Category: Speculation

The Longer View, Part 3

The Longer View, Part 3

  1. August wasn’t all that bad of a month… so why were investors squealing? The volatility, I guess… since people hurt three times as much from losses as they feel good from gains, I suppose market-neutral high volatility will always leave people with perceived pain.
  2. Need a reason for optimism? Look at the insiders. They see more value at current levels.
  3. Need another good investor to follow? Consider Jean-Marie Eveillard. I’ve only met him once, and I can tell you that if you get the chance to hear him speak, jump at it. He is practically wise at a high level. It is a pity that Bill Miller wasn’t there that day; he could have learned a few things. Value investing involves a margin of safety; ignoring that is a recipe for underperformance.
  4. Call me a skeptic on 10-year P/E ratios. I think it’s more effective to look at a weighted average of past earnings, giving more weight to current earnings, and declining weights as one goes further into the past. It only makes sense; older data deserves lower weights, because business is constantly changing, and older data is less informative about future profitability, usually.
  5. I found these two posts on the VIX uncompelling. Simple comparisons of the VIX versus the market often lead to cloudy conclusions. I prefer what I wrote on the topic last month. When the S&P 500 is below the trendline, and the VIX is relatively high, it is usually a good time to buy stocks.
  6. What does a pension manager want? He wwants returns that allow him to beat the actuarial funding target over the lifetime of the pension liabilities. If long-term high quality bonds allowed him to do that, then he would buy them. Unfortunately, the yield is too low, so the concept of absolute return strategies becomes attractive. Well, after the upset of the past six weeks, that ardor is diminished. As I have said before, to the extent that hedge funds seek stable, above average returns, they engage in yield-seeking behavior which prospers as credit spreads and implied volatilities fall, and fail when they rise. Eventually pension managers will realize that hedge fund returns cannot provide returns over the full length of the pension liability, in the same way that you can’t invest more than a certain amount of the pension assets in junk bonds.
  7. Is productivity growth slowing? Probably. What may deserve more notice, is that we have larger cohorts entering the workforce for maybe the next ten years, and larger cohorts exiting as well, which will decrease overall productivity. Younger workers are less productive, middle-aged most productive, and older-aged in-between. With the Baby Boomers graying, productivity should fall in aggregate.
  8. This is just a good post on sector data from VIX and More. It’s worth looking at the websites listed.
  9. Economic weakness in the US doesn’t make oil prices fall? Perhaps it is because the US is important to the global economy, but not as important as it used to be. It’s not hard to see why: China and India are growing. Trade is growing outside of the US at a rapid pace. The US consumer is no longer the global consumer of last resort. Now we get to find out where the real resource shortages are, if the whole world is capitalist in one form or another.
  10. Calendar anomalies might be due to greater macroeconomic news flow? Neat idea, and it seems to fit with when we get the most negative data.
  11. Is investing a form of gambling? I get asked that question a lot, and my answer is in aggregate no, because the economy is a positive-sum game, but some investors do gamble as they invest, while others treat it like a business. Much depends on the attitude of the investor in question, including the time horizon and return goals that they have.
  12. Massachusetts vs. the laws of economics. Beyond the difficulty of what to do with expensive cohorts in a public insurance system, I’ve heard that they are having difficulties that will make the system untenable in the long run… most of which boil down to antiselection, and inability to fight the force of aging Baby Boomers.
  13. Rationality is one of those shibboleths that economists can’t abandon, or their mathematical models can’t be calculated. Bubbles are irrational, therefore they can’t happen. Welcome to the real world, gentlemen. People are limitedly rational, and often base their view of what is a good idea, off of what their neighbor thinks is a good idea, because it is a lot of work to think independently. Because it is a lot of work, people conserve on hard thinking, since it is a negative good. They maximize utility where utility includes not thinking too hard. Any surprise why we end up with bubbles? Groupthink is a lot easier than thinking for yourself, particularly when the crowd seems to be right.
  14. Is China like the US with 120 years of delay? No, China has access to better technology. No, China does not have the same sense of liberty and degree of tolerance of difference. Its culture is far more uniform from an ethnic point of view. It also does not have the same degree of unused resources as the US did in the 1880s. Their government is in principle totalitarian, and allows little true freedom of religious expression, which is critical to a healthy economy, because people work for more than money/goods, but to express themselves and their ideals.
  15. As I have stated before, prices are rising in China, and that is a big threat to global stability. China can’t continue to keep selling goods without receive goods back that their workers can buy.
  16. The US needs more skilled immigrants. Firms will keep looking for clever ways to get them into the US, if the functions can’t be outsourced abroad.
  17. It’s my view that dictators like Chavez possess less power than commonly imagined. They spend excess resources on their pet projects, while denying aid to the people whom they claim to rule for their benefit. With inflation running hard, hard currencies like the dollar in high demand, and the corruption of his cronies, I can’t imagine that Chavez will be around ten years from now.
  18. Makes me want to buy Plum Creek, Potlach, or Rayonier. The pine beetle is eating its fill of Canadian pines, and then some, with difficult intermediate-term implications. More wood will come onto the market in the short run, depressing prices, but in the intermediate term, less wood will come to market. Watch the prices, and buy when the price of lumber is cheap, and prices of timber REITs depressed.
  19. Pax Romana. Pax Americana. One went decadent and broke, the other is well on its way. I love my country, but our policies are not good for us, or the world as a whole. We intrude in areas of the world that are not our own, and neglect the proper fiscal and moral management of our own country.
  20. Finally, it makes sense for economic commentators to make bold predictions, because there’s no such thing as bad publicity. Sad, but true, particularly when the audience has a short attention span. So where does that leave me? Puzzled, because I enjoy writing, but hate leading people the wrong way. I want to stay “low hype” even if it means fewer people read me. At least those who read me will be better informed, even if it means that the correct view of the world is ambiguous.

