This book has just been released.  I got an early copy.  The book is interesting enough that I would like to do a Q&A with the author, and I have contacted the PR flack to do so.

To the review:

Would you like to understand the mindsets of a variety of successful hedge fund managers?  This book will give that to you, but there is a catch: you will also learn how these managers developed, and this is a big plus.

Most of the managers went through rigorous experiences that made them far more effective at evaluating risk and return potentials.   Have you been through anything similar to that?  If not, you might read this very interesting set of accounts, but then realize that you don’t have the personality/skills necessary to replicate what they have done.  Don’t feel bad, most people don’t have that.

A large part of what makes hedge fund managers successful is their willingness to limit their activity to areas where they have genuine expertise.  They gain insight beyond most into areas where they are experts in discerning value.

This book does not give you a formula for how to make money; instead, it gives you lessons in the characters of those that have made a lot of money for themselves and their clients.  What are they like?

Among their many attributes, they are:

• Driven/competitive — though I have known my share of failures in investing that have that attribute.
• Lifelong learners, like Buffett and Munger — though I have known some really bright people who know a lot about investing/finance who add little to an investment process.
• Opportunistic — they recognize what their best opportunities are, and pursue them to the exclusion of others.
• Focused — they develop an edge, and try to be “best in class,” whether in mathematics of the markets, understanding the legal rights of different types of securities, understanding industry dynamics, accounting nuances, etc.
• Patient — if opportunities are not promising, don’t do much.  It’s like being an intelligent underwriter — when your competitors are giving away the store, don’t write business, spend time sharpening your skills.  Study what could go wrong, and see if there is a way to take advantage of the situation.
• Team-builders — They develop talented teams/cultures and motivate them to excellence.
• Sensible — They know when to be doggedly persistent, and know when to admit defeat.

Now, no hedge fund manager has all of these, but the best have most of them.

Contents

The book covers nine managers/firms:

1. Ray Dalio — Bridgewater
2. Pierre LaGrange & Tim Wong — MAN Group / AHL
3. John Paulson — Paulson & Co.
4. Marc Lasry and Sonia Gardner — Avenue Capital Group
5. David Tepper — Appaloosa Management
6. William A. Ackman — Pershing Square Capital Management
7. Daniel Loeb — Third Point
8. James Chanos — Kynikos Associates LP
9. Boaz Weinstein, Saba Capital Management

About the Author

Her name is Maneet Ahuja, and is a producer for CNBC, specializing in covering hedge funds.  That’s how she gained the contacts in order to write the book.  Business Insider did a profile on her, and you can find it here.

Quibbles

The book needs something to tie it together and give it depth, otherwise the book is only “Meet these nine nifty hedge fund managers that I have gotten to know.”  That’s a serious deficiency; even a single chapter at the front or back would have enriched the book, making it more general and cohesive.

I also think there would have been better choices for those that wrote the foreword (Mohamed El-Erian) and the afterword (Myron Scholes).  The former is an accomplished investor, but is not an expert on hedge funds.  Myron Scholes is an accomplished academic, has worked for hedge funds, but is still not an expert on them.

Who would benefit from this book: If you want to learn about what type of people these nine hedge fund managers are, and read anecdotes about some of their best and worst trades, this would be a book you would enjoy.  If you want to, you can buy the book here: The Alpha Masters: Unlocking the Genius of the World’s Top Hedge Funds.

Full disclosure: The book was sent to me out of the blue; did not ask for it.

If you enter Amazon through my site, and you buy anything, I get a small commission.  This is my main source of blog revenue.  I prefer this to a “tip jar” because I want you to get something you want, rather than merely giving me a tip.  Book reviews take time, particularly with the reading, which most book reviewers don’t do in full, and I typically do. (When I don’t, I mention that I scanned the book.  Also, I never use the data that the PR flacks send out.)

Most people buying at Amazon do not enter via a referring website.  Thus Amazon builds an extra 1-3% into the prices to all buyers to compensate for the commissions given to the minority that come through referring sites.  Whether you buy at Amazon directly or enter via my site, your prices don’t change.

I appreciate Eddy Elfenbein.  He comes up with ideas that make me say, “Huh. Interesting.  Let’s test that.”  His recent article, World’s Simplest Stock Valuation Measure, put forth the idea that:

Growth Rate/2 + 8 = PE Ratio

Cool, reminds me of my 1993 formula for value investing:

Price per share < Tangible Book per share + 5 * EPS

Eddy’s idea is that you can buy a company that isn’t growing or shrinking earnings at a PE of 8, or alternatively, a E/P (earnings yield) of 12.5%.  In a weird environment like this, it means an earnings yield that is more than 9% over the long bond is a good purchase.  I like that idea, it offers a good reward for taking risk.

But as the growth rate rises, you can expand the PE multiple by half of the anticipated growth rate.  So, a company anticipated to grow at a 10% rate would warrant a PE multiple of 13, a 20% rate 18, etc.  I like his formula, because it is conservative.  It seeks growth at a reasonable price.  It will not overpay for high growth rates.

