There’s a lot of bits and bytes spilled in the war between Elliott Associates (and those that favor their position) and the current board of Arconic.  I want to point out a few things, having held Alcoa since prior to the breakup, and added to my positions in both new Alcoa and Arconic post-breakup.

  • Profitability will likely improve more if Elliott’s nominees are elected to the board, and Larry Lawson is CEO.
  • The existing management team does not deserve credit for the recent rise in the stock price for two reasons: a decent amount of the rise in Arconic’s stock price anticipates a rising probability that the board and management team will be replaced.  Second, a decent amount of the increase in the stock price of Alcoa has been due to a rise in the price of aluminum, for which no single entity can take credit.  Current Arconic benefited from that, at least until it sold its whole stake in Alcoa.
  • To their discredit, the existing management team and board resisted the breakup of the company into upstream and downstream for years.  (See point 2 of this Elliott letter, Was Dr. Kleinfeld the Driving Force Behind the Separation?)
  • Existing management was not a good capital allocator.
  • Prior to the agitation by Elliott, Alcoa and Arconic sold at low valuations, because earnings prospects were poor.  Now new Alcoa is in better hands, and that might be true for Arconic in the future, which may further improve valuation.
  • The existing board has low ownership in Arconic.  Many of the existing board members have been around too long.
  • The current board are late to the party of improving corporate governance.  Though their proposals are good, it looks like they were dragged there by the activists, and therefore, can’t be trusted to maintain these improvements.

That’s my short summary; it is not meant to be detailed, as Elliott’s arguments are.  In general, I agree with the arguments over at New Arconic, and will be voting the blue proxy card.  If you disagree, then you should vote the white proxy card sent out by the existing board.

I’m not telling you what to do.  Vote the proxy that reflects your view of what will improve Arconic the most.

Full disclosure: long AA & ARNC for my clients and me (Note: Aleph Investments, LLC, is dust on the scales in this fight, representing less than 0.01% of outstanding shares.)

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This will be a short post, though I want to toss this question out to readers: what investment strategies do you know of that are simple, and work on average over the long-term?

Here are four (together with posts of mine on the topic):

1) Indexing

Index Investing is not Inherently Socialistic

Why Indexes are Capitalization-Weighted

Why do Value Investors Like to Index?

On Bond Investing, ETFs, Indexes, and the Current Market Environment

2) Buy-and-Hold

Buy-and-Hold Can’t Die

Buy-and-Hold Can’t Die, Redux

Buy and Hold Will Return — 2/15/2009 (what a time to write this)

Patience and a Little Courage

Risk vs Return — The Dirty Secret

3) The Permanent Portfolio

The Permanent Portfolio

Can the “Permanent Portfolio” Work Today?

Permanent Asset Allocation

4) Bond Ladders

On Bond Ladders

I chose these because they are simple.  Average people without a lot of training could do them.  There are other things that work, but aren’t necessarily simple, like value investing, momentum investing, low volatility investing, and a few other things that I will think of after I hit the “Publish” button.

That said, most people don’t need to work on investing.  They need to work on cash management, and I have written a small fleet of articles there.  Managing cash is simple, but it takes self-control, and that is what most people lack in their financial lives.

But for those that have gotten their cash under control, with a full buffer fund, the above strategies will help, and they aren’t hard.

Final note: I realize valuations are high now, so buy-and-hold is not as attractive as at other times.  I realize that interest rates are low, so bond ladders aren’t so great, seemingly.  Indexing may be overused.  Most of the elements of the Permanent Portfolio look unappealing.

But what’s the alternative, and simple enough for average people to do?  My answer is simple.  If they can buy and hold, these strategies will pay off over time, and far better than those that panic when things get bad.  There are few regularities in the markets more reliable than this.

What a difference a quarter makes!  As I said one quarter ago:

Are you ready to earn 6%/year until 9/30/2026?  The data from the Federal Reserve comes out with some delay.  If I had it instantly at the close of the third quarter, I would have said 6.37% — but with the run-up in prices since then, the returns decline to 6.01%/year.