Tickers mentioned: PCH PCL RYN

The Longer View, Part 2

The Longer View, Part 2

When the market gets wonky, I write more about current events.? I prefer to write about longer-dated topics, because the posts will have validity for a longer time, and I think there is more money to be made off of the longer trends.? Before I go there tonight, I would like to say that at present the Fed says that it is ready to act, but it hasn’t done much yet.? As for the Bush Administration, and Congress, they have done nothing so far, and the few credible promises are small in nature.? My counsel: don’t be surprised if the markets stay rough for a while.

Onto longer-dated topics:

  1. Perhaps this should go into my “too many vultures” file, but conservative players like Annaly can take advantage of bargains produced by the crisis.? My suspicion is that they will succeed in their usual modest conservative way.
  2. Falling rates?? Falling equity prices?? Pension funding declines.? This issue has not gone away in the UK, and here in the US, the PBGC is still struggling.? As it is, FASB is facing the issue head on (finally), and the result will likely be a diminution of shareholders’ equity for most companies with defined benefit plans.
  3. China is a capitalist country?? Eminent domain can be quite aggressive there.? At least now they are promising compensation, but who knows whether the government really follows through.
  4. Any strategy, like quant funds, can become overcrowded.? As a strategy goes from little known to crowded, total returns rise and then flatten.? Prospective returns only fall as more and more compete for scarce excess returns.? As the blowout occurs, total returns go negative, and more so for the most leveraged.? Prospective returns rise as capital exits the trade.? Smart quants measure prospective return, and begin liquidating as prospective returns get too low.? Not many do that for institutional imperative reasons (investor: what do you mean cash is building up?? What am I paying you for?), but it is the right strategy regardless.
  5. This is a useful graph of sector weights in the S&P 500.? If nothing else, it is worth knowing what one is underweighting and overweighting.? I am overweight Energy, Basic Materials, Staples, Utilities, and (urk) Financials, and underweight the rest.? My portfolio, right or wrong, never looks like the market.
  6. I’ve written about SFAS 159 before.? Well, we may have a new poster child for why I don’t like it, Wells Fargo.? Mark-to-model is impossible to escape in fixed income, but I would treat gains resulting from changes in model assumptions as very low quality.? Watch SFAS 159 disclosures closely with complex financial companies.? If we wanted to repeat the late 90s headache from gain on sale accounting, we may have created the conditions to repeat the experience in a related way.
  7. How dishonest is the P&C insurance industry?? It varies, as in most industries.? Insurance is a bag of complex promises, which leaves it more open to abuse.? This article goes into some of that abuse, and teaches us to evaluate a company’s claims paying record.? You may have to pay more to get Chubb or Stancorp, but they almost always pay.
  8. China’s financial system is maturing slowly; one example of that is reduced reliance on bank finance, and issuing bonds directly.
  9. I don’t care what regulations get put into place, capitalist economies are unstable, and that’s a good thing.? There are always information asymmetries, and always crowd behavior, such that risk preferences change precipitously.? That’s the nature of the system.? The only true protection is to be aware of this reality, and adjust your behavior before things get crazy.
  10. A firm I was with had an early opportunity to invest in LSV and we didn’t do it.? The two members of our committee that read academic research thought we ought to (I was one), but the practical men of the committee objected to investing with unproven academics.? Oh, well, win some, lose some.
  11. Speaking of academic research, here’s a non-mathematical piece on cognitive biases.? Economists believe that man is economically rational not because of evidence, but because it simplifies the models enough to allow calculations to be made.? They would rather be precisely wrong than approximately right.
  12. Bit by bit, the efficient markets hypothesis get chipped away.? Here we have a piece indicating persistence of excess returns of the best individual investors.? For those of us that have done well, and continue to plug away in the markets, this is an encouragement.? It’s not luck.