But now let’s test this statistically to see what validity it presently has.  I ran a regression on Current year expected PEs versus expected 3-5 year growth rates.  I excluded all companies with fewer than two analysts putting forth growth estimates.  Here were the results:

Significant results statistically, but what a low R-squared.  Just shows us all how complex the market really is.  Look at this graph to see it as it is:

There really doesn’t seem to be much of a relationship.  But Eddy’s formula is conservative versus the estimates.  His formula invests in no-growth  companies  at an earnings yield of 12.5%, the market does so at an earnings yield of 8.4%.  His formula increases the PE multiple at a 50% rate as earnings increases, but the market does so at a 69% rate.

Good for Eddy, and any that follow him.  His method builds in a margin of safety, which is a key to all good investing.

Before I close I would like to offer the 20 most mispriced companies, both positively and negatively.  Just be aware that the markets are complex, and this valuation method is simple, and most likely wrong… but it can provide a jumping-off point for due diligence.

Potential Buys

Potential Sells

That’s all for now.

This stretches from August 2010 to October 2010:

The Education of a Corporate Bond Manager, Part VII

On the value of credit analysts.

The Education of a Corporate Bond Manager, Part VIII

On price discovery in dealer markets, and auctions gone wrong.  I never knew that I could haggle so well.

The Education of a Corporate Bond Manager, Part IX

On the vagaries of bulge-bracket brokers, and how a good reputation helps on Wall Street.

The Education of a Corporate Bond Manager, Part X

On how we almost did a CDO, and how it fell apart.  Also, how to make money in the bond market when you reach the risk limits.

The Education of a Corporate Bond Manager, Part XI

On my biggest mistakes in managing bonds.  Also, on aggressive life insurance managements.

The Education of a Corporate Bond Manager, Part XII (The End)

On bond technical analysis, and how to deal with a rapidly growing client.   Also, the end of my time as a bond manager, and the parties that came as a result.   Oh, and putting your subordinates first.

Queasing over Quantitative Easing

Queasing over Quantitative Easing, Redux

Queasing over Quantitative Easing, Part III

Queasing over Quantitative Easing, Part IV

Queasing over Quantitative Easing, Part V

Queasing over Quantitative Easing, Part VI

The problems with the Fed’s seemingly “free lunch”strategy.  Pushes up asset prices and commodity prices, benefiting the rich versus the poor.

The Economic Geography of Publicly-Traded Companies in the United States by Sector

The Economic Geography of Publicly-Traded Companies in the United States by Sector (II)

Shows what US states have diversified vs concentrated economies by sector, and what states dominate each sector.

Portfolio Rule One

Industries are under-analyzed, relative to the market on the whole, and relative to individual companies. Spend time trying to find good companies with strong balance sheets in industries with lousy pricing power, and cheap companies in good industries, where the trends are not fully discounted.

Portfolio Rule Two

Purchase equities that are cheap relative to other names in the industry. Depending on the industry, this can mean low P/E, low P/B, low P/S, low P/CFO, low P/FCF, or low EV/EBITDA.

Portfolio Rule Three

Stick with higher quality companies for a given industry.

Portfolio Rule Four

Purchase companies appropriately sized to serve their market niches.

Portfolio Rule Five

Analyze financial statements to avoid companies that misuse generally accepted accounting principles and overstate earnings.

Portfolio Rule Six

Analyze the use of cash flow by management, to avoid companies that invest or buy back their stock when it dilutes value, and purchase those that enhance value through intelligent buybacks and investment.

Portfolio Rule Seven

Of Investment Earnings Assumptions and Century Bonds

If we could turn back the clock 65 or so years and set up a more conservative method of accounting for pension liabilities, we would be much better off today.

Who Dares Oppose a Boom?

This piece won a small prize, and in turn, I received three speaking engagements.

Fairness Versus Economics

Fairness Versus Economics (2)

People care more about fairness than improving their own economic/social position.

Earnings Estimates as a Control Mechanism, Flawed as they are

Earnings Estimates as a Control Mechanism, Flawed as they are, Redux

Earnings estimates have their problems, but they exist to give us a flawed method of estimating the future performance of companies.

-==-=-=-=-=–=-=

That’s all for now.  Never thought I would do so many long series when I started blogging.

I think one of the largest areas for practical investigation in finance is reviewing dollar-weighted versus time weighted returns, especially for vehicles that are traded heavily.  I am going to try to analyze one major ETF per month to see what the level of slippage is due to trading.

But if my hypothesis is wrong, I’ll post on it anyway.  The last post I did on this was on SPY, the S&P 500 Spider.  The slippage was 7%+/year.

