a feel for what part of the market cycle we’re in, and how you can profit from it. It is not math intensive; the book has no equations. There are a lot of graphs, but they are simple to understand.

Quibbles

In one sense, this book is about the credit cycle, and how it affects all risky assets. But it is couched in the language of how moods change of market participants, which then drives the market. My view of the matter is slightly different. I see market players making estimates of their future well-being, and as that estimate changes, so do their moods change, and the prices of risky assets. I don’t think this is a big difference from what the author is saying, so I heartily endorse this book.

Who would benefit from this book:?? Inexperienced investors would definitely benefit from this book. Experienced investors who are having a hard time with the unpredictability of the market of late would also benefit.? If you want to, you can buy it here: Moods and Markets: A New Way to Invest in Good Times and in Bad (Minyanville Media).

Full disclosure:?I got this book in a weird way. I don’t know the author, but we have a mutual friend, and he suggested to the publisher that he send me a copy of the book. That’s how I got it.

If you enter Amazon through my site, and you buy anything, I get a small commission.? This is my main source of blog revenue.? I prefer this to a ?tip jar? because I want you to get something you want, rather than merely giving me a tip.? Book reviews take time, particularly with the reading, which most book reviewers don?t do in full, and I typically do. (When I don?t, I mention that I scanned the book.? Also, I never use the data that the PR flacks send out.)

Most people buying at Amazon do not enter via a referring website.? Thus Amazon builds an extra 1-3% into the prices to all buyers to compensate for the commissions given to the minority that come through referring sites.? Whether you buy at Amazon directly or enter via my site, your prices don?t change.

Sorted Weekly Tweets

Sorted Weekly Tweets

Life Insurance Secondary Guarantees

 

  • Hartford Mulls Client Buyouts to Cut Risk Buffett Called Ungodly http://t.co/Nv4jRlUC Advice: don’t take the Variable Annuity buyouts $$ Aug 10, 2012
  • The original: Buffett Says Insurers Took ‘Ungodly Amount of Risk’ http://t.co/pXfXv8ME Warren Buffett again is prescient cc: @PlanMaestro $$ Aug 10, 2012
  • @PlanMaestro Thanks4 flagging this. Together w/companies scaling back gtees 4 new prods, the buyout offers show the probs in the life biz $$ Aug 10, 2012
  • @PlanMaestro I am not in favor of peer review. Actuaries call themselves a “profession,” but they really technicians. Aug 09, 2012
  • @PlanMaestro Regulators not crazy for this, because they can’t understand it, & almost makes the companies self-regulating. Peer Review? $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • @PlanMaestro But actuaries are trying to get regulators to cmove to a Canadian-style principle based approach. In Actuaries we Trust! $$ + Aug 09, 2012
  • @PlanMaestro But the devil is in the details, and GAAP reserving does not always reflect antiselection. Stat tries to do that, but + $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • @PlanMaestro But you’re right, the 10Ks do contain approximate partial sensitivity data on economic value for most important variables $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • @PlanMaestro In 1999, I saw a VA that guaranteed 7% minimum return if held till death or annuitization $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • @PlanMaestro I said “Wow, how do you guarantee the better of 5%/yr and performance of the underlying 4 just 2.25%?” $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • @PlanMaestro I have a friend who is a $PRU agent. One day he showed me his hottest-selling VA product, and ask me how I liked it. $$ + Aug 09, 2012
  • @PlanMaestro Acctg can get really screwy if you hedge NPV or FMV; gets really noisy because the results pile up in the current year $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • @PlanMaestro hedging long-dated options, w/complex contingencies built into them. Do you hedge next few years, or NPV sensitivity? $$ + Aug 09, 2012
  • @PlanMaestro I was an ALM actuary for many years, typically we hedged partial durations; fixed income hedging is easy, what’s hard is $$ + Aug 09, 2012
  • @PlanMaestro many exposures are impossible to hedge b/c the contracts r long-term, and hedge instruments r usually far shorter $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • @PlanMaestro That’s one of my concerns about the life industry; secondary guarantees r virtually impossible to reserve, getting big now $$ Aug 09, 2012

 

Insurance Industry

  • @ReformedBroker Good post, same thing happens with young life insurance agents to a degree http://t.co/LbMyo48G $$ Aug 10, 2012
  • @Bonfire_Sherman P&C – P/TB vs ROTE, adjusted 4 business mix, reserve life & conservatism, mgmt quality, U/W cycle, never premiums $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • @Bonfire_Sherman Most of it is change in required capital. Life actuaries typically calculate “distibutable earnings” reflting stat & RBC $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • Anytime anyone talks about Financial Cos & tells u about Free Cash Flow, ask how they did the calc. C if they mention chg in req capital $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • Wrong: 3 Life Insurance Stocks Undervalued By Levered Free Cash Flows http://t.co/gF5HYRZb GAAP financials don’t have data4 FCF calcs $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • Aviva profits fall as it cuts the value of its US unit http://t.co/t816IjAZ Amerus IR was annoyed @ me 4saying the orignal deal expensive $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • @PlanMaestro HIG is next on my list Aug 09, 2012
  • @PlanMaestro Thanks, I know where to get them, but I have enough GNW on my plate for now, I took me two weeks to write my AIG piece. $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • @PlanMaestro Have not looked at HIG, after I am done with GNW may take a look. If u r looking at stat acctg, look @ pg 5 indiv annuities $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • @PlanMaestro That’s the thing, like AIG prior to the crisis, and Scottish Re, they are capital constrained; things have 2go right 4 them $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • @PlanMaestro & not so sure about the rest if investing for more than five years. $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • @PlanMaestro Aye, agreed. Oddly, my interest stemmed from a reader who asked me if I would invest in GNW bonds. Yes 4 GIC-MTNs + Aug 09, 2012
  • @PlanMaestro I’m going to write a broad piece about it, but follow it up, with a narrow piece focusing on the specific problems. $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • @PlanMaestro Intercompany surplus notes and preferred stock too. Aug 09, 2012
  • @PlanMaestro There’s a ton. Underreserving, capital stacking, capital interlacing, intercompany reinsurance, & I’ve ony been looking 2 hours Aug 09, 2012
  • @Bonfire_Sherman Good guess, I need to look at the life co stmts someday, esp. page 5 for Indiv annuities Aug 09, 2012
  • Ding! We have a winner! RT @RennieScinto: @AlephBlog gnw? Aug 09, 2012
  • I’m a fun guy, looking @ statutory statements of a major US insurer, though AIG in 2008 looked worse, this company doesn’t look good $$ Who? Aug 09, 2012
  • Online Dating for Homes Stumps Insurers http://t.co/R2fmztPa Y not have both deposit $$ w/the insurer plus a premium payment? #wouldwork Aug 08, 2012
  • Regulators Probe ‘Captives’ http://t.co/xbXQ5aYO How to bend life insurance reserves. Catch my comment: http://t.co/9WQWYZ3W $$ Aug 06, 2012
  • Berkshire Trims Municipal-Debt Bet http://t.co/9zhhbdtD Meredith Whitney, no. Buffett, yes. But even he is only selectively reducing $$ Aug 05, 2012

 

Poway School District

 

  • Article near issuance of Poway School District CAB http://t.co/kxAWCNxT Letter from CA AG: http://t.co/UiZM0j3K cc: @munilass @jamessaft $$ Aug 06, 2012
  • @jamessaft I’m not a muni expert like @munilass, but no, I would try to find another way to refinance prior debts. $$ Aug 06, 2012
  • Ideal buyer4the preceding bond would b Buffett, or a P&C company w/long-tail liabilities. Prospectus 4 wonks only http://t.co/nIKJvJje $$ Aug 06, 2012
  • Where Borrowing $105 Million Will Cost $1 Billion: Poway Schools http://t.co/IPaABoXY Paying 7.6% IRR at a duration of 25. Astounding! $$ Aug 06, 2012
  • @munilass Also, I found the prospectus here: http://t.co/nIKJvJje Last Q: Do county tax levies into a sinking fund ever fail to work? $$ Aug 06, 2012
  • @munilass I get the holder taxes now. Poway was structured as a series of zero coupon notes, followed by 2 series of long lottery bonds $$ Aug 06, 2012
  • @munilass Used to be an asset-liability manager, so I look for that. 1 question: do you know how holders are taxed on a deal like that? Aug 06, 2012
  • @munilass This is just a crude estimate, but the IRR on the Poway deal is around 7.7%, and is nonrefinancable. Duration estimate 25 years $$ Aug 06, 2012