I have enough for two more pieces on longer dated data.? It will have to come later.

Tickers Mentioned: NLY WFC CB SFG

The Liquidity Noose Tightens

The Liquidity Noose Tightens

At RealMoney today, After Dr. Jeff Miller of A Dash of Insight commented, I felt I had to add my own two cents:


David Merkel
Watch What They Do, and Less on What They Say
8/30/2007 1:57 PM EDT

Listen to Dr. Jeff on the Fed. Here are a few factoids to reinforce what the Fed is actually doing at present:

  • Fed funds have averaged 5.25% over the past five days, and 5.00% over the past fifteen, since the crisis began.
  • The Fed’s last permanent injection of liquidity was May 3rd. That’s a pretty long time for no injection, even in a tightening cycle.
  • The monetary base is flat, growing little over the last year. If policy changed recently, I can’t see it.
  • Policy change doesn’t show up in the monetary aggregates either, but lag effects dominate here.
  • We won’t know about discount window borrowings until this evening, but I don’t expect much
  • 3 month LIBOR is back around 5.60%, and the 3-month T-bill around 4% (rallying today). A TED spread at 1.6% indicates a lot of fear. Kinda surprised that swap spreads have not budged much.
  • In summary, the Fed hasn’t done much yet, aside from loosening up leverage requirements for some of the big banks, and allowing low quality collateral to come to the discount window. Though I don’t want the Fed to loosen, I don’t think they have much choice here. I expect an ordinary announcement by the end of the year cutting the Fed funds target.

    Position: none

    After that, I was pleasantly surprised to find that Calculated Risk and Econbrowser agreed with me.? Good company to be in.? After the close today, I wasn’t surprised to find that the discount window moves still haven’t done much.? Everyone will be listening to Bernanke tomorrow, but he won’t give any policy cues, most likely.? He has charted out a different course than the one Greenspan took; the hard question is whether he can maintain a policy of limited liquidity in the face of deteriorating conditions, and avoid the charge of favoritism, or, sloppy bank solvency management.? After all, credit is offered to few parties, and solvency rules are getting bent for the biggest banks.? That said, his tactics are more in line with the pre-Greenspan era.? But as this goes on, the commercial paper world shrinks for the third straight week, mainly due to the collapse of ABCP.

    Looking around the world, there are a variety of news bits:

    1. The Bank of England lends 1.6 billion pounds at the penalty rate of 6.75%.? Barclays plc was the borrower, again, supposedly over a clearing mess-up.? I am feeling more edgy about my Barclays stock.? Repeated problems in clearing should not happen, particularly during a period of market stress.
    2. Cheyne Finance begins a partial wind-up of its operations.? Amazing what what happens when liquidity is no longer cheaply available to finance assets.? This also points up the difference between ABCP sponsored by a bank, where they might bail it out to preserve relationships (as with the Development Bank of Singapore), and sponsorship from a hedge fund, where the balance sheet can’t fix the problems, even if they wanted to.
    3. With all of the fixed-income assets that Chinese banks have taken out of the US, is it any surprise that they took down a significant slug of subprime ABS?? I know from experience; new fixed-income investors tend to be more trusting of complexity than more experienced investors.? Failure brings maturity, and risk-based pricing.
    4. See Yen run.? Run Yen, run.? Amid all of this stress, we may have the slow unwind of the carry trade.? It has not become a rout yet, but who can tell.? I am still a bull on the yen, but I have no positions there.
    5. Amid the lack of liquidity in the US markets, foreign firms seeking debt capital go elsewhere.? Gerdau, the Brazilian steelmaker, seeks a international syndicated loan deal, rather than a deal in the US bond markets.? Just another sign of the times.? If you want to have a strong capital market for foreign entities, you must keep your domestic markets functioning, and that the US has not done.