Now I have done the calculation for the QQQ, the PowerShares QQQ Trust, which mimics the Nasdaq 100.  The Nasdaq 100 is more volatile than the S&P 500, so I expected the gap to be worse, but it wasn’t: from the inception in March 1999 to the end of the fiscal year in September of 2011, the dollar weighted return was 0.38%/year versus a time-weighted return that a buy-and-hold investor would get of 0.77%/year.  0.4% of difference isn’t much to talk about.  It still indicates a little bad trading.

That said, the net amount of unit creation and liquidation tended to be small.  Maybe that is the difference.  I have to think more about this, but my advice to anyone using exchange traded products remains the same — read your prospectus carefully, and understand the weaknesses of the vehicle.  If creation units don’t have to be something exact, ask what that might imply for your returns.

Anyway, here were the figures from my dollar-weighted return calculation:

I used annual data, and assumed midperiod dates for the cashflows.

The next ETF I plan to analyze is XLF, the Financial Sector Spider.  I suspect that will look bad, but who knows?
Full disclosure: short SPY in some hedged accounts.

Market Dynamics

• On Paradigm Shifts http://t.co/h68quEDX Hunter takes us through mental exercises 2 make us intelligently contrarian. “Invert, Always Invert” May 02, 2012
• Hedgers’ net short position vanishes in US oil http://t.co/X0hLOWGB Commercial interests do not fear lower prices, could be bullish 4 crude May 02, 2012
• There’s Plenty of Money for Junk http://t.co/vXML0Bao Presently the credit cycle is virtuous; vicious part is coming, but no appt set $$ May 02, 2012
• Bad Models Mistook Housing Bust for Dot-Com Bubble http://t.co/IxC8m2mk Busts of assets that are heavily levered harder than unlevered $$ May 02, 2012
• Best U.S. Real Estate With Self-Storage http://t.co/mxyHdK2U Self storage a winner in the past, may not do so well in the future; hi vals May 02, 2012
• Marginal oil production costs are heading towards $100/barrel http://t.co/G2zNB5JS Same as my reasoning on high crude prices $$ May 02, 2012
• Four-percent rule a relic, advisers say http://t.co/PrdHQy48 Better rule: 10y Tsy yield plus 0% if bearish, 1% if neutral, 2% if bullish $$ May 01, 2012
• The remarkable resurgence in synthetic credit tranches http://t.co/1iIZ8ous Increases in the notional amounts of several corp bond swaps May 01, 2012
• Contra: Black Scholes & the formula of doom http://t.co/flVNsYMx Debt levels & Asset-Liab mismatch largest causes of crisis not BS model Apr 30, 2012
• Energy’s Pain is Consumer Discretionary’s Gain http://t.co/lM7UW0T7 I have been on the wrong side of this trade. Sigh. $$ Apr 30, 2012
• Notes from the DoubleLine Lunch with Jeffrey Gundlach, Spring 2012 http://t.co/KDiqA5Sp Gives a good overview, w/a large topping of snark $$ Apr 30, 2012

China

• China’s Auditing Train Wreck http://t.co/UeIZtw06 Any Chinese firm listed in the US, the auditors should be subject to SEC scrutiny. $$ May 05, 2012
• China bear Pettis says world coming around to his view http://t.co/lo1nGc7e Pettis isn’t a bear but a realist; invt-led growth overplayd $$ May 04, 2012
• The Family and Corruption http://t.co/R4NwZ6od Family ties & group affiliation dominate economic/political power among Chinese Communists $$ May 04, 2012
• Who is Fu? Chinese exile is ‘God’s double agent’ http://t.co/plyQhwtg Story of a Chinese Pastor in US & escape of Chen Guangcheng $$ May 02, 2012
• Microblogs Survive Real-Name Rules–So Far http://t.co/5UItJjwj Even the CCP would have a hard time shutting down their Twitter-apps $$ May 02, 2012
• Beijing’s secret: It’s not really loosening http://t.co/3RPhAOwH There is not enough demand in China 2 pay all of the high prices. $$ May 02, 2012
• China’s Left Behind Children http://t.co/OL0gmSFE Economic growth that separates parents from children imposes significant costs on China $$ May 02, 2012
• China Closes Unirule Website http://t.co/ItkW0p0A Founder receives award from Cato Institute; China government shuts down his website $$ May 02, 2012
• China’s property boom has peaked, forever http://t.co/aLC2U8F8 Amount of deadweight in China property is so large that prices have peaked $$ Apr 29, 2012