 

Rest of the World

 

  • China Export Growth Slides as World Recovery Slows http://t.co/u4YEUPQB China sneezes & the world catches a cold? no, important anyway $$ Aug 10, 2012
  • India?s Biggest Corporate Loss Shows Singh?s Dilemma on Deficit http://t.co/6xl7lsZD Force oil company to lose $$, eventually lose oil co. Aug 10, 2012
  • Housewives With Frying Pans Protest Japan Tax Hike as Debt Soars http://t.co/z3aeqjEv Taxes to double; can’t keep borrowing 4ever $$ Aug 10, 2012
  • Virus found in Mideast can spy on finance transactions http://t.co/V2GgyjpV Can spy on financial transactions, email & social networking $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • Toronto Condo ?Roller Coaster? Peaks as Flaherty Acts http://t.co/c6sJ0CqE Is Canadian housing a basketball (sss) or a bubble (pop)? $$ Aug 08, 2012
  • Iran?s Big Crisis: The Price of Chicken http://t.co/WXlUIIdL Describes some the economic difficulties of Iran under sanctions $$ Aug 08, 2012
  • Article makes a good point. The industries where China has overcapacity are power-intensive & are shrinking. Simple. http://t.co/IzyV0Bxe Aug 08, 2012
  • China’s answer to subprime bets: the “Golden Elephant” http://t.co/MP7LviwT Illiquid investments touting high returns w/lousy business $$ Aug 07, 2012
  • RE: Things are getting less equal in the US, because we allow more freedom here.? Globally, things are getting more e? http://t.co/WeGEEJF9 Aug 07, 2012
  • Presidential candidate up by 15%+ in August will win. If merely ahead, 9 times out of 12 he will win the Presidency http://t.co/soCj7Kf9 Aug 08, 2012
  • Swiss Banks Face Slow Death as Taxman Chases Assets http://t.co/13I9NkiQ Life’s tough when u can no longer help people cheat the taxman $$ Aug 06, 2012
  • Germany has the most to lose from a meltdown http://t.co/9JTwRfii Basically encourages an inflationary “solution.” Prob won’t work $$ Aug 06, 2012
  • If policymakers are worried about this, they are worried about the wrong thing. EU does not have that big… http://t.co/eCBlZg5I Aug 06, 2012
  • Summary: greater structural unity, mutualization of sovereign debts and a weak euro $$ Tough order for the… http://t.co/KN9pc0Pt Aug 06, 2012
  • Rogoff Sees World Wishing It?s America Year After S&P Downgrade http://t.co/MpStm7ww Relative flexibility pays off $$ Aug 06, 2012

 

Fixed Income

 

  • Lending in the offshore markets developed because of bad regulations here. It is outside US control & we should not m? http://t.co/C8y9rVFw Aug 10, 2012
  • In hunt for yield, hybrids flourish anew http://t.co/GCugG6A6 Credit rally revsup ppl grab yield in exchange 4 higher poss loss severity $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • Please, no $$ RT @CapitalCityIFR: In hunt for yield, hybrids flourish anew http://t.co/ZWbdRRl5 Aug 09, 2012
  • For a bad 30-yr Tsy auction, nice rally since then $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • A Greek banker, the Shah and the birth of Libor http://t.co/ibvVs9mE ht: @alea_ Started w/a loan 2 the Shah. Inauspicious start 4a big # $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • Definitely a weak auction, surprised long end not selling off $$ RT @ritholtz: 30 yr bond auction weak as well http://t.co/1gU89HMb $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • “Credit default swaps are easily manipulated. Rather, watch the bond market; it’s much bigger. $$” ? David_Merkel http://t.co/tESmTJsK Aug 09, 2012

 

Politics

 

  • The Neocon War Against Robert Zoellick http://t.co/vZreHf1n If Romney wins, pragmatic Zoellick could be influential on foreign policy $$ Aug 11, 2012
  • Christie Does Tenure http://t.co/J8krPlim Tenure is one of those sacred cows that hides the intellectually weak from consequences $$ Aug 10, 2012
  • In New York City, Microsoft Really Is Watching You http://t.co/trNOkU2d Interesting partnership w/NYC & $MSFT Civil liberties? $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • Postal Service $1 Million-an-Hour Loss Puts Abyss in View http://t.co/FVXMn5Di Raise stamp prices & costs 2 $FDX & $UPS $$ #simple Aug 09, 2012
  • Here’s The Real Reason The Feds Are Furious At The NY Regulator Going After Standard Chartered http://t.co/OmpwBILH Made Feds look dumb $$ Aug 08, 2012
  • RE: @bloombergview Dream, the Republicans will block this because it favors blue states over Red. $$ http://www.bloom? http://t.co/jT7EmSS0 Aug 08, 2012
  • I think it is a fair tradeoff to lose 2% of GDP in 2013 in order to get the economy growing. I agree with… http://t.co/mwuvnogX Aug 07, 2012
  • The Numbers Inside a Hot-Button Issue http://t.co/Fwois4YN Something to make everyone unhappy. Me: Don’t focus on rates, but deferral $$ Aug 07, 2012

?

Pensions & Endowments

 

  • State Pensions Get High Fees, Low Profits-Study http://t.co/3LRIL23c Add to that the lack of adequate funding &you have a serious crisis $$ Aug 10, 2012
  • Cornell, MIT Scale Back Aid Even as Endowments Rise http://t.co/WUoWDLLB Endowments provide less when rates r low, future cashflows smallr Aug 10, 2012
  • Defined contribution assets hit all-time high despite conservative shift http://t.co/7s9Stabd Amazing 2c bond alloc rising w/low rates $$ Aug 06, 2012
  • U can say that again $$ RT @e_d_sanders: @AlephBlog now this is an issue I know something about. Public pensions for execs are a nightmare Aug 05, 2012
  • Police Chief?s $204,000 Pension Shows How Cities Crashed http://t.co/ZorpuSjX Sloppy pension negotiating leads2 L-T cash flow crises. $$ Aug 05, 2012

 

Energy

 

  • Let the market decide.? If people want to pay a lot for gas, let them.? Why is Obama discouraging consumer spending? http://t.co/VT8xCyU0 Aug 10, 2012
  • Refiners Awash in Shale Oil Offer 10 Times Exxon Returns http://t.co/IIw9xXlb Buy cheap shale oil, ship to coasts, refine, sell & make $$ Aug 10, 2012
  • Louisiana sinkhole roils local natural gas network http://t.co/IkZxHLAs Now, who could have seen that coming? Risk is pervasive. $$ #sloorp Aug 09, 2012
  • Coal stocks typically have a lot of debt, beware $$ RT @MKTWBurton: Don?t mine this coal stock – Chuck Jaffe – http://t.co/nCQWfYzQ Aug 09, 2012

 

Other

 

  • Passed 10,000 tweets today. I quit Twitter after my first month, but came back to it after I saw its usefulness. Thanks 4 reading me $$ Aug 10, 2012
  • Heavy rain in Baltimore w/sleet and sunshine. Really weird weather. Sleet is neat, is hard to beat & will repeat, to make me tweet. $$ #ugh Aug 09, 2012
  • After Moods & Markets, Bailout is my next book to review. http://t.co/zkioUQ5N Aug 09, 2012
  • 5 Questions Great Job Candidates Ask http://t.co/JpnpVWtu Questions show initiative, intelligence, & give u good jump pts 2 sell yrself $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • Novel Cure for Ailing Hearts http://t.co/RAiv4FYj Nanotech combines w/vascular endothelial growth factor to grow new heart muscle $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • Wrong: Business Is Booming in Empirical Economics http://t.co/aTNu4qfu U might get cute papers out of it, but nothing that generalizes $$ Aug 07, 2012

 

Companies

 

