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This blog is produced by David Merkel CFA, a registered representative of Finacorp Securities as an outside business activity. As such, Finacorp Securities does not review or approve materials presented herein. By viewing or participating in discussion on this blog, you understand that the opinions expressed within do not reflect the opinions or recommendations of Finacorp Securities, but are the opinions of the author and individual participants. Neither the information nor any opinion expressed constitutes a solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security or other instrument. Before investing, consider your investment objectives, risks, charges and expenses. Any purchase or sale activity in any securities instrument should be based upon your own analysis and conclusions. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Finacorp Securities is a member FINRA and SIPC.

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At my blog there are two main purposes: teaching investors about better investing through risk control, and tying all of the markets into a coherent whole.

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    The Global View — Six Themes

    Thursday, April 10th, 2008

    Though I write mainly about US economic and investment issues, I try to be think globally as I consider macroeconomics. I think that many economists are hobbled because they think about the US economy in a closed framework, neglecting the effects that the rest of the world has on the US. Prior to the end of the cold war, that was a useful shortcut, but now many aspects of the US economy depend on global, and less on local factors. (Some articles cited here will be dated, but are still relevant in my mind.)

    This article is meant to take you through six themes affecting the global economy. Here goes:

    China

    I’ve been writing about neomercantilism and China now for almost five years. The negative effects are now obvious. Inflation has been rising in China, because too much credit is chasing too few goods. That inflation is funneling into US goods prices as well. China exports too much, and imports too little, which forces them to import US credit. This is getting tired, and the Chinese and Middle Eastern savings gluts need a new place to invest, or better, new goods to buy. Absent these adjustments, in order to cool the economy, the PBOC keeps raising reserve requirements again and again. Better they should revalue the yuan up 20%, or they will continue to import inflation from the US.

    China has its growing pains amid this. Pollution is rampant, and standards for product safety are low. Beyond that, China now competes with the US and Europe for economic alliances in Africa. Given past bad blood there, the Chinese may at many points be better received, that is, until they abuse their welcome.

    Currencies

    The main question here is the demise of “Bretton Woods II” where the rest of the world uses the US Dollar as the main reserve currency, while the US continues to debase the dollar through the issuance of more dollar claims. You can read about it in any of the following articles:

    Now, Ken Fisher told us not to worry about the declining dollar, but the euro-yen exchange rate. It’s too early to say, but that exchange rate is flat, while the S&P 500 is off 7% or so. Perhaps the overall carry trade is weakening, but not with the euro as a currency to purchase, yet.

    Finally, not only is the weak dollar good for exports, but for tourism as well. Now maybe they buy some of our slack houses as well…. please?

    Inflation, Especially Food Prices

    All the buzz is over rice, which has risen fivefold in six years. You can read about it here:

    Now, that inflation is feeding back to the US, but slowly.  You would think that this would be a great time to eliminate US farm subsidies, but no, they are too effective at buying votes insuring economic stability in the Midwest.

    Now, in the face of these inflationary pressures, the ECB is not mimicking the Fed.  They see the inflationary pressures, and aren’t loosening, at least not much.  Australia is even tightening.

    Recession Fears in the Developed World

    Now there are similar stresses in housing in some places of Europe, as compared to the US.  Consider Spain (and here), and the UK.  Low-ish interest rates can lead to overbuilding anywhere, if the regulators look the other way.  Japan may not have housing worries, but their growth is slowing, and they worry about the next recessionary leg of a what is proving to be a long recessionary era (since 1990).

    Energy

    It doesn’t matter how you slice it, Chavez has mismanaged the Venezuelan economy, and particularly the oil industry.  Now he is trying to do the same thing to cement.  Venezuelans are experiencing shortages and high inflation, as Chavez directs resources that he has stolen nationalized to his cronies and his foreign interests that he funds in order to make life difficult for US foreign policy in Latin America (not that I am a great fan of US policy there — I only recognize the conflict).

    The Middle East has lots of new oil fields to tap at the right price, yes?  Well, I’m not so sure.  It is interesting to see the UAE develop a nuclear program.  Perhaps they are looking to a day when oil will not be so plentiful?  Then again, maybe we will have a big energy find in Greenland (an island that may once again be green, now that temperatures are rising to levels last seen in the middle ages).

    Emerging Markets

    Coming back to the beginning of the article, emerging markets (like China), are going through an adjustment period.  Since these two articles were written, emerging market equities have fallen significantly.  They may fall further; many of those nations are geared to global growth, and when it slows, it slows even more for them.  Many of them are absorbing US inflation as well, and need to raise their exchange rates.  That will hurt exports in the short run, but will aid in bringing economic stability.

    Fourteen Notes on Monetary Policy

    Tuesday, April 8th, 2008

    This post is on current monetary policy. The review piece on how monetary policy works is yet to come.

    1) Let’s start out with the regulatory issues to get them out of the way, beginning with Bear Stearns. To me, the most significant thing to come out of the “rescue” was the Federalizing of losses from the loans that were guaranteed by the Fed (something which I noted before had to be true, since the Fed turns over its profits to the Treasury), and the waiving of many leverage rules for the combined entity (also here and here). These in turn led to an attitude that if the Fed was going to lend to Bear (however indirectly), then they should be regulated by the Fed.

    Now, I don’t blame the Fed for bailing out Bear, because they were “too interlinked to fail.” You could say, “Too big to fail,” but only if you measure big by the size of the derivatives book. The last thing that the investment banks needed was a worry on concentrated counterparty risk affecting the value of their derivative books.

    That said, given that Jamie Dimon was very reluctant to help unless the Fed provided guarantees, and the low price paid, it indicates to me that Bear and the Fed were desperate to get a deal done. What was in it for Bear? I’m not sure, but the deal avoided greater ignominy for the board, and might preserve jobs at Bear for a longer period of time.

    2) At a time like this, many cry for tighter regulation in the the intermediate-term and more aggressive actions in the short-term to restore liquidity. Forget that the two of these fight each other. Personally, I find the comments from the IMF amusing because they are an institution in search of a mission; the IMF was designed to help developing nations, not developed ones. The comments from the FDIC Chairwoman are good, but really, where were the banking regulators in 2005-2006, when something useful could have been done?

    3) Does the Fed want to be a broader financial regulator? My initial guess would be “no,” but I could be wrong here. Part of my reasoning is that they have not used the powers effectively that they already have. Another part is that monetary policy has often been misused, and been pro-cyclical. With their new powers, they will still face significant noise and data lags. Why should they be more successful at a more complex task than they have been with the less complex task of monetary policy? Schiller is way too optimistic here. The central bankers are part of the problem here, not part of the solution. For years they provided too much liquidity in an effort to keep severe recessions from occurring, and in the process they removed fear from the financial system, and too much leverage and bad underwriting built up. Now the piper has to be paid.