Financial Services

• Caution: Contents May Be Hot http://t.co/cp9yjbH3 I worry about ETF slippage from bad creation/redemption unit design & bad trading by users May 04, 2012
• Well, That Was Awkward… http://t.co/zS5f6zAI Bank Chiefs’ Regulatory Concerns Met With Official Silence; maybe regulators getting fed up May 04, 2012
• A talent shortage looms as the industry booms http://t.co/QGLZzzg7 Financial planners getting old/retiring faster than the Baby Boomers $$ May 04, 2012
• 2nd attempt2 automate bond trading 1st failed RT @BloombergNews: Goldman preps trading system for corporate bonds | http://t.co/NceasmN7 May 04, 2012
• Mortgage Rates in US for 30-Year Loans Fall to Record Low http://t.co/LPolAP5Q Mtge rates b nimble, MR b quick, MR go under limbo stick $$ May 04, 2012
• Spending A Year On An M&A Bidding War Is Apparently Overrated http://t.co/tKguPYGy It’s well-known that scale acquirers underperform $$ May 04, 2012
• Every liability has an asset, but not every asset has a liability. Some are owned outright. http://t.co/fB3ARju7 May 03, 2012
• Canadians Dominate World’s 10 Strongest Banks http://t.co/qj6TOgA3 Ask again after their housing bubble pops, same 4 other fringe nations May 03, 2012
• Pimco’s latest ETF shields against price spikes http://t.co/TmOrCIj2 I wonder if active ETFs will have more performance slippage. $$ May 02, 2012
• Hedge Funds Hurt by Volatility http://t.co/ogoL62qT Hedge funds r vehicles that do better when credit spreads r tightening $$ May 01, 2012
• Bond Market Is Creating A New Galaxy for Trading http://t.co/YgvNwz1j Dealer inventories thin; trading costs rise; electronic mkts start May 01, 2012
• US banks still cutting commercial real estate exposure http://t.co/qsqIMRph Banks still rotating out @ an almost constant rate since 2009 $$ Apr 30, 2012
• Largest U.S. Banks Resist Federal Reserve’s Credit Limits http://t.co/JndcrvWI Big banks need 2b broken up or shrunk; they don’t accept it Apr 29, 2012

US Fiscal/Regulatory Policy

• CEOs rank Texas tops for business, California worst http://t.co/jWEIGP89 8th year in a row for this survey; high taxes/regs annoy CEOs $$ May 04, 2012
• Exposing the Medicare Double Count http://t.co/HIVIx3lJ Same $$ being spent twice, must borrow the difference. May 02, 2012
• Coburn: `We Ought to Totally Revamp Our Tax Code’ http://t.co/71WquMIf Very similar to my proposals; simplify code eliminate deductions $$ May 02, 2012
• U.S. Considers Notes That Float http://t.co/jynXGcYG Intermediate-dated Tsy floaters would trade above par, neg yields like TIPS $$ May 01, 2012
• Trying to Shed Student Debt http://t.co/0GmvckOn Lawmakers Rethink Bankruptcy-Law Ban on Walking Away From Education Loans $$ #slavery Apr 30, 2012
• Can the US Economy Recover Without a Housing Recovery? http://t.co/Tqy4l8J3 It will probably have to try w/o housing’s assistance $$ Apr 30, 2012
• Central Bank paper suggests house prices have ‘over-corrected’ http://t.co/KDrXCkzy Have Irish housing prices overshot? Tough 2 say. $$ Apr 30, 2012
• http://t.co/KbnUO93s Treasury floaters could b issued @ premium 2 par 2 inflation speculators allowing the Tsy 2 finance @ negative rates Apr 30, 2012
• U.S. Perfecting Formula for Budget Failure, Says Bowles http://t.co/vlLQzZ8q It’s nice 2b a part of a nation that is a global leader $$ Apr 30, 2012
• Will TARP Make a Profit? That’s the Wrong Question http://t.co/MZBHaO51 Conflicting govt goals make policy hard 2 implement & interpret $$ Apr 30, 2012
• You will buy more Govvies, or else http://t.co/DLrnyb9u Financial Repression, Quantitative Easing, Debt Monetization, Hyperinflation $$ Apr 30, 2012
• On Student Loans, Accounting Gimmicks, Electric Cars, FX and a note on SS http://t.co/2BCB9nAi Hodgepodge of insight from @brucekrasting $$ Apr 30, 2012
• “The Treasury should be issuing 100 year or perpetual bonds until the market can’t stand it anymore to lock in these … http://t.co/gXMUXW4C Apr 30, 2012
• The floating YTMs will probably be negative, as interest rate speculators will pay more than par for the floating rat… http://t.co/OSmE7QuJ Apr 30, 2012

Eurozone

• The euro crisis just got a whole lot worse http://t.co/XSqmQnGv Election of Hollande may lead2 Euozone policy paralysis; growth v austerity May 04, 2012
• Making eurozonians, or not http://t.co/JmuO5OXC The Eurozone was never a natural place to set up a shared currency. $$ May 04, 2012
• Madness in Spain Lingers as Ireland Chases Recovery http://t.co/BXdYSX5e Ireland may b rebounding, as Spain’s slump deepens #austerity $$ May 02, 2012
• Why the New York Times’s Paul Krugman is clueless about the European economic crisis http://t.co/xMuzZXC7 Aside frm Ireland no austerity yet May 02, 2012
• Core infection and eurozone PMIs http://t.co/xr97yPgD Core of the EZone sluggish @ a time when it can least afford it $$ #depressionary May 02, 2012
• ECB Measures Pushing Domestic Bonds Into Domestic Banks, Planting Seeds for Euro Disintegration http://t.co/HAITJJnX Yeh, this da future $$ May 02, 2012
• The rise in the Eurozone money supply has not improved credit conditions http://t.co/rYazqcuP Euro M3 diverges from bank loans $$ May 01, 2012
• The ECB lending to periphery governments via “backdoor SMP” http://t.co/uQeG2QQK How to stuff the ECB full of Eurofringe debt, c/o LTRO $$ May 01, 2012

