Archive for the ‘Personal Finance’ Category

Elderly Poor?

Thursday, May 17th, 2012

There will be elderly poor.  Look at page 26 of this PDF.  I interpret those that don’t know or declined as being well below $50K in assets.  That means 60% of those reaching “retirement age” will have less than two years income stored up.

That said I feel more sorry for younger workers who have to pay high amounts into Social Security/Medicare, and they will not get out of program what they put in.  There’s a longish article here, excerpting from a recently released book on the topic.  In general, the older you are, the sweeter the deal was for those who received payments from Social Security, at least until 2026 when benefits will be cut by 25%, or taxes raised.

What this means is that in aggregate, Americans don’t save enough, particularly the Baby Boomers, of which I am one, but not a negligent one.

We are heading for elderly poverty/work for a large portion of Americans.  I suspect that many older people will continue to work, solving their problem but taking jobs from those who are younger.

This should be no surprise.  Incomes should be declining for lower skilled people in the US, because there are more people who can do that work abroad.  My advice to all readers is to make sure you cannot be obsoleted by foreigners.

One more note: don’t expect the asset markets to bail you out.  Returns to financial assets will do poorly as so many begin to sell them to pay for living expenses, whether directly as individuals, or indirectly as defined benefit plans pay retirement benefits.

This is on top of the problem that when high-quality long interest rates are so low, it is typically a bad time to try to make money in financial assets, because returns on risky assets are typically only 0-2% percent higher than the yield on long BBB/Baa debt over the long run.

All for now…

The Best of the Aleph Blog, Part 15

Thursday, May 10th, 2012

This stretches from August 2010 to October 2010:

The Education of a Corporate Bond Manager, Part VII

On the value of credit analysts.

The Education of a Corporate Bond Manager, Part VIII

On price discovery in dealer markets, and auctions gone wrong.  I never knew that I could haggle so well.

The Education of a Corporate Bond Manager, Part IX

On the vagaries of bulge-bracket brokers, and how a good reputation helps on Wall Street.

The Education of a Corporate Bond Manager, Part X

On how we almost did a CDO, and how it fell apart.  Also, how to make money in the bond market when you reach the risk limits. ;)

The Education of a Corporate Bond Manager, Part XI

On my biggest mistakes in managing bonds.  Also, on aggressive life insurance managements.

The Education of a Corporate Bond Manager, Part XII (The End)

On bond technical analysis, and how to deal with a rapidly growing client.   Also, the end of my time as a bond manager, and the parties that came as a result.   Oh, and putting your subordinates first.

Queasing over Quantitative Easing

Queasing over Quantitative Easing, Redux

Queasing over Quantitative Easing, Part III

Queasing over Quantitative Easing, Part IV

Queasing over Quantitative Easing, Part V

Queasing over Quantitative Easing, Part VI

The problems with the Fed’s seemingly “free lunch”strategy.  Pushes up asset prices and commodity prices, benefiting the rich versus the poor.

The Economic Geography of Publicly-Traded Companies in the United States by Sector

The Economic Geography of Publicly-Traded Companies in the United States by Sector (II)

Shows what US states have diversified vs concentrated economies by sector, and what states dominate each sector.

Portfolio Rule One

Industries are under-analyzed, relative to the market on the whole, and relative to individual companies. Spend time trying to find good companies with strong balance sheets in industries with lousy pricing power, and cheap companies in good industries, where the trends are not fully discounted.

Portfolio Rule Two

Purchase equities that are cheap relative to other names in the industry. Depending on the industry, this can mean low P/E, low P/B, low P/S, low P/CFO, low P/FCF, or low EV/EBITDA.

Portfolio Rule Three

Stick with higher quality companies for a given industry.

Portfolio Rule Four

Purchase companies appropriately sized to serve their market niches.

Portfolio Rule Five

Analyze financial statements to avoid companies that misuse generally accepted accounting principles and overstate earnings.

Portfolio Rule Six

Analyze the use of cash flow by management, to avoid companies that invest or buy back their stock when it dilutes value, and purchase those that enhance value through intelligent buybacks and investment.

Portfolio Rule Seven

Rebalance the portfolio whenever a stock gets more than 20% away from its target weight. Run a largely equal-weighted portfolio because it is genuinely difficult to tell what idea is the best. Keep about 30-40 names for diversification purposes.

Portfolio Rule Eight

Make changes to the portfolio 3-4 times per year. Evaluate the replacement candidates as a group against the current portfolio. New additions must be better than the median idea currently in the portfolio. Companies leaving the portfolio must be below the median idea currently in the portfolio.

The Portfolio Rules Work Together

How the portfolio rules work together to create a “margin of safety.”

The Rules, Part XVIII

When rules become known and acted upon, the system changes to incorporate them, making them temporarily useless, until they are forgotten again.

When a single strategy becomes dominant, it can become temporarily self-reinforcing.  Eventually, it will become self-reinforcing on the negative side.

A healthy market ecology has multiple strategies that are working in separate areas at the same time.

The Rules, Part XIX

There is room for a new risk model based on the idea that risk is unique among individuals, and inversely related to the price paid for an asset.  If a risk control model has an asset becoming more risky when prices fall, it is wrong.

 The Rules, Part XX

In the end, economic systems work, and judicial systems modify to accommodate that.  The only exception to that is when a culture is dying.

 Managing Illiquid Assets

Illiquidity is an underrated risk.  Most financial company failures are due to illiquidity, which usually takes the form of too many illiquid assets and liquid liabilities.  Adding to the difficulty is that it is generally difficult to price illiquid assets, because they don’t trade often.

Of Investment Earnings Assumptions and Century Bonds

If we could turn back the clock 65 or so years and set up a more conservative method of accounting for pension liabilities, we would be much better off today.

Who Dares Oppose a Boom?

This piece won a small prize, and in turn, I received three speaking engagements.

Fairness Versus Economics

Fairness Versus Economics (2)

People care more about fairness than improving their own economic/social position.

