Fed Policy – Page 61 – The Aleph Blog

Depression, Stagflation, and Confusion

Posted on 26 December 2007 by David Merkel

I’m not sure what to title this piece as I begin writing, because my views are a little fuzzy, and by writing about them, I hope to sharpen them.? That’s not true of me most of the time, but it is true of me now.

Let’s start with a good article from Dr. Jeff.? It’s a good article because it is well-thought out, and pokes at an insipid phrase “behind the curve.”? In one sense, I don’t have an opinion on whether the FOMC is behind the curve or not.? My opinions have been:

The Fed should not try to reflate dud assets, and the loans behind them, because it won’t work.
The Fed will lower Fed funds rates by more than they want to because they are committed to reflating dud assets, and the loans behind them.
The Fed is letting the banks do the heavy lifting on the extension of credit, because they view their credit extension actions as temporary, and thus they don’t do any permanent injections of liquidity.? (There are some hints that the banks may be beginning to pull back, but the recent reduction in the TED spread augurs against that.)
Instead, they try novel solutions such as the TAF.? They will provide an amount of temporary liquidity indefinitely for a larger array of collateral types, such as would be acceptable at the discount window.
We will get additional consumer price inflation from this.
We will continue to see additional asset deflation because of the overhang of vacant homes; the market has not cleared yet.? Commercial real estate is next.? Consider this fine post from the excellent blog Calculated Risk.
The Fed will eventually have to choose whether it is going to reflate assets, or control price inflation.? Given Dr. Bernanke’s previous statements on the matter, wrongly ascribing to him the name “Helicopter Ben,” he is determined not to have another Depression occur on his watch.? I think that is his most strongly held belief, and if he feels there is a modest risk of a Depression, he will keep policy loose.
None of this means that you should exit the equity markets; stick to a normal asset allocation policy.? Go light on financials, and keep your bonds short.? Underweight the US dollar.
I have not argued for a recession yet, at least if one accepts the measurement of inflation that the government uses.

Now, there continue to be bad portents in many short-term lending markets.? Take for example, this article on the BlackRock Cash Strategies Fund.? In a situation where some money market funds and short-term income funds are under stress, the FOMC is unlikely to stop loosening over the intermediate term.

Clearly there are bad debts to be worked through, and the only way that they get worked out is through equity injections.? Think of the bailing out of money market funds and SIVs (not the Super-SIV, which I said was unlikely to work), or the Sovereign Wealth Fund investments in some of the investment banks.

Now, one of my readers asked me to opine on this article by Peter Schiff, and this response from Michael Shedlock.? Look, I’m not calling for a depression, or stagflation, at least not yet.? At RealMoney, my favored term was “stagflation-lite.”? Some modest rise in inflation while the economy grows slowly in real terms (as the government measures it).?? A few comments on the two articles:

?First, international capital flows from recycling the current account deficit provide more stimulus to the US economy than the FOMC at present.? Will they stop one day?? Only when the US dollar is considerably lower than now, and they buy more US goods and services than we buy from them.
Second, the Federal Reserve can gain more powers than it currently has.? If this situation gets worse, I would expect Congress to modify their charter to allow them to buy assets that it previously could not buy, to end the asset deflation directly, at a cost of more price inflation, and spreading the lending losses to all who hold longer-term dollar-denominated assets.? If not Congress, there are executive orders in the Federal Register already for these actions.
Third, in a crisis, the FOMC would happily run with a wide yield curve — they will put depositary institution solvency ahead of purchasing power.
Fourth, the Fed can force credit into the economy, but not at prices they would like, or on terms that are attractive.? In a crisis, though, anything could happen.
Fifth, I don’t see a crisis happening.? It is in the interests of foreign creditors to stabilize the US, until they come to view the US as a “lost cause.”? Not impossible, but unlikely.? The flexible nature of the US economy, with its relatively high levels of freedom, make the US a destination for capital and trade.? The world needs the flexible US, less than it used to, but it still needs the US.

