Pro: Pick Your Poison

Con: The Hidden Risks of Risk Parity Portfolios

I’m on the “con” side of this argument, because I am a risk manager, and have traded a large portfolio of complex bonds.  For additional support consider my article Risks, Not Risk.  Or read the second half of my article, “The Education of a Corporate Bond Manager, Part X.” There is no generic risk in the markets.  There are many risks.  Interest rate risk and credit risk are different topics.   There are bonds that have interest rate risk but not credit risk — long Treasuries.  There are bonds that have credit risk but not interest rate risk — corporate floating rate notes, my favorite example being floating rate bank trust preferred securities.

It is not raw price volatility that drives investment results as much as the underlying drivers of the volatility.  For fixed income, I described those in the two articles linked in the last paragraph.  During non-credit-stressed times, a bank’s 30-year floating rate trust preferred security is roughly as volatile as a five-year noncallable bond that it issues.  But during times of credit stress, the first security becomes volatile, whereas the second one doesn’t.  The first moves in line with 30-year swap yields, LIBOR, and long junior bank spreads.  The second moves in line with 5-year Treasury yields, and short senior bank spreads.  The underlying drivers have little in common, and when things are calm, their volatilities are similar, because the drivers aren’t moving.  But when the drivers move, which in this case is one correlated driver, credit stress (30-year swap & junior bank spreads go a lot higher), the volatilities are very different, the first one being high and the second one low.

Thus equating volatilities across a bunch of asset subclasses, investing less in the volatile, and levering up the non-volatile, is hard to do.  History embeds all the curiosities of the study period, and calls them normal, and that past is prologue.

From the Pick Your Poison article above, what I think is the (lose) money quote:

Gundlach insists most money managers misunderstand junk bonds, comparing them to 5-year Treasurys to determine how rich their yields are, when the correct comparison should be to 30-year Treasurys.

How can Gundlach compare junk bonds, which do better when the economy heats up, with long-term Treasurys, which get killed when the economy revs up and the Fed raises interest rates?

That’s irrelevant, he responds. The thing to look at is volatility, because that tells you the odds you will have to sell at a loss when you need to raise cash in an emergency. On that basis, junk bonds that were trading at a seemingly reasonable spread of 5 percentage points, or 500 basis points, to 5-year Treasurys in mid-2011 were actually trading at an intolerably low 250-basis-point spread to the proper bond. (By then DoubleLine had cut its junk bond allocation from 10% to 1%.) Sure enough, junk fell 12% as the year went on, and the spread to 30-year Treasurys has doubled since mid-2011.

“It’s called risk parity,” Gundlach says. “There’s only two investors who seem to understand it—me and Ray Dalio,” the highly successful manager of $122 billion (assets) Bridgewater Associates.

Personally, I don’t think Gundlach makes his money that way for his funds, but in case he does, how should a good bond manager view junk bonds?

First, ignore Treasuries — they aren’t relevant to the price performance of junk bonds.  I’ve run the regression of Treasuries vs junk bond index yields many times.  It’s barely significant for BBs, and insignificant thereafter.  Second, look at stock market indexes of industries that lever up and issue junk debt.  Junk corporate debt is a milder version of junk stocks, i.e., the stocks that issue junk debt.

Third, a corollary of my first reason, realize that risks with junk aren’t driven by spreads, but yields.  With highly levered, or very junior debt, it does not trade on a spread basis, but on a price basis.  Anyone looking at spreads will see too much volatility versus yields and prices.

But mere volatility won’t tell you the riskiness.  Indeed, when economic times are good, junk will do well, and long Treasuries do poorly.  Now, maybe that makes for a very noisy hedge, but I wouldn’t rely on it.

And, volatility is a symmetric measure, which as bond yields get closer to zero, the symmetry disappears.  Most asset classes display negative skew and fat tails, which also makes volatility problematic as a risk measure.

Going back to my first piece on the topic, if I were applying risk parity to a bond portfolio, it would mean that I would have to buy considerably more of shorter and higher quality instruments, and lever them up to my target volatility level, somehow with spreads large enough that they overcome my financing costs.  Now, maybe I could do that with mispriced mortgage securities, but with the problem that those aren’t the most liquid beasties, particularly not in a crisis if real estate is weak.

