• On Paradigm Shifts http://t.co/h68quEDX Hunter takes us through mental exercises 2 make us intelligently contrarian. “Invert, Always Invert” May 02, 2012
• Hedgers’ net short position vanishes in US oil http://t.co/X0hLOWGB Commercial interests do not fear lower prices, could be bullish 4 crude May 02, 2012
• There’s Plenty of Money for Junk http://t.co/vXML0Bao Presently the credit cycle is virtuous; vicious part is coming, but no appt set $$ May 02, 2012
• Bad Models Mistook Housing Bust for Dot-Com Bubble http://t.co/IxC8m2mk Busts of assets that are heavily levered harder than unlevered $$ May 02, 2012
• Best U.S. Real Estate With Self-Storage http://t.co/mxyHdK2U Self storage a winner in the past, may not do so well in the future; hi vals May 02, 2012
• Marginal oil production costs are heading towards $100/barrel http://t.co/G2zNB5JS Same as my reasoning on high crude prices $$ May 02, 2012
• Four-percent rule a relic, advisers say http://t.co/PrdHQy48 Better rule: 10y Tsy yield plus 0% if bearish, 1% if neutral, 2% if bullish $$ May 01, 2012
• The remarkable resurgence in synthetic credit tranches http://t.co/1iIZ8ous Increases in the notional amounts of several corp bond swaps May 01, 2012
• Contra: Black Scholes & the formula of doom http://t.co/flVNsYMx Debt levels & Asset-Liab mismatch largest causes of crisis not BS model Apr 30, 2012
• Energy’s Pain is Consumer Discretionary’s Gain http://t.co/lM7UW0T7 I have been on the wrong side of this trade. Sigh. $$ Apr 30, 2012
• Notes from the DoubleLine Lunch with Jeffrey Gundlach, Spring 2012 http://t.co/KDiqA5Sp Gives a good overview, w/a large topping of snark $$ Apr 30, 2012

China

• China’s Auditing Train Wreck http://t.co/UeIZtw06 Any Chinese firm listed in the US, the auditors should be subject to SEC scrutiny. $$ May 05, 2012
• China bear Pettis says world coming around to his view http://t.co/lo1nGc7e Pettis isn’t a bear but a realist; invt-led growth overplayd $$ May 04, 2012
• The Family and Corruption http://t.co/R4NwZ6od Family ties & group affiliation dominate economic/political power among Chinese Communists $$ May 04, 2012
• Who is Fu? Chinese exile is ‘God’s double agent’ http://t.co/plyQhwtg Story of a Chinese Pastor in US & escape of Chen Guangcheng $$ May 02, 2012
• Microblogs Survive Real-Name Rules–So Far http://t.co/5UItJjwj Even the CCP would have a hard time shutting down their Twitter-apps $$ May 02, 2012
• Beijing’s secret: It’s not really loosening http://t.co/3RPhAOwH There is not enough demand in China 2 pay all of the high prices. $$ May 02, 2012
• China’s Left Behind Children http://t.co/OL0gmSFE Economic growth that separates parents from children imposes significant costs on China $$ May 02, 2012
• China Closes Unirule Website http://t.co/ItkW0p0A Founder receives award from Cato Institute; China government shuts down his website $$ May 02, 2012
• China’s property boom has peaked, forever http://t.co/aLC2U8F8 Amount of deadweight in China property is so large that prices have peaked $$ Apr 29, 2012

Financial Services

• Caution: Contents May Be Hot http://t.co/cp9yjbH3 I worry about ETF slippage from bad creation/redemption unit design & bad trading by users May 04, 2012
• Well, That Was Awkward… http://t.co/zS5f6zAI Bank Chiefs’ Regulatory Concerns Met With Official Silence; maybe regulators getting fed up May 04, 2012
• A talent shortage looms as the industry booms http://t.co/QGLZzzg7 Financial planners getting old/retiring faster than the Baby Boomers $$ May 04, 2012
• 2nd attempt2 automate bond trading 1st failed RT @BloombergNews: Goldman preps trading system for corporate bonds | http://t.co/NceasmN7 May 04, 2012
• Mortgage Rates in US for 30-Year Loans Fall to Record Low http://t.co/LPolAP5Q Mtge rates b nimble, MR b quick, MR go under limbo stick $$ May 04, 2012
• Spending A Year On An M&A Bidding War Is Apparently Overrated http://t.co/tKguPYGy It’s well-known that scale acquirers underperform $$ May 04, 2012
• Every liability has an asset, but not every asset has a liability. Some are owned outright. http://t.co/fB3ARju7 May 03, 2012
• Canadians Dominate World’s 10 Strongest Banks http://t.co/qj6TOgA3 Ask again after their housing bubble pops, same 4 other fringe nations May 03, 2012
• Pimco’s latest ETF shields against price spikes http://t.co/TmOrCIj2 I wonder if active ETFs will have more performance slippage. $$ May 02, 2012
• Hedge Funds Hurt by Volatility http://t.co/ogoL62qT Hedge funds r vehicles that do better when credit spreads r tightening $$ May 01, 2012
• Bond Market Is Creating A New Galaxy for Trading http://t.co/YgvNwz1j Dealer inventories thin; trading costs rise; electronic mkts start May 01, 2012
• US banks still cutting commercial real estate exposure http://t.co/qsqIMRph Banks still rotating out @ an almost constant rate since 2009 $$ Apr 30, 2012
• Largest U.S. Banks Resist Federal Reserve’s Credit Limits http://t.co/JndcrvWI Big banks need 2b broken up or shrunk; they don’t accept it Apr 29, 2012