One final note off of the excellent blog Naked Capitalism.? They note, as I have, that the FOMC hasn’t been increasing the monetary base.? From RealMoney:

		David Merkel
		The Fed Has Shifted the Way it Conducts Monetary Policy
		12/21/2007 11:56 AM EST

Good post over at Barry’s blog on monetary policy. Understanding monetary policy isn’t hard, but you have to look at the full picture, including the presently missing M3. I have a proxy for M3 — it’s total bank liabilities from the H8 report –> ALNLTLLB Index for those with a BB terminal. It’s a very good proxy, though not perfect. Over the last years, it has run at an annualized 9.4%. MZM has grown around 12.8%. The monetary base has grown around 3%, and oddly, has not been spiking up the way it usually does in December to facilitate year-end retail.

The Fed is getting weird. At least, weird compared to the Greenspan era. They seem to be using regulatory policy to allow the banks to extend more credit, while leaving the monetary base almost unchanged. This is not a stable policy idea, particularly in an environment where banks are getting more skittish about lending to each other, and to consumers/homebuyers.

This has the odor of trying to be too clever, by not making permanent changes, trying to manage the credit troubles through temporary moves, and not permanently shifting policy through adding to the monetary base, which would encourage more price inflation. But more credit through the banks will encourage price inflation as well, and looking at the TED spread, it seems the markets have given only modest credit to the Fed’s temporary credit injections.

I am dubious that this will work, but I give the Fed credit for original thinking. Greenspan would have flooded us with liquidity by now. We haven’t had a permanent injection of liquidity in seven months, and that is a long time in historical terms. Even in tightening cycles we tend to get permanent injections more frequently than that.

Anyway, this is just another facet of how I view the Fed. Watch what they do, not what they say.

Position: noneThe Naked Capitalism piece extensively quotes John Hussman.? I think John’s observations are correct here, but I would not be so bearish on the stock market.

After all of this disjointed writing, where does that leave me? Puzzled, and mostly neutral on my equity allocations.? My observations could be wrong here.? I’m skeptical of the efficacy of Fed actions, and of the willingness of foreigners to extend credit indefinitely, but they are trying hard? to reflate dud assets (and the loans behind them) now.? That excess liquidity will find its way to healthy assets, and I think I own some of those.

FOMC, Choose Your Poison

Posted on 15 December 2007 by David Merkel

We’re not there yet, but we are close.? The FOMC is likely facing inflation problems at the same time that it faces problems in the financial system.? Goods price inflation versus Asset price deflation.? There is a term for this, but it is easy to be marginalized if one uses the S-word too readily.? So I won’t.

On the other hand, I am almost done with James Grant’s Money of the Mind.? Several themes come to mind here regarding government policy in the late 20s and early 30s, most notable that the government tried to force credit onto an economy that had too much credit already.? First they tried to get the private sector to do their bidding.? When the private sector would not cooperate to the desired degree, the government entered the lending business itself.? This probably prolonged the Depression by not allowing bad debts to get liquidated on a timely basis.

But, if I use the D-word with respect to today, it is even worse than using the S-word as far as credibility goes.? So I won’t, except for historical reference purposes.

The thing is, though, the FOMC is running out of options.? Pretty soon, it will have to decide which pain is greater: goods price inflation, or asset deflation.? Given the current political demographics, I believe they will choose goods price inflation, while saying the exact opposite, or doing the intelligent equivalent of a mumble.

Final note: current FOMC policies are a bit of a joke.? The temporary nature of them (TAF), plus the reduction in T-bill holdings, particularly during year-end, when liquidity is needed for the “holidays” of some, is unusual to say the least.? If the Fed is serious about reflation of assets, they need to do a permanent injection of liquidity, and stop messing around with these temporary half-measures.