Earnings Estimates as a Control Mechanism, Flawed as they are

Earnings Estimates as a Control Mechanism, Flawed as they are, Redux

Earnings estimates have their problems, but they exist to give us a flawed method of estimating the future performance of companies.

-==-=-=-=-=–=-=

That’s all for now.  Never thought I would do so many long series when I started blogging.

Book Review: The Little Book of Bull’s Eye Investing

Wednesday, May 9th, 2012

Before I start this evening, if you like my reviews generally, please go to Amazon and tell them that my reviews are helpful.  From this link, it does not take long to do so.  Thanks.

This was one of those books that grew on me.  The author, the well-known John Mauldin, strings together a bunch of ideas originated by others.  That’s not much different than what Tadas Viskanta does at Abnormal Returns.  He brings us the best ideas that he has culled from others.  That is a significant piece of work that should not be denigrated by others.

The beginning of the the book is consumed with 12-20 year market cycles.  There are times when investing in risky assets where you face headwinds and tailwinds. The headwinds and tailwinds are driven by valuation, often expressed through Q-ratio, CAPE, or Michael Alexander’s Price-to-Resources ratio, out of which the book makes a lot (link here for an example).  It’s a Price-to-Adjusted Book value ratio as I see it.

Regardless of the method, if you buy in at high valuations, the wind is in your face, and you are not likely to earn much.  The opposite is true for low valuations, but at the valuation trough, everyone is disgusted, and few are willing to buy.

So it takes a strong stomach and mind to follow a method like this.  Strong stomach, because when it is time to buy one will fear that the money will be lost.  Strong mind, because near valuation peaks people will tell you that you are nuts to leave the party — it’s just getting started.

But what if a decent sized portion of institutional money did this?  The cycles would go away, or be muted.  That’s not likely to happen in my opinion: some men may change, but you can’t change mankind.  Emotions of fear and greed dominate over clear thinking.

The book touches on many other topics:

  • Why strategies go in and out of favor
  • Why to be skeptical of those who give investment advice (including Mauldin & me)
  • That the growth rate of the economy eventually limits the growth rate of any company.
  • The effect of demographics on the markets
  • Why chasing performance doesn’t work.
  • Why most newsletter writers strategies could never be as good as they state, or they manage money in tiny niches.
  • How to detect value in stocks.
  • How to use bonds and commodities in asset allocation.

I say “touches on” because in line with its title, it is a “little book.”  You are only getting a taste of what an intelligent investor who hires other managers to manage money for clients thinks.  This is especially true as you go through the section on value investing, which does not get much beyond dividend yield, dividend growth, and price-to-book (common equity).

As such, this book will not be a complete answer to any investor wanting to learn about the markets.  It introduces basic concepts in ways that most ordinary people could learn.  Reading time should be less than two hours.  One more thing, the book has very little in the way of math.

I appreciated the short summaries at the end of each chapter.  If someone wanted to get the gist of the book, they could read all of the short summaries in about 10 minutes, and then they would have the skeletal ideas of the book, allowing them to read all or part of the book with greater understanding.

Quibbles

The book could have used an index.

Who would benefit from this book:People who want an introduction to investing, including long-term market cycles would benefit from this book.  It would be of modest help to experienced investors who understand market cycles.  If you want to, you can buy the book here: The Little Book of Bull’s Eye Investing: Finding Value, Generating Absolute Returns, and Controlling Risk in Turbulent Markets (Little Books. Big Profits).

Full disclosure: This book was sent to me without my asking for it.

If you enter Amazon through my site, and you buy anything, I get a small commission.  This is my main source of blog revenue.  I prefer this to a “tip jar” because I want you to get something you want, rather than merely giving me a tip.  Book reviews take time, particularly with the reading, which most book reviewers don’t do in full, and I typically do. (When I don’t, I mention that I scanned the book.  Also, I never use the data that the PR flacks send out.)

Most people buying at Amazon do not enter via a referring website.  Thus Amazon builds an extra 1-3% into the prices to all buyers to compensate for the commissions given to the minority that come through referring sites.  Whether you buy at Amazon directly or enter via my site, your prices don’t change.

Correlating Risky Assets

Friday, May 4th, 2012

Asset allocation is tough, because the correlations are not stable.  Here’s an example: in the 90s, at many conferences that I went to, I was told that one of the smartest moves you could make was to invest heavily in every new class of Asset Backed Security [ABS] created, because they all tighten in yield spread terms after issuance, leading to price gains.

I didn’t believe it then, and that was a good thing, because the most exotic of ABS classes got whacked in the financial crisis.  As it was was, I had already seen debacles in Franchise Loan ABS (spit, spit), and Manufactured Housing (post-1997 vintage).  At a conference for Life Insurance, I was a skunk at the party in 2006, as one ignorant presenter suggested that AAA structured assets never went bad.  History already taught us better, and as I tried to say to the then-CEO of Principal Financial as he was exiting the conference, he needed to look at the mezzanine and subordinated structured product in his company.  Free consulting, but but worth more than the consensus.  As far as I can tell, he didn’t listen.  For many reasons the stock price is lower today.

I have many other tales where in fixed income (bonds), everyone “followed the leader,” which worked in the short run, but failed in the long run.  The point is that investor behavior correlates asset classes.  There may be underlying economic differences, such as owning a natural gas producer and utility that uses natural gas, but most of those differences get erased as most investors seek portfolios immune from factors of secular change.

So as new asset or sub-asset classes are introduced, in the short-run they are uncorrelated, and likely rally, because few own them.  But after the rally, many now own it, and the future correlations are high because so many own it.  The correlations ultimately depend on two things: the underlying economics, and investor behavior.  Investor behavior is the dominant aspect of pricing.

I don’t think there is a lot of diversification in most risky asset classes from an economic standpoint.  Does it matter whether a business is public or private?   I think the answer is no.