Rest of the World

• Brazil: cutting at any cost? http://t.co/mh3vN1Te Pushes up asset & price inflation, as currency held down 2aid exporters; unsustainable $$ May 04, 2012
• Turkey Credit Rating Outlook Cut by S&P on Worsening Trade http://t.co/pFDzEhZl Wide current account def & hi external financing needs $$ May 02, 2012
• Once poster child of crisis, Iceland recovers http://t.co/Sgr2wTGl Letting banks fail & stiffing foreign creditors -> winning solution $$ May 02, 2012
• Which emerging economies are at greatest risk of overheating? http://t.co/olHdiYRE A gauge from the Economist on which Em Mkts r2 hot $$ Apr 29, 2012

Company News

• Buffett’s CTB Adds Chicken Eviscerators in Dutch Purchase http://t.co/K6Q3NGt2 Buffett’s firm is no chicken; it has a lot of guts! $$ May 04, 2012
• Sorry, really sorry… May 04, 2012
• Ackman Rejects Canadian Pacific Deal Ruling Out CEO Pick http://t.co/KYe970NJ Pick is former CEO of $CP rival $CNI – Bad blood; good CEO May 02, 2012
• Impressive work Mr. Einhorn. The analyst that wrote up the question deserves praise; if you did that… http://t.co/tSTWxqBa May 01, 2012
• Phillips 66 aims to run more shale oil http://t.co/tC7NBfLO LD: + $COP $PSX First day of trading for the new $PSX. Combo up 2%+ so far $$ May 01, 2012
• Value investing does not mean cheap. It means margin of safety. Cemex does not have that. Look at the debt. $CX $$ http://t.co/ydklVkth May 01, 2012
• Falcone Agrees To Step Aside http://t.co/bYgLxMMV “a final agreement may not be reached, and a bankruptcy filing was still possible” $$ Apr 30, 2012
• Delta to buy US refinery for $150 million http://t.co/IsK9xsDu If zero is dumb & 100 is very dumb, this one scores in the 90s. $$ Apr 30, 2012
• Discuss “At $1.7 billion, Nook is worth more than Barnes http://t.co/xOz6skwP Spin off Nook 2 create value $$ $BKS $AMZN #interneteatsbooks Apr 30, 2012
• @ampressman Would it have been value-enhancing to $BKS 2 sell the whole Nook unit 2 $MSFT, in your opinion? $$ Apr 30, 2012

Statistical Analysis

• trading-and-the-null-hypothesis http://t.co/QpYutOTb Problem:No academic journal wants2 publish studies with ‘no result’ as their conclusion May 04, 2012
• . @thenumb47 Allows for too much of a specification search; would be good to require disclosure of everything tried but not published $$ May 03, 2012
• Have to allow for accidents! RT @incakolanews: just scrub the word “validate” and I think you have a great idea May 03, 2012
• Thus my proposal for economists: come up w/research idea: goes 2a database. Randomly assigned economist will analyze & trash/validate it $$ May 03, 2012
• Unlike double-blind studies, raw statistical research allows health analysts to inject their own bias into the analysis, as economists do $$ May 03, 2012
• Analytical Trend Troubles Scientists http://t.co/bzcAIpHG Health researchers using statistics like economists find ambiguous results $$ May 03, 2012

Miscellaneous

• 14 Lessons From Benjamin Franklin About Getting What You Want In Life http://t.co/BWAjCz1l Advice from 1 of the wealthiest men of America $$ May 04, 2012
• Is Wall Street Meeting God’s Expectations? http://t.co/5H5j2QGG Many Christians misuse the Bible; almost all non-Christians misuse it $$ May 03, 2012
• What would Jesus trade? http://t.co/Dkrfwt9k Many Christians misuse the Bible; almost all non-Christians misuse it; another example $$ May 03, 2012
• And in a more honest way than Google RT @SconsetCapital: Long good, short evil. May 03, 2012
• Apparel-Swapping Millennials Eschew Stores and Malls http://t.co/B7jq2dcY “Is that a new outfit?” “Well, it’s new to me!” An odd trend $$ May 03, 2012
• @TheStalwart Kasriel was different enough that he will be missed, kind of like the sound of one hand clapping $$ #littledoghasbuddhanature May 01, 2012
• The record 4 tallest bldg s/b based on weighted average height; weighting based on cross-sectional area @ height http://t.co/03HNZ0BB $$ Apr 30, 2012
• So if you have something thin at the top, it wouldn’t count 4 much. A rectangular parallpiped would get full credit 4 height $$ #usingmath Apr 30, 2012
• That would work, simpler than mine $$ RT @Pollack7: @AlephBlog Meh.Highest continuous occupancy floor. Apr 30, 2012
• As the smartest boss I ever had said “Make bets, but never bet the franchise.” http://t.co/qWdHX3BS Apr 30, 2012