    4) Eric Rosengren, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, comments on the difficulties involved in effective regulation of financial institutions as a lender of last resort.  The Fed will have to build new models, and think in new paradigms.

    5)  Charles Plosser, President of the Philadelphia Fed, tells us not to overestimate monetary policy.  Sage words, and rarely heard from the Fed (though in my experience, more often heard toward the end of a loosening cycle).  Plosser moves up a couple of notches in my view… monetary policy can deal with price inflation, and that’s about it.  Once we try to do more than that, the odds of making a mistake are significant.

    6)  Who loses when the Fed loosens?  Savers.  They earn less; there is a net transfer of wealth from savers to borrowers.  Holders of US-dollar based fixed income assets also bear the brunt, if thy have to convert it back to their harder currency.

    7)  Perhaps the TSLF is succeeding.

    8 ) But perhaps all of the Fed’s efforts on the asset side are making it more difficult for Fed to keep the fed funds market stable.  I have one more graph that stems from my recent piece on the Fed:

    Note that during the past six months, the low transaction on Fed funds was significantly below the effective rate.

    9) VIX and More has latched onto this calculation of M3.  Given the changes and the adjustments that they have made, and the 20% or so rate of growth for M3, I would want to see a “spill” of the calculation to see what’s going on.  Perhaps there has been some double-counting.

    Now, if we are talking about MZM (all monetary liabilities immediately redeemable at par) , we are facing high rates of growth — around 17% YOY.

    My M3 proxy, total bank liabilities, is running ahead at a 13%+ rate.  Only the monetary base stays in the mud with barely 2% growth.  I still think that the Fed is trying to restrain inflation through no monetary base growth, while allowing the healthy banks to grow aggressively.  So much for supervision.

    10)  Reading the H.4.1 report the past weeks have had the Fed lending more directly through their new programs, and selling Treasuries to keep the Fed’s balance sheet from growing.

    11) I expect the minutes tomorrow to reveal little that is new; if anything, it will highlight the competing pressures that the Fed is trying to deal with.

    12) For a view compatible with mine, read Bob Rodriguez of First Pacific Advisors.  One of my favorite equity managers, and he is doing well in the present environment.

    13) The yield curve and Fed funds futures indicate another 25-50 basis points of easing in this cycle, at least, until the next institution blows up.

    14) Finally, and just for fun — two guys I would nominate for the Federal Reserve Board — Ron Paul and James Grant.  Toss in Steven Hanke, and it starts to get interesting.

    Shelter Fallout

    Friday, April 4th, 2008

    Though sometimes I do posts that are a melange of different items that have caught my attention, I do try when possible to gang them up under a common theme.I try not to do “linkfests” because I want my readers to get a little bit of interpretation from me, which they can then consider whether I know what I’m talking about or not. Anyway, tonight’s topic is housing. I didn’t get to my monetary policy 101 post this week — maybe next week. I do have three posts coming on Fed policy, credit markets, and international politics/economics. (As time permits, and ugh, I have to get my taxes done…. :( )

    1) The big question is how much further will housing prices fall, and when will the turn come. My guess is 2010 for the bottom, and a further compression of prices of 15% on average. Now there are views more pessimistic than that, but I can’t imagine that a 50% decline from the peak would not result in a depression-type scenario. (In that article, the UCLA projections are largely consistent with my views.) It is possible that we could overshoot to the downside. Markets do overshoot. At some level though, foreigners will find US housing attractive as vacation/flight homes. After all, with the declining dollar, it is even cheaper to them. Businesses will buy up homes as rentals, only to sell them late, during the next boom.
    2) But, the reconciliation process goes on, and with it, losses have to go somewhere. In some cases, the banks in foreclosure refuse to take the title. Wow, I guess the municipality auctions it off in that case, but I could be wrong. Or, they let the non-paying borrowers stay. I guess the banks do triage, and decide what offers the most value to act on first, given constraints in the courts, and constraints in their own resources. Then again, developers can reconcile the prices of the land that they speculated on to acquire. In this case, cash is king, and the servant is the one that needs cash. I just wonder what it implies for the major homebuilders, with their incredible shrinking book values. Forget the minor homebuilders… Can one be worse off? Supposedly my father-in-law’s father lost it all in the great depression because he was doing home equity lending. There are wipeouts happening there today as well. Add in the articles about unused HELOC capacity getting terminated (happened to two friends of mine recently), and you can see how second-lien lending is shrinking at just the point that many would want it.

    3) The reconciliation process goes on in other ways also. Consider PennyMac, as they look to acquire mortgage loans cheaply, restructure, and service them. Or, consider Fannie and Freddie, who are likely to raise more capital, and expand their market share (assuming guarantees don’t get the better of them). Or, consider the Fed, which has tilted the playing field against savers, and in favor of borrowers, particularly those with adjustable rate loans. No guarantee that the Fed can control LIBOR, though…

    4) The reconciliation process steamrollers on. We’ve seen Bear Stearns get flattened trying to pick up one more nickel, and maybe Countrywide will get bought by Bank of America, but you also have banks with relatively large mortgage-lending platforms up for sale as well, like National City. Keycorp might bite, but I’ve seen Fifth Third rumors as well. Then there is UBS writing down their Alt-A book, along with a lot of other things.

    5) A moment of silence for Triad Guaranty. A friend of mine said that they were the worst underwriter of the mortgage insurers. Seems that way now. Another friend of mine suggested that MGIC would survive off of their current capital raise. They stand a better chance than the others, but who can really tell, particularly if housing prices drop another 15%.

    6) Beyond that, the financial guarantors have their problems. FGIC goes to junk at S&P. MBIA goes to AA at the operating companies, and single-A at the holding company at Fitch. I personally think that both MBIA and Ambac will get downgraded to AA by S&P and Moody’s. I also think that the market will live with it and not panic over it. That said, BHAC (Berky), Assured Guaranty, and FSA (Dexia) will get to write the new business, while the others are in semi-runoff.

    7) Now for the cheap stuff. Amazing to see vacancy rates on office space in San Diego rising. I think it is a harbinger for the rest of the US.

    8 ) Buy the home, take the copper, abandon the home, make a profit. Or, just steal the copper.

    9) Bill Gross. A great bond manager, but overrated as a policy wonk. Many would like to see home prices rise, but others would like to buy a home at the right price. How do we justify discriminating against those who would like to buy a cheap house?

    10) “The prudent will have to pay for the profligate.”  Well, yeah, that is much of life, in the short run.  In the long run, the prudent do better, absent aggressive socialism.  The habits of each lead to their rewards, and the ants eventually triumph over the grasshoppers.