So now I say:

Are you ready to earn 5%/year until 12/31/2026?  The data from the Federal Reserve comes out with some delay.  If I had it instantly at the close of the fourth quarter, I would have said 5.57% — but with the run-up in prices since then, the returns decline to 5.02%/year.

A one percent drop is pretty significant.  It stems from one main factor, though — investors are allocating a larger percentage of their total net worth to stocks.  The amount in stocks moved from 38.00% to 38.75%, and is probably higher now.  Remember that these figures come out with a 10-week delay.

Remember that the measure in question covers both public and private equities, and is market value to the extent that it can be, and “fair value” where it can’t.  Bonds and most other assets tend to be a little easier to estimate.

So what does it mean for the ratio to move up from 38.00% to 38.75%?  Well, it can mean that equities have appreciated, which they have.  But corporations buy back stock, pay dividends, get acquired for cash which reduces the amount of stock outstanding, and places more cash in the hands of investors.  More cash in the hands of investors means more buying power, and that gets used by many long-term institutional investors who have fixed mandates to follow.  Gotta buy more if you hit the low end of your equity allocation.

And the opposite is true if new money gets put into businesses, whether through private equity, Public IPOs, etc.  One of the reasons this ratio went so high in 1998-2001 was the high rate of business formation.  People placed more money at risk as they thought they could strike it rich in the Dot-Com bubble.  The same was true of the Go-Go era in the late 1960s.

Remember here, that average returns are around 9.5%/year historically.  To be at 5.02% places us in the 88th percentile of valuations.  Also note that I will hedge what I can if expected 10-year returns get down to 3%/year, which corresponds to a ratio of 42.4% in stocks, and the 95th percentile of valuations.  (Note, all figures in this piece are nominal, not inflation-adjusted.)  At that level, past 10-year returns in the equity markets have been less than 1%, and in the short-to-intermediate run, quite poor.)

You can also note that short-term and 10-year Treasury yields have risen, lowering the valuation advantage versus cash and bonds.

I have a few more small things to add.  Here’s an article from the Wall Street Journal: Individual Investors Wade In as Stocks Soar.  The money shot:

The investors’ positioning suggests burgeoning optimism, with TD Ameritrade clients increasing their net exposure to stocks in February, buying bank shares and popular stocks such as Amazon.com Inc. and sending the retail brokerage’s Investor Movement Index to a fresh high in data going back to 2010. The index tracks investors’ exposure to stocks and bonds to gauge their sentiment.

“People went toe in the water, knee in the water and now many are probably above the waist for the first time,” said JJ Kinahan, chief market strategist at TD Ameritrade.

This is sad to say, but it is rare for a rally to end before the “dumb money” shows up in size.  Running a small asset management shop like I do, at times like this I suggest to clients that they might want more bonds (with me that’s short and high quality now), but few do that.  Asset allocation is the choice of my clients, not me.  That said, most of my clients are long-term investors like me, for which I give them kudos.

Then there is this piece over at Bloomberg.com called: Wall Street’s Buzz Over ‘Great Leader’ Trump Gives Shiller Dot-Com Deja Vu.  I want to see the next data point in this analysis, which won’t be available by mid-June, but I do think a lot of the rally can be chalked up to willingness to take more risk.

I do think that most people and corporations think that they will have a more profitable time under Trump rather than Obama.  That said, a lot of the advantage gets erased by a higher cost of debt capital, which is partly driven by the Fed, and partly by a potentially humongous deficit.  As I have said before though, politicians are typically limited in what they can do.  (And the few unlimited ones are typically destructive.)

Shiller’s position is driven at least partly by the weak CAPE model, and the rest by his interpretation of current events.  I don’t make much out of policy uncertainty indices, which are too new.  The VIX is low, but hey, it usually is when the market is near new highs.  Bull markets run on complacency.  Bear markets plunge on revealed credit risk threatening economic weakness.

One place I will agree with Shiller:

What Shiller will say now is that he’s refrained from adding to his own U.S. stock positions, emphasizing overseas markets instead.

That is what I am doing.  Where I part ways with Shiller for now is that I am not pressing the panic button.  Valuations are high, but not so high that I want to hedge or sell.