Monetary Policy

• Bernanke Charts New Mission For Fed: Financial Stability http://t.co/6RrWEQws Fed has a hard enuf time w/a double mandate, triple will b wrs May 02, 2012
• Then again, if focusing on financial stability forces the Fed to be more restrained in its monetary policy, that would be good. $$ May 02, 2012
• Bernanke: Be Humble! http://t.co/6icSHD1K The picture says it: http://t.co/OqOflqsI Humility in BB’s view: leaving monetary policy loose $$ May 01, 2012
• My Speech Delivered at the New York Federal Reserve Bank http://t.co/DbAhOdQR An Austrian let loose amid the marble palace in NYC?! Wow. $$ Apr 29, 2012

US Politics

• Renewed Hope that Jon Corzine, President Obama’s Top Tier Campaign Bundler, Will Face Criminal Charges http://t.co/wCLrXFve J. Tavakoli $$ May 01, 2012
• Occupy Wall Street Plans Global Protests in Resurgence http://t.co/0FLjKfiJ #OWS won’t b effective until they organize as a 3rd party $$ + May 01, 2012
• Or, organize to influence the Democrats the way the t-party does the Republicans. #OWS is irrelevant until then, b/c it doesn’t do anything May 01, 2012
• Is that a bailout in your pocket? http://t.co/8xwW4Cbi Boyazny, panel’s populist, replied that the credit markets had become “undemocratic” May 01, 2012

Asset allocation is tough, because the correlations are not stable.  Here’s an example: in the 90s, at many conferences that I went to, I was told that one of the smartest moves you could make was to invest heavily in every new class of Asset Backed Security [ABS] created, because they all tighten in yield spread terms after issuance, leading to price gains.

I didn’t believe it then, and that was a good thing, because the most exotic of ABS classes got whacked in the financial crisis.  As it was was, I had already seen debacles in Franchise Loan ABS (spit, spit), and Manufactured Housing (post-1997 vintage).  At a conference for Life Insurance, I was a skunk at the party in 2006, as one ignorant presenter suggested that AAA structured assets never went bad.  History already taught us better, and as I tried to say to the then-CEO of Principal Financial as he was exiting the conference, he needed to look at the mezzanine and subordinated structured product in his company.  Free consulting, but but worth more than the consensus.  As far as I can tell, he didn’t listen.  For many reasons the stock price is lower today.

I have many other tales where in fixed income (bonds), everyone “followed the leader,” which worked in the short run, but failed in the long run.  The point is that investor behavior correlates asset classes.  There may be underlying economic differences, such as owning a natural gas producer and utility that uses natural gas, but most of those differences get erased as most investors seek portfolios immune from factors of secular change.

So as new asset or sub-asset classes are introduced, in the short-run they are uncorrelated, and likely rally, because few own them.  But after the rally, many now own it, and the future correlations are high because so many own it.  The correlations ultimately depend on two things: the underlying economics, and investor behavior.  Investor behavior is the dominant aspect of pricing.

I don’t think there is a lot of diversification in most risky asset classes from an economic standpoint.  Does it matter whether a business is public or private?   I think the answer is no.

What that means in the present environment is that there is a gap between business risk, and those that finance business risk.  In other words, there is a difference between investment grade bonds, and risk assets.  That’s the negative correlation in this market.  Do you want diversification?  Buy some ETFs that invest in long high investment grade debt.  You will not get any effective diversification out of buying different classes of risky assets.  Those are already owned by those that compete with you.

Promises to pay from sound entities that can be relied upon in the future behave very differently than risky assets.  In your asset allocation, to the degree that you need real diversification, look at that as the critical distinction.  All other distinctions are secondary at best.

Before I get started this evening, I would like to offer an apology to those that read my recent piece, Simple Retirement Calculator.  I didn’t define all of the terms in the piece, and so here are the definitions:

• DB plan — defined benefit plan, a pension plan that offers a certain benefit, and the cost of funding that benefit varies.
• DC plan — defined contribution plan, a pension plan that allows for a certain level of contributions, and the benefit achievable varies.
• 100% J&S — 100% Joint & Survivor.  In an annuity, its payment is the same regardless of who dies first.  The one surviving does not see any reduction in payments.  In 50% J&S, the one surviving get only half the payment after the first spouse dies, which allows for a higher initial benefit than 100% J&S.
• CR — cash refund.  Some people getting an annuity hate, really hate the idea that the insurance company might make money off of them if they die early.  The cash refund option says that heirs receive the difference between the premium paid and benefits paid.  The cost of this option is a slightly lower benefit.
• Indexed — the annuity benefit rises with inflation, usually the CPI.