PS — All that said, if I were Fed Chairman, I would presently aim monetary policy to a yield curve that had a 1% spread between 2-years and 10-years, and then I would leave it there.? There would be screaming for a year, but the excesses would get bled out of the system.? After that succeeded, I would narrow the spread to 0.5%.? The economy would remain stable for a long time.

Should the FOMC Statement have been a Surprise?

Posted on 13 December 2007 by David Merkel

Here?s the quick answer: no.? The Fed Statement was what I expected.? Read Dr. Jeff?s pieces on the reaction to the Statement; he hits the nail on the head.? No one should have been surprised at 25 bps, no differential change in the discount rate, and an evenhanded statement.? Real GDP is still growing, unemployment is low, and inflation is low also (pardon any differences on measurement issues).

There are too many people who are little better than cheerleaders for the equity markets, and think that the Fed should cater its policy for the good of public equity shareholders.? Forget what you think the FOMC should do.? I gave that up seven years ago, and it was amazing how much better my FOMC forecasting became.

The Fed only has three functions:

Keep inflation low (as they measure it)
Keep labor unemployment low (as they measure it)
Protect the security of the depositary financial system, particularly that which is affiliated with the Federal Reserve.

Three functions the Fed does not have:

The exchange value of the dollar, except as it affects inflation
Affecting the value of the bond market (though they occasionally mess around there trying to affect the shape of the yield curve)
Preserving the value of the stock market.

At some level of fall in the stock market, the Fed does care, but only because it affects soundness of the banking system and labor unemployment.? While the stock market is within 10% of record highs, it does not figure into the calculations of the FOMC.? Maybe at a decline of 30% it does matter to them.

Now, this doesn?t mean that the FOMC isn?t going to eventually lower the Fed funds rate to 3% at some point in 2008.? I believe they will still do that, largely because of the effect that falling housing prices will have on the credit of the residential mortgage market, and not just Subprime, but Alt-A, and Prime loans as well.

The thing is, the FOMC is off on a fool?s errand.? The cheap credit that they inject will overstimulate healthy assets, perhaps encouraging healthy US firms to level up using short-term finance, and buy back stock.? It?s one of the few areas of strength left.? What else could absorb the incremental credit?? The US government?? Maybe.

Cheap credit can?t reflate a sector in fundamental oversupply, like residential housing, unless the FOMC were willing to let inflation rip, perhaps leading the value of residential housing to rise, as it did in the ?70s.? More likely though, is that commodities that are in short supply globally would rise, like coal, steel, oil, gold, rare minerals, etc., and only after a while, would housing prices rise, as nominal incomes become large enough, and household formation great enough for the excess supply to disappear.

But inflation would lead mortgage rates to rise, which would cut against the ability to afford housing.? So, let this be a takeaway.? The FOMC is using their powers for other than there stated purposes, but grudgingly.? Their actions may preserve some marginal lenders, but will be inadequate to reflate housing, particularly in the short run.

-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

Now, I wrote the above while on a plane heading from LA to Baltimore, so I only found out about the Fed’s announcement about their term loan facility when I got home this evening.? Not to be a perpetual pessimist, but I think this idea is more show than substance.? The Fed can discontinue this program after two months.? The Fed has not done a permanent injection of liquidity since May 3rd, and growth in the monetary base is anemic.? All of the growth in broader monetary aggregates is coming from the banks stretching their balance sheets.

This may work in the short run to lower the TED spread, but unless the Fed makes a commitment that they will keep doing this until the market sees things their way, it will not have a major effect on the markets.? I don’t care how many different types of collateral they might take; if they won’t guarantee to take that collateral on favorable terms for a long time, it will amount to nothing by mid-2008.? For a clue to the market’s view, watch the change in 1-month LIBOR versus 12-month LIBOR.? True credibility will be measured by the change in the yield on 12-month LIBOR.