I guess my main misgiving is that levered portfolios are path-dependent, as pointed out in the GMO piece above.  You can’t be certain that you will be able to ride through the storm.  The ability to finance short-term disappears at the time it is most needed.

Now, if you can get leverage after the bust, and invest in beaten-up asset classes, you can be a hero.  But that’s a time when only the most solvent can get leverage, so plan ahead, if that’s the strategy.  If an investor could consistently time the liquidity/credit cycle, he could make a lot of money.

As the GMO piece concludes, the only benchmark that everyone could hold would be a proportionate slice of all of the assets in the world, which implicitly, would strip out all of the leverage, because one would own both the shares of the company, and the debt it owes, and in the right proportion.

So I don’t see risk parity as a silver bullet for asset allocation.  I think it will become more problematic, as all strategies do, as more people show up and use it, which is happening now.   First in the hands of the master, last in the hands of a sorcerer’s apprentice.  Be careful.

PS — I have respect for the skills of Gundlach and Dalio.  I’m just skeptical about what happens to risk parity when too many use it, and use it without understanding its limitations.  And, here is a nice little piece about Bridgewater and its strategies.

Economics

• If you look in the back, it seems that there were 58 respondents. From page 13: Methodology & Panel Selection Invi… http://t.co/p8sVZl9g Feb 06, 2012
• Will the great interest rate gamble pay off? http://t.co/hgj5XSKc People want to believe that you can get something for nothing; ain’t true. Feb 05, 2012
• Central Planning at the Federal Reserve http://t.co/X8qmqU6C Fed: we can create prosperity by holding interest rates down, right? $$ #wishes Feb 05, 2012
• Labor Force Participation Rate: 28-year Low http://t.co/kLgQ61iK Everyone still happy about the lower unemployment rate? $$ Feb 05, 2012
• Bill Gross: Free Money Ain’t Really Free http://t.co/LXWxpxp5 It will lead to stagflation, IMO, depending on what fiscal policy does $$ Feb 05, 2012
• Life & Death Proposition http://t.co/XuZS5Snn Where does credit go when it dies? Back where it came. It delevers, slows & inhibits ec growth Feb 02, 2012
• US unemployment “progress” http://t.co/WoIVZPGp If you add back the discoraged workers, all of the improvement in U-3 goes away $$ Feb 02, 2012
• The Perniciousness of ZIRP http://t.co/dYlFMbLe Gonzalo Lira on how ZIRP loses effectiveness b/c people think it’ll b there a long time $$ Feb 01, 2012
• Why Neoclassical Economics Doesn’t Work In The Age Of Deleveraging http://t.co/D3IAhTyv Steve Keen explains y Krugman & others r wrong $$ Feb 01, 2012
• Warning: Goat Rodeo http://t.co/JQ2FV9LS Hussman makes his case that equities are overvalued and could pull back 25% $$ Feb 01, 2012
• Who Owns World’s Financial Assets? & Why R US Households So Fascinated W/Stocks? http://t.co/5rp52OM4 American Exceptionalism in investing Feb 01, 2012
• As an aside, that is one reason why the US net foreign debt hasn’t spiraled up. We own equities abroad & they own our debt. $$ declines + Feb 01, 2012
• $$ declines reduce the value of our debts, but not the value of r foreign holdings. I think the US will come out of this crisis rel well $$ Feb 01, 2012

Housing

• Home Prices Tumble http://t.co/N1gdNslr No surprise here with all of the dark supply; houses come onto mkt when ppl can bear loss $$ Feb 01, 2012
• Too lazy to be knowns http://t.co/flXRR6fM I know many who understood what would happen if home RE prices fell, but none who got the size $$ Feb 01, 2012
• Freddie Mac’s “inverse floater” allowed more loan origination http://t.co/5devKZ17 Other side to the Propublica story http://t.co/KjXJHU1x Feb 01, 2012
• I’m no fan of the GSEs; I think they should be abolished, but the GSEs have always made a variety of bets on prepayment over time. $$ Feb 01, 2012