    Ten Notes on Our Quasi-Government and the Financial System

    Thursday, March 27th, 2008

    Personal notes before I get started: I’ve been busy studying for the Series 7 (and also reviewing the compliance manual for my new firm — wow it is big). The two of them fit together, as I get to see how the regulations get applied. I’ve made through the study guide (what do you do when it is wrong — not that I found a lot of errors, maybe half a dozen?), and I am 20% through my first practice test. Went and got fingerprinted for the fourth time in my life yesterday. (The other three times were for adoptions.)

    My links are back :) but I had to give up my descriptive permalinks. :( Maybe I’ll get them back when I upgrade the blog to WordPress 2.5.1. Beyond that, I am working on a book review for Gene Marcial’s forthcoming book, “7 Commandments of Stock Investing.”

    Catching up on the markets:

    Our Unorthodox Federal Reserve, GSEs and Government

    1) Repo rates may not be negative now, but they were so recently. Fails (failures to deliver securities) become common, because of the lack of a penalty. Today we should see whether the TSLF has any impact on the scarcity of Treasuries. We should learn more about the direct landing program as well after the close today. It got off to a big start last week. Watch for the H.4.1 report after the close. Given all that is going on, it is becoming the critical weekly Fed document.

    2) Now, because of all these actions on the asset side of the Fed’s balance sheet, some are calling the actions of the Fed, including the Bear Stearns bailout, revolutionary. Well, maybe. It’s certainly different than before, but there is a cost to doing business this way. Bit by bit the Fed loses flexibility as more and more of its highest quality assets become encumbered for a time.  The more that they do, also, the harder it will be to unwind, in my opinion.

    3)  Greenspan…  If we turn off the spotlight, will he go away?  (Then again, he has enough money to buy his own spotlight.)  It is tough for anyone to defend a legacy, and I don’t blame him for trying, but the Fed became too integrated with the political establishment under his tenure, which made it too activist in avoiding short-term pain.  It made him look like a hero at the time, but now we are paying the price.  Overly loose monetary policy and financial supervision led to gluts of borrowing to finance assets that appreciated dramatically, until the ability to service the debt began to decrease.  I don’t think history will treat him kindly.  He said too much in the past that he is contradicting today.

    4) Will the Fed buy agency MBS outright?  I think the answer to that one is yes, if the crisis persists. If housing prices drop enough further, like say 15%, the actions of the Treasury, Fed, FHLB, Fannie, Freddie, FHA, and whatever new lending monstrosity our imaginative Government comes up with will have to be closely coordinated.  At some level, if the Fed can’t trust the implicit guarantee of Fannie and Freddie, why should the rest of us?  That guarantee is as sound as a dollar! ;)

    5)  It’s interesting to see the tide shift with respect to GSE involvement in the mortgage market:

    6)  On a consolidated basis, our government, with its enterprises, are levering up.  This is a substitution of public debt for private, and more, just a lowering of capital standards for the GSEs.  (I wonder how comfortable the rating agencies are with this?)  This works while Treasury yields are low.  I wonder, though, how much impact this will have on the willingness of foreign buyers of Treasuries to continue their funding of our government?  One thing for sure, this will all get funded by the US taxpayers, together with those who lend to the US (dollar depreciation).

    7) Now, it’s not as if the US is the only place in the world with central banking problems.  Consider the Eurozone, where there is still no lender of last resort.  How would they deal with a financial crisis?  I’m not sure; the ECB has quietly helped out some Spanish banks, but it is not really in their jurisdiction.  Under conditions of deflationary stress, it would not be impossible to see a nation whose financial system was in trouble either directly bail out the dud institutions, or even, exit the euro (last resort, but not impossible).

    Or consider China, where inflation is getting a nice head of steam.  Their neomercantilism, with their crawling peg against the dollar is forcing them to import loose monetary policy from the US.  As the article cited points out, they need to significantly revalue their currency upward, which would would whack their exports, at least for a time.

    8 )  For those that remember the files that I created for my piece, A Social View of the FOMC, it looks like I will have to update the file soon.  We have a successor to Bill Poole nominated, James Bullard.  When he is approved, I will update the file.  (I will miss Poole.  Though he was occasionally out of step with the rest of the FOMC, he always spoke his mind, which was usually more hawkish than the rest of the FOMC.)

    9)  Now, Bullard is an Economics Ph. D.  (Surprise!)   In my earlier piece, Jeff Miller took note of a few of the things that I said, and perhaps attributed to me an anti-Academic bias.  I don’t have a bias against academics, per se.  (Hey, can we put Steve Hanke on the Fed?!  One of my professors…)  I do have concerns about not having enough real debate.  If the neoclassical view of monetary policy is correct, then we don’t have problems, because everyone on the FOMC is either a neoclassical economist, or a monetarist.

    Now, I do know the difference between politics and policy formation, and if I hadn’t been trying to keep the number of pages down, I might have had two columns.  (Getting it down to 15 pages was hard.)  But most of the FOMC members had either one or the other, but not both, so I left it as one column.  Next time I change the column heading.  That said, even if one is in a policymaking capacity in the executive branch, there is typically some political affiliation that helps get that person the job.  Those are relevant bits of experience, just as I noted everyone that had foreign experience, or military experience.  But what worries me is a lack of real diversity in views of how economics works.  (Perhaps we could get someone from the Santa Fe Institute?)

    10) Finally, there will be a lot of pressure in the future to re-regulate our financial system.  Personally, I don’t think it is possible to create a regulatory scheme that eliminates crises.  The regulator shapes the type of crisis that will come, and when it will come, but it is impossible to wipe out the boom-bust cycle.  (We put off this bust for a long time, and now we are getting it with compound interest for time delay.)  If a regulatory regime is too tight, the financial companies complain because their ROEs are too low.  To the extent that it can, capital begins to exit the industry, or, the stock prices languish, and financials trade at low multiples on book, because they can’t earn much off their net worth.

    Financial companies find the weak spots in any risk-based capital formula.  They also lobby the executive branch and Congress effectively.  Unless we slide into Great Depression II, I don’t think things will change remarkably from here.

    I  agree that we need to re-regulate, but perhaps after this crisis is done, we can consider systemic reforms, and not the piecemeal stuff we have been dished up in the name of crisis management.  My re-regulation would be to reduce the Federal Government’s role in the credit markets, but then, I am walking out of step, and realize that is not what is going to happen.

    One Dozen Notes on Our Crazy Credit Markets

    Thursday, March 13th, 2008

    1) I typically don’t comment on whether we are in a recession or not, because I don’t think that it is relevant. I would rather look at industry performance separate from the performance of the US economy, because the world is more integrated than it used to be. Energy, Basic Materials, and Industrials are hot. Financials are in trouble, excluding life and P&C insurers. Retail and Consumer Discretionary are soft. What is levered to US demand is not doing so well, but what is demanded globally is doing well. Much of the developed world has over-leverage problems. Isn’t that a richer view than trying to analyze whether the US will have two consecutive quarters of negative real GDP growth?