That’s all for now.  This series of posts generates more questions than most, so feel free to ask away in the comments section, or send me an email.  I will try to answer the best questions.

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Late edit: changed bolded statement above from third to fourth quarter.

This post may fall into the “Dog bites Man” bucket, but I will see if I can’t shed a little more light on the phenomenon.  Here’s the question: “When do we see new highs in the stock market most often?”  The punchline: “After a recent new high.”

The red squares above show the probability of hitting a new high so many days after a new high.  The black line near it is a best fit power curve.  The blue diamonds above show the probability of hitting a new high so many days after not hitting a new high.  The green triangles above show the ratio of those two probabilities, matching up against the right vertical axis. The black line near it is a best fit power curve.

As time goes to infinity, both probabilities converge to the same number, which is presently estimated to be 6.8%, the odds that we would hit a new high on any day between 1951 and 2015.  Here’s the table that corresponds to the above graph:

Probability of a new high afterDays after no new highDays after new highProbability Ratio
1st day3.1%57.3%18.29
2nd day4.2%43.3%10.39
3rd day4.6%36.7%7.90
4th day4.8%33.8%6.99
5th day5.1%30.0%5.87
6th day5.2%28.2%5.37
7th day5.5%24.2%4.36
8th day5.7%22.5%3.97
9th day5.6%23.4%4.18
10th day5.6%22.6%4.00
11-155.9%19.0%3.22
16-206.0%17.2%2.86
21-306.1%16.4%2.71
31-406.2%14.5%2.35
41-506.2%15.2%2.47
51-606.3%14.2%2.28
61-756.3%13.9%2.21
76-906.3%13.6%2.16
91-1056.3%12.8%2.02
106-1206.4%12.5%1.96
121-1406.4%12.0%1.87
141-1606.5%11.3%1.75
161-1806.4%11.5%1.79
181-200 days6.4%11.8%1.84

 

E.g., as you go down the table the probability 43.3% represents the probability that you get a new high on the second day after a new high.

Here’s an intuitive way to think about it: if you are not at a new high, you are further away from a new high than if you were at a new high recently.  Thus with time the daily probability of hitting a new high gets higher.  If you were at a new high recently, you daily odds of hitting a new high are quite high, but fall over time, because the odds of drifting lower at some point increase.  Valuation is a weak daily force, but a strong ultimate force.

That said, the odds of hitting new highs a long time away from a new high are significantly higher than the odds of hitting a new high where there has been no new high for the same amount of time.

Closing Thoughts

I could segment the data another way, and this could be clearer: If you are x% away from a new high, what is the odds you will hit a new high n days from now?  As x gets bigger, so will the numbers for n.  Be that as it may, when you have had new highs recently, you tend to have more of them.  New highs clump together.

The same is true of periods with no new highs — they tend to clump together and persist even more.

Valuation and momentum are hidden variables here — momentum aids persistence, and valuation is gravity, eventually causing markets that don’t fairly price likely future cash flows to revert to pricing that is more normal.  Valuation is powerful, but takes a long while to act, often waiting for a credit cycle to do its work.  Momentum works in the short-run, propelling markets to heights and depths that we can only reach from human mimickry.

That’s all.

I was reading through The Wall Street Journal’s Daily Shot column, done by the estimable @SoberLook, and saw the following graph and text:

The S&P 500 move this year is completely outside the historical seasonal trends.

Graph Credit: Deutsche Bank via @SoberLook at The Wall Street Journal

Averages reveal, but they also conceal.  When I look at a graph like this, I know that any given year is highly likely to look different than an average of years.  So, no surprise that the returns on the S&P 500 are different than the averages of the prior 11 or 19 years.

But how has the S&P 500 fared versus the last 68 years?  At present this year is 20th out of 68, which is good, but not great or average.  But look at the graph at the top of this article: up until the close of the 25th trading day of the year (February 7th) the market had performance very much like a median year.  All of the higher performance has come out of the last nine days.  (For fun, it is the ninth best out of 68 for that time of year; even that is not top decile.)