Ave Atque Vale et Mea Culpa

Posted on 8 December 20079 December 2007 by David Merkel

I’m going to be gone Monday through Wednesday of next week on business, and my ability to blog will likely be curtailed.? I would simply like to offer two observations.? The first is on the FOMC.? Given the balance of all of the data, I believe that the FOMC will loosen by 25 basis points on Tuesday.? They will issue the standard “two-handed economist” language about troubles from inflation and financial/economic weakness, indicating that the FOMC is vigilant, and that nothing more is coming given present data, because the FOMC is in control.

The markets will be disappointed by 25 basis points, and will get excited by 50.? Language of the statement will matter some, but I can’t imagine that it will be that amazingly different from before.

One other note: I will write more about National Atlantic at a later date, but for now I am just holding my head in my hands and moaning.? I know there are forced sellers in the name, but to be at 40% of tangible book on a short-tailed name is notable.? It indicates that claim reserves at the end of the second quarter would be 50% light, to justify current valuations.

I’m not suggesting that anyone buy the name; for me, if it stays at these levels, it will be my largest personal loss.? I teach my children about investing through my losses.? If things don’t change, this will be lesson one.

Full disclosure: long NAHC

Personal Finance, Part 5 ? Inflation and Deflation

Posted on 6 December 2007 by David Merkel

This is another in the irregular series on personal finance.? This article though, has implications beyond individuals.? I’m going to describe this in US-centric terms for simplicity sake.? For the 20-25% of my readers that are not US-based, these same principles will apply to your own country and currency as well.

Let’s start with inflation.? Inflation is predominantly a monetary phenomenon.? Whenever the Fed puts more currency into circulation on net, there is monetary inflation.? Some of the value of existing dollars gets eroded, even if the prices of assets or goods don’t change.? In a growing economy with a stable money supply, there would be no monetary inflation, but there would likely be goods price deflation.? Same number of dollars chasing more goods.

Let’s move on to price inflation.? There are two types of price inflation, one for assets, and the other for goods (and services, but both are current consumption, so I lump them together).? When monetary inflation takes place, each dollar can buy less goods or assets than in the absence of the inflation.? Prices would not rise, if productivity has risen as much or more than the amount of monetary inflation.

Now, the incremental dollars from monetary inflation can go to one of two places: goods or assets.? Assets can be thought of? as something that produces a bundle of goods in the future.? Asset inflation is an increase in the prices of assets (or a subgroup of assets) without equivalent improvement in the ability to create more goods in the future.? How newly printed incremental dollars get directed can make a huge difference in where inflation shows up. Let me run through a few examples:

?In the 1970s in the US, the rate of household formation was relatively rapid, and there was a lot of demand for consumer products, but not savings.? Money supply growth was rapid.? The stock and bond markets languished, and goods prices roared ahead.? Commodities and housing also rose rapidly.
In? the mid-1980s the G7 induced Japan to inflate its money supply.? With an older demographic, most of the excess money went into savings that were invested in stocks that roared higher, creating a bubble, but not creating any great amount of incremental new goods (productivity) for the future.
In 1998-1999, the Fed goosed the money supply to compensate for LTCM and the related crises, and Y2K.? The excess money made its way to tech and internet stocks, creating a bubble.? On net, more money was invested than was created in terms of future goods and services.? Thus, after the inflation, there came a deflation, as the assets could not produce anything near what the speculators bid them up to.
In 2001-2003 the Fed cut rates aggressively in a weakening economy.? The incremental dollars predominantly went to housing, producing a bubble.? More houses were built than were needed in an attempt to respond to the demand from speculators.? Now we are on the deflation side of the cycle, where prices adjust down, until enough people can afford the homes using normal financing.

I can give you more examples.? The main point is that inflation does not have to occur in goods in order to be damaging to the economy.? It can occur in assets when people and institutions become maniacal, and push the price of an asset class well beyond where its future stream of cash flow would warrant.

Now, it’s possible to have goods deflation and asset inflation at the same time; it is possible to save too much as a culture.? The boom/bust cycles in the late 1800s had some instances of that.? It’s also possible to have goods inflation and asset deflation at the same time; its definitely possible to not save enough as a culture, or to have resources diverted by the government to fight a war.