Now the table in the article tried to show how much of a person’s salary would be replaced at retirement, given a certain level of saving.  Another way of viewing it would be how many years of income would the accumulated value of savings be relative to their final salary at age 70.  That’s the “Accum Years Ending Pay.”  It’s surprising how few years of ending pay a person accumulates unless they save a lot.

That’s all.  Other questions, forward them my way, but please, ask, don’t demand…

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Now there was one more item from my piece Simple Retirement Calculator, the line that read 4% — i.e., pay out 4% of the lump sum annually, an assumption that has fairly broad acceptance for managing a lump sum without annuitizing it.  I myself came to endorse the 4% rule in 2001, after doing a series of analyses using what I thought was a good risk, inflation, and asset allocation model, concluding that the average person had 95% odds of not going bankrupt if they took just 4% of the initial sum invested, adjusted for inflation annually, as a distribution.

The data through 2000 did not allow for a “lost decade” like the one we have recently experienced.  During such a time, marginal returns on capital became very low.  GDP growth slowed, and yields on Treasuries fell.

Going back to Ben Graham, who when bullish never let his asset allocation go above 75% stocks (risky assets), and 25% bonds, and when bearish never let his asset allocation go below 25% stocks (risky assets), and 75% bonds, in the same sense, I use this to offer a new distribution rule for those that don’t annuitize and have to manage a lump sum:

As a percentage of your assets, spend no more than the 10-year Treasury yield annually, plus:

• 0% if the situation is bearish (risk assets are highly priced)
  
• 1% if the situation is neutral
• 2% if the situation is bullish (risk assets have depressed prices)

As for determining risk posture, I would use things like the Q-ratio, Shiller’s CAPE, and the difference between Moody’s Baa and Aaa spreads to be my guide.  At present, by those measures it would leave me halfway between neutral and bearish in the intermediate-term, and so I would be look to distribute only 2.5%/year from endowments as income.

Chintzy?  Today yes, but it respects the idea that depressionary conditions may persist longer than we might otherwise expect.  It also adjusts as inflation rises, to the degree that it gets reflected in Treasury yields, which may be held down by the Fed.  In such a case of the Fed constraining longer Treasury yields, gold prices and the prices of other materials may rise dramatically, because there is no penalty for holding commodities in real terms.

This views the asset markets through the eyes of a conservative but clever bond investor, who realizes that future equity returns are highly correlated with Baa-rated bond yields, and future bond returns are highly correlated with Treasury yields.

But, think of what this formula would have done in the early ’80s, when endowments were constrained, and they took little as income.  This formula would have anticipated the future, and allowed endowments to spend more aggressively, anticipating the recovery.

So let Treasury yields, the Q-ratio, Shiller’s CAPE, and the difference between Moody’s Baa and Aaa spreads be your guide in distribution formulas.  Better to distribute less now, than find yourself or your institution impoverished later.

Sorry that I have not been posting much of late.  April is always rough for me.  Taxes play some role in April, because I get a certain amount of my tax data late, but the main reason stems from some charitable boards on which I serve, which meet in/near April.

One of the questions that came to me was how we could educate some of the workers to put away more of their income for retirement, because we don’t have a Defined Benefit plan.  After a little discussion, I said that I could give them good friendly advice.  As most committees go, when someone volunteers to solve a problem, discussion ends.

Now, what I have done is pretty simple, and violates one of my rules — I don’t believe in constant compound interest.  Markets don’t work that way, but for some perverse simplifying reason, retirement planning models do.

What I have done is create a model for retirement income, attempting to express it in terms that someone non-knowledgeable could understand.  You can download the Simple Retirement Calculator (free to download) that I created.

My base case assumes 3% inflation, pay keeps pace with inflation, and the real return on investing is 2% over inflation.  Other assumptions: one works for 45 years from age 25 to 70, and that the options for payout are limited to those that respect spouses and heirs.

So what can one 25 years old expect from saving over a 45 year period of time?

This table expresses what is needed in order to have effective income during retirement.  The average investor can’t control asset returns.

J&S 100% Cash Refund -> Spouse gets 100% after death of annuitant, heirs get a payment annuitants got less than the lump sum value at retirement.  Indexed benefits increase at the rate of the CPI.

With a 2%% real return, it takes a lot of saving to replace current income in retirement, even over 45 years. Note that the real return assumption has the largest impact on the results.

Much as I think DB plans are superior to DC plans for the average person, most companies in the present environment will not subsidize a DB plan to the degree that will allow a person to retire at the same level of purchasing power that they had while employed.

There are many ways that I could improve the results of this model, but the improvements would only be incremental.  The main point of this model indicates that most people do not save enough, if all of their retirement outcomes rely on a defined contributions plan.

Let me know what you think  in the comments below.  Thanks.