    2) So Moody’s is moving Munis to the same scale as corporates? Well, good, but don’t expect yields to change much. The muni market is dominated by buyers that knew that the muni ratings were overly tough, and they priced for it accordingly. The same is true of the structured product markets, where the ratings were too liberal… sophisticated investors knew about the liberality, which is why spreads were wider there than for corporates.

    3) Back to the voting machine versus the weighing machine a la Ben Graham. It is much easier to short credit via CDS, than to borrow bonds and sell them. There is a cost, though. The CDS often trade at considerably wider spreads than the cash bonds. It’s not as if the cash bond owners are dumb; they are probably a better reflection of the true expectation of default losses, because they cannot be traded as easily. Once the notional amount of CDS trading versus cash bonds gets up to a certain multiple, the technicals of the CDS trading decouple from the underlying economics of the bond, whether the bond stays current or defaults. In a default, often the need to buy a bond to deliver pushes the price of a defaulted bond above its intrinsic value. Since so many purchased insurance versus the true need for insurance, this is no surprise.. it’s not much different than overcapacity in the insurance industry.

    4) If you want a quick summary of the troubles in the residential mortgage market, look no further than the The Lehman Brothers Short Swaption Volatility Index. The panic level for short term options on swaps is above where it was for LTCM, and the credit troubles of 2002. What a take-off in seven months, huh?

    LBSOX

    5) Found a bunch of neat charts on the mortgage mess over at the WSJ website.

    6) I have always disliked the concept of core inflation. Now that food and fuel are the main drivers of inflation, can we quietly bury the concept? As I have pointed out before, it doesn’t do well at predicting the unadjusted CPI. Oh, and here’s a fresh post from Naked Capitalism on the topic of understating inflation. Makes my article at RealMoney on understating inflation look positively tame.

    7) The rating agencies play games, but so do the companies that are rated. MBIA doesn’t want to be downgraded by Fitch, so they ask that their rating be withdrawn. Well, tough. Fitch won’t give up that easily. Personally, I like it when the rating agencies fight back.

    8 ) Jim Cramer asks if Bank of America will abandon Countrywide, and concludes that they will abandon the bid. Personally, I think it would be wise to abandon the bid, but large companies like Bank of America sometimes don’t move rapidly enough. At this point, it would be cheaper to buy another smaller mortgage company, and then grow it rapidly when the housing market bounces back in 2010.

    9) Writing for RealMoney 2004-2006, I wasted a certain amount of space talking about home equity loans, and how they would be another big problem for the banking system. Well, we are there now. No surprise; shouldn’t we have expected second liens to have come under stress, when first liens are so stressed?

    10) In crises, hedge funds and mortgage REITs financed by short-term repo financing are unstable. No surprise that we are seeing an uptick in failures.

    11) As I have stated before, I am not surprised that there is more talk of abandoning currency pegs to the US dollar. That said, it is a getting dragged kicking and screaming type of phenomenon. Countries get used to pegs, because it makes life easy for policymakers. But when inflation or deflation gets to be odious, eventually they make the move. Much of the world pegged to the US dollar is importing our inflationary monetary policy.

    12) Finally, something that leaves me a little sad, people using their 401(k)s to stay current on their mortgages. You can see that they love their homes, as they are giving up an asset that is protected in bankruptcy, to fund an asset that is not protected (in most states). Personally, I would give up the home, and go rent, and save my pension money, but to each his own here.

    Berkshire Hathaway — The Anti-Volatility Fortress

    Saturday, March 1st, 2008

    I’ve commented on Buffett’s Shareholder letter now for the past five years.  Those who know me well know that I admire Buffett and Berky, but not uncritically.   Also, I view Berky as primarily an insurance company, secondarily as an industrial conglomerate, and thirdly as an investment company.

    Onto the letter:

    From page 3:

    You may recall a 2003 Silicon Valley bumper sticker that implored, “Please, God, Just One More Bubble.” Unfortunately, this wish was promptly granted, as just about all Americans came to believe that house prices would forever rise. That conviction made a borrower’s income and cash equity seem unimportant to lenders, who shoveled out money, confident that HPA – house price appreciation – would cure all problems. Today, our country is experiencing widespread pain because of that erroneous belief. As house prices fall, a huge amount of financial folly is being exposed. You only learn who has been swimming naked when the tide goes out – and what we are witnessing at some of our largest financial institutions is an ugly sight.

    Buffett starts out with the cause behind most of our current problems in financial companies.   There are too many houses chasing too few people, and inadequate underwriting of the financing, because of a misplaced trust in the rise of housing prices.

    From page 4:

    Though these tables may help you gain historical perspective and be useful in valuation, they are completely misleading in predicting future possibilities. Berkshire’s past record can’t be duplicated or even approached. Our base of assets and earnings is now far too large for us to make outsized gains in the future.  (emphasis his)

    Buffett has been honest on this point for years.  As the business grows, it is unlikely to find opportunities as good in percentage terms as it did when it was smaller.  That’s normal, even for the best investors.

    In our efforts, we will be aided enormously by the managers who have joined Berkshire. This is an unusual group in several ways. First, most of them have no financial need to work. Many sold us their businesses for large sums and run them because they love doing so, not because they need the money. Naturally they wish to be paid fairly, but money alone is not the reason they work hard and productively.

    Buffett hits on what I think is one of the great secrets of good capitalism.  The best capitalists are not purely money-motivated, but are idealists, aiming for excellence as they serve others though their businesses.  In the best businesses that I have worked in, we did it because we loved what we did.  That’s a key for all good businesses, from the CEO down to the clerk.

    From page 7:

    Long-term competitive advantage in a stable industry is what we seek in a business. If that comes with rapid organic growth, great. But even without organic growth, such a business is rewarding. We will simply take the lush earnings of the business and use them to buy similar businesses elsewhere. There’s no rule that you have to invest money where you’ve earned it. Indeed, it’s often a mistake to do so: Truly great businesses, earning huge returns on tangible assets, can’t for any extended period reinvest a large portion of their earnings internally at high rates of return.

    This is the core of Buffett the businessman.  He understands the need to redirect free cash flow to the opportunities that offer the best returns.  He knows that certain businesses will never be more than niches, and like a good farmer would, harvests his specialty crop each year, but doesn’t plant much more the next year.

    He goes on for two pages on how he distinguishes between businesses, considering their long-term competitive advantage, return on investment, and capital intensiveness.    It’s a good read, and very basic.  If it weren’t for the fact that many companies operate more for the good of management than shareholders, you might see this in operation more broadly.  (And you would see opportunities diminish for private equity as far as big deals go.  Private equity keeps public management teams on their toes, for the bigger deals.)