What that means in the present environment is that there is a gap between business risk, and those that finance business risk.  In other words, there is a difference between investment grade bonds, and risk assets.  That’s the negative correlation in this market.  Do you want diversification?  Buy some ETFs that invest in long high investment grade debt.  You will not get any effective diversification out of buying different classes of risky assets.  Those are already owned by those that compete with you.

Promises to pay from sound entities that can be relied upon in the future behave very differently than risky assets.  In your asset allocation, to the degree that you need real diversification, look at that as the critical distinction.  All other distinctions are secondary at best.

Book Review: Abnormal Returns

Wednesday, May 2nd, 2012

Abnormal Returns

I consider Tadas Viskanta to be a friend of mine.  I write my eclectic blog, and Tadas occasionally features me on his daily curation of the economics/finance/investment blogosphere.

But it is not friendship that leads me to write the following: this is a really good book.  Why?  Every day, Tadas curates the best thoughts in finance.  He finds them, he motivates them, and links to them.  If I had just one site to visit everyday, it would be his, not mine.  He’s really good at finding the best content in finance.

But it goes a step further than that.  Tadas is a very good blogger in his own right.  It’s not that he comes up with new insights, but he is very good at taking the insights of others and weaves them into a greater insight than the separate thoughts of the individuals.  He finds themes, and he finds disagreements.  Each provides good food for thought.

Now, if Tadas can do this on a daily basis, let’s call him the Chief Synthesizer of the economics/finance/investment blogosphere — then, what happens if he decides to take several steps back, and synthesize the grand themes he has seen in six years of writing his blog.

It’s been a violent period, after all.  Tadas has been blogging from the peak of residential real estate (October 2005), through the tail of the boom (October 2007), to the bust (March 2009), to the present.  He keeps it relevant, and he doesn’t take sides, which allows him to source the best content better.

So as he synthesizes the themes of the last six or seven years, he comes down to really basic ideas for each chapter: Risk, Return, Stocks, Bonds, Portfolio Management, Does Active Investing Work, ETFs, Global Investing, Alternative Assets, Behavioral Finance, Using Media, and the Lost Decade.  He handles them deftly, highlighting differences, but giving a consensus opinion.

The book is modest, in that it does not promise you greater profits if you follow his advice.  It is a realistic book, because most of us know that the basic principles of investing are straightforward, but they get clouded by academics and hucksters.  After you read this book, you may or may not earn more, but you will probably be safer.

Also, the book is an easy read; I glided through it in less than three hours.

Quibbles

The editor could have done more work to make the index complete; I was surprised to find myself mentioned in the book more times than the index noted.

Who would benefit from this book: Most amateur investors would benefit from the book, and many, though not all professionals would benefit from the book’s basic approach. Think of it this way — what if you could explain basic concepts to the uninstructed more clearly? Wouldn’t it help you in your business?  If you want to, you can buy the book here: Abnormal Returns: Winning Strategies from the Frontlines of the Investment Blogosphere.

Full disclosure: I asked the publisher for the book and he sent it to me.

If you enter Amazon through my site, and you buy anything, I get a small commission.  This is my main source of blog revenue.  I prefer this to a “tip jar” because I want you to get something you want, rather than merely giving me a tip.  Book reviews take time, particularly with the reading, which most book reviewers don’t do in full, and I typically do. (When I don’t, I mention that I scanned the book.  Also, I never use the data that the PR flacks send out.)

Most people buying at Amazon do not enter via a referring website.  Thus Amazon builds an extra 1-3% into the prices to all buyers to compensate for the commissions given to the minority that come through referring sites.  Whether you buy at Amazon directly or enter via my site, your prices don’t change.

Simple Retirement Calculator

Saturday, April 28th, 2012

Sorry that I have not been posting much of late.  April is always rough for me.  Taxes play some role in April, because I get a certain amount of my tax data late, but the main reason stems from some charitable boards on which I serve, which meet in/near April.

One of the questions that came to me was how we could educate some of the workers to put away more of their income for retirement, because we don’t have a Defined Benefit plan.  After a little discussion, I said that I could give them good friendly advice.  As most committees go, when someone volunteers to solve a problem, discussion ends.

Now, what I have done is pretty simple, and violates one of my rules — I don’t believe in constant compound interest.  Markets don’t work that way, but for some perverse simplifying reason, retirement planning models do.

What I have done is create a model for retirement income, attempting to express it in terms that someone non-knowledgeable could understand.  You can download the Simple Retirement Calculator (free to download) that I created.

My base case assumes 3% inflation, pay keeps pace with inflation, and the real return on investing is 2% over inflation.  Other assumptions: one works for 45 years from age 25 to 70, and that the options for payout are limited to those that respect spouses and heirs.

So what can one 25 years old expect from saving over a 45 year period of time?

Savings Rate
Salary Replacement5%6%7%8%9%10%11%12%13%14%15%
J&S 100% Cash Refund22.9%27.5%32.0%36.6%41.2%45.8%50.4%54.9%59.5%64.1%68.7%
J&S 100% CR Indexed15.1%18.1%21.1%24.1%27.1%30.1%33.1%36.1%39.1%42.1%45.2%
4% year14.6%17.6%20.5%23.4%26.4%29.3%32.2%35.2%38.1%41.0%43.9%
Accum Years Ending Pay   3.66   4.39   5.13   5.86   6.59   7.32     8.06     8.79     9.52   10.25   10.99

This table expresses what is needed in order to have effective income during retirement.  The average investor can’t control asset returns.

J&S 100% Cash Refund -> Spouse gets 100% after death of annuitant, heirs get a payment annuitants got less than the lump sum value at retirement.  Indexed benefits increase at the rate of the CPI.

With a 2%% real return, it takes a lot of saving to replace current income in retirement, even over 45 years. Note that the real return assumption has the largest impact on the results.

Much as I think DB plans are superior to DC plans for the average person, most companies in the present environment will not subsidize a DB plan to the degree that will allow a person to retire at the same level of purchasing power that they had while employed.

There are many ways that I could improve the results of this model, but the improvements would only be incremental.  The main point of this model indicates that most people do not save enough, if all of their retirement outcomes rely on a defined contributions plan.