When I look at what stocks to switch to as I manage my assets, and those of my clients, I look for assets that may be more valuable than the market currently believes.  Most of that involves looking at industries and valuations, but that has led me to the following group of tickers:

ABC ACCL ADTN AET AKAM ALTR AMKR APA ARB ARKR ARO ARRS ARTNA AVY BBY BDX BEAM BGS BHP BIDU BLT BSX BX BZ C CACH CAG CAH CBG CCH CELL CF CFN CLF CMVT CNQR CODI COV CP CPB CPE CPSI CREE CSCO CSTR CSWC CTRP CZZ DD DFS DGX DHT DLPH DLX DRIV DVN DVR EBAY EEP EFC EFX EPAX ERIC FBHS FCX FDP FORR FSLR FTE FUJIY GD GKK GLDD GLW GNRC GOOG GT GTAT HAL HII HNZ HOGS HON HRC HWCC IACI IART IN IRE ISIL ITRI ITT IVC JBL JCI JCP JNPR K KFN KKR KLAC KNM KOP KRA LDR LIFE LLTC LMCA LOW LPS LSI LVLT MASI MCHP MCK MDCI MDRX MKC MOS MPC MRVL MS MSI MTG MWW NAV NE NFG NFLX NILE NLY NOK NTGR NTI NTIC NTK NTRI NUVA NVDA ONNN PC PCLN PHG PLCM PTNR QCOR QGEN QLGC QSII RAH RIMM RMD RUK SEMG SGX SIGI SLM SNE SNX SOHU SPLS SPN STE STJ STM STX SWKS SXT T TFX THOR TNDM TNS TRGT TRIP TSM TSRA TXN UTHR VAR VFC VOLC VPRT VRX VZ WBMD WBSN WDC WMB WMGI WNR WPI WST XRAY YHOO ZINC

Other ideas are solicited, but I think these companies as a group  will outperform over the next three years.

Before I start this evening’s book review, I would like to ask a favor of my readers.  If you like my reviews, maybe you can say that they are helpful at Amazon.  I rank in the 2000s at present, which was a challenge to get to, because not many reviewers of finance, investing, and economics books get to levels like that.  So, to the degree that you like my reviews, and have extra time to do this, I appreciate it.  If not, no worries — I’ve well exceeded my expectations; I appreciate that you read me.

I have never taken a course in accounting.  But I have had to do accounting for most of my working life, including doing financial reporting inside life insurers, which is the most complex industry for accounting. I have even opined on 10+ financial accounting standards over time.  And Aleph Blog is a leading accounting website as a user of accounting. (Dubious distinction, I know, but when you are a blogger, you take what you can get. )

As a value investor, I have taken a skeptical view toward the accounting of the companies that I invest in.  Cash entries can be trusted; accrual entries are less trustworthy in proportion to the length of time and uncertainty to the collection of cash.

This book relates accounting principles to value investing principles, and it is uncanny as to how they overlap.  It also attempts to connect it to Modern Portfolio Theory [MPT] concepts where it makes sense, but with less success. (No surprise, because value investing has a decent theory behind it and MPT doesn’t.)

The cornerstone of this book is return on net operating assets [RNOA].  The idea is to split the company in two, and separate operating results from financing results.  Give little value to financing results, which are likely no repeatable, and give significant value to operating results.

Note: this means that there is no way of evaluating financial companies under this rubric, but that’s a common problem.  Financial companies are a bag of accruals; value is difficult to discern.  That is why I spend most of my time analyzing the management teams of financial companies to see if they are conservative or not.

The book offers two measures of accounting quality, the Q-score and the S-score.  You would have to do more digging to make these practical, but at least you get some direction in the matter.

There are two simple prizes that the book gives to readers:

1) Profit results mean-revert; don’t trust strong or weak current ROEs. (or RNOAs)

2) Stocks with low P/Es and P/Bs do well.  Each works well, but they work better together.  Maybe if Ben Graham were still alive, he would not have been dismissive of his life’s work at the end, value works.  It’s an ugly brain dead strategy, but it works.

Quibbles

None.

Who would benefit from this book: Those who want to improve their perception of investment value would benefit from this book.  If you want to, you can buy it here: Accounting for Value (Columbia Business School Publishing).

Full disclosure: The publisher asked me if I wanted the book, so I asked for the book and he sent it to me.

If you enter Amazon through my site, and you buy anything, I get a small commission.  This is my main source of blog revenue.  I prefer this to a “tip jar” because I want you to get something you want, rather than merely giving me a tip.  Book reviews take time, particularly with the reading, which most book reviewers don’t do in full, and I typically do. (When I don’t, I mention that I scanned the book.  Also, I never use the data that the PR flacks send out.)

Most people buying at Amazon do not enter via a referring website.  Thus Amazon builds an extra 1-3% into the prices to all buyers to compensate for the commissions given to the minority that come through referring sites.  Whether you buy at Amazon directly or enter via my site, your prices don’t change.