The problem is this, then.? It’s difficult to make hard-and-fast statements about the effect of an increasing money supply.? It will likely create inflation, but the question is where?? Many emerging economies have rapidly growing money supplies, and they are building up their productive capacity.? The question is, will there be a market for that capacity?? At what price level?? Many of them have booming stockmarkets.? Do the prices fairly reflect the future flow of goods and services?? Emerging markets presently trade at a P/E premium to the developed markets.? If capitalism sticks, the premium deriving from faster growth may be warranted.? But maybe not everywhere, China for example.

The challenge for the individual investor, and any institutional asset allocator is to look at the world and estimate where the assets generating future inflation-adjusted cash flows (or goods and services) are trading relatively cheaply.? That’s a tall order.? Jeremy Grantham of GMO has done well with that analysis in the past, and I’m not aware that he finds anything that cheap today.

We live in a world of relatively low interest rates; part of that comes from the Baby Boomers aging and pension plans investing for their retirement.? P/E multiples aren’t that high, but profit margins are also quite high.? We also face central banks that are loosening monetary policy to reduce bad debt problems.? That incremental money will aid institutions not badly impaired, and might eventually inflate the value of houses, if they get aggressive enough.? (Haven’t seen that yet.)? In any case, the question is how will the incremental dollars (and other currencies) get spent?? In the US, we have another demographic wave of household formations coming, so maybe goods inflation will tick up.

We’ll see.? More on this tomorrow; I’ll get more practical and less theoretical.

Ten Notes on Our Crazy Credit Markets

Posted on 5 December 2007 by David Merkel

This post may be a little more disjointed than some of my posts.? Recently I have been working on calculating the fair value for mezzanine tranches of a series of real estate oriented CDOs.? Not pretty.? Anyway, here are few articles that got me thinking yesterday:

Let’s? start with CD rates.? Bloomberg had a nifty table on its system which I can’t reproduce here, except to point you to the data source at the Fed.? Note how one-, three-, and six-month CD rates have been rising, somewhat in sync with LIBOR, but widening the gap with Treasury yields. (Hit your “end” button to see the most recent rates…)
As a result, I have been debating whether the FOMC might not do a 50 basis point loosen next Tuesday.? CDs aren’t the bulk of how most banks fund themselves, but they can be a way to get a lot of cash fast.? Remember that after labor unemployment and inflation, the Fed’s hidden third mandate is protecting the depositary financial system, particularly the portion that belongs to the Federal Reserve System.
Now, I’m not the only one wondering about what the FOMC will do.? There’s Greg Ip at The WSJ, who speculates on the size of the cut, and whether the discount rate might not be cut even more, with a loosening of terms and conditions as well.? Bloomberg echoes the same themes.? Even the normally placid Tony Crescenzi sounds worried if the FOMC doesn’t act aggressively here.
The US isn’t the only place where this is a worry.? The Bank of Canada cut rates yesterday, as noted by Trader’s Narrative, partly because of credit pressures in Canada and the US.? The Financial Times notes that Euro-LIBOR [Euribor] is also rising vs. Government short-term yields, which may prompt the ECB to cut as well.? Or, they also could cut their version of the discount rate, or liberalize terms.
It doesn’t make sense to me, but the Yen is weakening at present.? With forward interest rate differentials narrowing as more central banks tip toward easing, I would expect the carry trade to weaken; instead, it is growing.? For now.
As noted by Marc Chandler, the Gulf States have largely decided to keep their US Dollar peg.? I found the article to be interesting and somewhat counterintuitive at points, but hey, I learned something.? Inflation is rising in Kuwait after they switched from the US Dollar to a basket of currencies, because residential real estate prices are rising.
Credit problems continue to emerge on the short end of the yield curve.? Accrued Interest has a good summary of the problems in money market funds.? It almost seems like Florida is a “trouble magnet.”? If it’s not hurricanes, it’s bad money management.? Then there’s Orange County, which has a 20% slug of SIV-debt in its Extended Fund.? It’s all highly rated, so they say, but ratings don’t always equate to credit quality, particularly in unseasoned investment classes.? Then there’s the credit stress from borrowers drawing down on standby lines of credit, which further taxes the capital of the banks.
As a final note, both here (point 6) and at RealMoney, I was very critical of S&P and Moody’s when they decided to rate CPDO [Constant Proportion Debt Obligation] paper AAA.? I’ll let the excellent blog Alea take the victory lap though.? We finally have CPDOs that are taking on serious losses (and here).
In summary, we are increasingly in a situation where the major central banks of our world are reflating their currencies as a group in an effort to inflate away embedded credit problems.? Most of the credit problems are too deep for a lowering of the financing rate to solve, though it will help financial institutions with modest-to-moderate-sized credit problems (say, less than 25% of tangible net worth — does the rule of thumb for P&C reinsurers apply to banks?).? This can continue for some time, and credit spreads and yield curves should continue to widen, and inflation (when fairly measured) should increase.? Some of the inflation will move to assets that aren’t presently troubled, perhaps commodities, and higher quality equities, which are doing relatively well of late.
Quite an environment.? The big question is when the “free lunch” period for the rate cuts end, and the hard policy choices need to be made.? My guess is that would be in mid-to-late 2008, just in time for the elections.? Now, wouldn’t that spice things up? 🙂