US Fiscal/Regulatory Policy

• CEOs rank Texas tops for business, California worst http://t.co/jWEIGP89 8th year in a row for this survey; high taxes/regs annoy CEOs $$ May 04, 2012
• Exposing the Medicare Double Count http://t.co/HIVIx3lJ Same $$ being spent twice, must borrow the difference. May 02, 2012
• Coburn: `We Ought to Totally Revamp Our Tax Code’ http://t.co/71WquMIf Very similar to my proposals; simplify code eliminate deductions $$ May 02, 2012
• U.S. Considers Notes That Float http://t.co/jynXGcYG Intermediate-dated Tsy floaters would trade above par, neg yields like TIPS $$ May 01, 2012
• Trying to Shed Student Debt http://t.co/0GmvckOn Lawmakers Rethink Bankruptcy-Law Ban on Walking Away From Education Loans $$ #slavery Apr 30, 2012
• Can the US Economy Recover Without a Housing Recovery? http://t.co/Tqy4l8J3 It will probably have to try w/o housing’s assistance $$ Apr 30, 2012
• Central Bank paper suggests house prices have ‘over-corrected’ http://t.co/KDrXCkzy Have Irish housing prices overshot? Tough 2 say. $$ Apr 30, 2012
• http://t.co/KbnUO93s Treasury floaters could b issued @ premium 2 par 2 inflation speculators allowing the Tsy 2 finance @ negative rates Apr 30, 2012
• U.S. Perfecting Formula for Budget Failure, Says Bowles http://t.co/vlLQzZ8q It’s nice 2b a part of a nation that is a global leader $$ Apr 30, 2012
• Will TARP Make a Profit? That’s the Wrong Question http://t.co/MZBHaO51 Conflicting govt goals make policy hard 2 implement & interpret $$ Apr 30, 2012
• You will buy more Govvies, or else http://t.co/DLrnyb9u Financial Repression, Quantitative Easing, Debt Monetization, Hyperinflation $$ Apr 30, 2012
• On Student Loans, Accounting Gimmicks, Electric Cars, FX and a note on SS http://t.co/2BCB9nAi Hodgepodge of insight from @brucekrasting $$ Apr 30, 2012
• “The Treasury should be issuing 100 year or perpetual bonds until the market can’t stand it anymore to lock in these … http://t.co/gXMUXW4C Apr 30, 2012
• The floating YTMs will probably be negative, as interest rate speculators will pay more than par for the floating rat… http://t.co/OSmE7QuJ Apr 30, 2012

Eurozone

• The euro crisis just got a whole lot worse http://t.co/XSqmQnGv Election of Hollande may lead2 Euozone policy paralysis; growth v austerity May 04, 2012
• Making eurozonians, or not http://t.co/JmuO5OXC The Eurozone was never a natural place to set up a shared currency. $$ May 04, 2012
• Madness in Spain Lingers as Ireland Chases Recovery http://t.co/BXdYSX5e Ireland may b rebounding, as Spain’s slump deepens #austerity $$ May 02, 2012
• Why the New York Times’s Paul Krugman is clueless about the European economic crisis http://t.co/xMuzZXC7 Aside frm Ireland no austerity yet May 02, 2012
• Core infection and eurozone PMIs http://t.co/xr97yPgD Core of the EZone sluggish @ a time when it can least afford it $$ #depressionary May 02, 2012
• ECB Measures Pushing Domestic Bonds Into Domestic Banks, Planting Seeds for Euro Disintegration http://t.co/HAITJJnX Yeh, this da future $$ May 02, 2012
• The rise in the Eurozone money supply has not improved credit conditions http://t.co/rYazqcuP Euro M3 diverges from bank loans $$ May 01, 2012
• The ECB lending to periphery governments via “backdoor SMP” http://t.co/uQeG2QQK How to stuff the ECB full of Eurofringe debt, c/o LTRO $$ May 01, 2012