International

• On China, Henry Kissinger and Fareed Zakaria see Domestic Tension and Risk of Geopolitical Conflict http://t.co/1bhvrI3U Ferguson is wrong. Feb 05, 2012
• Tightening lending standards vary materially across the Eurozone http://t.co/ciWUK9cm Conditions tight in Italy & France, but not Germany $$ Feb 02, 2012
• Japan Auto Sales Notch Record Jump http://t.co/0VzF4WST Another small bright spot. Of course, bouncing back from a low level $$ Feb 02, 2012
• Socialist Hollande, Who Wants Full European Treaty Renegotiation, Increases Lead Over Sarkozy http://t.co/J3qCpZZ3 Eurozone Wild Card $$ Feb 01, 2012
• Hong Kong Homes Face 25% Drop as Loans Fall in Year of Dragon http://t.co/ifg1146H And this is with wealthy mainlanders fleeing China. $$ Feb 01, 2012

Markets

• RBC Takes On High Frequency Predators http://t.co/MfA5qdxm Where there is offense, there will b defense; nothing goes unanswered in the mkts Feb 05, 2012
• Global Strategists Abandoning Bearish Views http://t.co/dOXCUMA7 Makes me think we r getting close to a turning point. Feb 02, 2012
• Dividend stocks: Buyer beware http://t.co/SvMCHtCj Makes the valid & missed point: high qual div paying stocks r stocks & can lose $$ #yeah Feb 01, 2012

Credit

• 6 High-Yield Canaries-in-the-Coalmine http://t.co/4pz6SSQc 6 reasons y high yield is overheated http://t.co/fKnHmBqD & http://t.co/UPVev0iD Feb 02, 2012
• QOTD: Regulators Watching Aggressive Yield Chasing http://t.co/iWimo3eg FINRA warns of undue risk in income seeking. Advisors take note $$ Feb 02, 2012
• Contra: The Safest 7% Yield in America http://t.co/VrXoLEFH Poor analysis does not take into account the highish leverage on mtge repo $$ Feb 02, 2012
• Shipping Loans Go Bad for European Banks http://t.co/y5Z0wt3R Highly glutted area w/many dead firms walking; how far down will the losses go Feb 02, 2012

Politics

• Group lists top stock investments by members of Congress http://t.co/CarxUCjS Top 50 hldgs -> in top 100 cos by mkt cap. Hard2manipulate $$ Feb 05, 2012
• Obama Re-Election Odds Versus the Stock Market http://t.co/F5EETcve Example of 2 variables that r correlated b/c they anticipate GDP changes Feb 05, 2012
• RE: @abnormalreturns Gold is mostly political philosophy. How much control do you want the government to have over mo… http://t.co/hRxIkaoo Feb 03, 2012
• Getting back to the gold standard http://t.co/pCk8Ij6j Gingrich & Ron Paul have said they would like to appoint James Grant as Fed Chairman Feb 02, 2012

Companies

• Carlyle’s proposed IPO disaster http://t.co/OqGke8eN So there’s no board. Most boards don’t do much. Mgmt will have no board 2 shield them Feb 05, 2012
• For These Fans, a Day With Buffett Offers Wealth of Photo Opportunities http://t.co/UpcwVKe7 I think Buffett is enjoying life more now. Feb 05, 2012
• Buffett Railroad Boosts Capital Plan to $3.9B http://t.co/9XEw2gyT Buffett changes; organic investment in capital-intensive biz $$ #olddog Feb 01, 2012
• Pep Boys Seen Gaining 27% as Cheapest Value Lures Bids http://t.co/GyfH7qRL Could a bidding war start? Company is undermanaged $$ Feb 01, 2012
• Jefferies Allows Bonus Recipients to Swap Stock 4 Cash With 25% Discount http://t.co/pfGB3Vmc Fair way2 let employees disconnect from $JEF Feb 01, 2012