I can tell you something easy: you can have a lot of different occurrences over nine days in the market.  The distribution of returns would be quite wide.  Therefore, don’t get too excited about the returns so far this year — they aren’t that abnormal.  You can be concerned as you like about valuation levels — they are high.  But 2017 at present is a “high side of normal” year compared to past price performance.

And, if you want to be concerned about a melt-up, it is this kind of low positive momentum that tends to persist, at least for a while.  Trading behavior isn’t nuts, even if valuations are somewhat steamy.

I’m around 83% invested in equity accounts, so I am conservative, but I’m not thinking of hedging yet.  Let the rally run.

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I am a fiduciary in my work that I do for my clients. I am also the largest investor in my own strategies, promising to keep a minimum of 80% of my liquid net worth in my strategies, and 50% of my total net worth in them (including my house, etc.).

I believe in eating my own cooking.  I also believe in treating my clients well.  I’ve treated part of this in an earlier post called It’s Their Money, where I describe how I try to give exiting clients a pleasant time on the way out.  For existing clients, I will also help them with situations where others are managing the money at no charge, no payment from another party, and no request that I manage any of those assets.  I do that because I want them to be treated well by me, and I know that getting good advice is hard.  As I wrote in a prior article The Problem of Small Accounts:

We all want financial advice.  Good advice.  And we want it for free.  That’s why we come to the Aleph Blog, where advice is regularly dispensed, and at no cost.

But… I can’t be personal, and give you advice that is tailored to your situation.  And in my writing here, much as I try to be highly honest, I am not acting as a fiduciary, even though I still make my writings hold to such a standard.

Ugh.  Here’s the problem.  Good advice costs money.  Really good advice costs a lot of money, and is worth it, if you have enough money to spread the cost over.

But when you have a small account, you have a problem in getting advice.  There is no way for someone who is fiduciary (like me) to make money addressing your concerns.  That is why I have a high minimum for investing: $100,000.  With that, I can spend time on clients, even helping them with assets from which I make no money.

What extra things have I done for clients over time?  I have:

  • Analyzed asset allocations.
  • Analyzed the performance of other managers.
  • Advised on changing jobs, negotiating salary, etc.
  • Explained the good and bad points of certain insurance companies and their policies, and suggested alternatives.
  • Analyzed chunky assets that they own elsewhere, aiding them in whether they keep, sell, or sell part of the asset.
  • Analyzed a variety of funky and normal investment strategies.
  • Advised on buying a building, and future business plans.
  • Told a client he was better off reinvesting the slack funds in his business that needed financing, rather than borrow and invest the funds with me.
  • Told a client to stop sending me money, and pay down his mortgage.  (He has since resumed sending money, but he is now debt-free.)

I take the fiduciary side of this seriously, and will tell clients that want to put a lot of their money in my stock strategy that they need less risk, and should put funds in my bond strategy, where I earn less.

I’ve got a lot already.  I don’t need to feather my nest at the expense of the best interests of my clients.

Over the last six years, around half of my clients have availed themselves of this help.  If you’ve read Aleph Blog for awhile, you know that I have analyzed a wide number of things.  Helping my clients also sharpens me for understanding the market as a whole, because issues come into focus when the situation of a family makes them concrete.

So informally, I am more than an “investments only” RIA [Registered Investment Advisor], but I only earn money off of my investment fees, and no other way.  Personally, I think that other “investments only” RIAs would mutually benefit their clients if they did this as well — it would help them understand the struggles that they go through, and inform their view of the economy.

Thus I say to my competitors: do you want to justify your fees?  This is a way to do it; perhaps you should consider it.

Postscript

Having some people in an “investment only” shop that understand the basic questions that most clients face also has some crossover advantages when it comes to understanding financial companies, and different places that institutional money gets managed.  It gives you a better idea of the investment ecosystem that you live and work in.

Well, this market is nothing if not special.  The S&P 500 has gone 84 trading days without a loss of 1% or more.  As you can see in the table below, that ranks it #17 of all streaks since 1950.  If it can last through February 27th, it will be the longest streak since 1995.  If it can last through March 23rd, it will be the longest streak since 1966.  The all-time record (since 1950) would take us all the way to June.