  • Yahoo Reviewing Business Strategy, Alibaba Proceeds; Shares Tumble http://t.co/ikk3dpeC Marissa Mayer has plans, & they require $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • Why Honda?s New Accord Looks Like the Old One http://t.co/6Ez8uL5i FD: + $HMC Designers tire of their designs long b4 users do $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • The WARN Act dilemma http://t.co/ilbxFsXD Defense, Fiscal cliff, DOL Guidance Letter saying ignore WARN act on 11/1, & elections $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • Hewlett-Packard?s Whitman Dismantles Hurd-Era Empire http://t.co/ySeeVM9w FD: + $HPQ She seems 2b evaluating each biz separately $$ #good Aug 09, 2012
  • The New York Times Is About to Say Goodbye to About,com http://t.co/frzrVlUq gives more details on the lossesv$$ Aug 08, 2012
  • New York Times Shares Rise on Deal to Sell About,com http://t.co/k5GarxXV Amazing how much $NYT lost on it, capital losses, neg income $$ Aug 08, 2012
  • Judge in Google, Oracle case seeks names of paid reporters, bloggers http://t.co/7vhmK5N3 Fascinating 4bloggers 2b paid $$ by corps quietly Aug 08, 2012
  • I do not get how http://t.co/ROsNYak3 could be worth $270M. What’s the revenue model? Ads? $$ http://t.co/n1ddWxvU Aug 08, 2012
  • Wrong: The PC looks like it’s dying http://t.co/IqeVAbi6 Like most tech, when it matures, it finds & stays there. Think of “dead” radio $$ Aug 07, 2012
  • Amazon Is No Wal-Mart…Yet http://t.co/cmEjPHHu Relatively neutral article on $AMZN by Martin Sosnoff; prob: treats AMZN as retailer $$ Aug 07, 2012
  • Why FedEx and UPS Want the Postal Service to Survive http://t.co/MAaCfOXQ Solution: raise stamp prices, and prices to $FDX and $UPS $$ #easy Aug 05, 2012

 

Monetary Policy

 

  • Fisher Says More Stimulus May Overburden Central Banks http://t.co/5ZMlKO5G 3-time winner of coveted “FOMC loose cannon award” speaks $$ Aug 08, 2012
  • Economic Musings – Fed eyeing a new kind of twist? http://t.co/aUezU2XE $$ Extending duration in MBS; creating larger losses later $$ Aug 08, 2012
  • RE: @bondtrader83 That’s not all that much different than the 1st Twist. It’s duration extension in MBS. Wait till ra? http://t.co/PrMHBSGh Aug 08, 2012
  • How about quantitative easing for the people? http://t.co/inHK9NF2 Would work better than current QE/Twist etc, but this frightens me. $$ Aug 08, 2012
  • Wrong: Bernanke to Economists: More Philosophy, Please http://t.co/9638QlHo Been down this road; utility theory doesn’t explain mankind $$ Aug 07, 2012

 

Housing & Related

 

  • Public-Housing Parking Lots Make Everyone Poorer http://t.co/2gensCd8 Set rates to achieve 15% vacancy; Rather than lots, have garages $$ Aug 08, 2012
  • Home Prices Climb as Supply Dwindles http://t.co/hMoZBsNZ Good news for the low end of the market, high end will take time $$ Aug 08, 2012
  • Fannie Mae profits rolled into rainy day fund http://t.co/bDWphSuE Good for Fannie & Freddie preferred, not worth anything 4 the common $$ Aug 08, 2012

 

Financial Companies & Markets

 

  • NYSE in talks with SEC to settle data probe http://t.co/FkxBtlbz Wow, faster data feeds 4 some special clients; level the playing field $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • Are Diamonds an ETF?s Best Friend? http://t.co/RHbSghCw Bad things happen when you take something illiquid and try to make it liquid $$ Aug 08, 2012
  • Richest Family Offices Seeing Fastest Growth as Firms Oust Banks http://t.co/NqY9650P UberWealthy get $$ talent; tax savings >> costs Aug 07, 2012
  • 4 ETF Lessons From Knight http://t.co/st6wbNgR Lead Market Makers matter, Markets Work, Settlement Works, Illiquid ETFs Need Helpers $$ Aug 06, 2012
  • Other problem: active etf gives away trading information it might rather not divulge, leading to front-running. $$ http://t.co/q4XXZwRv Aug 06, 2012
  • A Tale of Two Fund Giants: American Funds vs Vanguard http://t.co/46rFsL9e Key advantage for Vanguard was embracing ETFs early $$ Aug 06, 2012

 

Repos

 

  • Banks? Liquidity Hinges on Risky Assets http://t.co/45Iw5Dz9 Repo lending is subject2runs during credit panics which depress collateral $$ Aug 08, 2012
  • Good one $$ RT @pdacosta: Watch out for the grim repo-er RT @cate_long Banks? liquidity hinges on risky assets http://t.co/9lk0GjA0 Aug 08, 2012
  • The danger of repo http://t.co/mZDG9Ocb Repo is weak financing in crisis; 3-mo T-bills would b a better index 4 Tsy floating rate notes $$ Aug 06, 2012

 

The Equity Premium

 

  • That would get the advantage of stocks over high quality bonds down to ~1-2%/year. Outperforms with a *lot* of noise $$ Aug 11, 2012
  • Bill Gross Is Wrong About Stocks: GMO http://t.co/c6gJwfUB Truth inbetween; have GMO adjust 4 $$ -weighted returns, not time-weighted Aug 11, 2012
  • Bonds for the Long Run http://t.co/MmkoYk3U @ritholtz nails it. Advantage of stocks over bonds is ~1%/yr over the long haul. Limited data $$ Aug 10, 2012

 

 

Comments

 

  • @LDrogen After reading this, I have more certainty that airbnb has already worked out some of the bugs http://t.co/Xx3ztVZv $$ Aug 10, 2012
  • @LDrogen Fine, Leigh, I hope it works. When single party lending gave way to securitization, it was unstoppable, until lending stds died. $$ Aug 10, 2012
  • RE: @ldrogen Multiple party economic dealings have their issues.? Consider: http://t.co/Z2rRNeTS? http://t.co/gCrEYzX2 Aug 10, 2012
  • ‘ @TheOneDave In a word: depletion. Costs are rising to incremental barrels of oil, and ounces of gold. $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • @PlanMaestro $CLD LTD/E ~89%, take a look at $HNRG Hallador Energy. I’m not looking @ coal names until I see a few go BK, like steel 2002 $$ Aug 09, 2012
  • @PragCapitalist Depends on slope of demand curve 4 Tsys. Compare it2the former on-the-run. Jump of 6 bps high for that spot on the curve $$ Aug 08, 2012
  • @groditi Effective Yield series. Was trying to show that junk yields don’t compress as much when HQ-yields are low. Would have liked OAY $$ Aug 08, 2012
  • @PragCapitalist If it gets enough assets to survive $$ Aug 08, 2012
  • @footnoted …and maybe adjs for a year, but large writeoffs mean that prior earnings were overstated; testifies to bad mgmt quality $$ Aug 08, 2012
  • @footnoted That’s one reason why I tell investors to look at LT growth in BV + Divs rather than op income. I accept adjustments 4 a qtr + $$ Aug 08, 2012
  • RE: @bloombergview The single period cost to fix might be small, the continuous transfer cost would be considerably l? http://t.co/9gyFVvh4 Aug 08, 2012
  • RE: @bloombergview When games change from two players to three players, things get messy if no single player has most? http://t.co/TU09OZml Aug 08, 2012
  • Most pessimistic he’s been on China debts RT @groditi: Wow. I’m used to Pettis’ Euro-pessimism, but he’s not holding back here. U MAD, PROF? Aug 07, 2012
  • Always a great read RT @groditi: yaaaaaay new Pettis! Aug 07, 2012
  • @AnaCapMgmt Ain’t true. The foolish models of economists do not take into account political realities, and when inflation runs, no ammo. $$ Aug 05, 2012
  • @LisaCNBC Ask him how confident he is in India’s power grid. After that, the water supply. $$ Aug 05, 2012
  • ‘ @pvitha Gold moves inversely to real interest rates, a.k.a. cost of carry, that’s all I know. $$ Aug 06, 2012
  • ‘ @WTOP Romney shouldn’t worry about the Fed; they are out of ammo. QE is a joke, as is Operation Twist, and forward fed funds guidance. $$ Aug 05, 2012
  • +1 I like to say that 🙂 RT @BarbarianCap: “there are more debt claims than resources to pay them at par” Aug 05, 2012
On the Poway School District

On the Poway School District

I am not an expert on Municipal Bonds, so if an expert reads this, and has corrections for me, please leave corrections in the comments.

In general, I am a conservative guy who avoids situations with a lot of debt.? I am also an actuary and a financial analyst who has a lot of experience with long dated assets.? I know how illiquid they can be, and how violent the price moves can be when they happen.