    From pages 9-11, Buffett discusses his insurance businesses, and spends much less time on them than in prior years.  It is not as if there isn’t a good story to tell.  Are underwriting profits down?  Yes, but only by 10%.  The rest of the P&C insurance industry is struggling with the same problems, and is likely doing worse in aggregate.  I think that some major disasters will have to happen to re-energize earnings here.  Berky is an anti-volatility asset, and always does relatively better when the rest of the insurance industry is hurting.

    On page 11, Buffett comments on his utility businesses.  Earnings are up in this line.  These are a natural fit for Berky, with their earnings yield considerably above Berky’s cost of float, and earnings that tend to do well when inflation is higher.  Expect Buffett to buy more here, but only during some significant pullback in utility stock prices.

    From that page:

    Somewhat incongruously, MidAmerican also owns the second largest real estate brokerage firm in the U.S., HomeServices of America. This company operates through 20 locally-branded firms with 18,800 agents. Last year was a slow year for residential sales, and 2008 will probably be slower. We will continue, however, to acquire quality brokerage operations when they are available at sensible prices.

    From page 13:

    Last year, Shaw, MiTek and Acme contracted for tuck-in acquisitions that will help future earnings. You can be sure they will be looking for more of these.

    and

    At Borsheims, sales increased 15.1%, helped by a 27% gain during Shareholder Weekend. Two years ago, Susan Jacques suggested that we remodel and expand the store. I was skeptical, but Susan was right.

     

    From page 15:

    Clayton, XTRA and CORT are all good businesses, very ably run by Kevin Clayton, Bill Franz and Paul Arnold. Each has made tuck-in acquisitions during Berkshire’s ownership. More will come.

    Buffett understands that most good acquisitions are little ones that can be used to increase organic growth of the subsidiary.  Same thing for intelligent capital spending, as at Borsheim’s.  He may keep a tight hold on free cash flow, but he listens to his subsidiary CEOs, and usually gives them enough to invest to improve the businesses.

    Also look at the countercyclical nature of Buffett’s acquisitions.  He is willing to buy real estate sales franchises in this environment, if they come at the right price.  Much as I am a bear on housing, this is the right strategy, if you have a strong enough balance sheet behind it.

    On pages 12 and 14, net operating income improved in Manufacturing, Service, and Retailing Operations, and fell in Finance and Finance Products.  He doesn’t discuss it, but there was a loss in life and annuity.  Berky mainly does life settlements there, a business I regard as somewhat malodorous because it undermines the life insurance industry, by weakening the concept of insurable interest.  Also, leasing didn’t do that well, as Buffett points out.

    On page 15, I don’t have a strong opinion on his stock positions… they are a little more expensive than I like to buy, but he has to deploy a lot more money than I do, and has a longer time horizon.  His focus on long term competitive advantage is exactly right for his position in the market.

    On page 16, Buffett discusses his derivative book:

    Last year I told you that Berkshire had 62 derivative contracts that I manage. (We also have a few left in the General Re runoff book.) Today, we have 94 of these, and they fall into two categories. First, we have written 54 contracts that require us to make payments if certain bonds that are included in various high-yield indices default. These contracts expire at various times from 2009 to 2013. At yearend we had received $3.2 billion in premiums on these contracts; had paid $472 million in losses; and in the worst case (though it is extremely unlikely to occur) could be required to pay an additional $4.7 billion.

     

    We are certain to make many more payments. But I believe that on premium revenues alone, these contracts will prove profitable, leaving aside what we can earn on the large sums we hold. Our yearend liability for this exposure was recorded at $1.8 billion and is included in “Derivative Contract Liabilities” on our balance sheet.

     

    The second category of contracts involves various put options we have sold on four stock indices (the S&P 500 plus three foreign indices). These puts had original terms of either 15 or 20 years and were struck at the market. We have received premiums of $4.5 billion, and we recorded a liability at yearend of $4.6 billion. The puts in these contracts are exercisable only at their expiration dates, which occur between 2019 and 2027, and Berkshire will then need to make a payment only if the index in question is quoted at a level below that existing on the day that the put was written. Again, I believe these contracts, in aggregate, will be profitable and that we will, in addition, receive substantial income from our investment of the premiums we hold during the 15- or 20-year period.

     

    Two aspects of our derivative contracts are particularly important. First, in all cases we hold the money, which means that we have no counterparty risk.

     

    Second, accounting rules for our derivative contracts differ from those applying to our investment portfolio. In that portfolio, changes in value are applied to the net worth shown on Berkshire’s balance sheet, but do not affect earnings unless we sell (or write down) a holding. Changes in the value of a derivative contract, however, must be applied each quarter to earnings.

     

    Thus, our derivative positions will sometimes cause large swings in reported earnings, even though Charlie and I might believe the intrinsic value of these positions has changed little. He and I will not be bothered by these swings – even though they could easily amount to $1 billion or more in a quarter – and we hope you won’t be either. You will recall that in our catastrophe insurance business, we are always ready to trade increased volatility in reported earnings in the short run for greater gains in net worth in the long run. That is our philosophy in derivatives as well.

     

    Okay, so Buffett is long high yield credit, and seemingly receiving a pretty reward for it (the numbers seem too good, what is he doing?), and is long the US and other equity markets by writing long-dated European puts.  Sounds pretty good to me on both, though I’d love to see the details on the high yield, and on the equity index puts, Berky will be vulnerable in a depression scenario (it would be interesting to know the details there also).

     

    Buffett is behaving like a long-tail P&C insurer, and he is willing to take on volatility if it offers better returns.  Berky is almost always willing to take on catastrophe risks, if they are more than adequately compensated.  If you are uncertain about this, ask the financial guarantors, they will tell you.

     

    On page 17:

     

    There’s been much talk recently of sovereign wealth funds and how they are buying large pieces of American businesses. This is our doing, not some nefarious plot by foreign governments. Our trade equation guarantees massive foreign investment in the U.S. When we force-feed $2 billion daily to the rest of the world, they must invest in something here. Why should we complain when they choose stocks over bonds?

     

    Indeed, what’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.  Why should the rest of the world buy our depreciating bonds, when they can buy our companies, which in my opinion, often offer much better prospects?  As Buffett puts it later, we are force-feeding dollars to the rest of the world… the decline in value is to be expected.

     

    Also on page 17:

     

    At Berkshire we held only one direct currency position during 2007. That was in – hold your breath – the Brazilian real. Not long ago, swapping dollars for reals would have been unthinkable. After all, during the past century five versions of Brazilian currency have, in effect, turned into confetti. As has been true in many countries whose currencies have periodically withered and died, wealthy Brazilians sometimes stashed large sums in the U.S. to preserve their wealth.

     

    Clever move, and emblematic of the shift happening in our world where resource- and cheap labor-driven nations grow rapidly, and build up trade surpluses against the developed world.  Their currencies have appreciated.