Here’s another way to think about this — look at the VIX.  It closed today at 10.85.  Sleepy, sleepy… no risk to be found.  When you don’t have any significant falls in the market, the VIX tends to sag.  Aside from the election, which is an exception to the rule, the last two peaks of the VIX over the last six months were after 1%+ drops in the S&P 500.

The same would apply to credit spreads, which are also tight.  No one expects a change in liquidity, a credit event, a national security incident, etc.  But as I commented on Friday:

This is an awkward time when you have a lot of people arguing that the market CAN’T GO HIGHER!  Let me tell you, it can go higher.

Will it go higher?  Who knows?

Should it go higher?  That’s the better question, and may help with the prior question.  If you’re thinking strictly about absolute valuation, it shouldn’t go higher — we’re in the mid-80s on a percentile basis.  On a relative valuation basis, where are you going to go?  On a momentum basis, it should go higher.  It’s not a rip-roarer in terms of angle of ascent, which bodes well for it.  The rallies that fail tend to be more violent, and this one is kinda timid.

We sometimes ask in investing “who has the most to lose?”  As in my tweet above, that very well could be asset allocators with low stock allocations that conclude that they need to chase the rally.  Or, retail waking up to how great this bull market has been, concluding that they have been missing out on “free money.”

Truth, I’m not hearing many people at all banging the drum for this rally.  There is a lot of skepticism.

As for me, I don’t care much.  It’s not a core skill of mine, nor is it a part of my business.  I am finding cheap stocks still, and I will keep investing through thick and thin, unless the 10-year forecast model that I use says future returns are below 3%/year.  Then I will hedge, and encourage my clients to do so as well.

Until then, the game is on.  Let’s see how far this streak goes.

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Streaks of over 50 days since 1950

RankDateStreakYear
110/8/19631541963
22/28/19661541966
36/7/19541421954
46/3/19641311964
54/17/19611191961
67/26/19571151957
76/12/19851121985
85/17/19951101995
912/15/19951051995
1010/30/19671031967
115/13/19581021958
1211/2/1993951993
1311/24/2006942006
142/12/1993871993
158/15/1952861952
1612/20/1968851968
172/10/2017842017
188/31/1979821979
1911/30/1964811964
206/2/1950751950
216/1/1965751965
228/23/1972741972
235/8/1972731972
242/4/1953701953
254/24/1962671962
267/16/2014662014
2710/14/1958651958
286/10/1969651969
2912/2/1996651996
301/27/2004652004
312/3/1994631994
321/4/1962601962
338/18/1976601976
3412/20/1985601985
359/18/1961581961
365/14/1971581971
372/9/1989581989
387/19/1968571968
391/19/2006562006
4010/18/1951551951
419/13/1978551978
422/27/1963541963
433/29/1977541977
446/23/2016542016
458/21/1953531953
467/11/1960531960
4711/19/1969521969
489/8/1994521994
499/8/2016512016

Photo Credit: Brent Moore || Watch the piggies run after scarce yield!

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If you do remember the first time I wrote about yield being poison, you are unusual, because it was the first real post at Aleph Blog.  A very small post — kinda cute, I think when I look at it from almost ten years ago… and prescient for its time, because a lot of risky bonds were about to lose value (in 19 months), aside from the highest quality bonds.

I decided to write this article this night because I decided to run my bond momentum model — low and behold, it yelled at me that everyone is grabbing for yield through credit risk, predominantly corporate and emerging markets, with a special love for bank debt closed end funds.

I get the idea — short rates are going to rise because the Fed is tightening and inflation is rising globally, and there is no credit risk anymore because economic growth is accelerating globally — it’s not just a US/Trump thing.  I just have a harder time playing the game because we are in the wrong phase of the credit cycle — profit growth is nonexistent, and debts are growing.

I have a few other concerns as well.  Even if encouraging exports and discouraging imports aids the US economy for a while (though I doubt it — more jobs rely on exports than are lost by imports, what if there is retaliation?) there is a corresponding opposite impact on the capital account — less reinvestment in the US.  We could see higher yields…

That said, I would be more bearish on the US Dollar if it had some real competition.  All of the major currencies have issues.  Gold, anyone?  Low short rates and rising inflation are the ideal for gold.  Watch the real cost of carry go more negative, and you get paid (sort of) for holding gold.