Let me know what you think  in the comments below.  Thanks.

Book Review: The Facebook IPO Primer

Tuesday, April 24th, 2012

There is more money to be lost than made in most controversial IPOs, on average. Don’t get me wrong, this is a good book, and the author knows what she is talking about, but whether one should buy Facebook in its IPO next month is a huge open question, and I would encourage you to read this book to think through the problem.

If you read the book, you will get a healthy dose of skepticism, mixed with the idea that many large IPOs in tech have been successful, like Google.  The main idea is that you have to do due diligence.  All snowflakes have six corners, but they are all different.

The book gives you five different ways to value Facebook, and those methods are all over the map, as they should be for a company where the economics are yet to be determined.  At least it is profitable.

The range of valuation gives everyone something to hang onto, but the thought process should force everyone to think about how Facebook will monetize all of their users.  Will the users behave in a way that allows Facebook to make money off them?  So far, yes, but the future is far more volatile than I can imagine.

In general, I would advise readers to avoid IPOs.  Most people lose money in buying them on the secondary markets.  Better you should buy stock in less flashy businesses like utilities, insurance, and energy stocks.  You will make more money there — businesses with a high earnings yield tend to do better than other stocks, and Facebook does not make it there, for now.  Buying Facebook implies a company that will grow far more rapidly than most, and far a long time, which is not common.

If you are thinking about buying shares of Facebook, spend five bucks or so, and get this book.  It’s less than a brokerage commission, and worth more than most in educating you about the value of Facebook.

Quibbles

None; this is a good book.  What matters most is how you think about it.

Who would benefit from this book: If you want to buy the Facebook IPO, buy this book and learn something.  Be aware before you buy, or be dissuaded before you do nothing.  If you want to, you can buy the book here: The Facebook IPO Primer.

Full disclosure: The publisher asked if I wanted to read the book electronically.  I said “yes” and I downloaded it and read it.

If you enter Amazon through my site, and you buy anything, I get a small commission.  This is my main source of blog revenue.  I prefer this to a “tip jar” because I want you to get something you want, rather than merely giving me a tip.  Book reviews take time, particularly with the reading, which most book reviewers don’t do in full, and I typically do. (When I don’t, I mention that I scanned the book.  Also, I never use the data that the PR flacks send out.)

Most people buying at Amazon do not enter via a referring website.  Thus Amazon builds an extra 1-3% into the prices to all buyers to compensate for the commissions given to the minority that come through referring sites.  Whether you buy at Amazon directly or enter via my site, your prices don’t change.

Sorted Weekly Tweets

Monday, April 23rd, 2012

Busy week last week.  Here’s the economic and other news:

=-=-=-=-=-=–=-=-==-=-=-==-=-=-=-=–==-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

China

 

  • Bloomberg: Inflated Notions http://t.co/hvMoIFH6 Patrick Chovanec questions whether Chinese economic statistics are correct. $$ Apr 22, 2012
  • China’s Political Stability Questioned, while Deposit Withdrawals Accelerate http://t.co/X9kJ9oZb Deposits exit China’s banks; many worry $$ Apr 22, 2012
  • Asia dominates new treasury purchases http://t.co/BXvgGQRi If you want to favor your exporters, you have to suck in the debts of the buyers Apr 22, 2012
  • China’s Achilles heel http://t.co/3TPxHEvL Very difficult to change the practice of having fewer children once it is entrenched $$ Apr 22, 2012
  • Son is a good man, more worthy than Dad $$ RT @mprobertson: & the first wife had a son. http://t.co/dFzgm1kp extra extra, read all about it Apr 19, 2012
  • Chinese Move to Wealth Products May Undermine Bank Stability http://t.co/bYK4qImP Disintermediation happening increasing shadow bank risk $$ Apr 18, 2012
  • Chinese Officialdom Indulges in the Almost-Free Lunch http://t.co/tTMkP8JK A modest subsidy/perk looks big if the 1 looking in is poor $$ Apr 18, 2012
  • The Power Shift in China http://t.co/bgxN7t8h Shifts: 1.weak leaders < strong factions 2. government < interest groups 3. party < country $$ Apr 18, 2012
  • More Chinese get US green card http://t.co/ZU30ahwF They know where they’ve got it good, not in the Socialist worker’s paradise! $$ Apr 18, 2012
  • So many Chinese officials r arrested 4 embezzling funds through Macau that 2 scholars devoted a study to the subject http://t.co/YZbDqX57 $$ Apr 18, 2012
  • That’s Governor Zhou to you http://t.co/AkXcHbPZ Check out chart of central bank balance sheet growth http://t.co/VG0bySGA China leads $$ Apr 18, 2012
  • China widens the range 4 currency fluctuations. Is it really making x-rate more flexible? http://t.co/Rv79vI0q PBOC still targets x-rate $$ Apr 18, 2012
  • Rotting From Within http://t.co/vAwKBTzb Investigates the massive corruption of the Chinese military; makes corruption in the US look small Apr 18, 2012
  • Bo Xilai’s first wife gets her revenge at last http://t.co/UsrGejSF Some Chinese r very good @ maintaining a grudge 4a long time $$ Apr 18, 2012
  • China Doubling Yuan Band Signals Drive for Convertibility http://t.co/FK9OohMh Importance overstated; will not have a big effect on x-rate Apr 18, 2012
  • China Adds Treasuries for Second Month on Reserve Growth http://t.co/Ev9Fqi8s Export earnings have 2b invested somewhere $$ is best of bad Apr 18, 2012
  • China New Yuan Loans Surge in March as Money Supply Quickens http://t.co/DmXg6QB5 Sounds inflationary, if not 4 goods, then 4 assets $$ Apr 18, 2012

 

Energy

 