     

    Also on page 17:

     

    Our direct currency positions have yielded $2.3 billion of pre-tax profits over the past five years, and in addition we have profited by holding bonds of U.S. companies that are denominated in other currencies. For example, in 2001 and 2002 we purchased 310 million Amazon.com, Inc. 6 7/8 of 2010 at 57% of par. At the time, Amazon bonds were priced as “junk” credits, though they were anything but. (Yes, Virginia, you can occasionally find markets that are ridiculously inefficient – or at least you can find them anywhere except at the finance departments of some leading business schools.)

     

    The Euro denomination of the Amazon bonds was a further, and important, attraction for us. The Euro was at 95¢ when we bought in 2002. Therefore, our cost in dollars came to only $169 million. Now the bonds sell at 102% of par and the Euro is worth $1.47. In 2005 and 2006 some of our bonds were called and we received $253 million for them. Our remaining bonds were valued at $162 million at yearend. Of our $246 million of realized and unrealized gain, about $118 million is attributable to the fall in the dollar. Currencies do matter.

     

    Though Buffett got scared out of many of his foreign currency positions over the last few years, intellectually he was right about the direction of the US dollar, and made decent money off it.  The Amazon position was a home run in bond terms.  Bill Miller benefited from that one as well.  (I also endorse the comment on occasional inefficient markets.)

     

    On page 18:

     

    At Berkshire, we will attempt to further increase our stream of direct and indirect foreign earnings. Even if we are successful, however, our assets and earnings will always be concentrated in the U.S. Despite our country’s many imperfections and unrelenting problems of one sort or another, America’s rule of law, market-responsive economic system, and belief in meritocracy are almost certain to produce ever-growing prosperity for its citizens.

     

    This is one of America’s greatest sustainable competitive advantages.  We allow more flexibility and failure than anywhere else in the world.  We have a relatively open and free system of markets and government.  Woe betide us if we change this.

     

    On pages 18-20, Buffett takes on employee stock option accounting and pension accounting.  He believes options should be expensed, and that companies should bring down their assumptions for investment earnings, because they are unrealistically high.  I agree on the latter, and on the former, I think full disclosure is good enough.  Accounting rules are important, but investors (like Buffett) look for long-term free cash flows, which are largely unaffected by accounting rules.

     

    I don’t think the market is fooled in either case.  Companies with large stock option grants and high assumed earning on pension plans both tend to trade cheap.  Their earnings quality is light.

     

    Finally, on page 20:

    Whatever pension-cost surprises are in store for shareholders down the road, these jolts will be surpassed many times over by those experienced by taxpayers. Public pension promises are huge and, in many cases, funding is woefully inadequate. Because the fuse on this time bomb is long, politicians flinch from inflicting tax pain, given that problems will only become apparent long after these officials have departed. Promises involving very early retirement – sometimes to those in their low 40s – and generous cost-of-living adjustments are easy for these officials to make. In a world where people are living longer and inflation is certain, those promises will be anything but easy to keep.

     

    Ummm… say it again, Warren.  I’ve been saying this for years.  Hey, throw in multiple employer trusts as well.

     

    With that, I would offer two observations about this letter from Warren.  First, it is shorter, and contains less data on the businesses, particularly the insurance businesses, but then, it was a quiet year.  Second, he had less in the way of “soap box” issues this year.

     

    In closing, Berky had a good year, and I have little to quibble with in this letter.  Another good job, Warren.

    One Dozen Thoughts on Bonds, Financials and Financial Markets

    Tuesday, February 26th, 2008

    1) The blog was out of commission most of Saturday and Sunday, for anyone who was wondering what happened. From my hosting provider:

    We experienced a service interruption affecting the Netfirms corporate websites and some of our customer hosted websites and e-mail services.

    During scheduled power maintenance at our Data Centre on Saturday Feb. 23 at approximately 10:30 AM ET, the building’s backup generator system unexpectedly failed, impacting network connectivity. This affected several Internet and Hosting Providers, including Netfirms.

    Ouch. Reliability is down to two nines at best for 2008. What a freak mishap.

    2) Thanks to Bill Rempel for his comments on my PEG ratio piece. I did not have access to backtesting software, but now I do. I didn’t realize how much was available for free out on the web. He comes up with an interesting result, worthy of further investigation. My main result was that PEG ratio hurdles are consistent with a DDM framework within certain moderate values of P/E and discount rates. Thanks also to Josh Stern for his comments.

    3) I posted a set of questions on Technical Analysis over at RealMoney, and invited the technicians to comment.


    David Merkel
    Professionals are Overrated on Fundamental Analysis
    2/21/2008 5:19 PM EST

    I’m not here to spit at technicians. I have used my own version of technical analysis in bond trading; it can work if done right. But the same thing is true of fundamental investors, including professionals. There are very few professional investors that are capable of delivering above average returns over a long period of time. Part of it is that there are a lot of clever people in the game, and that raises the bar.

    But I have known many good amateur investors that do nothing but fundamental analysis, and beat the pros. Why? 1) They can take positions in companies that are too small for the big guys to consider. 2) They can buy and hold. There is no pressure to kick out a position that is temporarily underperforming. With so many quantitative investors managing money to short time horizons, it is a real advantage to be able to invest to longer horizons amid the short-term volatility. 3) They can buy shares in companies that have been trashed, without the “looks that colleagues give you” when you propose a name that is down over 50% in the past year, even though the fundamentals haven’t deteriorated that much. 4) Individual investors avoid the “groupthink” of many professionals. 5) Individual investors can incorporate momentum into their investing without “getting funny looks from colleagues.” (A bow in the direction of technical analysis.)

    When I first came to RM 4.4 years ago, I asked a question of the technicians, and, I received no response. I do have two questions for the technicians on the site, not meant to provoke a fundy/technician argument, but just to get opinions on how they view technical analysis. If one of the technicians wants to take me up on this, I’ll post the questions — hey, maybe RM would want to do a 360 on them if we get enough participation. Let me know.

    Position: none


    David Merkel
    The Two Questions on Technical Analysis
    2/22/2008 12:15 AM EST

    I received some e-mails from readers asking me to post the questions that I mentioned in the CC after the close of business yesterday. Again, I’m not trying to start an argument between fundies and techies. I just want to hear the opinions of the technicians. Anyway, here goes: 1) Is there one overarching theory of technical analysis that all of the popular methods are applications of, or are there many differing forms of technical analysis that compete against each other for validity (and hopefully, profits)? If there is one overarching method, who has expressed it best? (What book do I buy to learn the theory?)

    2) In quantitative investing circles, it is well known (and Eddy has written about it recently for us) that momentum works in the short run, and is often one of the most powerful return anomalies in the market. Is being a good technician just another way of trying to decide when to jump onto assets with positive price momentum for short periods of time? Can I equate technical analysis with buying momentum?