Most of the discussion here stems from this article: Where Borrowing $105 Million Will Cost $1 Billion: Poway Schools.

There are a few other notable writers who have picked up on this:

But unlike them, I want to give you more data, and less opinion.? For a start, here is the dense prospectus, should you want to review it.

As an aside, I looked at buying a house in Poway back in 1989, when I was considering a job in San Diego with the soon-to-be gone First Capital Holdings.? Poway was what I could afford in such an expensive area.

Financial crises always come at the wrong time.? In 2007, the Poway School District borrowed money to fix up the physical plant of the schools.? They financed it short-term, then in early 2009 issued the “A” notes, financing much of the project, encumbering tax revenues out to 2032, and allowed the rest to float via General Obligation Anticipation Notes.? The “A” series were also capital appreciation bonds, which means they are zero coupon bonds, and the interest comes from buying the bonds at a discount to the face value, and receiving the face value at maturity.? The time period was shorter then the “B” notes, so they were cheaper, and hence less odious.

Given that they had already encumbered tax revenues all the way out to 2032, and had a large amount of debt that they needed to refinance, they needed to issue more permanent debt.? They were already at their maximum level of what they could expect given assumed growth in the property tax base, so what could they do if they wanted to issue more general obligation debt without raising the tax rate?

After getting the assent of the voters in February 2008, to extend tax rates for an estimated additional 11 to 14 years, they issued the “A” notes, and then in 2011, the “B” notes.? The “B” notes picked up where the “A” notes left off.? They would make payments from 2033 through 2051.

Now, anyone who has worked with long duration fixed income (there aren’t many of us) know a few things:

  1. It’s illiquid because there aren’t that many that can fund it for so long.?? It becomes the province of strong balance sheets and speculators.
  2. It’s rare for people to give up current income for capital appreciation over the long haul.? Most people need income over the next 20-30 years.
  3. Slight changes in the interest rate can make a lot of difference to the value of the debt.
  4. When you issue very-long-dated credit-sensitive notes, expect to pay a high yield.? Poway SD is rated Aa2/AA-.? That’s a high rating, but when you say you will pay nothing for 20 years, that injects a lot of uncertainty/risk into the likelihood of payment.

After all, what will the courts be like 20 years from now?? What will the nation be like?? What will we default on or inflate away?? I know that present rules make it difficult for any entity to not repay General Obligation debt, but 20 years from now, things could be different.

The “B” notes, capital appreciatin bonds, that they offered in 2011 refinanced prior debts, and left $21 million to be used as they wished, which raised the hackles of the California Attorney General, though nothing came of that.? Letter from the Attorney General Article on the topicSecond article on the topic

Take a look at the sources an uses of funds:

ESTIMATED SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS

The proceeds of the Series B Bonds are expected to be applied as follows:

Sources of Funds

Principal Amount of Series B Bonds??? $105,000,149.70
Original Issue Premium?????????????????????????????? 21,360,189.45
Total Sources???????????????????????????????????????????? $126,360,339.15

Uses of Funds

Deposit relating to partial payment of
Lease Revenue Bonds(1)????????????????????? ?? ? $98,707,473.55
Deposit for full payment of 2010 Notes 26,270,000.00
Costs of Issuance(2) ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ??? 569,114.44
Underwriter?s Discount????????????????????????????????????? 813,751.16
Total Uses????????????????????????????????????????????????? $126,360,339.15
____________________
(1) Includes $98,327,473.55 for partial payment of the Lease Revenue Bonds and $380,000 for payment of costs associated with refinancing the Lease Revenue Bonds.
(2) Includes, among other things, the fees and expenses of Bond Counsel, the fees and expenses of Disclosure Counsel, the fees and expenses of District Counsel, the fees and expenses of the Paying Agent, the fees and expenses of School District consultants, rating fees, the cost of printing the preliminary and final Official Statements and other costs associated with issuing, selling and delivering the Series B Bonds, as well as costs associated with refinancing the 2010 Notes.

I would note that the premium was entirely applied to the reduction of existing debts.? They may not be debts of the same class, and that makes me wonder.

Now capital appreciation notes are politically controversial.? Here is a White paper from the LA Treasurer, and here is an article about it.? It’s not that different than what you have heard already.? Borrowing using long zero coupon notes is expensive.

Let me show you the cash flow table for the “A” and “B” bonds.

Year

Series A

?

Compounded

Series B

Total

Ending

Total Annual

Principal

Interest

Total Annual

Combined

August 1st

Debt Service

Payment

Payment

Debt Service

Annual

?

?

?

?

?

Debt Service

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

$3,720,000

$3,720,000.00

2018

4,580,000

4,580,000.00

2019

5,525,000

5,525,000.00

2020

6,560,000

6,560,000.00

2021

7,690,000

7,690,000.00

2022

8,925,000

8,925,000.00

2023

10,275,000

10,275,000.00

2024

11,745,000

11,745,000.00

2025

13,355,000

13,355,000.00

2026

15,095,000

15,095,000.00

2027

17,005,000

17,005,000.00

2028

19,070,000

19,070,000.00

2029

21,350,000

21,350,000.00

2030

23,800,000

23,800,000.00

2031

26,455,000

26,455,000.00

2032

48,960,000

48,960,000.00

2033

16,615,000

6,570,615.00

23,929,385.00

30,500,000.00

47,115,000.00

2034

9,192,225.60

37,487,774.40

46,680,000.00

46,680,000.00

2035

8,803,904.00

39,516,096.00

48,320,000.00

48,320,000.00

2036

8,305,119.90

41,464,880.10

49,770,000.00

49,770,000.00

2037

7,923,383.30

43,086,616.70

51,010,000.00

51,010,000.00

2038

7,522,497.40

44,507,502.60

52,030,000.00

52,030,000.00

2039

7,107,169.80

45,702,830.20

52,810,000.00

52,810,000.00

2040

6,607,225.80

46,732,774.20

53,340,000.00

53,340,000.00

2041

6,072,404.70

47,537,595.30

53,610,000.00

53,610,000.00

2042

5,268,942.40

48,470,788.40

53,739,730.80

53,739,730.80

2043

4,900,657.60

48,974,867.45

53,875,525.05

53,875,525.05

2044

4,557,796.80

49,449,334.50

54,007,131.30

54,007,131.30

2045

4,239,633.60

49,909,078.80

54,148,712.40

54,148,712.40

2046

3,942,536.00

50,332,464.00

54,275,000.00

54,275,000.00

2047

3,237,210.90

51,177,273.40

54,414,484.30

54,414,484.30

2048

3,000,734.10

51,554,365.20

54,555,099.30

54,555,099.30

2049

2,780,993.25

51,904,836.75

54,685,830.00

54,685,830.00

2050

2,577,771.00

52,248,044.00

54,825,815.00

54,825,815.00

2051

2,389,328.55

52,575,671.45

54,965,000.00

54,965,000.00

The “B” bonds kick in after the “A” bonds give out, which means that if future politicians want to do capital improvement projects in the Poway school district, they will have to wait a while, until debt gets paid down.? The present has stripped flexibility from the future.? Who should be surprised, this is the USA.

Now one should argue over whether the expenditures reflect the life of the bonds.? Poway SD says that structures have a 45 year lifespan, and this fits inside that.

But maybe there was a cheaper way to fund this.? Rather than using Capital Appreciation Bonds, maybe a mortgage-style note could have done it, even over 40 years, and at a much cheaper rate.? Even accepting the premium boosted the combined yield of the “B” notes from around 6.9% to 7.6%.

As it is the deal bets on the appreciation of real estate:

Right now, the district receives about $11 million a year from homeowners towards paying off its bonds.

So, to be able to afford its debt payments 20 years from now, the total assessed value of property within the taxed area would have to quadruple.

That’s about 7%/year, which is not impossible if inflation comes.? It is still a difficult target to manage against.

Personally, I think it would be cheaper to do with out the improvements, or add user fees, or raise taxes.? The benefits are going to those living there in the short run, taxes should be similar.

Finally, I would like to note that the “B” bonds appreciated dramatically from their issue prices.? You can see it here: data for the “B” series.? My view is that it was a period of falling interest rates, but that the rate on the Poway “B” note fell more.? Whoever bought and held has made a lot of money, and at the expense of Poway SD taxpayers, who will have to pay more, because of the lame way that the district borrowed.