Rest of the World

• Brazil: cutting at any cost? http://t.co/mh3vN1Te Pushes up asset & price inflation, as currency held down 2aid exporters; unsustainable $$ May 04, 2012
• Turkey Credit Rating Outlook Cut by S&P on Worsening Trade http://t.co/pFDzEhZl Wide current account def & hi external financing needs $$ May 02, 2012
• Once poster child of crisis, Iceland recovers http://t.co/Sgr2wTGl Letting banks fail & stiffing foreign creditors -> winning solution $$ May 02, 2012
• Which emerging economies are at greatest risk of overheating? http://t.co/olHdiYRE A gauge from the Economist on which Em Mkts r2 hot $$ Apr 29, 2012

Company News

• Buffett’s CTB Adds Chicken Eviscerators in Dutch Purchase http://t.co/K6Q3NGt2 Buffett’s firm is no chicken; it has a lot of guts! $$ May 04, 2012
• Sorry, really sorry… May 04, 2012
• Ackman Rejects Canadian Pacific Deal Ruling Out CEO Pick http://t.co/KYe970NJ Pick is former CEO of $CP rival $CNI – Bad blood; good CEO May 02, 2012
• Impressive work Mr. Einhorn. The analyst that wrote up the question deserves praise; if you did that… http://t.co/tSTWxqBa May 01, 2012
• Phillips 66 aims to run more shale oil http://t.co/tC7NBfLO LD: + $COP $PSX First day of trading for the new $PSX. Combo up 2%+ so far $$ May 01, 2012
• Value investing does not mean cheap. It means margin of safety. Cemex does not have that. Look at the debt. $CX $$ http://t.co/ydklVkth May 01, 2012
• Falcone Agrees To Step Aside http://t.co/bYgLxMMV “a final agreement may not be reached, and a bankruptcy filing was still possible” $$ Apr 30, 2012
• Delta to buy US refinery for $150 million http://t.co/IsK9xsDu If zero is dumb & 100 is very dumb, this one scores in the 90s. $$ Apr 30, 2012
• Discuss “At $1.7 billion, Nook is worth more than Barnes http://t.co/xOz6skwP Spin off Nook 2 create value $$ $BKS $AMZN #interneteatsbooks Apr 30, 2012
• @ampressman Would it have been value-enhancing to $BKS 2 sell the whole Nook unit 2 $MSFT, in your opinion? $$ Apr 30, 2012

Statistical Analysis

• trading-and-the-null-hypothesis http://t.co/QpYutOTb Problem:No academic journal wants2 publish studies with ‘no result’ as their conclusion May 04, 2012
• . @thenumb47 Allows for too much of a specification search; would be good to require disclosure of everything tried but not published $$ May 03, 2012
• Have to allow for accidents! RT @incakolanews: just scrub the word “validate” and I think you have a great idea May 03, 2012
• Thus my proposal for economists: come up w/research idea: goes 2a database. Randomly assigned economist will analyze & trash/validate it $$ May 03, 2012
• Unlike double-blind studies, raw statistical research allows health analysts to inject their own bias into the analysis, as economists do $$ May 03, 2012
• Analytical Trend Troubles Scientists http://t.co/bzcAIpHG Health researchers using statistics like economists find ambiguous results $$ May 03, 2012

Miscellaneous

• 14 Lessons From Benjamin Franklin About Getting What You Want In Life http://t.co/BWAjCz1l Advice from 1 of the wealthiest men of America $$ May 04, 2012
• Is Wall Street Meeting God’s Expectations? http://t.co/5H5j2QGG Many Christians misuse the Bible; almost all non-Christians misuse it $$ May 03, 2012
• What would Jesus trade? http://t.co/Dkrfwt9k Many Christians misuse the Bible; almost all non-Christians misuse it; another example $$ May 03, 2012
• And in a more honest way than Google RT @SconsetCapital: Long good, short evil. May 03, 2012
• Apparel-Swapping Millennials Eschew Stores and Malls http://t.co/B7jq2dcY “Is that a new outfit?” “Well, it’s new to me!” An odd trend $$ May 03, 2012
• @TheStalwart Kasriel was different enough that he will be missed, kind of like the sound of one hand clapping $$ #littledoghasbuddhanature May 01, 2012
• The record 4 tallest bldg s/b based on weighted average height; weighting based on cross-sectional area @ height http://t.co/03HNZ0BB $$ Apr 30, 2012
• So if you have something thin at the top, it wouldn’t count 4 much. A rectangular parallpiped would get full credit 4 height $$ #usingmath Apr 30, 2012
• That would work, simpler than mine $$ RT @Pollack7: @AlephBlog Meh.Highest continuous occupancy floor. Apr 30, 2012
• As the smartest boss I ever had said “Make bets, but never bet the franchise.” http://t.co/qWdHX3BS Apr 30, 2012