  • Peak oil goes mainstream (again) http://t.co/BijPuVFG Oil & Gas will never run out, but the price to get them could get high $$ Apr 22, 2012
  • Feeling peaky http://t.co/4mefPCBR “But there is a simpler explanation: that supply is inadequate to keep up with rising demand.” $$ Apr 22, 2012
  • Could US natural gas run out of storage capacity? http://t.co/8R1aYxjM Yes, it could, and we could see the price of spot gas go 2 zero $$ Apr 22, 2012
  • Delta’s Oil Refinery Plan Flies Against Economic Sense http://t.co/0xAnIV2z It rarely makes sense to be vertically integrated. $$ Apr 22, 2012
  • Obama’s oil market plan more politics than substance http://t.co/w2vwKhNx Crude oil market is so big; would be difficult 2 game secretly Apr 18, 2012

 

Eurozone

 

  • Odds of bankruptcy http://t.co/v0xBexrW Short table of bankruptcy odds: European banks = E-Zone Fringe > US Banks > Other nations $$ Apr 22, 2012
  • The bank-sovereign linkage in the Eurozone http://t.co/9q7Sx9cn Not 2 surprising; governments & banks comprise most systemic risk $$ Apr 22, 2012
  • Spain’s loan delinquencies accelerate http://t.co/3Nlf2QDu Really ugly graph: http://t.co/iJVux7fj The Spain issue is not dead $$ #ezonedead Apr 22, 2012
  • Paulson Said to Short Europe Bonds Amid Spain Concern http://t.co/hJQwSc9n This one isn’t as easy as shorting subprime. Be careful $$ Apr 18, 2012
  • Modell Deutschland über alles http://t.co/DtrBNHDL Suggests EZone imitate German labor rules, but not austerity $$ Apr 18, 2012
  • French Campaign Enters Final Week With Hollande Extending Lead http://t.co/whQhmUb1 & widening recently; could make Ezone matters messy $$ Apr 18, 2012
  • Downgrades Loom 4 Banks http://t.co/EdDRDGQa Moody’s Weighing Ratings Cuts to 114 Institutions in 16 European Countries $$ #lookoutbelow Apr 18, 2012
  • Spanish Minister Asks ECB to Buy Bonds as Crisis Deepens http://t.co/cUcLRHLW Things r calmer now but this is the path of least resistance Apr 18, 2012
  • Spain’s Surging Bad Loans Cast New Doubts on Bank Cleanup http://t.co/QQT2BSsB NPLs /totallending jumped to 8.16% in February, <1% in 2007 Apr 18, 2012
  • Weidmann says not ECB job to tackle Spain’s problems http://t.co/kRUWSfyQ Famous last words $$ ECB only entity w/flexbility 2act fast Apr 18, 2012
  • Ray Dalio’s Bridgewater Says Spain Is Worse Off Than It Was Before The LTRO http://t.co/nVMDpG5c It’s a solvency, not a liquidity problem Apr 18, 2012
  • GEORGE SOROS: The Euro Crisis Just Entered A ‘Less Volatile But More Lethal Phase’ http://t.co/uzIev7nm LTRO papers overinsolvency probs Apr 18, 2012

 

Rest of the World

 

  • Argentina’s shadow FX rate shows total loss of confidence http://t.co/RVRicp1p Dishonesty in one area makes others distrust u elsewhere $$ Apr 22, 2012
  • Cristina: she is not alone http://t.co/gBWcllwU Many nations engage in expropriation from foreigners. $$ Apr 22, 2012
  • Pakistan And India To Go To War Over Water? http://t.co/2mx9a7u9 Whiskey’s for drinking, water’s for fighting over — Mark Twain $$ Apr 18, 2012
  • Unlikely but never say never RT @SCMITHA: @AlephBlog Sir No chance of war bet India & Pakistan both Nuclear Army Chief Kayani wants peace Apr 18, 2012
  • Mexico Manifesting its Own Destiny http://t.co/kLwx5A6l “Mexico has clearly stood out to me for its relative and absolute strength.” $$ Apr 18, 2012
  • Japan’s Teachers Fund to Start Investing in REITs, Hedge Funds http://t.co/9nKnY0zM Trend following; late to the alternative assets party Apr 18, 2012


US Tax Policy & Pensions

 

  • Congress Eyes 401(k)s Again http://t.co/nRL9IkeO Interesting article on some possible/unlikely proposals to change 401(k)s $$ Apr 22, 2012
  • How to Pay No Taxes: 10 Strategies Used by the Rich http://t.co/ljjgefpc The main problem is defining income, not tax rates on the rich $$ Apr 22, 2012
  • Occupy defined-benefit pension funds! http://t.co/eQooNetC Employees would be better off with DB plans, even if had to fund them themselves Apr 22, 2012
  • New Suits Over Do-It-Yourself IRAs http://t.co/B6UYpG5m They aim for the wrong target; the custodian is only a conduit, not a referee $$ Apr 22, 2012
  • As population ages, institutions reduce equity holdings http://t.co/rPfescwH A first: US pensions have allocated more to bonds than equities Apr 18, 2012

 

Miscellaneous

 