Financial Services

• I’ve just started “Acts of God and Man,” by Michael Powers. In the intro, he goes through the various meanings of th… http://t.co/tX7uAlWl Feb 05, 2012
• When evaluating Investment Funds, use Dollar-weighted Returns http://t.co/N5g7PI0d This is a neglcted concept that is enjoying a rebirth $$ Feb 02, 2012
• After a Delay, MF Global’s Missing Money Is Traced http://t.co/4s6U8yOe Investigation moves to how to recover the $$ and who is at fault. Feb 01, 2012
• http://t.co/wBbJTe3D FINRA Alert: Do you use complex products? What additional work do you do 2 assure that they are being used properly? $$ Feb 01, 2012
• Banks Need Higher Interest Rates to Start Making Money http://t.co/SneRACCi Flat front end of yield curve squishes bank interest margins $$ Feb 01, 2012
• 401(k) Plans Step Into the Sunshine http://t.co/fvKeup2L But as with DB plans, as costs rise, companies will offer them less. $$ Jan 31, 2012

Value Investing

• The SEC’s “90% Convergence” Fantasy http://t.co/bkWaAS5S US GAAP has many flaws, but we know them. IFRS will introduce abusable flexibility Feb 02, 2012
• But on the bright side, value investors may do relatively better as financials become less trustworthy; the accruals anomaly will sing $$ Feb 02, 2012
• Need to consider (Cost of goods sold)/user $$ RT @ErikSchatzker: Facebook gets $4.39/yr of revenue per user. ESPN gets $4.69/mo. Feb 02, 2012
• Berkowitz: Fund Plunge ‘Makes Little Sense’ http://t.co/pcoPLahW BB, appoint someone in your group 2 seek out opinions contrary 2 yours $$ Feb 01, 2012
• @ADayforRabbit I have argued in the past that BB is not paying attention to the delevering, which is a real headwind for the banks. $$ Feb 02, 2012
• New Fund Hopes to Prove Outspoken Analyst’s Thesis http://t.co/cuVpRzvO I bet @rcwhalen does well like my friends @ Hovde or M3 Partners $$ Feb 01, 2012

Hedge Funds

• Are Hedge Funds Worthwhile Investments? http://t.co/Lw2EhRPr Yet another “Hedge Fund Mirage” citation; the book is having a lot of influence Feb 02, 2012
• Are the hedge fund and private equity boys pulling a fast one? http://t.co/TNXFJo62 Beginning 2c the args of “Hedge Fund Mirage” everywhere Feb 02, 2012
• Did Hedge Funds Trigger the Financial Crisis? http://t.co/lNIb2dgF Secured asset classes can be overlevered; when they collapse, big mess $$ Feb 01, 2012

Miscellaneous

• Do the Job You’re Meant to Do http://t.co/wR3OX20N LIfe is too short to work with people you don’t respect, or tasks unfit for you $$ Feb 02, 2012
• Millionaire adopts girlfriend as daughter http://t.co/zffGCWbu Asset shelter. Does incest rely on consanguinity or on legal relationship? Feb 02, 2012
• Charles Murray Reiterates Willpower http://t.co/smeXZKNh Lack of self-control can destroy relationships, jobs, firms & lives $$ Feb 02, 2012
• I ran into @twitalyzer today. Lots of interesting analytics for tweeting. Here are some for me: http://t.co/HDdcFYaU & http://t.co/8uFFOMuP Feb 01, 2012
• At the first blogger summit at the UST, I recommended to the powers that be that they issue floaters. I also recommen… http://t.co/R3U8OHSi Feb 01, 2012
• California Faces Cash Shortfall by March on Low Receipts, Controller Says http://t.co/QxH1a6Re Could be interesting given the elections $$ Feb 01, 2012

Thus, the concept of “risk parity.”  Lever every asset class up until it has the same volatility as common stocks. Under theoretical conditions, one could make extra money doing this, and with less risk than just a common stock portfolio.

That makes sense when few are doing it, but not when many are doing it.  When I worked for Hovde Capital Advisors, I highlighted to the group how hedge funds were forcing every asset class to the same level of riskiness.  A Grants Interest Rate Observer article on Leveraged Non-prime Commercial Paper is etched on my mind as emblematic of that era.

Risk parity can work so long as the total riskiness of the system does not get too high, as it did in 2007-8.  But if it does get too high, the assets that are levered face disadvantages versus volatile unlevered assets.  Failures of leverage feed on themselves, and lead to a real washout.  Failures of growth stocks don’t do that to the economy.