That said, if you think your area is in better shape, spend some time digging into the numbers, and prove it.

PS — Who would buy a bond like this?? P&C insurers with long tail liabilities, like asbestos and environmental.? But Buffett is cutting down on his munis.

On Complexity in Financials, and Insurers Specifically

On Complexity in Financials, and Insurers Specifically

I’m not a fan of complexity in financial companies.? Complexity is a sign of trying to be” too clever by half,” as the British might say.? If an economic idea is good it can be executed simply.? Complex financial business stems from a desire to do accounting, regulatory, and other arbitrage.

Like my piece on AIG in 2009, I am doing low level research on an insurer using the statutory data. ?Let me give an example of what I mean.

There is no economic reason to have internal reinsurance treaties aside from sharing losses on short duration coverages.? To have large internal reinsurance credits is a sign that you are passing your reserves to the subsidiaries in domiciles with weak rules.

Also, to have a complex organization chart means that you are taking advantage of weak reserving requirements, capital requirements, except to the extent that national requirements call for a separate subsidiary.

Things are also tough when you interlace the capital of your subsidiaries, whether through equity, preferred stock, trust preferreds, or debt.? And with insurance companies, surplus notes.

That’s one reason why investment banks trade at low valuations, and might be better to be broken up.? Complexity.? “If you are not buying a Sunkist orange, you don’t know what you are eating.”? Okay, that dates me, but if the financials of a company are not transparent, in this environment, they will trade at a discount.? That is what I have said to reporters who have called me.? Complexity deserves a discount.? Level 3 assets deserve a discount.

Also, under-reserving deserves a discount, when you see significant claims arise out of prior year business.

Good financial businesses are simple and have few complexities to make them look like they are trying to scam the accounting rules.? Please remember my folly with Scottish Re, where I was a bull, and when it? got into trouble, I did a deep analysis, and turned into a bear.? When the company announced superficial changes and the price almost doubled, we sold out, though we held ~5% of the stock in a very busy day.? Where did the stock go out at? Zero.? Do I feel bad for losing money? Yes.? Do I feel good for cutting losses? Yes, and even more so.? Risk control is important.

Scottish Re was Bermuda domiciled, and so we didn’t get as much data as with a US domiciled company, but I had enough in the SEC-required documents to see the morass that Scottish Re was in, and the lack of ability for cash to flow to the publicly-traded holding company.

Financials are tough to invest in and the simpler that they are, the better.? To the degree that you can see that margins are assured, they are safe, but that is tough to assure.

Financials require extra caution.? That is most of what I am trying to say.

Retail Investors and the Stock Market

Retail Investors and the Stock Market

I’ve seen a spate of articles lately on retail investors abandoning the stock market. Here’s a sampling:

  1. Cult Figures — Bill Gross
  2. Stock bulls have a beef with Bill Gross — Jonathan Burton
  3. Why Are Investors Fleeing Equities? Hint: It?s Not the Computers — Andrew Ross Sorkin
  4. Small investors vs high-speed traders — Felix Salmon
  5. AMERICAN IDLE: FIVE REASONS WE HATE THE STOCK MARKET — Josh Brown

I chose these because I think they add to the discussion.? In general, I think there are a decent number of retail investors, that have left the markets, or reduced their exposure.

But I saw this back in 2002, when I saw many friends leave the stock market because of the losses they were taking.? Several said to me, “I am going to invest in what I know — I’m sticking with real estate.”? I winced and stuck with stocks, and had phenomenal performance in 2003.? I paid off my mortgage, and considered selling my house in 2005, but I realized for me, a house is not an investment — it’s a place to live.

After 2008, more people concluded the stock market was rigged.? Why?? Because they lost money, and that couldn’t be their fault.? Sorry, but retail investors, and many professionals too, give way to fear and greed, and chase trends.? They are not invested at the bottom, because they are too scared.? They are invested at the top, because it is the “thing to do if you want to make money.”

Call my point 1 this: People who don’t understand investing buy and sell at the wrong times.? They panic and get greedy.

Point 2: People don’t get that returns are lumpy.? They happen in spurts, over months, years, decades.? This is the big problem with financial planners — they assume smooth returns that will assure a retirement.? Sorry, but market moves in regimes, and is not easily predictable.? There are a few two decade periods where the market goes nowhere.? They are not anomalies; the value of companies are catching up to their prices.

Point 3: The estimates of equity outperformance sold by consultants, financial planners and naive journalists exaggerate the reality.? Here’s the reality: equities perform maybe 1% better than Baa/BBB bonds, particularly when you analyze the investments on a dollar-weighted basis.

Point 4: Everyone loves a winner.? People were spoiled by the returns of the 80s and 90s, and that validated in their minds the idea that more stocks are better; the projections of the financial planners are conservative; equities always beat bonds.

Point 5: Most ignore long-term valuation metrics, whether professionals or retail.? Whether it is the:

  • Q-Ratio
  • CAPE
  • Price-to-Resources Ratio
  • Whatever John Hussman has cooked up
  • Eddy Elfenbein’s view the stock market as a bond measure

they say roughly the same thing at present: equities are overvalued long-term.? Short-term is another matter: P/Es aren’t that high and momentum is running.? But how short is your horizon?? This makes sense if you are willing to play for months, not years.

Point 6: Professionals changed too.? In this market environment many professionals have started to trade more, as if we don’t trade too much already, and I think this is the wrong response.? As professionals, we need to do due diligence, and pick stocks we can be happy with for some time.? High frequency trading affects those who are not clever at trading.? Those who are clever disguise their trades making them look small like retail.

Point 7: But regardless of who holds stocks, they are still held by some entity.? They don’t disappear.? They move from weak hands to strong hands.? The trouble for retail investors is that they are weak hands on average.? They can’t handle disappointment, versus value investors who buy when there is disappointment.

Yes, I understand the frustration of average investors who do not do well; you are novices in a complex market.? Maybe you should just buy BBB bonds.? With the abnormal economic policies of our government, it is difficult to make any decision.

Personally I don’t think that retail investors are abnormally disappointed at present.? This is just market noise — we face overvaluation, but positive momentum.

Me?? I keep owning undervalued companies for myself and clients.

On Credit Scores

On Credit Scores

To give credit where credit is due, this post was triggered by an article at SmartMoney, 10 Things Credit Scores Won’t Say.

In 1996, I got a call from a recruiter suggesting there was a real opportunity with the Philadelphia-based corporation Advanta.? They were looking for an actuary with investment knowledge that could help them in their joint venture with The Progressive to use credit scores in underwriting auto insurance.? Since I was local, and known to be a “nontraditional actuary” with some degree of talent, and my situation at Provident Mutual was deteriorating because of a management change, I accepted the interview.

Being a life actuary, I didn’t know much about P&C insurance, but my career had been one of growth.? I may not know everything there is to know about a given topic, but I learn rapidly, and bring allied knowledge to the table that others may not possess.? The interview was interesting.? If you are a life actuary, you don’t expect interviews like Advanta. Credit cards were reaching their apex, and some clever people were trying to figure out other ways to apply the data from individuals using credit cards.? I ended up being Advanta’s “second choice.”? Bad for them, good for me.? Two years later, I would join the St. Paul’s Investment department in Baltimore.

The key idea was that credit scores were highly predictive regarding personal insurance losses, particularly when combined with traditional underwriting metrics.? The idea was a surprise to me when I first ran into it, but it quickly made sense to me.? Let me explain.

Honoring agreements that you have entered into is an important indicator of your personality.? Those who do not repay are on average less moral than those that repay.? Those that are net creditors on average made efforts that net debtors did not.

Credit scores are important.? In a specific way, they measure your willingness to keep your word.? Anytime you enter into a debt contract, you make a promise to repay.? If you fulfill your promise to repay, you impress others as one of good moral character.? If you don’t repay, it is vice-versa, you appear to be of low moral character.? (Note: I am excluding those that got hoodwinked by lenders that defrauded borrowers in a variety of ways.? That said, if you can be hoodwinked, that says something else about you, and that may have an impact on your creditworthiness as well.)

Now, before I continue, these concepts work on average, and not always in particular.? I have helped some at the edge of society with gifts and loans.? In some cases there is a cascade of bad events that the most intelligent would have a hard time facing.? Being wise helps, but there are some situations that would tax the soul of anyone, and be difficult to claim that they were blameworthy; it’s just the way things happened.