  • The New York Times Company in 2015 http://t.co/qp451VDA An optimistic view of $NYT three years from now. I will not buy it. $$ Apr 22, 2012
  • Joel Kotkin: The Great California Exodus http://t.co/WOvr2BFE Y California is in deep trouble & will shrink as better places r found $$ Apr 22, 2012
  • Contra: Climate Change Has Nothing to Do With Al Gore http://t.co/GO0S60J3 Misinterprets Lk 16:2, & I am to believe he is a Christian? $$ Apr 22, 2012
  • The Celestial Event That Sparked a Revolution http://t.co/Kn3E9XJb Fascinating tale on the transit of Venus across the Sun $$ #June6th Apr 22, 2012
  • The Downside of Cohabiting Before Marriage http://t.co/a1fFySzW For a man & woman 2 live together long run requires decisive commitment $$ Apr 18, 2012
  • Amazon’s knock-off problem (35 Shades of Grey, anyone?) http://t.co/oRJNKhVB Fascinating that some r knocking off books & selling on $AMZN Apr 18, 2012
  • Median age for first marriage spikes to record, holding back family formation http://t.co/Uf2SbCTI Long-run effect on society won’t b good Apr 18, 2012
  • To Pay Off Loans, Grads Put Off Marriage, Children http://t.co/G72NieZI Far better to skip college than put off marrying & children $$ Apr 18, 2012
  • The 101 Finance People You Have To Follow On Twitter: http://t.co/pIaCWK1n A good list, but where’s @moorehn, @interfluidity, @edwardnh $$ Apr 18, 2012
  • Dark Meat Getting a Leg Up on Boring Boneless Breast http://t.co/7BDSaTru “Every single day we have shortage of dark meat.” Who knew? $$ Apr 18, 2012
  • ‘Pink Slime’ Furor Means Disaster for U.S. Meat Innovator http://t.co/uGwKSIhw The other side of the story; fighting bacteria in beef $$ Apr 18, 2012
  • RAIL TRAFFIC CONTINUES TO SOFTEN http://t.co/EnhWT7Ay Economy slowing; just another straw blowing in the wind. $$ Apr 18, 2012
  • Freeport Deal Talk Intensifies on Cheap Copper http://t.co/DH26Nf1s Would be a big deal & difficult to pull off; Interesting idea tho $$ Apr 18, 2012
  • Taxes are filed and now I have some time to tweet, making up for lost time… Apr 18, 2012
  • @danprimack Private Investment Limited Partnership. Features: asset & profit-based fees. Limited liquidity & information. Aims high gets low Apr 17, 2012 (DM: defining “hedge fund” in 140 chars)

 

Economics & Finance Theory

 

  • Is modern portfolio theory bunk? http://t.co/NrplQvbp Low volatility anomaly says bunk; if you didn’t know MPT was bogus alre ady-> #hopeless Apr 22, 2012
  • U.S. money supply growth offers bullish signal http://t.co/aqV6oP0c It is bullish in nominal terms for risk assets; not bullish for the rest Apr 22, 2012
  • Slump Taught Profligate Americans Value of Saving http://t.co/22jWf3OL Having slack assets & not being in debt is a virtue not a vice $$ Apr 22, 2012
  • The Great Depression as a Credit Boom Gone Wrong http://t.co/OBXRGeY2 Until the great depression is viewed as the bust after a credit boom + Apr 22, 2012
  • …we won’t get policy right. The credit cycle is real, & the Fed ignores it, providing liquidity as if it were not a structural problem. $$ Apr 22, 2012
  • El-Erian Breaches The Final Frontier: What Happens If Central Banks Fail? http://t.co/pRcdN42N Goal: print enough credit until promises -> 0 Apr 18, 2012
  • Deflation Does Not Lead to a Depression, suggests Research http://t.co/2VTu2bAd Separate probs; falling inflation vs systemic impaired debts Apr 18, 2012
  • Depression is a choice http://t.co/F4YdBn8x Every creditor wants 2b paid off @ par; many debtors would like compromise, enabling econ growth Apr 18, 2012
  • Difficulties in forecasting the impact of shadow inventory on the housing market http://t.co/xcALioOb Mtge > value makes sales slow, $$ low Apr 18, 2012

 

Financial Markets

 

  • Are fixed income ETFs the new “securitization” product? http://t.co/6qo2U7Zg Shows the many ways that sponsors make $$ off of ETFs Apr 22, 2012
  • Time for the SEC to institute new disclosure rules on CEO leverage http://t.co/nMJZslXg Insider CEO deals r material & should be revealed $$ Apr 22, 2012
  • Fear Barometer Bubbling http://t.co/HjXre23p Puts getting more expensive relative to calls on the S&P Apr 22, 2012
  • Is This the Book that Inspired Jamie Dimon’s Warnings About Regulation? http://t.co/ikzuXwlD Regs make banks behave alike ->systemic risk $$ Apr 22, 2012
  • @historysquared One question I always ask is how mgmt/directors treat outside passive minority shareholders. Do we ride the back of bus? $$ Apr 18, 2012
  • @historysquared Yeh, don’t let management control audit, nominating, or compensation committees. Split Chairman & CEO, etc., etc., etc… $$ Apr 18, 2012
  • Regulators should encourage more diversity in the financial system http://t.co/xhfvsTlS Consistent regs create less diversity forces conform Apr 18, 2012
  • In New Funds, Old Flaws http://t.co/h931mglc Some have high fees, longer-term tracking error, hidden counterparty risk, enable stupidity Apr 18, 2012
  • Why Investors Should Pay Attention to the JOBS Act of 2012 http://t.co/kk9seYVH Here’s what Hunter thinks are the positives of the JOBS Act Apr 18, 2012
  • Fannie Mae Fix Said to Retain Some US Mortgage Role http://t.co/YPAFyygs Crazy people @ UST. 2much debt on housing in general->instability Apr 18, 2012
  • Wells Fargo, JPMorgan Label More Junior Liens as Bad Assets http://t.co/QpwE2S43 Wow, this took a long time to finally happen $$ #reality Apr 18, 2012
  • Structured-Note Fees (etc) http://t.co/rYf5WXBS IBs must disclose likely value of securities, fees incurred in creation of the notes $$ Apr 18, 2012
  • Citadel, Millennium Above $115 Billion With Rule Change http://t.co/j53AMUGG Many hedge funds have borrowed lots; now we know how much $$ Apr 18, 2012
  • Year’s first outflows from HY bond funds http://t.co/mUmIq0Yw May eventually lead to $$ weakness Apr 18, 2012
  • Green Light for Hedge-Fund Ads Means Caution on Main Street http://t.co/4mh9LNgW Most people will not fare well w/complex investments $$ Apr 18, 2012
  • Doing the Right Thing: Upside? Zero. Downside? Financial Ruin… http://t.co/eZlNDJJA We aren’t paid 2b sheriffs a la: http://t.co/egqIsb9V $$ Apr 18, 2012
  • Do Jubilee shares make any sense? http://t.co/2LxtggJ1 I don’t think so. Unnecessary complexity; increased illiquidity; would not work $$ Apr 18, 2012
  • 12 Intriguing Insights on Mutual Funds http://t.co/6U3JZegh Interesting mutual fund trivia from Morningstar $$ Apr 18, 2012
  • Interesting post. But a successful spec on 1 risk can morph into credit risk post-crisis. … http://t.co/Vzlb5xdT Apr 17, 2012
  • Falcone looks like a one-trick pony who made one lucky bet and won. Now he loses regularly. http://t.co/dsivgMCs Apr 16, 2012

 

Misunderstanding the Tax Debate (II)

Thursday, April 19th, 2012

I’m going to do something different to start this post.  I’m going to highlight those that disagreed with the last post.  Thanks for disagreeing, because it makes this post better.