Book Review: The Trouble With Prosperity

Posted on 29 November 2007 by David Merkel

In principle, I make a pittance off of any book sales from clicking on the links in any review that I write.? But I will write about books that are “out of print” as well (no money there); whether in print or out of print, my goal is to serve readers by bringing important investment ideas to their attention.

Presently, I am reading Money of the Mind, by James Grant, but I have also read The Trouble With Prosperity, which is important to understanding our present circumstances.? Both analyze monetary and other economic policies in the past, with an eye toward what it implies for us today.

In The Trouble With Prosperity,? Grant’s main theme is what happens when monetary policy is perverted from trying to preserve purchasing power, to trying to assure a perpetual prosperity.? He wrote this in 1996, when the US was recovering from the severe Fed tightening in 1994, which resulted from lax monetary policy 1991-1993, where the Fed funds rate was stuck at 3%.

As with most things, James Grant is right in direction, but early.? Back in 1996, he could not envision a 1% Fed funds rate, much less the mysterious hypothetical helicopters of Chairman Bernanke.? Capitalist economies are quite resilient, and can survive considerable mismanagement.? Today we are far closer to what he worried about eleven years ago.

A central bank trying to assure continued prosperity will always be biased toward inflation.? How the inflation manifests is a function of demographics.? With a younger population, goods inflation will be stronger (buy more, save less), and asset inflation for an older generation (buy less, save more).? At the same time, such a central bank will be biased against major losses in financial institutions.

The trouble is, the likelihood of the Federal Reserve rescuing troubled financial institutions raises the odds that the institutions will get into trouble.? It skews the payoff to financial executives, and makes them more willing to take risk, because the institution will not be under threat if they fail.

In The Trouble With Prosperity, Grant walks us through:

The puzzle of the markets in 1958, given the rise in interest rates and inflation
A tall building that characterized the troubles of the Depression.
The Japanese real estate and stock bubbles, and their deflation (still early in 1996)
The S&L crisis in the early 90s
Willingness to sponsor speculative ventures in the early 1990s, with a focus on gambling.

My opinion: low Fed funds rates foster speculation in healthy assets.? Lever them up more, because we can.? Ignore risk, and focus on the income one can generate today.? Of course, the eventual risk is that the US ends up in a liquidity trap similar to the which the Japanese have been in for the last 17 years.? Of course, the US economy is more flexible than that, but the risks are still significant.