Risk parity turns managers into bankers, or worse yet, asset managers that specialize in non-AAA investment grade portions of structured securities deals.  Most asset managers are not used to thinking like bankers, largely because they think in terms of total return, and because they don’t have a balance sheet.  Their capital can run at will, unlike banks that have deposit stickiness, savings accounts, CDs, ability to borrow from the FHLBs, etc.  The banks can hold the assets to maturity, they have a buffer against losses in their capital, and don’t have to mark to market in an assiduous manner (though they *should* have to do so).

Think of the mortgage REITs in the most recent crisis — the ones that did the best were the least levered and had the longest terms for their repo lines.  In the short run, that costs more than the vain idea that one can roll over their repo lines every night, and that repo haircuts won’t rise.  Crises lead to a failure of both ideas, together with a set of forced sellers driving down the price of assets being repo-ed, which sometimes leads to a cascade where repo terms get progressively tighter, and only those that were the most conservative at the start of the crisis survive.

There is a Wall Street aphorism, “The fool does at the end of a bull market what the wise man does at its beginning.”  Risk parity falls into that bucket.  Early adopters of new asset classes and liability structures typically do well, but when they become mainstream, the dynamics can be ugly, as we learned in 2007-present.

So ignore the idea of risk parity.  Risk managers are not bankers, they don’t have the capacity to play leveraged spread games to maturity.  Risk parity if practiced on a large scale will produce wipeouts akin to the recent crisis.

They moved this paragraph up from last time.the Committee decided today to continue its program to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securities as announced in September. The Committee is maintaining its existing policies of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction. The Committee will regularly review the size and composition of its securities holdings and is prepared to adjust those holdings as appropriate.The Committee also decided to continue its program to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securities as announced in September. The Committee is maintaining its existing policies of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction. The Committee will regularly review the size and composition of its securities holdings and is prepared to adjust those holdings as appropriate to promote a stronger economic recovery in a context of price stability.No real change.  Central bank asset policy does not have that big of an impact on economic activity.

They moved this paragraph down from last time.The Committee will continue to assess the economic outlook in light of incoming information and is prepared to employ its tools to promote a stronger economic recovery in a context of price stability. Deletes meaningless sentence.Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; Elizabeth A. Duke; Richard W. Fisher; Narayana Kocherlakota; Charles I. Plosser; Sarah Bloom Raskin; Daniel K. Tarullo; and Janet L. Yellen.Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; Elizabeth A. Duke; Dennis P. Lockhart; Sandra Pianalto; Sarah Bloom Raskin; Daniel K. Tarullo; John C. Williams; and Janet L. Yellen.Three new regional Fed presidents.  Storm and fury, signifying nothing.Voting against the action was Charles L. Evans, who supported additional policy accommodation at this time.Voting against the action was Jeffrey M. Lacker, who preferred to omit the description of the time period over which economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate.Make that four, with a dissent from Mr. Lacker, who is likely the only one to dissent in 2012.  Talked with him at the Cato Monetary Conference – he is skeptical of the asset policy at the Fed.  This dissent disagrees with the Fed trying to give a time period for how long the Fed funds rate will remain low.

Comments

• So they extend the period of accommodation by a little more than a year.  Sends financial markets flying, and especially TIPS prices, but will have little impact on the economy.  (Do they want the yield on 30 year TIPS to go negative?  Looks that way.)
• GDP growth is not improving much if at all, and the unemployment rate improvement comes more from discouraged workers.  Inflation has moderated, but whether it will stay that way is another question.
• In my opinion, I don’t think holding down longer-term rates on the highest-quality debt will have any impact on lower quality debts, which is where most of the economy finances itself.
• Also, the reinvestment in Agency MBS should have limited impact because so many owners are inverted, or ineligible for financing backed by the GSEs, and implicitly the government, even with the recently announced refinancing changes.
• The key variables on Fed Policy are capacity utilization, unemployment, inflation trends, and inflation expectations.  As a result, the FOMC ain’t moving rates up, absent increases in employment, or a US Dollar crisis.  Labor employment is the key metric.
• The Fed is out of good policy tools, so it will use bad policy tools instead, and for longer than before.