Monetary Policy

• Bernanke Charts New Mission For Fed: Financial Stability http://t.co/6RrWEQws Fed has a hard enuf time w/a double mandate, triple will b wrs May 02, 2012
• Then again, if focusing on financial stability forces the Fed to be more restrained in its monetary policy, that would be good. $$ May 02, 2012
• Bernanke: Be Humble! http://t.co/6icSHD1K The picture says it: http://t.co/OqOflqsI Humility in BB’s view: leaving monetary policy loose $$ May 01, 2012
• My Speech Delivered at the New York Federal Reserve Bank http://t.co/DbAhOdQR An Austrian let loose amid the marble palace in NYC?! Wow. $$ Apr 29, 2012

US Politics

• Renewed Hope that Jon Corzine, President Obama’s Top Tier Campaign Bundler, Will Face Criminal Charges http://t.co/wCLrXFve J. Tavakoli $$ May 01, 2012
• Occupy Wall Street Plans Global Protests in Resurgence http://t.co/0FLjKfiJ #OWS won’t b effective until they organize as a 3rd party $$ + May 01, 2012
• Or, organize to influence the Democrats the way the t-party does the Republicans. #OWS is irrelevant until then, b/c it doesn’t do anything May 01, 2012
• Is that a bailout in your pocket? http://t.co/8xwW4Cbi Boyazny, panel’s populist, replied that the credit markets had become “undemocratic” May 01, 2012

I consider Tadas Viskanta to be a friend of mine.  I write my eclectic blog, and Tadas occasionally features me on his daily curation of the economics/finance/investment blogosphere.

But it is not friendship that leads me to write the following: this is a really good book.  Why?  Every day, Tadas curates the best thoughts in finance.  He finds them, he motivates them, and links to them.  If I had just one site to visit everyday, it would be his, not mine.  He’s really good at finding the best content in finance.

But it goes a step further than that.  Tadas is a very good blogger in his own right.  It’s not that he comes up with new insights, but he is very good at taking the insights of others and weaves them into a greater insight than the separate thoughts of the individuals.  He finds themes, and he finds disagreements.  Each provides good food for thought.

Now, if Tadas can do this on a daily basis, let’s call him the Chief Synthesizer of the economics/finance/investment blogosphere — then, what happens if he decides to take several steps back, and synthesize the grand themes he has seen in six years of writing his blog.

It’s been a violent period, after all.  Tadas has been blogging from the peak of residential real estate (October 2005), through the tail of the boom (October 2007), to the bust (March 2009), to the present.  He keeps it relevant, and he doesn’t take sides, which allows him to source the best content better.

So as he synthesizes the themes of the last six or seven years, he comes down to really basic ideas for each chapter: Risk, Return, Stocks, Bonds, Portfolio Management, Does Active Investing Work, ETFs, Global Investing, Alternative Assets, Behavioral Finance, Using Media, and the Lost Decade.  He handles them deftly, highlighting differences, but giving a consensus opinion.

The book is modest, in that it does not promise you greater profits if you follow his advice.  It is a realistic book, because most of us know that the basic principles of investing are straightforward, but they get clouded by academics and hucksters.  After you read this book, you may or may not earn more, but you will probably be safer.

Also, the book is an easy read; I glided through it in less than three hours.

Quibbles

The editor could have done more work to make the index complete; I was surprised to find myself mentioned in the book more times than the index noted.

Who would benefit from this book: Most amateur investors would benefit from the book, and many, though not all professionals would benefit from the book’s basic approach. Think of it this way — what if you could explain basic concepts to the uninstructed more clearly? Wouldn’t it help you in your business?  If you want to, you can buy the book here: Abnormal Returns: Winning Strategies from the Frontlines of the Investment Blogosphere.

Full disclosure: I asked the publisher for the book and he sent it to me.

If you enter Amazon through my site, and you buy anything, I get a small commission.  This is my main source of blog revenue.  I prefer this to a “tip jar” because I want you to get something you want, rather than merely giving me a tip.  Book reviews take time, particularly with the reading, which most book reviewers don’t do in full, and I typically do. (When I don’t, I mention that I scanned the book.  Also, I never use the data that the PR flacks send out.)

Most people buying at Amazon do not enter via a referring website.  Thus Amazon builds an extra 1-3% into the prices to all buyers to compensate for the commissions given to the minority that come through referring sites.  Whether you buy at Amazon directly or enter via my site, your prices don’t change.

Risk is a tough subject because history only vaguely informs you as to how bad things can get.  Past is not prologue.  There are two possibilities, the past contains and event that was so horrible that it can never happen again, or, the past does not tell you how bad things can be.

Market observers took the first view, that the Great Depression could not repeat.  As a result, few prepared for a situation where there was too much debt, and insufficient ability to service it.

The subtitle of the book is rightly “Uncertainty at the Core of Finance.” Not risk, but uncertainty.  The distinct is important, because risks are things that we know some things about the possible economic outcomes, and can control them to a degree.  Uncertainty is where we don’t really understand the dimensions of the outcomes, and have little if any control.

There is fundamental uncertainty to the simplest aspect of finance, money.  Money seems stable enough in the short-run, but every now and then it fails due to hyperinflation, or the slow steady failure in the store of value sense of moderate inflation over long periods.