Don’t view soft FOMC policy as a panacea.? Eventually we will have goods inflation as a result.? For now, the market is rejoicing in an accommodative Fed.? Enjoy it while it lasts, buy inflation is coming.

Notes on Fed Policy and Short-term Credit

Posted on 28 November 2007 by David Merkel

I just did my usual review of my FOMC indicators.? The FOMC should cut 25 basis points at the December 11th meeting.? Whatever the formal “bias” is, the verbiage will be a little of this and the a little of that, something like:? “Yes, we are worried about the solvency of some financial institutions.? That’s why we cut.? But this cut very likely should be enough, so don’t expect anymore.? Now leave us alone.”
So Goldman sees a 3% Fed funds rate in mid-2008?? So do I.? Small moves in FOMC policy don’t achieve the desired ends, either when policy is rising or falling.? Large cumulative moves are needed to affect the behavior of market participants.
The TED [Treasury – Eurodollar] spread is at its largest one-year moving average since 1990.? That’s significant short-term credit stress to the large banks, and it is worth watching.? It’s not just a US phenomenon either; in the UK the banks are under stress as well.
Residential housing is driving the decisions of the FOMC.? As prices fall, more houses become non-refinancable, and non-salable (except at a loss).? All it takes then is for a problem to happen… death, disability, divorce, unemployment, or casualty, and another house goes on the market because of insolvency.
So, I agree with Accrued Interest (great blog, doesn’t everyone want to read about bonds?).? Many Fed governors talk between meetings, and they trot out their baseline scenario, but often it is the worry of avoiding a somewhat likely negative scenario that can drive policy.
At some level though, if the dollar falls far enough, the FOMC will have to reverse course, as Caroline Baum has pointed out.? Remember, that’s what drove the FOMC to tighten in 1986-87.
Of course, the credit stress in the short end of the market has led some money market fund sponsors to bail out their funds (Legg Mason, Wachovia and B of A, while GE lets a pseudo-money market fund take a hit.? Remember, with money market funds, it’s not wise to stretch for yield, particularly not in bear markets for credit.
One more weak Commercial Paper [CP] funding structure: using it as part of a “super senior” tranche in CDOs.? Now in this case, the collateral is weak — subprime mortgage loans, but this could be true of any CDO where the collateral comes under stress in the future, including high yield corporate bonds.? I wrote about this three months ago, but this one is still unraveling.
I haven’t talked about it, because I wasn’t sure I had anything to add to the discussion, but the M-LEC, or super-SIV, proposed by the major banks seems like hooey to me.? After all, if this shifting of assets from one pocket to another created value, why wasn’t it done before?? It doesn’t change the underlying asset prices, and for the banks as a whole, it is just a zero sum game, unless new parties enter, at which point, they will have to offer a discount to move the paper, which eliminates one of the reasons for doing the deal.
Putting another nail in the coffin, HSBC takes their SIVs onto their own balance sheet, cleaning up their own financing, and making it more difficult for the other banks who want to do the Super-SIV.

What an interesting time in the short-term debt markets.? For now, prudence dictates staying high quality in what financial institutions you lend to short term.

The Rising Disconnect between FOMC Policy and LIBOR

Posted on 26 November 2007 by David Merkel

The FOMC can loosen interest rate policy, but how much will unsecured interbank lending rates like LIBOR respond?? As it stands right now, the Treasury-Eurodollar spread [TED spread], is at 180 basis points, up from 96 basis points (or so — don’t have access to a Bloomberg Terminal).? 17 basis points of that rise is a rise in LIBOR.? Not the usual response that you expect to loosening monetary policy, but these are unusual times, when credit spreads dominate over monetary policy, even on high quality lending and short term.

It feels like the major global banks don’t trust each other enough to lend to each other short term.? This has impacts on mortgage markets as well, such as the ability to refinance mortgages, and resetting mortgage payment rates even on prime mortgages.