That said, that concept of a “credit score” traveled rapidly to insurance, because moral character is highly correlated with how a person drives.? People who are sloppy with their debts tend to be sloppy with their driving.? As with everything in this post, this is only a general tendency.? It applies on average, it does not always apply.

Some US states were offended at P&C companies using credit scores, and so the companies moved to use “insurance scores,” which were little different from what they aimed to replace.? The insurance companies took the disaggregated data behind the credit scores, did a little more research, and discovered which variables were most predictive of insurance claims, in concert with their own data.

The same is true for many other uses of credit data.? Different parties want different aspects of the underlying data.? Whether it is employers, lessors, lenders, insurers, etc., in an impersonal world, where there are fewer shared ethical values than in the past, economic actors rely on semi-public data to get comfortable about who they are dealing with.

Two final notes:

1) It’s easier to go down than up with credit scores.? But that is similar to many things in life.? One big mistake can undo a hundred lesser things done well.

2) Those who pay off debts rapidly are rewarded with discounts, as many companies want to avoid bad debts.? You might remember my piece, Build the Buffer.? Be wise, and have enough cash around to get discounts over those that pay things monthly/quarterly.

I am happily debt-free aside from paying off the debts regularly on my few credit cards.? The simple truth is that living within your own means, and having enough of a buffer to deal with minor crises is the best place to be.

 

Sorted Weekly Tweets

Sorted Weekly Tweets

Monetary Policy

 

  • Central Banks Can?t Save the World http://t.co/SLzVcZ0r No duh, since printing $$ isn’t productive it can’t do anything to help us. $$ Aug 04, 2012
  • Another example of how loose monetary policy in the West inflates bubbles in the fringe economies. http://t.co/xA3cKNFh Aug 03, 2012
  • Central Banks Seek New Crisis Options http://t.co/z3pLZdbw Fed & ECB straining @ the political limits of what they can & should do $$ Aug 02, 2012
  • SNB-central bank or hedge fund? http://t.co/LFuad30w Policy makers err in thinking they can control markets: task beyond ability of mortals Aug 02, 2012
  • Ghost of 2008 Haunts Fed as Companies Take Short View on Risk http://t.co/Wl6KgzdS When policy is not sustainable, businessmen cautious $$ Aug 01, 2012
  • Ben Bernanke Could Lose for Same Reason as Olympic Sailor http://t.co/aPBZLuwN Strong growth resumes when bad debts are liquidated $$ Aug 01, 2012
  • Deflation Dismissed by Bond Measure Amid QE3 Anticipation http://t.co/pK0cLw5e Link2 5yr inflation 5yrs forward http://t.co/ZVA74EmF $$ Jul 30, 2012

 

Energy

 

  • Tesoro lifts volumes of Bakken rail project http://t.co/eKzsyOu2 Coastal v. central difference in oil prices incent rail delivery of oil $$ Aug 02, 2012
  • Buffett Railroad Beats Coal Slump With 75% Gain in Oil http://t.co/VK50miRq From coal to crude oil, frack sand, automobiles, pipes &c $$ Aug 02, 2012
  • Oil Can?t Go Down http://t.co/CV73DUqW Offers long term arguments that we aren’t finding cheaper-to-produce oil, short-run YMMV $$ Jul 30, 2012

 

Financials

 

  • Where Are the Move-up Home Buyers? http://t.co/MDlos0oL Low end of housing in good shape, will take a while for the high end 2 recover $$ Aug 01, 2012
  • Libor Punishment Could Be Worse Than the Crime http://t.co/jyRCvVtw There’s a lot to unscramble here, and first do no harm should apply $$ Aug 01, 2012
  • RE: @bloombergview First do no harm. LIBOR dampens volatility during a crisis vs market-derived measures, which are m? http://t.co/q7cLqTpI Aug 01, 2012
  • “Really doubt getting closer to zero will make banks lend. Fear >> Greed $$” ? David_Merkel http://t.co/ajgZ7K60 http://t.co/M2DtNp4p #fedup Jul 30, 2012
  • Bank Breakups: Not So Fast http://t.co/CB4TYM4o Think most of TBTF came from allowing interstate branching, not investment banking $$ Jul 30, 2012
  • 10 Things Credit Scores Won’t Say http://t.co/3KIeIqH0 More powerful than most people imagine, & less uniform, customized 4 diff uses $$ Jul 30, 2012

 

Investing

 

  • If I use your framework, that gets me to a 2% real return assumption for stocks. Current dividend yield is… http://t.co/ssMBpc2L Aug 03, 2012
  • Wrong: Verizon, AT&T, Altria Among Top CDS-Adjusted Dividend Stocks http://t.co/fHEfo9jF This is another misuse of CDS spreads $$ Aug 02, 2012
  • Fair disclosure for last tweet: Long $HPQ common Aug 01, 2012
  • Wrong: Debt Markets Aren?t Only Worried About HP, but Dell and Others, Too http://t.co/ho8hqt8R CDS mkt spooked, bigger bond mkt calm $$ Aug 01, 2012
  • RT @KidDynamiteBlog: hearing NYSE is reviewing trades from this AM. Cancelling them would be the worst thing they could possibly do. @r … Aug 01, 2012
  • “You need to learn more about bonds & CDS before you write about them.” ? David_Merkel http://t.co/zcTji7O6 $$ Aug 01, 2012
  • Seeing a weird inverted market in $PSX w/bid $1 > ask. Weird, why doesn’t it clear. FD: long $PSX for myself & clients Aug 01, 2012
  • Cult Figures http://t.co/7yDHHbqn Bill Gross explains why future equity returns won’t b as high as the past, unless it is due 2 inflation $$ Aug 01, 2012

 

International

 

  • The Crushing Burden of Old Debt http://t.co/SHXhIYbN True of many places; there are more debt claims than resources to pay them at par $$ Aug 04, 2012
  • Shock, Ore and Chinese Steel http://t.co/j7HBuIHI When you can no longer cover variable costs, time to shutter high cost capacity $$ Aug 02, 2012
  • RE: Europe hasn’t tried austerity yet. The debts are still growing as a % of GDP. $$ http://t.co/NbaAxKZN Aug 01, 2012
  • India’s Power Grid Collapses Again http://t.co/BmQKGyJZ “half of India’s population ? reportedly impacted” $$ Jul 31, 2012
  • Merkel Allies Harden Opposition to Granting Bank License to ESM http://t.co/cgca4EW4 Right hand taking back what left hand gave $$ Jul 31, 2012

 

TheStreet.com

 

 

Politics

 

  • The Bad History Behind ?You Didn?t Build That? http://t.co/Yd8vyYlA Obama was deliberately ambiguous; prime motive was 2 dis entrepreneurs Aug 04, 2012
  • Obama authorizes secret US support for Syrian rebels http://t.co/s0PJ8Hx1 US allies itself w/Turks & Saudis against Alawite dictatorship $$ Aug 02, 2012
  • California Says Tax Revenue ?at Risk? From Facebook Drop http://t.co/ZLzQuFHE Normal 4 bad surprises 2 happen 2 those w/liberal acctg $$ Aug 02, 2012
  • Protesters Break Into Nuclear Complex http://t.co/yhn1WRvV Gotta admire the tenacity of a bunch of aged Catholic old-style liberals $$ Aug 02, 2012
  • Republicans Buoyed by Freshmen Seek Rewrite of Tax System http://t.co/TE8HeV3s SImplify, flatten, elim deductions/credits 4 corp/indiv $$ Aug 02, 2012
  • Postal Service to Miss $5.5B Payment to US Treasury http://t.co/zcgaQDWa Raid Employee benefits, or raise stamp, $UPS & $FDX prices? $$ Jul 31, 2012
  • The Man Who Saved Capitalism http://t.co/6qBtGnXI Milton Friedman did many good things, but saying he saved Capitalism is hagiography $$ Jul 31, 2012
  • Indirectly, tax $$ would fund principal reductions RT @diana_olick: #Obama gets a big NO on slashing #mortgage debt: http://t.co/N1vHNnDj Jul 31, 2012
  • Punctuation Nerds Stopped by Obama Slogan, ‘Forward.’ http://t.co/uRjpoBdq An ! would have worked better. What state’s motto is Forward? Jul 31, 2012
  • Why Capitalism Has an Image Problem http://t.co/xQIwll6s We need to save capitalism from capitalists *&* the enemies of capitalism $$ 😉 Jul 30, 2012
  • US loves cops and firefighters – but not their pensions http://t.co/ioSglMne The pension cost is 2high, and politicians ignore the cost $$ Jul 29, 2012
  • @MikeImbery Then explain why we support anti-freedom governments that support our political aims. Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, India, etc. Jul 29, 2012
  • That last tweet was meant to highlight the dual nature of US foreign policy, & while it is not lily white, it is better than alternatives $$ Jul 29, 2012
  • Charles Hill: The Empire Strikes Back http://t.co/9oY16P9A The US is an anti-empire providing freedom, so long as its aims endure $$ Jul 29, 2012