Wealth itself is uncertain.  Even if you own it free and clear, there’s no way to tell what it will be exchangeable for next year, much less further out.  There are a lot of people who thought they knew what their homes were worth 5-7 years ago that are decidedly disappointed.

Government debt is uncertain, as governments think they can always roll it over, but political and other obstacles can lead to a refusal to pay when debt service becomes high relative to tax revenues.

Banking is uncertain, mainly because of borrowing short to lend long.  If banks limited themselves to facilitating transactions, a lot of the uncertainty would go away.  Banks would be a lot smaller, less profitable, and there would be fewer of them, and the economy would be more stable.  (Entities with longer liability structures, like pension plans, endowments, and life insurers would become the new source of lending. More would be financed through equity.)

Credit is uncertain.  During boom times, corporate bonds behave independently, and diversification evens out results.  As a result, corporate credit seems safer than it really is, and marginal ideas get to borrow.  During bust times, far more corporate debt defaults than would be expected — there’s almost no such thing as an average year.  It’s either feast or famine.

There are things that can be done to try to mitigate uncertainty: credit ratings, or any scoring system for assets, lending at a more senior level, and Value-at-Risk.  Also using more robust assumptions on possible outcomes, which would lead to smaller position sizes, less leverage, or more cash.

The book has a real strength in showing how the the assumption of normally-distributed risks fails dramatically in many cases, and offers alternatives that would work better.  Trouble is, once you realize how volatile the world really is, a lot of strategies either don’t work, or need to be scaled back.

The book praises actuaries as risk managers, with their ethic codes and stress tests, as opposed to quants with Value-at-Risk and no ethics code.  Banks and Wall Street would be better off in the long run hiring actuaries, who think about risk more holistically, and getting rid of the quants in their risk control departments.  Same for the regulators who evaluate banks.

There are other controversial ideas here: is it possible that the strong economic growth of the past is an anomaly?  Is it possible that growth for nations, and the world as a whole follows S-curves, like products and companies?

This is an ambitious book, and I like it a lot because it is willing to cross boundaries and apply the principles in one  area to another that seemingly should not receive it.  I liked it a lot, and would recommend it to many.

Quibbles

On page 17, he thinks of currency as a put option, but I think of it as 0% overnight commercial paper.  On page 37, he confuses Moses and Joseph, having Moses predict the 7 good followed by 7 bad years, when it was Joseph who did that.

Who would benefit from this book: Every financial regulator should have this book.  Every academic burdened by the lies of Modern Portfolio Theory should get this book.  Anyone who fancies himself to be a risk manager should have this book.  Finally, if you want to understand why financial markets are inherently uncertain, this book will teach you well.  If you want to, you can buy it here: Pandora’s Risk: Uncertainty at the Core of Finance (Columbia Business School Publishing).

Full disclosure: The publisher asked if I wanted the book.  I said “yes” and he sent it to me.

If you enter Amazon through my site, and you buy anything, I get a small commission.  This is my main source of blog revenue.  I prefer this to a “tip jar” because I want you to get something you want, rather than merely giving me a tip.  Book reviews take time, particularly with the reading, which most book reviewers don’t do in full, and I typically do. (When I don’t, I mention that I scanned the book.  Also, I never use the data that the PR flacks send out.)

Most people buying at Amazon do not enter via a referring website.  Thus Amazon builds an extra 1-3% into the prices to all buyers to compensate for the commissions given to the minority that come through referring sites.  Whether you buy at Amazon directly or enter via my site, your prices don’t change.

The Education of a Corporate Bond Manager, Part I

How I learned the basics, and survived 9/11.

The Education of a Corporate Bond Manager, Part II

How I learned to trade bonds, and engage in intelligent price discovery.

The Education of a Corporate Bond Manager, Part III

What is the new issue bond allocation process like, and what games get played around it?

The Education of a Corporate Bond Manager, Part IV

On the games that can be played in dealing with brokers.

The Education of a Corporate Bond Manager, Part V

On selling hot sectors, and dealing with the dirty details of unusual bonds.

The Education of a Corporate Bond Manager, Part VI

On dealing with ignorant clients, and taking out-of-consensus risks.

Then there was the continuation of “The Rules” series:

The Rules, Part XIII, subpart A

On the biases the come from yield-seeking.

The Rules, Part XIII, subpart B

Repeat after me, “Yield is not free.”

The Rules, Part XIII, subpart C

Reaching for yield always has risks, but the penalties are most intense at the top of the cycle, when credit spreads are tight, and the Fed’s loosening cycle is nearing its end.  It is at that point that a good bond manager tosses as much risk as he can overboard without bringing yield so low that his client screams.

The Rules, Part XV

Securitization segments a security into liquid and illiquid components.

The Rules, Part XVI

“Governments are smaller than markets; markets are smaller than cultures.“

A fundamental rule of mine, but one with a lot of punch.