Typically the TED spread does not stay this high for long.? If the FOMC cut the Fed funds rate to 3%, that might normalize things, but for now they will be content with half measures like temporary injections of liquidity.? Now, a 3% Fed funds rate will produce other problems (inflation, lower dollar), and it won’t really solve the overall mortgage credit problems in the short-run, but it is what the market expects by mid-2008.? It might help out in problems with the banks that are on the cusp of creditworthiness, and that is what may drive the FOMC to act.

More later.

Musings on the Fed and Yesterday’s Article

Posted on 21 November 2007 by David Merkel

From Tuesday’s Columnist Conversation over at RealMoney.com:

		David Merkel
		Thinking About the Fed
		11/20/2007 1:51 PM EST

One of my maxims of the Fed is that it is better to watch what they do, and pay less attention to what they say. The markets are saying that they expect Fed funds at 3% sometime in 2008. The Fed governors see that also, and are being dragged there, kicking and screaming. They don’t want to do it; there is real risk to the US Dollar, and there are inflation risks as well. As they measure it, the economy is growing adequately, and labor employment is fairly full. But as Cramer and others point out, the financial system is under stress, manifesting most sharply in mortgage lenders and insurers. Secondary stress is in the investment banks and financial guarantors.

But what exactly has the Fed done so far? Most of the monetary easing has not come through growth in the monetary base, but from continued relaxation of reserve requirements. Given that the Fed is loosening, I would have expected a permanent injection of liquidity by now. As it is, the last one was May 3rd, when there was no hint of the loosenings coming.

So what then for future FOMC policy? The banks are increasingly incapable of levering up more. The monetary base will have to grow. With the Treasury-Eurodollar spread at over 170 basis points, the big banks don’t trust each other. Again, this measure points to 3.00-3.25% Fed funds sometime in 2008.

I see them getting dragged to cuts, kicking and screaming, until a combination of inflation and the dollar force them to change. Then the real fun begins.

Fed minutes out soon. Watch them make a fool out of me.

Okay, the FOMC minutes did not make a fool out of me.? Neither did the market action.? I’m in the weird spot of thinking that nominal economic activity is higher than expected, on both an inflation and real GDP basis.? I don’t like the mortgage and depositary financial sectors at present, two areas that are dear to the FOMC.? That’s where I stand.

One reader asked, what do you mean by, “Then the real fun begins.”?? Maybe I have to do a book review on James Grant’s, “The Trouble with Prosperity.”? James Grant is very often correct, but usually way too early, which is why it is hard to make money off of his insights.? The “real fun” is watching FOMC policymakers squirm as they balance off costs of inflation and economic growth on the negative side, as it was in the late 70s and early 80s.? It is also the fun of watching policymakers at the Treasury Department squirm as they realize that the the fiscal wind is in their face and not at their backs anymore, as the demographic winds spin 180 degrees.

Other readers e-mailed, asking the practical question of how to invest in such an environment.? First, don’t overdo it.? Invest for a normal market scenario, and then tweak it to add more short bonds, TIPS, Commodities, Foreign bonds, and stocks with good inflation pass-through.

I got a few questions asking me to justify my bearish view on the US Dollar.? On, a purchasing power parity basis, the US Dollar is fairly valued now.? (What goods can the Dollar buy versus other currencies?) Unfortunately, currencies react more to forward covered interest parity in the short run. (What will I be able to earn by investing my money in dollar denominated debt, instead of another currency?)? Low intermediate term interest rates in the US portend bad returns from investing in US Dollar denominated debt, so the US Dollar declines.? The rest of the world seems to be bracing for more inflation and more growth.? Because US policy is headed the other way, the US Dollar is weakening.

As for my longer-run negative view on US Bonds, US government policies are designed to undermine bonds.? They have made more future promises than they can keep.? Who will they renege on their promises?? Bond investors are the easiest target; they don’t vote in large numbers.? It will be harder to turn their backs to those receiving social insurance payments, at least in nominal terms.? They have a lot of votes.

That’s all for now.? More tomorrow.