 

Other

 

  • I also don’t do #FF often but I ask my followers to follow @japhychron Aug 04, 2012
  • Just spent a fun 90 minutes discussing economics, banking, etc. w/ @japhychron in beautiful Ellicott City. It was a great time $$ Aug 03, 2012
  • WSJ home page is causing Firefox to lock up as it absorbs more and more memory until the system dies. Anyone else experiencing that? $$ Aug 03, 2012
  • This article reinforces the notion that the mainstream media does not understand conservative evangelicals. Chick-Fi? http://t.co/WoANS3bi Aug 03, 2012
  • Will Publishers Perish? http://t.co/2qveRV4I Arends: As self-publishing gets easier, the book business faces a major shake-out $$ #yup Aug 02, 2012
  • WSJ Olympic Medal Tracker http://t.co/P4kKLdcb #WSJLondon2012 Interesting graphical depiction of the Olympic Medal Standings $$ Aug 01, 2012
  • My Education in Home Schooling http://t.co/jXFF2BTT She makes more fuss than most homeschoolers do; it is easy to beat public schools $$ Jul 29, 2012

 

Comments

 

  • RE: @bloombergview Simplify: “Customer account segregation should never be compromised.” Fits in a tweet. $$ http://t.co/e6TnFVbT Aug 02, 2012
  • @kaylatausche Buffett doesn’t believe in the Sabbath, but likes high-margin focused entrepreneurs w/ethics. Many Christians buy there $$ Aug 01, 2012
  • @kaylatausche 1 logical buyer for those wanting 2 preserve corporate culture: Buffett. Has 1-2 retail businesses closed on the Sabbath $$ Aug 01, 2012
  • @izakaminska I though the same when I looked at the moon this evening over Ellicott City, MD. $$ Aug 01, 2012
  • @izakaminska I hear you, and think similarly. If nothing else, the “terms of Service” will become tighter. Love your work, Izabella. $$ Aug 01, 2012
  • @izakaminska Okay, it’s not a perfect solution, but it is good enough that 10% of the time, the account has been suspended when I try it $$ Aug 01, 2012
  • @izakaminska I regularly use the “block & report spam” feature of twitter to get rid of trolls and spammers, shouldn’t that solve it? $$ Aug 01, 2012
  • @sandbergadvisor Ding, you were the first to get Wisconsin’s motto, “Forward” $$ Jul 31, 2012
  • @felixsalmon On medals, original link: http://t.co/h8cEhIHo ultimately coming from story here: http://t.co/8C2vQR3P Jul 31, 2012
  • @felixsalmon “The value of the materials in the gold medal is about $644, silver about $330, and bronze about $4.71” http://t.co/6MWND6Mz $$ Jul 31, 2012
  • @felixsalmon The silver medal is 92.5% silver, the rest copper. Bronze medal is 97% copper, 2.5% zinc & 0.5% tin. S/b “Copper medal” $$ Jul 31, 2012
  • @felixsalmon oops, here’s the metallic composition: http://t.co/SP3zXzs9 The 2012 gold medal is 92.5% silver, 1.34% gold, rest copper. $$ Jul 31, 2012
  • @felixsalmon At the relative prices, that’s a gold medals table, assuming the medals are the same size and are purely that metal $$ Jul 31, 2012
  • “The solution is simple. Raise stamp prices, and the fees they charge UPS & Fedex for “going the?” ? David_Merkel http://t.co/0zaUbegb $$ Jul 31, 2012
  • @munilass I’ve reviewed enough crisis books that I can’t read them anymore; I scan 2c what they observe & ignore $$ http://t.co/Zy8nfeZh Jul 31, 2012
  • @TFMkts I agree; I’ve written about the problems w/levered ETFs. Kass is big enough, he can short bonds directly if he wants. Not hard $$ Jul 30, 2012
  • I know and agree; I’ve written about it. Suspect he shorts bonds directly RT @tradingpoints: you can’t hold $TBT on that time-frame – wow – Jul 30, 2012
  • “Small cap Japan: low valuations, low leverage, low expectations.” ? David_Merkel http://t.co/LfuLH8WD Jul 30, 2012
  • RE: @CharlesSizemore I think you gave a good summary.? Here’s my more bearish take: http://t.co/1gW2Js52? http://t.co/LVwWQEJj Jul 30, 2012
  • I disagree w/Kass here, though he is generally a clever investor. He is also more of a trader than most… http://t.co/BpynxRQR Jul 30, 2012

 

Limitations of Credit Default Swap Spreads

Limitations of Credit Default Swap Spreads

Once I was talking to my boss at Provident Mutual about exotic options, like barrier, knock-out, and knock-in options.? As I described them to him his reactions were:

  • Why would I want to take that risk?
  • But when describing the other side of the trade, he would say “That’s an attractive proposition.”

And vice-versa.? He was a bright guy, but I don’t think his opinions were very different from what most people would think who have a moderate knowledge of the markets.? Asymmetric payoffs are typically favored by those that can earn a lot, even if the odds are small.

The same is true of Credit Default Swaps [CDS].? There are a lot of players that want to speculate on the demise of companies, hoping for a big payout, even if the odds are small, partly because the amount they pay to gamble on the risk is also small.

The markets for single company CDS are thin because there are few natural counterparties that want to nakedly go long credit risk. Those wanting to nakedly short credit risk therefore have to pay a premium to do so, usually higher than the credit spread inherent on a corporate bond of the same maturity.

And if one or two hedge funds want to do it “in size,” guess what? The dealers in the CDS market will back off considerably, and make them pay through the nose. No dealer wants to take the risk that an informed trader knows something he doesn’t.? They will raise the levels that one would have to pay to bet on the risk so high that some others might be willing to take the other side of the trade.

Now some investment journalists naively think that there is a strong correlation between CDS prices and probability of default.? The CDS market is a thin market, for reasons mentioned above.? Before I would say that there is a “creditor panic” going on, I would look at the corporate bonds of the company in question, and see if the yield spreads are “blowing out.”

Typically, the CDS market is quick to react, but with a lot of false signals.? The corporate bond market is slow to react, and sometimes misses problems.? The stock market is in-between, which is why I would look at the stocks of the companies when I was a corporate bond manager.

So, when I read articles like these:

I say to myself, “What is happening in the corporate bond market? Is it panicking?”? The CDS markets say this:

But when I look at the corporate bond market for the same names, I see no panic. Here is the yield for a similar maturity HPQ bond:

And for a similar maturity DELL bond:

and for a similar maturity Xerox [XRX] bond:

Finally, for a similar maturity Lexmark [LXK] bond:

Aside from the Lexmark bond, there is no hint of trouble.? Lexmark is a small company, with two small bond deals, and as such is more volatile. Still, there is no real panic there.? Panic means the prices of the bonds is below $80, and these bonds still trade over $100.

In most cases, you could short the corporate bonds, and offer credit protection through CDS, and make risk free profits.

There is no panic going on in the technology company bond market, aside from Lexmark, of those names that have been mentioned.

It’s hard to spook the bond market for a liquid bond issuer; it is easy to spook the CDS market.? That’s why I don’t trust? appeals to rising CDS spreads if the bond market does not validate them.? Big markets do not need small markets for validation; rather, small markets need big markets for validation.

An Appeal to Journalists

When talking about default, you need to spend more time on the bond market and less time on the CDS market.? Yes, the CDS market tends to lead the bond market, but this relationship has a lot of noise, and offers a lot of false positives.? Far better to look at the bond market.? When the bonds of any company drop below $80 per $100 of par, there is trouble, and usually a juicy story, with considerable concern as to whether the company can survive.