The Rules, Part XVII

On the differences between panics and booms.

The Journal of Failed Finance Research

Much research fails quietly, but other researchers don’t learn about the dead ends.  Better that they should learn of the failures, and avoid the dead ends.

How I Minimize Taxes on my Stock Investing

Sell low tax cost lots and donate appreciated stock to charities.

Place Political Limits on Overly Compliant Central Banks

Gives a simple rule to control central banks so that they avoid the present troubles.

Yield, the Oldest Scam in the Books

Yes, offering yield is the oldest way to trick people into handing over their money.

A Summary of my Writings on Analyzing Insurance Stocks

A good place to get started if one wants to get up to speed on insurance stocks, but there is a lot there.

Economics is Hard; the Bad Assumptions of Economists Makes it Harder

Going over Kartik Athreya’s letter criticizing nonprofessional economics bloggers.  Why the math behind macroeconomics and microeconomics doesn’t work.

Why Are We The Lucky Ones?

When you are a part of a small broker-dealer, all manner of harebrained deals get offered to you.  This explores three of them.  Note: management did not ask my opinion on the fourth deal, and that is a large part of why they no longer exist.

One more note: the guy who was going to pledge $5 million of stock in example 2 for a $1 million loan?  The stock is worth $7,000 today.

Watch the State of the States

The economics of the states tells us a lot more about the national health because they can’t print money to buy national debts.  (Though they can can raid accrual accounts…)

We Might Be Dead In The Long-Run, But What Do We Leave Our Children?

My view is that neoclassical economists are wrong.  Aggregate demand has failed for four reasons:

1. Overleveraged consumers will not readily buy.
2. Citizens of overleveraged governments will not readily spend, for fear of what may come later from the taxman, or from fear of future unemployment.
3. Aggregate demand is mean-reverting.  It overshot because of the buildup of debt, and is now in the process of returning to more sustainable levels.  The same is true of private debt levels, which are being reduced to levels that will allow consumers to buy more freely once again.
4. When the financial system is in trouble, people get skittish.

The Market Goes to the Dogs, Which Chase Their Tail Risk

Complex and expensive hedging solutions, many of which embed some credit risk, can be less effective than lowering leverage, and (horrors) holding some cash.

Fishing at a Paradox. No Toil, No Thrift, No Fish, No Paradox.

This one had its detractors, because I believe the paradox of thrift is wrong.  Too much aggregation, and it does not allow the dynamism of the economy to adjust over time, even from severe conditions.

I have to say that I admire all of the young men and women who presented to us.  It takes a lot of guts to present to people 30 years older then you.  The experience differential is considerable.

One practical difference is that the students apply many methods from Modern Portfolio Theory that are roundly ignored by most investment managers.  Few investment managers apply Discounted Cash Flows [DCF], because it is too flexible, with too many parameters that are hard to calculate.  Some apply reverse DCF, attempting to estimate the rate of return of companies at their current price… same problems exist, though the comparability of results is simpler.

My advice to future contestants would be to spend more time on qualitative issues, and less on quantitative.  Regarding quantitative issues, I would encourage abandoning DCF in favor of simpler valuation methodologies.

Also, I would discourage using regression unless you really understand what it means.  It’s easy to teach people to use advanced statistical methods, but tough to teach them the limitations of where the methods get abused, or don’t work.  As I have often said, I rarely see advanced statistics used properly by Wall Street, and yesterday was no exception.

But all that said, there are a lot of bright people entering the talent pool for investing; for investment firms in a given region, going to an event like this could be a good recruiting tool.

PS — make sure you understand the liability structure in full, also…

Thus, the concept of “risk parity.”  Lever every asset class up until it has the same volatility as common stocks. Under theoretical conditions, one could make extra money doing this, and with less risk than just a common stock portfolio.

That makes sense when few are doing it, but not when many are doing it.  When I worked for Hovde Capital Advisors, I highlighted to the group how hedge funds were forcing every asset class to the same level of riskiness.  A Grants Interest Rate Observer article on Leveraged Non-prime Commercial Paper is etched on my mind as emblematic of that era.

Risk parity can work so long as the total riskiness of the system does not get too high, as it did in 2007-8.  But if it does get too high, the assets that are levered face disadvantages versus volatile unlevered assets.  Failures of leverage feed on themselves, and lead to a real washout.  Failures of growth stocks don’t do that to the economy.

Risk parity turns managers into bankers, or worse yet, asset managers that specialize in non-AAA investment grade portions of structured securities deals.  Most asset managers are not used to thinking like bankers, largely because they think in terms of total return, and because they don’t have a balance sheet.  Their capital can run at will, unlike banks that have deposit stickiness, savings accounts, CDs, ability to borrow from the FHLBs, etc.  The banks can hold the assets to maturity, they have a buffer against losses in their capital, and don’t have to mark to market in an assiduous manner (though they *should* have to do so).