    To any of you that answer, I thank you. If we get enough answers, maybe the editors will want to do a 360.

    Position: none

    I kinda thought this might happen, but I received zero public responses. I did receive one thoughtful private response, but I was asked to keep it private. Suffice it to say that some in TA think there is a difference between TA and chart-reading.

    As for me, though I have sometimes been critical of TA, and sometimes less than cautious in my words, my guesses at the two questions are: 1) There is no common underlying theory to all TA, there are a variety of competing theories. 2) Most chart-readers are momentum players, as are most growth investors. Some TA practitioners do try to profit from turning points, but they seem to be a minority.

    I’m not saying TA doesn’t work, because I have my own variations on it that I have applied mainly to bond investing. But I’m not sure how one would test if TA in general does or doesn’t work, because there may not be a commonly accepted definition of what TA would say on any specific situation.

    4) One more note from RM today:


    David Merkel
    Just in Case
    2/25/2008 4:20 PM EST

    Um, after reading this article at the Financial Times, I thought it would be a good idea for me to point readers to my article that explained the 2005 Correlation Crisis. Odds are getting higher that we get a repeat. What would trigger the crisis? A rapid decline in creditworthiness for a minority of companies whose debts are referenced in the relevant credit indexes, while the rest of the companies have little decline in creditworthiness. One or two surprise defaults would really be gruesome.

    Just something to watch out for, as if we don’t have enough going wrong in our debt markets now. I bumped into some my old RM articles and CC comments from 2005, and the problems that I described then are happening now.

    Position: none, and there are times when I would prefer not being right. This is one of them. Few win in a bust.

    There are situations that are micro-stable and macro-unstable, and await some force to come along and give it a push, knocking it out of its zone of micro-stability, and into a new regime of instability. When you write about situations like that before the fact, it is quite possible that you can end up wrong for a long time. I wrote for several years as RM about overleveraging credit, mis-hedging, yield-seeking, over-investment in residential real estate (May 2005), subprime lending (November 2006), quantitative strategies gone awry, etc. The important thing is not to put a time on the prediction because it gives a false message to readers. One can see the bubble forming, but figuring out when cash flow will be insufficient to keep the bubble financed is desperately hard.

    5) This brings up another point. It’s not enough to know that an investment will eventually yield a certain outcome, for example, that a distressed tranche of an ABS deal will eventually pay off at par. One also has to understand whether an investor can handle the financing risks before receiving the eventual payoff. Will your prime broker continue to finance you on favorable terms? Will your regulator force you to put up more capital against the position? Will your investors hang around for the eventual payoff, or will they desert you, and turn you into a forced seller? Can your performance survive an asset that might be a dud for some time?

    This is why the price path to the eventual payoff matters. It shakes out the weak holders, and moves assets that should be financed by equity onto strong balance sheets. It’s also a reason to be careful with your own balance sheet during boom times, and in the beginning and middle of financial crises — don’t overextend your positions, because you can’t tell how long or deep the crisis might be.

    6) I agree with Caroline Baum; I don’t think that the FOMC is pushing on a string. The monetary aggregates are moving up, and nominal GDP will as well… it just takes time. The yield curve has enough slope to benefit banks that don’t face a lot of credit problems… and the yield curve will steepen further from here, particularly if the expected nadir of Fed funds drops below 2%. Now, will real GDP begin to pick up steam? Not sure, the real question is how much inflation the Fed is willing to accept in the short run as they try to reflate.

    7) Now, inflation seems to be rising globally. At this point in the cycle, the FOMC is ahead of almost all major central banks in loosening policy. I think that is baked into the US dollar at present, so unless the FOMC gets even more ahead, the US Dollar should tread water here. Eventually inflation elsewhere will get imported into the US. It’s just a matter of time. That’s why I like TIPS here; eventually the level of inflation passing through the CPI will be reflected in implied inflation rates.

    8 ) Okay, MBIA will split in 5 years? That is probably enough time to strike deals with most everyone that they wrote coverage for structured products, assuming the losses are not so severe that the entire holding company is imperiled. If it’s five years away, splitting is a possibility, but then are the rating agencies willing to wait that long? S&P showed that they are willing to wait today. Moody’s will probably go along, but for how long?

    9) I found it interesting that AQR Capital has not been doing well in 2008. When quant funds did badly in the latter half of 2007, I suffered along with them. At present, I am certainly not suffering, but it seems that the quants are. I wonder what is different now? I suspect that there is too much money chasing the anomalies that the quant funds target, and we reached the end of the positive self-reinforcing cycle around mid-year 2007; since then, we have been in a negative self-reinforcing cycle, with clients pulling money, and the ability to carry positions shrinking.

    10) Now some graphs tell a story. Sometimes the story is distorted. This graph of the spread on Fannie Mae MBS is an example. Not all of the spread is due to the creditworthiness of Fannie Mae. Those spreads have widened 30 basis points or so over the past six months for Fannie’s on-the-run 5-year corporate bond, versus 50 basis points on the graph that I referenced. So what’s the difference? Increased market volatility makes residential MBS buyers more skittish, and they demand a higher yield for bearing the negative optionality inherent in RMBS. Fannie and Freddie are facing harder times from the guarantees that they have written, and the credit difficulties at the mortgage insurers, but it would be difficult to imagine the US Government allowing Fannie or Freddie to default on senior obligations.

    That’s another reason why I like agency-backed RMBS here. You’re getting paid a decent spread to bear the risks involved.

    11) I would be cautious about using prics from CMBX, ABX, etc., to make judgments about the cash bonds that they reference. It is relatively difficult to borrow and short small ABS and CMBS tranches. It is comparatively easy to buy protection on the indexes, the only question is what level does it take to induce another market participant to sell protection to you. When there is a lot of pressure to short, prices overshoot on the downside, and stay well below where the cash bonds would trade.

    12) One last point, this one coming via one of our dedicated readers passing on this blurb from David Rosenberg at Merrill Lynch:

    A client sent this to us last week

    It was a New York Times article by Louis Uchitelle in December 1990 on the housing and credit crunch. In the article, there is a quote that goes like this – “This is different from the experience of the Great Depression, but something related to the 1930’s is beginning to happen”. Guess who it was that said that (answer is at the bottom of the Tidbits).

    Answer to question above

    Ben Bernanke, a Princeton University Economist” (and future Fed chairman, but who knew that then?).

    My take: it is a very unusual time to have a man as Fed Chairman who is a wonk about the Great Depression. That makes him far more likely to ease. The real question is what the FOMC will do if economic weakness persists, and inflation continues to creep up. I know that they want to save the day, and then remove all policy accomodation, but that’s a pretty difficult trick to achieve. In this scenario, I don’t think the gambit will work; we will likely end up with a higher rate of price inflation.

    One Year At The Aleph Blog!