    Closer to home, State Street has certainly had its difficulties with an underperforming short-term bond fund, and their own relatively large exposure to ABCP conduits.? Aside from the reputational hit, it’s possible that State Street won’t suffer too much damage from the conduits, they may be financing assets of good quality.

    So why conduits?? It allowed banks to do more business, while keeping it off of their balance sheets, thus maximizing their returns on assets and equity.? The banks may offer liquidity to the conduits during hard times, which brings some of the problems back during a crisis.

    As a final note, all of the credit stress has led banks to tighten credit standards, and has limited the ability to finance first mortgage and home equity loans.? So where do strapped consumers go?? Credit cards.? This can last for three to six months, but eventually the credit gambit will end in a trail of losses for all lenders involved, particularly those who have low or questionable security.


    Tickers mentioned: BCS STT DBS GGB

    Full disclosure: long BCS

    Cruising Across Our Speculative Markets

    Cruising Across Our Speculative Markets

    Quants have it tough.? Few in the investment world really understand what you do, and even fewer outside that world.? To many investment managers, quants are the guys nipping at their heels, clipping their returns, and questioning the need for fundamental analysis.? There comes a kind of schadenfreude when their models blow up, where qualitative mangers get to say, “See, I knew it was too good to be true,” and in the newspapers, a kind of bewilderment at eggheads whose models failed them.

    I write this as a hybrid.? I am a qualitative investor that uses quantitative models to aid my processes.? As such, I was hurt, but not badly, but recent market troubles.? Any class of models can be overused, and the factors common to most quant models indeed became overused recently.? Truth is, the models don’t vary that much from quant shop to quant shop, because the market anomalies are well known.? Many of these funds held the same stocks, as seen in hindsight.? Should it surprise us that their results were correlated?

    In a situation like this, success tends to breed more success, for a time, as more money gets applied to these strategies.? The statisticians should noticed the positive autocorrelation in excess returns, rather than randomness, which should have tipped them off to to much money entering the trade.? But no.? There was another calculation that could have been done as well, estimating the prospective return from new trades, which was declining as the trades got more popular.? My view is that a quant should estimate the riskiness of his strategy, and compare the returns to those available on junk bonds.? When the return is less than that available from a single-B bond, it’s time to start collapsing the trade.? (What, they won’t pay you to hold cash?? No wonder….)


    On a different topic, consider mark-to-model.? I’ve said it before, but Accrued Interest said it better when it said that mark-to-model is unavoidable.? Most bonds in the market do not have a bid at any given time.? Most bonds are bought and held; beyond that, there are multiple bonds for a given company, versus one class of common stock.? The common stock will be liquid, and the bonds merely fungible.? It is even more true for structured securities, where the classes under AAA are very thin.? The AAAs may trade, classes with lower credit ratings rarely do.

    Now the same argument is true when looking at a whole investment bank.? How do you mark positions that never trade, and here there is no readily indentifiable bid or ask?? You use a model that is built from things that do trade.? Sad thing is, there isn’t just one model, and there isn’t just one set of assumptions.? It is likely that the investment banks of our world, together with those they deal with, have marked illiquid securities to their own advantage.? Assets marked high, liabilities low.? Aggregate it across all parties, and the whole is worth more than the parts, due to mismarking.

    Now for a tour of unrelated items:

    1. There is something about a spike in volume that reveals weaknesses in back offices.? For derivative trading, where there is still a lot of paper changing hands, that is no surprise.
    2. Prime brokerage is an interesting concept.? They bring a wide variety of services to hedge funds, but also compete in a number of ways.? At my last firm, I never felt that we got much out of our prime brokerage relationships for what we paid.? They provided liquidity at times, but not often enough.? Executions were poor as well.
    3. The market sneezes, and we worry about jobs on Wall Street.? Par for the course.? What is unusual here is that few bodies were cut 2001-2003, so pruning may be overdue.? It may be worse because the structured product markets are under stress.
    4. Catastrophe bonds are opaque to most, and Michael Lewis did us a favor by writing this.? That said, though this article begins by suggesting that 2007 will be an above average hurricane season, I ask, “What if it is not?”? It is rare for the hurricane season to shift halfway through the season.? It may be time to buy RNR, FSR, MRH and IPCR.? But regarding cat bonds, they are issued by knowledgeable insurers.? After issue, there are dedicated hedge funds that trade them, taking advantage of less knowledgeable holder, who only originally showed up for the extra yield.
    5. A break in the market affects obscure asset classes as well.? If wealthy hedge fund managers are the marginal buyers of art, and they are getting pinched now, the art market should follow.
    6. Message to Mish: If Bill Gross is shilling for a PIMCO bailout, we are all in trouble.? If the prime mortgage market and the agencies are in trouble, then I can’t think of anyone in the US that will not feel the pain.? I think Bill Gross is speaking his mind here, much as I think that Fed funds rate cuts are not needed, though I also think that they will happen, and soon.
    7. Many emerging debt markets are in better shape than the US, because their current accounts are in better order.? Now, as for this article, Brazil might be okay, but Turkey is not in a stable place here because of their current account deficits, and I would be careful.
    8. Finally we are getting real volatility.? I like that.? It helps keep us honest, and shakes out weak holders and shorts.