Think of the mortgage REITs in the most recent crisis — the ones that did the best were the least levered and had the longest terms for their repo lines.  In the short run, that costs more than the vain idea that one can roll over their repo lines every night, and that repo haircuts won’t rise.  Crises lead to a failure of both ideas, together with a set of forced sellers driving down the price of assets being repo-ed, which sometimes leads to a cascade where repo terms get progressively tighter, and only those that were the most conservative at the start of the crisis survive.

There is a Wall Street aphorism, “The fool does at the end of a bull market what the wise man does at its beginning.”  Risk parity falls into that bucket.  Early adopters of new asset classes and liability structures typically do well, but when they become mainstream, the dynamics can be ugly, as we learned in 2007-present.

So ignore the idea of risk parity.  Risk managers are not bankers, they don’t have the capacity to play leveraged spread games to maturity.  Risk parity if practiced on a large scale will produce wipeouts akin to the recent crisis.

1. Generating research ideas
2. Doing the research

But here’s my twist: economists and biometricians could submit ideas to a central database, but would be barred from doing that particular project.  No researcher would be allowed to work on his own idea ever again.  Researchers would be assigned research ideas randomly from the central database, allowing for some modest amount of customization as to what types of projects they have the skills to do.

The researchers would then take a fresh look at the ideas, because they don’t have a dog in the fight.  They haven’t been defending a point of view on the idea, so the idea will be investigated with less bias.  This would have the salutary effect of creating more well-rounded researchers that have broader interests, and, more skeptical researchers.  It also might allow journals to publish articles that indicate that a certain area of inquiry is a dead end, which does not get done as often as it should.

This is an attempt to make economics and biometrics into sciences, by forcing more neutrality into the research.  The scientific method requires a neutral observer, but sadly, many researchers become patrons of their pet ideas, and the sorry excuse called “peer review” at the journals does not weed that out.  Peer review reinforces the biases of the majority most of the time.

My proposal will never be adopted because the cozy academic guilds are ever so happy to leave their “research” unchallenged, so that they can keep their cushy jobs, even though they produce little of lasting value.

Summary: if an idea is true, it shouldn’t matter which competent researcher investigates it.  We believe in a neutral observer.  Well, let’s make the observer genuinely neutral, and see how much trash gets discarded, and real truths preserved.

For those that work in the asset markets, it should be abundantly clear that equilibrium is a weak concept at best, reacting slowly over many years.  Mean reversion is slow — four years or so seems to be the periodicity.

Let the economists demonstrate that most markets display equilibria.  It is such an important element of their system, and yet so unproven.

My view is that markets are almost always not in equilibrium.  Being outside equilibrium causes economic actors to allocate or deallocate assets in order to maximize gains or minimize losses.   But the lengths of time for the information to flow, and production decisions to adjust are too long.

The same applies to theories in finance.  There is no equilibrium, so why argue for it?  Let the finance theorists step forward and show the times where the market was in equilibrium.

Personally, I think that disequilibrium is far more realistic.  This includes actions driven by the Fed or the US Government.

Let me start by quoting the beginning of the abstract:

The intellectual origins of the global financial crisis (GFC) can be traced back to blind spots emanating from within conventional financial theory. These blind spots are distorted reflections of the perfect market assumptions underpinning the canonical theories of financial economics: modern portfolio theory; the Modigliani and Miller capital structure irrelevancy principle; the capital asset pricing model and, perhaps most importantly, the efficient market hypothesis. In the decades leading up to the GFC, these assumptions were transformed from empirically (con)testable propositions into the central articles of faith of the ideology of modern finance: the foundations of a widely held belief in the self-correcting nature of markets and their consequent optimality as mechanisms for the allocation of society’s resources. This ideology, in turn, exerted a profound influence on how we regulate financial markets and institutions.

I have consistently been a critic of modern portfolio theory, the Modigliani and Miller capital structure irrelevancy principle, the capital asset pricing model and, the efficient market hypothesis.  I have also criticized the idea that incomplete markets are a problem, and that derivatives are needed to complete markets.  Trying to make liquid markets out of assets that are naturally illiquid is a fool’s bargain.  I have also argued that derivatives should be regulated as insurance contracts, and subject to the doctrine of insurable interest.

Why don’t academic finance theories work?  Quoting again from the paper:

These theories share a common and highly stylized view of financial markets, one characterized by, inter alia, perfect information, the absence of transaction costs and rational market participants. Yet in reality financial markets – and market participants – rarely (if ever) strictly conform to these assumptions.  Information is costly and unevenly distributed; transaction costs are pervasive and often determinative, and market participants frequently exhibit cognitive biases and bounded rationality.

In short, men are not hyper-rational calculators, like the Vulcans of Star Trek.  Markets for goods and services might be efficient, but not those for assets, where values are not as easily estimated.