Response 1:

It’s all well meaning but it’s likely to fail in practice, with unintended consequences and nasty corner cases where you have to reintroduce complexity.

For example imagine a taxpayer with one, liquid but volatile asset, which is essentially long term flat. It goes up +X in one year, -X the next, etc. So the taxpayer has essentially zero income (amortised) but must pay on the +X on the positive years. The no deferral rule prevents creating an offsetting tax credit on -X years, so he’s either paying tax on non-existing income, no good (>100% tax rate), or requires a refund on the down years, which creates a new class of enforcement problems that didn’t exist before (people creating fake losses to get actual cash, when they could only get tax credits before).

Another example is a taxpayer with a single illiquid asset, say a small business owner who owns nothing else, and the business is with tight cash flow, or a disabled/elderly person who owns their house outright but nothing else and who lives on welfare. If the business/house valuation goes up, these guys have a tax bill. So now they must raise money out of an illiquid asset just to pay tax, and as it’s illiquid and they don’t have cash flow they might have to either pay distressed credit rates on their tax borrowing, or just sell the business/house which is a bit of a harsh punishment for a tax-cashflow issue.

Income is intrinsically a tricky problem. You can clean up the crud from time to time, indeed you must as some nonsensical rules will inevitably accumulate, but a simple tax idyll is unfortunately not realistic I believe.

Response 2:

I respectfully don’t think so. The example of the taxpayer with the volatile asset could also be compared with a person who pays income taxes on a salary. If they lose their job next year (volatility) they would have paid too much this year by your model. The issue is that it seems less fair to tax work (salaries) at a higher rate than wealth (dividend income). Perhaps it could be separated from capital gains – which isn’t real income until it is sold at a profit. It could also be argued that salaried people contribute more to the economy than dividend income does. I’m not a job creator if I go sell a $100K of stock on the NY Stock Exchange – what have I added to the economy?

Response 3:

This does not strike me as a good idea. It isn’t practical to tax appreciation of illiquid untraded assets, and the overhead and intrusion involved in doing something like this fairly would be tremendous.

I don’t see why we should be so reliant on taxing income anyway. Pigovian taxes would be better for the economy, and consumption taxes would be easier to levy. Even a Henry George style single-tax would seem preferable to trying to impute income to people as a result of asset fluctuations.

I like my readers.  Why do I like my readers? One, they are bright people, even if I might disagree with them.  Second, they are relatively polite.  I was walking through Times Square with another prominent blogger, and he said to me, “When I see the comments at your blog, David, you have nice commenters, whereas those at my blog are not.”  I said to him that there were three factors in play:

  • He has more readers than I do.
  • His format did not allow for filtering.  I filter, but rarely.    Also, it’s harder to comment on my site, and that’s a feature, not a bug, because I want people who are determined to comment, not something that is off the top of the head.
  • I pointed out to him that his rhetoric had bomb-thrower tendencies, and what kind of crowd would that attract?

So, I like my readers, and commenters.  In general, if you comment here, and I don’t delete it, I respect you.  (Deletion rate is less than 0.1%.)

But now to my main point.  Much as I like Buffett, I disagree with him on tax policy, because he is a hypocrite.  Let him argue that stock holdings should be taxed annually on the unrealized increase, and I would agree with him.  He doesn’t pay as much taxes as he should because:

  • Berkshire Hathaway doesn’t pay a dividend.
  • He never sells shares of his company.
  • He engages inside his company to avoid taxes in every legal way.  He is not interested in paying taxes in the slightest.

My tax proposals would make Buffett and those like him pay, and others who game the system as well.  The critiques above miss the point in a major sense.  Much avoidance of taxation comes from having companies that are heavily indebted.  I don’t believe that having heavily indebted companies is a good thing.  If they faced taxation on the presumed increase in their value annually they would be forced to have more liquidity, and that is a good thing.

My proposal would lead to companies not being so heavily indebted.  That’s a feature, not a bug.  We need to discourage debt in the financial sector, because it tends to create booms and busts.  If you want to do a big capital investment, save for it, or borrow on a very short term basis.

My proposal on taxation should be phased in gradually.  Mr Buffett should not be presented with a bill for $12 billion, but rather a request for $1.2  billion for 10 years, reflecting the value he has obtained untaxed.  With respect to taxation, he is the ultimate hypocrite.  If he did not speak on such matters, I would respect him, because he is generally such a wise man, but he has prostituted his position to the current political scene.  Thus I don’t respect him here.

(As an aside, we could drop the estate tax after instituting this, because appreciation would be taxed annually.  As such, the cost basis at death would be very near market.  One thing that was little noted in the one year elimination of estate taxes in 2010 was that if you inherited something in that year, your tax basis did not step up to market, but remained at the cost basis of the decedent.  The taxes may be delayed, but they weren’t eliminated.  That’s still quite an advantage.)

I believe that a less levered system is better for the economy as a whole.  It is far better to disallow interest as a deduction for corporations. and allow corporations to dividend to shareholders without taxation.  Or, eliminate corporate taxation, and tax dividend receivers directly, combined with a tax that taxed profitable companies that did not pay dividends.