If growth and inflation persist globally (consider some of the work @soberlook has  been doing at The WSJ Daily Shot — a new favorite of mine, even his posts are too big) then almost no bonds except the shortest bonds will be any good in the intermediate-term — back to the ’70s phrase “certificates of confiscation.”  One other effect that could go this way — if the portion of Dodd-Frank affecting bank leverage is repealed, the banks will have a much greater ability to lend overnight, which would be inflationary.  Of course, they could just pay special dividends, but most corporations lean toward growing the business, unless they are disciplined capital allocators.

But it is not assured that the current growth and inflation will persist.  M2 Monetary velocity is still low, and the long end of the yield curve does not have yield enough priced in for additional growth and inflation.  Either long bonds are a raving sell, or the long end is telling us we are facing a colossal fake-out in the midst of too much leverage globally.

Summary

I’m going to stay high quality and short for now, but I will be watching for the current trends to break.  I may leg into some long Treasuries, and maybe some foreign bonds.  Gold looks interesting, but I don’t think I am going there.  I’m not making any big moves in the short run — safe and short feels pretty good for the bond portfolios that I manage.  I think it’s a time to preserve principal — there is more credit risk than the market is pricing in.  It might take a year or two to get there, or it might be next month… I would simply say stay flexible and look for a time where you have better opportunities.  There is no fat pitch at present for long only investors like me.

Postscript

To those playing with fire buying dividend paying common stocks, preferred stocks, MLPs, etc. for yield — if we hit a period where credit risk becomes obvious — all of your “yield plays” will behave like stocks in a poisoned sector.  There could be significant dividend cuts.  Dividends are not guaranteed like bonds — bonds must pay or it is bankruptcy.  Managements avoid defaulting on their bonds and loans, but will not hesitate to cut or not pay dividends in a crisis — it is self-preservation, at least in the short-run.  Even if they get replaced by angry shareholders, the management typically gets some sort of parachute if the company survives, and far less in bankruptcy.

One final note on this point — stocks that have a lot of yield buyers behave more like bonds.  If bond yields rise above current stock earnings yields, the stock prices will fall to reprice the yield of the stock, even if there is no bankruptcy risk.

And, if you say you can hold on and enjoy the rising dividends of your high quality companies?  Accidents happen, the same way they did to some people who bought houses in the middle of the last decade.  Many could not ride out the crisis because of some life event.  Make sure you have a margin of safety.  In a really large crisis, the return on risk assets may look decent from ten years before to ten years after, but a lot of people get surprised by their need to draw on those assets at the wrong moment — bad events come in bunches, when the credit cycle goes bust. Be careful, and don’t reach for yield.

Photo Credit: Mike Morbeck || On Wisconsin! On Wisconsin!

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It was shortly after the election when I last moved my trading band.  Well, time to move it again, this time up 4%, with a small twist.  I’m at my cash limit of 20%, with a few more stocks knocking on the door of a rebalancing sale, and none near a rebalancing buy.  (To decode this, you can read my article on portfolio rule seven.)  Here is portfolio rule seven:

Rebalance the portfolio whenever a stock gets more than 20% away from its target weight. Run a largely equal-weighted portfolio because it is genuinely difficult to tell what idea is the best. Keep about 30-40 names for diversification purposes.

This is my interim trading rule, which helps me make a little additional money for clients by buying relatively low and selling relatively high.  It also reduces risk, because higher prices are riskier than lower prices, all other things equal.

There are two companies that are double-weights in my portfolio, one half-weight, and 32 single-weights.  The half-weight is a micro-cap that is difficult to buy or sell. (Patience, patience…)  With cash near 20%, a single-weight currently runs around 2.2% of assets, with buying happening near 1.75%, and selling near 2.63%.

But, I said there was a small twist.  I’m going to add another single-weight position.  I don’t know what yet.  Also, I’m leaving enough in reserve to turn one of the single-weights into a double-weight.  That company is a well-run Mexican firm that has  had a falling stock price even though it is still performing well.  If it falls another 10%, I will do more than rebalance.  I will rebalance and double it.