Asset markets are frequently reflexive.  As an intelligent former boss once said to me, “When does a company look its best?  Immediately after receiving a loan.  That’s why we wait a few years before shorting a bad company that has just received a significant loan.”

The paper encourages study to understand how markets work in practice, rather than how they work ideally to neoclassical economists.  I heartily agree; I think that the more one studies the structure of asset markets, the more they will understand that there are many approaches to the market, and the popularity of strategies depends a lot on past success.

Quoting again:

Nevertheless, taking a broad look across the financial system, it is possible to identify at least six – in many respects intertwined and overlapping – sources of complexity: technology, opacity, interconnectedness, fragmentation, regulation and reflexivity.

Technology – things move faster, but can people keep up with it.  More data can be gathered by connected players.  It is one reason that I am a low turnover investor.  There are too many playing the short duration game in the market.

Opacity – few can truly understand the economics of most securitizations, or whether the subordination levels are right or not.  Investing in “dark pools” is rarely wise.  And as for the credit guarantors that I have criticized, they could not understand the risks they were taking, because they assumed the credit boom was normal and perpetual.

Interconnectedness – What could be more interconnected than the financial guarantors?  Or the banks who lent to one another, directly and indirectly?

Fragmentation – Securitization makes it tough for owner to understand what is happening several links down the chain.  Guess what?  It’s a lot easier to have your own mortgage loan department, and watch over your own loans.

Regulation – Financial regulation is fragmented, and often co-opted by those regulated.   Because the US government does not get this, market players arbitrage regulators.  Another aspect of it was the moral hazard engendered by the Fed and other regulators, giving the impression that there would be rescues available in any real crisis.

Reflexivity – I have talked about this above.

I would add a seventh source of complexity – leverage.  People underestimate the effects of leverage on managements in managing assets.  When the possibility of bankruptcy arrives, the effects are discontinuous, violent.  This is especially true when debts are layered, where A owes B, who owes C, who owes D, on thin equity bases.  A’s failure to pay has ripple effects, leading to a cascading failure.

An eighth source of complexity is use of short-term debt to finance long term assets.  An early precursor to the crisis was the failure of off-balance sheet subsidiaries that were financed with short-term loans.  Similarly, firms that relied on repo funding to finance their inventory of assets had a rough time of it as repo haircuts rose rapidly, and in tandem.

A ninth source of complexity was similar: margin requirements in derivative agreements, where a credit downgrade could lead to a call on capital at the worst possible moment.  This happened with AIG.

A tenth source of complexity which enabled much of the above nine is one that many writers don’t want to talk about, because it exposes many of “victims” to be enablers: yield-seeking.  Why be a lender to complex investment vehicles?  You get more yield.  None of them have blown up.  They are highly rated.  Why not go for the higher yield?  As I have said before, it takes failure to mature an asset class.  All new asset classes look pristine; nothing starts with failure.  Typically the best deals get done first – best quality, best incremental yields.  Then competition drives down quality and yield spreads, but raises quantity.

Without the yield-seeking, many complex financial instruments would never get issued.  Someone had to buy the “safe” tranches of CDOs, CDO-squareds, ABS CDOs, etc., in order to sell the deals.  Many European banks bought them because they didn’t have to put much capital against them for risk purposes, and the added yield helped them meet earnings targets, at a cost of greater illiquidity.

An eleventh source of complexity was the failure of accounting to properly account for these new instruments with volatile fair values.  Fair Value accounting, using market values and their approximations was a step in the right direction, and bitterly opposed by those who were financing illiquid, opaque, financial instruments, while their funding was short-dated with too little equity.

More will come in part 2, soon.  Still without power — a hard providence, be we are surviving it.

I think this is a stupid idea.  (I don’t favor the CAPM either.)  When you borrow money to buy some asset, the distribution of possible returns changes.

Let me give you some analogies.   First, securitization.  Those that invest in non-senior loan tranches get an enhanced yield, but they face a different risk profile than most corporate bond investors.  Corporate bond investors have a high expectation of full payment, but when default occurs, they lose 60-80%.  Investors in securitized bonds rarely get recoveries.  They usually get paid in full or lose it all.

Second, think of banks or REITs.  They lever up safe assets, and they blow up with a higher frequency than do industrial corporate bonds.

Leverage changes the nature of the distribution of possible returns in three ways:

1. The cost of borrowing decreases the return.
2. The returns are levered by the amount of borrowing.
3. To the degree that others do the same thing, the strategy is no longer undiscovered, and superior returns should not be expected.  In a crisis, the borrowed money leads to overshoots as panicked investors bail out en masse.

Personally. I wish we could get rid of the writings of academic economists and finance writers that don’t actively invest.  They don’t get the dynamics of investing, and assume a simple world that does not resemble our world.

My main point is that trying to buy the asset class with the highest return after equalizing volatilities is a fool’s bargain.  Adding leverage changes the nature of decisionmaking, and what tests in the lab will not likely work in real life.  Paper trading does not always translate to real world profits.