Questions for Dr. Bernanke:

• Why do think extending the period of accommodation by a little more than a year will have any significant effect on the economy, aside from stock and bond prices?
• Is it possible that you don’t really know what would have worked to solve the Great Depression, and you are just committing an entirely new error that will result in a larger problem for us later?
• Discouraged workers are a large factor in the falling unemployment rate. Why do you think the economy is doing so well at present?
• Why do you think that holding down longer-term rates on the highest-quality debt will have any impact on lower quality debts, which is where most of the economy finances itself?
• Why will reinvestment in Agency MBS help the economy significantly?  Doesn’t that only help solvent borrowers on the low end of housing, who don’t really need the help?
• Couldn’t increased unemployment be structural, after all, there is a lot more competition from labor in emerging markets?
• Isn’t stagflation a possibility here?  I mean, no one expected it in the ‘70s either.
• Could we end up with another debt bubble from keeping short rates so low?
• If the Fed ever does shrink its balance sheet, what effect will it have on the banks?

Recently, he wrote two  articles on financial intermediation.  Now I’d like to try my own thoughts on the topic.

Financial intermediation has two purposes: transactions and safety.  People want to buy and sell, but don’t want to have a currency where its value shifts radically day-to-day, which would complicate their decisions considerably.  They want a stable unit of account, and don’t want the possibility that they lose a lot of money as a result.  (Yes, during conditions of hyperinflation that boundary disappears, but that’s because they are already losing value already each day from holding the formerly “safe” transactional asset.  They get more careless on the intermediary, because of the risks of holding the safe asset.)

The second goal is safety/preservation/growth of purchasing power.  Can I park money or a short to long amount of time and be assured that when the term is up, I will:

• Receive receive back as much or more in purchasing power terms.
• Reduce my risks or the risks of those I care for from death and other calamities.

Financial intermediation leaves money on the table.  It does not seek the best investment outcome, but takes a lesser return, so that goals can be achieved with greater certainty.

Now, that provides an advantage to the financial intermediaries.  It means that they get cheap funding under most conditions.  Now, can they invest it over the likely lifetime of the funding and not lose money?  That’s a lot of what solvency regulation is about in banks and insurers.   Because financial promises made can’t be easily analyzed for quality by those that offer money, there are two responses by the government:

• Capital rules (which vary by liability and investments)
• Insurance, so that users don’t have to worry about loss.

And, for what it is worth, 12 years ago I played a large role in setting the rules for Maryland life insurers in place, both writing the law, and explaining to the legislators how it protected the public interest.  (Hey! Passed unanimously on the first try, and with the d-word! (Derivatives)  My bill allowed risk mitigation but not risk taking with derivatives.)  The then-governor dressed like a mafia don at the bill signing, for what it is worth… My boss and I and our external and internal legal counsels spent a lot of time on this, but I was the prime mover on getting it done.

As an aside, sitting around in hearings in Annapolis, not knowing when your bill will come up is a chore.  If you know me well, you know I brought work to do, and if that wore out, good books to read.  I was never sitting there with nothing, bored. In the process I learned that Johns Hopkins owns Maryland, but declines from making that public, except when they care. When they spoke up, the legislature rolls over and asks for a scratch on the tummy. Arf!

Sorry, got lost in reminiscing.  Can I say that it was weird?  (I will leave out my dealings with the Department of Insurance, which were surreal.)  I’m not political for the most part, but in the end, the Maryland life insurance investment code is one of the best of the 50 states.  Kind of sad that we don’t have more life insurers here.

The last three paragraphs were quite a detour.  Let me take a different tack.  Yes, intermediation is opaque; that is true by necessity.  Depositors and insureds do not know how their money is invested.  I am here to tell you that that is a feature and not a bug, because the regulators know you can’t analyze the safety of your deposited assets.

In most things, I am a libertarian, but in areas where average people can’t ascertain truth or or falsehood, I support some form of regulation.  Financial promises fall under that rubric, because they are hard to discern.

To close this off, my main point is this: people want financial intermediation, particularly during the bear phases of the financial cycle.  They want to be protected, and transact, and save.  It is reasonable that the government regulates this, because the ability to make future promises that people rely on is valuable to society as a whole.

In the recent run-up, there was talk of the infallibility of equities.  This led to a higher level of variable compensation in the economy through option and share issuance and low pressure to raise fixed wages.  This was yet another form of hidden leverage, which hid the unprofitability of enterprises through share dilution.