Part of the reason for the move in both number of positions and position size at the same time is that both the half-weight and one single-weight that is at the top of its band are being acquired for cash, and so they (3.5% of assets) behave more like cash than stocks.

Thus, amid a portfolio that has been performing well, I am adjusting my positioning so that if the market continues to do well, the portfolio doesn’t lag much, or even continues to outperform.  I’m not out to make big macro bets; I will make a small bet that the market is high, and carry above average cash, but it will all get deployed if the market falls 25%+ from here.

I keep the excess cash around for the same reason Buffett does.  It gives you more easy options in a bad market environment.  Until that environment comes, you’ll never know how valuable is is to keep some extra cash around.  Better safe, than sorry.

Photo Credit: D.C.Atty || Scrawled in 2008, AFTER the crash started

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Comments are always appreciated from readers, if they are polite.  Here’s a recent one from the piece Distrust Forecasts.

You made one statement that I don’t really understand. “Most forecasters only think about income statements. Most of the limits stem from balance sheets proving insufficient, or cash flows inverting, and staying that way for a while.”

What is the danger of balance sheets proving insufficient? Does that mean that the company doesn’t have enough cash to cover their ‘burn rate’?

Not having enough cash to cover the burn rate can be an example of this.  Let me back up a bit, and speak generally before focusing.

Whether economists, quantitative analysts, chartists or guys who pull numbers out of the air, most people do not consider balance sheets when making predictions.  (Counterexample: analysts at the ratings agencies.)  It is much easier to assume a world where there are no limits to borrowing.  Practical example #1 would be home owners and buyers during the last financial crisis, together with the banks, shadow banks, and government sponsored enterprises that financed them.

In economies that have significant private debts, growth is limited, because of higher default probabilities/severity, and less capability of borrowing more should defaults tarry.  Most firms don’t like issuing equity, except as a last resort, so restricted ability to borrow limits growth. High debt among consumers limits growth in another way — they have less borrowing capacity and many feel less comfortable borrowing anyway.

Figuring out when there is “too much debt” is a squishy concept at any level — household, company, government, economy, etc.  It’s not as if you get to a magic number and things go haywire.  People have a hard time dealing with the idea that as leverage rises, so does the probability of default and the severity of default should it happen.  You can get to really high amounts of leverage and things still hold together for a while — there may be extenuating circumstances allowing it to work longer — just as in other cases, a failure in one area triggers a lot more failures as lenders stop lending, and those with inadequate liquidity can refinance and then fail.

Three More Reasons to Distrust Predictions

1) Media Effects — the media does not get the best people on the tube — they get those that are the most entertaining.  This encourages extreme predictions.  The same applies to people who make predictions in books — those that make extreme predictions sell more books.  As an example, consider this post from Ben Carlson on Harry Dent.  Harry Dent hasn’t been right in a long time, but it doesn’t stop him from making more extreme predictions.

For more on why you should ignore the media, you can read this ancient article that I wrote for RealMoney in 2005, and updated in 2013.

2) Momentum Effects — this one is two-sided.  There are momentum effects in the market, so it’s not bogus to shade near term estimates based off of what has happened recently.  There are two problems though — the longer and more severe the rise or fall, the more you should start downplaying momentum, and increasingly think mean-reversion.  Don’t argue for a high returning year when valuations are stretched, and vice-versa for large market falls when valuations are compressed.

The second thing is kind of a media effect when you begin seeing articles like “Everyone Ought to be Rich,” etc.  “Dow 36,000”-type predictions come near the end of bull markets, just as “The Death of Equities’ comes at the end of Bear Markets.  The media always shows up late; retail shows up late; the nuttiest books show up late.  Occasionally it will fell like books and pundits are playing “Can you top this?” near the end of a cycle.

3) Spurious Math — Whether it is the geometry of charts or the statistical optimization of regression, it is easy to argue for trends persisting longer than they should.  We should always try to think beyond the math to the human processes that the math is describing.  What levels of valuation or indebtedness are implied?  Setting new records in either is always possible, but it is not the most likely occurrence.

With that, be skeptical of forecasts.