    Thursday, February 21st, 2008

    It has been one year since I started The Aleph Blog. During that time, we have seen a lot of changes:

    • The panic in China in late February 2007.
    • The troubles in subprime, home equity, and residential real estate generally. (Commercial real estate is a work in progress.)
    • Increased realized volatility in the markets.
    • Increased price inflation.
    • The accelerated decline in the US Dollar.
    • Blowout of private equity lending.
    • Trouble as the rating agencies and the financial guarantors.
    • Trouble in the money markets from SIVs and ABCP.
    • Troubles in the municipal bond markets, mainly from overspeculation, but also from troubles at the guarantors.
    • The FOMC shifts from being an inflation fighter to a weak economy and lending fighter.
    • I left my previous employer (good guys generally), and have become employed elsewhere (a much better match for my abilities and desires).
    • My broad market portfolio has adjusted to changing market conditions, and continues to outperform the S&P 500, as it has for the last 7.5 years.

    Pretty amazing, I think. My blog is an expression of my character in the economics/finance/investment world. I have a lot of interests, so my blog is diversified in what I write about. There is almost always someone more experienced than me writing about a given issue. I think of myself as a good number 2 (3? 5? 10?) on many issues. Because of that, my job is to look for the interactions — the second-order effects in other markets that may give us a clue as to future happenings.

    If you want to see a sampling of what I felt my best articles have been, you can look here. If you have other nominations for this category, I am all ears.

    Why did I start the blog? Rejection from those that I wrote for and worked with. I was frustrated, and needed an outlet for self-expression. Learning from what I wrote at RealMoney, from the first day, I followed the same ethics code, to protect those that I worked for.

    What of the future? I plan on some meaty articles on inflation, the PEG ratio, some book reviews, and perhaps a series on long-term investing for children. (In addition to what I mentioned in Post 500.)

    Now, I did not expect the level of acceptance that I received in my first year, and so I thank my readers. I have been quoted in a wide number of places that I would not have expected when I started this. I only ask that if you like what I write, please refer my blog to your friends, as it seems best to you.

    To all of my readers, here’s to a profitable year number two. Thanks for being with me over the past year. For those that have commented here, a special thank you. To my family and church, thank you. Finally, thanks be to Jesus Christ. Woo-hoo! What a great year! :D

    Ten Fed Notes, Plus One

    Wednesday, February 20th, 2008

    I like variety at my blog.  I like to think about a lot of issues, and the interconnections within the markets.  Sometimes that makes me feel like a lightweight compared to others on critical issues.  But what I am is a stock and bond investor who analyzes the economy to make better investment decisions, primarily at the sector level, and secondarily at the asset class level.

    At present, analyzing the FOMC is a little confusing.  Why?

    • We have Fed Governors speaking their minds, because Bernanke doesn’t maintain the control that Greenspan did.  Thus we hear a variety of views.
    • The economy is neither strong nor weak, but is muddling along.
    • The Dollar is weak, but doesn’t seem to be getting weaker; it seems that a pretty accommodative forecast of FOMC policy has been baked in.
    • MZM and my M3 proxy are running ahead at double-digit rates, while M2 trots at around 6%, and the monetary base lags at a 2% rate.  We are now more than nine months since our last permanent injection of liquidity.  I asked the Federal Reserve in an e-mail to tell me what the longest time was previously between permanent open market operations one month ago, but they did not respond to me.  (They did respond to me when I suggested my M3 proxy, total bank liabilities.)
    • The Treasury yield curve still has a 2% Fed funds rate in 2008, but the recent curve widening should begin to inject some doubt into the degree of easing that the Fed can do.  Once yield curves get near maximum steep levels, something bad happens, and the loosening stops.  At a 2% Fed funds rate, we will be near maximum steep.
    • The steepening of the curve has raised mortgage rates.  So much for helping housing.
    • The TAF auctions have reduced the TED spread to almost reasonable levels, but it almost seems that the Fed can’t discontinue the auctions, because the banks have found a cheap source of financing for collateral that can’t be accepted under Fed funds.
    • At present, I see a 50 basis point cut coming at the 3/18 meeting.  That’s what fits the yield curve, Fed funds futures, and the total chatter.  For the loosening trend to change, we will need something severe to happen, such as a inflation scare or a dollar panic.
    • Now the equity markets are not near their peak, but the debt markets are showing more fear, and that is what is motivating the Fed.  Capital levels at banks?  Credit spreads on bonds?  Ability to get financing?  The Fed cares about these things.
    • In some ways, Bernanke cares the most.  Of all the people to have in the Fed Chairman seat at this time, we get a man who is a scholar on the Great Depression, and determined to not let it happen again, supposing that it was insufficient liquidity from the Federal Reserve that led to the Depression.  That might not have been the true cause, but it does indicate a Fed biased toward easing, until price inflation smacks them hard.

    One last note.  Though I haven’t read through the 2001 transcripts of the FOMC, I have scanned the 1999 and 2000 transcripts.  The FOMC is flexible in the way that they view policy, and willing to consider things that aren’t perfectly orthodox, such as the stock market, even if it is hidden in the rubric of the wealth effect.

    What Might the Shape of the Treasury Yield Curve Tell Us?

    Friday, February 15th, 2008

    There are many things that are unusual about the current Treasury yield curve. I’ve built a moderately-sized model to analyze the shape of the curve, and what it might tell us about the state of the economy, and perhaps, future movements of the yield curve. My model uses the smoothed data from the Federal Reserve H15 series, which dates as far back as 1962, though some series, like the 30-year, date back to 1977, and have an interruption from 2002-2005, after the 30-year ceased to be issued for a time.

    So, what’s unusual about the current yield curve?

    1. The slope of six months to three months (19 bp) is very inverted — a first percentile phenomenon.
    2. The slope of two years to three months (38 bp) is very inverted — a third percentile phenomenon.
    3. The slope of seven years to ten years is steep (57 bp - 5 bp away from the record wide) — a 100th percentile phenomenon.
    4. The slope of five years to thirty years is steep (186 bp - 30 bp away from the record wide) — a 100th percentile phenomenon.
    5. The slope of two years to thirty years is steep (274 bp - 97 bp away from the record wide) — a 97th percentile phenomenon.
    6. The slope of ten years to thirty years is steep (82 bp - 29 bp away from the record wide) — a 98th percentile phenomenon.
    7. The butterfly of three months to two years to thirty years is at the record wide (312 bp). (Sum of #5 and #2. Buy 3 months and 30-years, and double sell 2-years? Lots of positive carry, but the 30-year yield could steepen further versus the rest of the curve, and its price volatility is much higher than the shorter bonds.)

    What prior yield curves is the current yield curve shaped like?

    • 9/7/1993 — after the end of the 1990-1992 easing cycle to rescue the banks from their commercial real estate loans.
    • 2/15/1996 — after the end of a minor easing cycle, recov