That was written in 2001, after the flop of the Nasdaq.  I have sometimes said that bubbles are financing phenomena.  That’s true, but we can phrase it more generally: bubbles occur because of an asset-liability mismatch.  People go long a long-duration asset with short-duration funding.  The short duration funding can be borrowing, or vendor finance, or it can be a labor commitment in order to get equity or option awards.

People chase the long-term asset that seems so valuable, and give up time and interest (money’s version of time) to get it.  They give up more than they imagine for something of uncertain value.  In other words, a mania.  Give up something relatively certain in the short run for something with uncertain long run potential.

The attitude could be summed up with a conversation I heard in early 1998 between my boss and his best salesman, where the salesman said, “It’s a no-brainer, have the market pay your employees.”  His idea was that a constantly rising stock market would provide compensation to employees through stock awards, options, 401(k)s, etc., even as the market was straining at valuation limits.  It is probably a sign that the market is overheated, when market-based rewards become common.

Startups by their nature require that employees be flexible, and give up a lot of fixed guarantees.  What payments they receive at the beginning are small, and less than their work might deserve in most established contexts.  But there is the possibility of the big payoff, and the possibility of total loss.  The asset in question has a lot of variability, but the liability, the work that must be put in, is big, and may not vary much for success or failure.

In the tech bubble, many parties extended vendor credit because there were big profits to be made in the future.  Alas, but they lent to those with very uncertain prospects, and in March of 2000, the chain of leverage started to collapse, both for vendors, and for those that worked in the industries.  Just as hedge funds have a hard time holding onto good employees when performance goes bad, so it is for tech companies when financing dries up, and the stock price craters.  Rats desert the sinking ship.

“Free money” brings out the worst in people.  Do something small in the present and reap a huge future.  Sadly, it rarely works that way, except at the very beginning of a boom.  At the end of the boom, it is a maelstrom, with many people demanding to throw their money away in search of riches that will never be.

From a dated piece:

Crowd-following is common to humanity.  It takes a lot to stand apart from highly correlated behavior.  I’ve told this story before, but in late 1999, I was talking with my mother (a very good self-taught investor), she told me about many of my cousins who were speculating in tech stocks.  I said to her, “They don’t know anything about investing!”  My mom replied, “Oh, David.  You’re such a fuddy-duddy.  I just bought some Inktomi!”

Now, to set the record straight, that was just 1% (or less) of my mom’s assets, so an occasional flyer is acceptable.  Call it “Mad Money.”    For my cousins, it was most of their investable assets.  My mom is fine, and the fuddy-duddy did all right also, but the cousins swore off stock investing.

I am close to concluding that it is impossible to teach the average person how to do well in investing.  They don’t have the patience or the willingness to learn. (Few want to be called “fuddy-duddy” by their mothers.)

Getting rich quick is very rare, but it entrances some people several times in their lives, and rarely does it end well.  It is far better for most people to work hard in areas of the economy that are being rewarded, and invest excess cash in a mix of  stocks, long-dated investment grade bonds, money markets, and a little gold.

After all, it’s not what you make, it’s what you keep.

Risk premiums should never be capitalized, they should only be taken into income as earned.

This may end up being another odd post of mine.  I’m going to start writing about bank regulation, but I will end up talking about monetary policy.

There are many people who hate the rating agencies. They hate them because they are a convenient target, and most people don’t understand what they do. Rating agencies provide opinions. Nothing more, nothing less.

Many people would like to get rid of the rating agencies. But it’s not that easy. Regulators outsource their credit rating function to the rating agencies because they don’t want to do that work.

There is a way to eliminate the rating agencies, and I have written about that before. But the idea is so radical, that the banks would rather have the rating agencies exist, than use my idea.

So what’s my idea? Simple. If you were setting up a portfolio, what would you assume would be the minimum that you could earn on the portfolio? My minimum would be buying Treasury bonds and earning interest on them.

So if I am looking at a portfolio of risky assets, I would split each asset into two. I would mirror the cash flow pattern of each asset, and construct an equivalent Treasury portfolio to mimic the cash flows. All of the cash flows above that amount from the risky asset are the risky cash flows. The amount of capital that banks hold as reserve against losses should be proportionate to the present value of risky cash flows.