The economy is better off when it is less levered.  Debt obligations make the economy less flexible, demanding fixed payments, regardless of how likely they are.  For modeling, it is best to think of the unlevered economy. What is the native demand, leaving aside the  speculative demand?  Borrowing to create speculative demand should not be encouraged by the tax code.  After a phase-in, interest should not be tax-deductible, but would add to the cost basis of assets.

My views are relatively simple:

  • Taxes should be moderate, and levied on the approximate increase in value annually.
  • Corporations and individuals should avoid borrowing to finance investment/consumption, at least, it should not be tax-favored to borrow in the short run.
  • Everyone should be taxed; there is no way to avoid it.  This ensures fairness.
  • All classes of income should be taxed at the same flat rate.
  • There are no non-income deductions/credits, and no use of the tax code for social engineering.
  • This should be phased in over ten years to avoid a shock.
  • For illiquid situations, businessmen would have to plan in advance for taxation, which would impose a cost on illiquidity in the economy.
  • We would not favor savings over consumption — goodbye to the complexities of IRAs, life insurance, pensions, and all other deferral vehicles.

The overarching idea is to create a flat taxation system, where the increase in value is taxed annually, and where there is little incentive to engage in any sort of action to convert one sort of income into another.  This would level out many of the advantages that the wealthy have, while leaving in place a relatively transparent taxation system with few preferences which would be stable, and create predictability in taxation.

Those are my views.  I am trying to create something more stable, fair, and transparent (can’t hide income).  Those are desirable goals.  Why shouldn’t everyone love this, aside from the rich that use the overly generous tax code?  Feel free to comment below…

PS — this would have implications for US entities owning foreign assets, but I haven’t figured out how to make this work globally without making people/firms flee the US.  Ideas are welcome.  Thanks to all readers/commenters, I appreciate all of you.

Ways to Buy Cars

Saturday, March 31st, 2012

To start, I will extensively quote a prior article that I wrote on the topic:

When I buy a car, I analyze what car I would like to buy.  I look at reliability, repair costs, overall costs, and style.  I use Consumer Reports to help me analyze this.  Then I go to the website(s) of the manufacturer in question, and copy the data on all of the used models on offer at the dealerships within 30 miles of me.  With price as the dependent variable, I then run a regression with model year as dummy independent variables, and total miles as an independent variable.  After I run my regression, I look at the cars with the biggest price deviations, the predicted price is a lot higher than actual.  I then look at the features of the underpriced cars, and choose one where there are good features with a discounted price.

I go to that dealer, review the car, test drive it, and if it passes my tests, I haggle over the price, and buy it.   In my experience, this cuts thousands off the price of the car.  What a great reason to have studied econometrics.

But then there is another way to do it, and I have done it before with success, and you can review it here.  Decide what car you want to buy, and solicit offers from nearby dealerships, and buy the cheapest offer.   For used car, you will have to adjust for quality.

I will offer you one more tweak which stems from this article from my bond manager days.  Call up all of the dealers offering the car that you want and tell them that you will buy from the dealer that offers the best offer, but at the second place price.  You’ll have to explain it on average at least once more.  If you want bonus points, mention that this idea stems from the research of a Nobel Prize winning economist William Vickery.  In my experience Vickery auctions even the odds against the experts, because it takes them out of their comfort zones, and makes them bid.

=–==-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

One final note: I have one idea that I think is a hole in the system — an area that I think harbors inexpensive cars relative to their value.  In applying the first method — gathering prices and mileages and running a regression, I found one class of vehicles to almost always trade cheaper than they should.  Cars with low mileage that are old tend to be underpriced.  There is a lot of variability here, but if you want to buy a car cheaply that is in good shape, it is a good initial screen to find some good vehicles because people prize younger cars overly, even if they have been driven heavily.

My idea here gives you a way of buying something of greater quality, though unusual, for a lower price.  There’s usually a story behind the vehicles, but it often involves vehicles that had owners that rarely drove them, then had an accident, and the insurance company bought the vehicle as part of a settlement, an a used car dealer rebuilds the car, buys it cheaply, and sells it for what is for him a large markup, but cheap compared to the mileage and condition of equivalent cars of later vintages.

There.  Some practical ways of saving some money for you.  Hope it works well for you.

Disclaimer


David Merkel is an investment professional, and like every investment professional, he makes mistakes. David encourages you to do your own independent "due diligence" on any idea that he talks about, because he could be wrong. Nothing written here, at RealMoney, Wall Street All-Stars, or anywhere else David may write is an invitation to buy or sell any particular security; at most, David is handing out educated guesses as to what the markets may do. David is fond of saying, "The markets always find a new way to make a fool out of you," and so he encourages caution in investing. Risk control wins the game in the long run, not bold moves. Even the best strategies of the past fail, sometimes spectacularly, when you least expect it. David is not immune to that, so please understand that any past success of his will be probably be followed by failures.


Also, though David runs Aleph Investments, LLC, this blog is not a part of that business. This blog exists to educate investors, and give something back. It is not intended as advertisement for Aleph Investments; David is not soliciting business through it. When David, or a client of David's has an interest in a security mentioned, full disclosure will be given, as has been past practice for all that David does on the web. Disclosure is the breakfast of champions.


Additionally, David may occasionally write about accounting, actuarial, insurance, and tax topics, but nothing written here, at RealMoney, or anywhere else is meant to be formal "advice" in those areas. Consult a reputable professional in those areas to get personal, tailored advice that meets the specialized needs that David can have no knowledge of.

 Subscribe in a reader

 Subscribe in a reader (comments)

Subscribe to RSS Feed

Enter your Email


Preview | Powered by FeedBlitz

Seeking Alpha Certified

Top markets blogs award

The Aleph Blog

Top markets blogs

InstantBull.com: Bull, Boards & Blogs

Blog Directory - Blogged

IStockAnalyst

Benzinga.com supporter

All Economists Contributor

Business Finance Blogs
OnToplist is optimized by SEO
Add blog to our blog directory.

Page optimized by WP Minify WordPress Plugin