The CDS market is driven by speculators who are probably right more often than wrong, but not by a large margin.? Avoid using that market to write stories, because it only lends to sensationalism, and does not reveal imminent trouble, unless the bond market agrees.

Final note: it is easy to go over to FINRA TRACE and get the bond yield data, even easier then getting CDS data if you don’t have a Bloomberg terminal.

 

Redacted Version of the August 2012 FOMC Statement

Redacted Version of the August 2012 FOMC Statement

June 2012 August 2012 Comments
Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in April suggests that the economy has been expanding moderately this year. Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in June suggests that economic activity decelerated somewhat over the first half of this year. Shades the GDP view down.
However, growth in employment has slowed in recent months, and the unemployment rate remains elevated. Growth in employment has been slow in recent months, and the unemployment rate remains elevated. No real change.
Business fixed investment has continued to advance. Household spending appears to be rising at a somewhat slower pace than earlier in the year. Despite some signs of improvement, the housing sector remains depressed. Business fixed investment has continued to advance. Household spending has been rising at a somewhat slower pace than earlier in the year. Despite some further signs of improvement, the housing sector remains depressed. Shades down household spending.
Inflation has declined, mainly reflecting lower prices of crude oil and gasoline, and longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable. Inflation has declined since earlier this year, mainly reflecting lower prices of crude oil and gasoline, and longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable. No change in ?their view of inflation. TIPS are showing flat inflation expectations since the last meeting. (5y forward 5y inflation implied from TIPS.)
Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. No change. Why bother saying this?
The Committee expects economic growth to remain moderate over coming quarters and then to pick up very gradually. Consequently, the Committee anticipates that the unemployment rate will decline only slowly toward levels that it judges to be consistent with its dual mandate. The Committee expects economic growth to remain moderate over coming quarters and then to pick up very gradually. Consequently, the Committee anticipates that the unemployment rate will decline only slowly toward levels that it judges to be consistent with its dual mandate. No change.
Furthermore, strains in global financial markets continue to pose significant downside risks to the economic outlook. Furthermore, strains in global financial markets continue to pose significant downside risks to the economic outlook. No change.
The Committee anticipates that inflation over the medium term will run at or below the rate that it judges most consistent with its dual mandate. The Committee anticipates that inflation over the medium term will run at or below the rate that it judges most consistent with its dual mandate. No change.
To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee expects to maintain a highly accommodative stance for monetary policy. To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee expects to maintain a highly accommodative stance for monetary policy. No change.
In particular, the Committee decided today to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that economic conditions–including low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run–are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through late 2014. In particular, the Committee decided today to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that economic conditions–including low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run–are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through late 2014. No change.
The Committee also decided to continue through the end of the year its program to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securities. Specifically, the Committee intends to purchase Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 6 years to 30 years at the current pace and to sell or redeem an equal amount of Treasury securities with remaining maturities of approximately 3 years or less. This continuation of the maturity extension program should put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative. The Committee also decided to continue through the end of the year its program to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securities as announced in June, No real change, drops the expanded explanation ? this is small potatoes.
The Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities. and it is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities. No real change.
The Committee is prepared to take further action as appropriate to promote a stronger economic recovery and sustained improvement in labor market conditions in a context of price stability. The Committee will closely monitor incoming information on economic and financial developments and will provide additional accommodation as needed to promote a stronger economic recovery and sustained improvement in labor market conditions in a context of price stability. Raises the possibility that they could act before the next meeting in September.
Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; Elizabeth A. Duke; Dennis P. Lockhart; Sandra Pianalto; Jerome H. Powell; Sarah Bloom Raskin; Jeremy C. Stein; Daniel K. Tarullo; John C. Williams; and Janet L. Yellen. Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; Elizabeth A. Duke; Dennis P. Lockhart; Sandra Pianalto; Jerome H. Powell; Sarah Bloom Raskin; Jeremy C. Stein; Daniel K. Tarullo; John C. Williams; and Janet L. Yellen. No change
Voting against the action was Jeffrey M. Lacker, who opposed continuation of the maturity extension program. Voting against the action was Jeffrey M. Lacker, who preferred to omit the description of the time period over which economic conditions are likely to warrant an exceptionally low level of the federal funds rate. Confirms that Lacker doesn?t like promising Fed Funds will remain low until 2014.

?

Comments

  • This was a nothing-burger.? Shades down GDP and household spending.? No change in policy, except that the FOMC might act ahead of the next meeting in September.
  • In my opinion, I don?t think holding down longer-term rates on the highest-quality debt will have any impact on lower quality debts, which is where most of the economy finances itself.
  • Also, the reinvestment in Agency MBS should have limited impact because so many owners are inverted, or ineligible for financing backed by the GSEs, and implicitly the government, even with the recently announced refinancing changes.
  • The key variables on Fed Policy are capacity utilization, unemployment, inflation trends, and inflation expectations.? As a result, the FOMC ain?t moving rates up, absent increases in employment, or a US Dollar crisis.? Labor employment is the key metric.
  • Do they want the yield on 30 year TIPS to go negative?? Only 0.30% of real yield there, and the 20-year real yield in negative.
  • GDP growth is not improving much if at all, and the unemployment rate improvement comes more from discouraged workers.? Inflation has moderated, but whether it will stay that way is another question.

Questions for Dr. Bernanke:

  • Is it possible that you don?t really know what would have worked to solve the Great Depression, and you are just committing an entirely new error that will result in a larger problem for us later?
  • Why do think extending the period of accommodation by a little more than two years will have any significant effect on the economy, aside from stock and bond prices?
  • Discouraged workers are a large factor in the falling unemployment rate. Why do you think the economy is doing well?
  • Couldn?t increased unemployment be structural, after all, there is a lot more competition from labor in emerging markets?
  • Why do you think that holding down longer-term rates on the highest-quality debt will have any impact on lower quality debts, which is where most of the economy finances itself?
  • Why will reinvestment in Agency MBS help the economy significantly?? Doesn?t that only help solvent borrowers on the low end of housing, who don?t really need the help?
  • Isn?t stagflation a possibility here?? I mean, no one expected it in the ?70s either.
  • If the Fed ever does shrink its balance sheet, what effect will it have on the banks?
PIMCO in Theory and Practice, Part II

PIMCO in Theory and Practice, Part II

Things are weird when you write the second part of an article five years later.? I don’t have a strong opinion on some of the arguments between Felix Salmon and “Dutch_Book,” or maybe I have too many opinions, and they conflict.

But I wanted to offer some data on PIMCO that I have gathered, as I considered the arguments made by Felix.? Here it is:

A few points, Felix:

1) This is an old piece of mine, but it helps explain the investment strategies on PIMCO.? PIMCO is basically a bond quant shop that does carry trades, and sells overly expensive volatility.? If you want the non-technical paper written by Bill Gross on the topic, shoot me a DM or an e-mail, and I will pass it on.

2) PIMCO is now wholly owned by Allianz.? After the sale in 1999, Pacific Life held a 30% stake in PIMCO, but also had option to put their stake in the company to Allianz, which they exercised back in 2008.

3) When the acquisition of PIMCO happened, Allianz issued B-units to the management of PIMCO, subject to vesting, to give them an incentive to perform well.? The B-Units were entitled to 15% of PIMCO?s adjusted profits.? Allianz has the right to buy in the B-units, with the price driven by a formula.? As of the end of 2011, only 11% of the B-units remain outstanding. ?That figure comes from Allianz’ 2011 annual report (in English).? Allianz paid out ?449 million to PIMCO management in this program in 2011.

I?m just guessing, but I think all of the B-units will be bought in by 2013.

4) But that?s not all, in 2008 Allianz created M-units.? Those are options granted to PIMCO management off of a formula-driven price for PIMCO shadow stock.? Unlike the B-units, I can?t tell how much of PIMCO is being given to management.? It looks smaller than the B-Unit program.

In 2011, Allianz paid roughly ?40 million to PIMCO management from the M-unit program.? If my calculations are correct, the shadow stock price of PIMCO rose 33% in 2011.

All of the 2011 data can be found here.? Particularly look at pages 306-307. In terms of special compensation, it looks like Allianz paid around ?490 million ($640 million) to PIMCO management in 2011, and that does not include their salaries.

So I don?t know how much any single person got at PIMCO in 2011, but large payouts are not impossible.? It is worth noting that the payouts derived from many years of work, and PIMCO is a huge organization.

That’s all I have to say.? The data does not admit any more obvious conclusions for me.

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