Unlike my last piece on this, I am not saying that the whole present value of risky cash flows should be held as capital against losses. But the regulators should use this, if we are not using rating agencies, as a proxy for credit risk in bank asset portfolios.

Why is this a good measure of credit risk inside banks? The market for lending is fairly efficient. Debts that have more risk have higher interest rates.

This measure of risk benefits from the concept of simplicity. It can be applied everywhere. And, there is good theoretical justification for it. Any return that is upon the government bonds is subject to question.

But suppose we decided to use this as a major portion of our formula for regulating bank capital. What would happen to monetary policy?

Well, if the Fed tries to do something similar to “operation twist” it would require banks to hold more capital against their positions, because the safe interest rate falls, it causes the risky portion of each loan to rise. As such, any sort of “operation twist” would fail, because the rise in capital levels, would blunt any advantage from over Treasury interest rates.

From my vantage point, it would be a real plus to have monetary policy neutered in that way. The Fed, should it deserve to exist, should be concerned with the banking system and its solvency. It should not be concerned with the overall level of interest rates. If lowering interest rates lowers the judgment of solvency, then that would restrain the Fed from being too aggressive in lowering rates. And that would be good. The Fed has generally not succeeded with monetary policy. They have been too loose in the past, leading to the problems of the present.

And, as I have said before, we should not have unelected bureaucrats driving our economy, rather, we should have Congress do it because we can vote them out.

That’s all for now. Thanks for reading me. I appreciate all of my readers.

If you run a regression of the magenta line on variables that have similar trends, you will get a spuriously high R2. I think you should try to explain the weekly changes in the magenta series instead. (I may have misunderstood you regression, in which case please show the actual data series in the regression so I’ll understand it better.)

Um, that’s not always true.  I did not get a Ph. D., but I passed my Ph. D. field in econometrics, including passing the oral exam.  I try to be really careful with regressions, unlike most.  I avoid multiple passes over the data, and I avoid “specification searches,” which are glorified hunts for correlations.

As it is, the regressors that I used are not highly correlated with each other.  They don’t have similar trends.  Here is the correlation matrix:

The regressors were very different variables, and were independently useful for deciphering the relationship.  Had it been otherwise, the t-coefficients would have weak, with the F-coefficient strong.  As it was, the t-coefficients were all strong.

This is not spurious.

But I’m not in their shoes, and I know one of the ECRI pair, so I asked for some insight into the models, which he coldly refused.  Okay, fair enough, I’m not a paying subscriber, but we had had good conversations in the past, so I thought I might have some relational capital, but no.

Tonight, I bring you my kludge that should be close to the ECRI Weekly leading index.  I am not saying that I reverse-engineered it because in econometrics there may be many fits with equal probability that explain the dependent variable well.  But here we go.

Yesterday, I read a post at the Bonddad Blog that said it had all of the variables for ECRI’s Weekly Leading Index.  I decided to gather the data, or reasonable proxies of it, and I ended up using the following variables to estimate the ECRI WLI:

1. M2 YOY % increase, SA
2. AAA yields from Moody’s
3. BAA yields from Moody’s
4. S&P 500 price YOY % increase
5. Initial Jobless Claims SA
6. Real Estate Loans from all Commercial Banks, SA YOY % increase
7. PPI for Industrial Commodities

I realized the the independent variables had to go up and down because the WLI does as well.  I normalized the variables against their long run averages, which would have no impact on the fit if the regression, but would enable sorting out the size effects.  Anyway here are the results:

That’s a really high R-squared (normalized F), with highly significant t-coefficients.  What is more, the coefficients sum to materially one in this regression that constrains the intercept to zero.

So, we have a good guess at what drives the ECRI WLI: two items, Corporate interest rates and industrial commodity prices.  The other items are significant, but less material.   BAA bond yields could be expressed as spreads against AAA yields, but the mathematical results would be the same.

So how does my model fit against the ECRI WLI:

If anything, my estimated model is more sensitive than ECRI’s model.  I could have a new business here, except that I have given the model away for free.

Comments are welcome.