    See you tomorrow, DV.

    Tickers mentioned: IPCR, MRH, FSR, RNR

    Surveying Bond Management and Overall Financial Market Volatility

    Surveying Bond Management and Overall Financial Market Volatility

    A personal note before I begin: My oldest daughter left for college today.? A bright girl who plays the harp beautifully, she is studying harp at the University of Maryland.? She is a true “people person” and an artist, and her good character is known by all of her friends.? She’ll be commuting, so I won’t lose her entirely yet, but we will miss her way with the other children.? She will be a natural mother, unlike her mother and I, who just try hard.

    Well, two off to college in a single year.? Good thing I’ve got six left, or I’d be lonely. 😀

    It takes two to make a market.? During the panic, some bond managers increased their risk postures as the market sold off.? Here is another example.? I agree with this in principle, but I at this point, I would only have moved my risk posture from “most conservative” to 20% of the way to “most aggressive,” which I actually did get to in November 2001, and October 2002.? There is a lot of leverage to unwind, and so there is a lot of room for further widening.? Take for example, these graphs of lower investment grade, and junk spreads.? We are nowhere near the 2002 wide spreads, though for investment grade, I don’t see how we get there.? Credit metrics are pretty good, though banks are more opaque and questionable.

    Bond management is a game where you are paid not to lose, because people are relying on you for safety, and then a modestly good return on their money.? Now, though the last article doesn’t treat Bill Gross well, in this article, he praises simplicity in investing, which I would heartily agree with.? The only thing that gives me a bit of pause there is that PIMCO is a quantitative bond management shop that has historically derived most of its excess returns from quantitative strategies that rely on the equivalent of selling deep out of the money options against their positions, and mean-reversion, and variety of other things.? When the ordinary relationships don’t work, PIMCO could be disproportionately hurt.

    Though investment grade looks fine, junk is another thing; it could reach the 2002 wides.? As an example, aside from all of the high yield deals that would like to get done, and all of the LBO debt standing in line waiting to be funded, there are still entities like Calpine that want to emerge from bankruptcy.? Willingness to take risk is not what it was when the banks made their commitments, so they’ll have to take losses to move the loans off of their books.? That will help to back up spreads, as buyers will toss out other paper to buy the Calpine debt, if it comes at an attractive enough concession.

    In situation like this, one would expect municipal [muni] bonds to be a haven, and largely, they are, partly because they are one of the few areas not touched by foreign capital.? But I was genuinely surprised when I read this article.? Muni arbitrage?? Okay, it comes from one simple insight muni investors want low volatility, which means short duration bonds, while most municipalities want to lock in long term funding.? After all, most of their projects are long term in nature.? Muni hedge funds (sigh) step in to fill the gap, buying long dated bonds, and selling short bonds against them to muni investors, clipping a yield spread in the process.? Worked fine for a while, but the hedge funds warped the market by their own participation, and played for yield spreads that were too low for the risks involved.? As the market normalized, they got hurt, and some aggressive selling of the long end happened.? Now, long munis are probably a good deal.? For taxable accounts, they make sense, if your time horizon is long enough.

    During financial stress, financial journalists may get a little over the top.? Comparing Ken Lewis to JP Morgan is an example.? First, the rescue is not that big, relative to Countrywide’s total liquidity needs.? Second, Countrywide, even if it failed, would not have that big of an impact on the total US financial system; it’s just not that big.? Would it be inconvenient?? Yes.? A bother for the regulators?? Sure.? But it would not appreciably affect the average financial institution, and it would inject some needed caution into those that lend to less secure entities.? Third, in a real rescue, far more capital is hazarded; honestly, the Fed did more by opening the discount window, pitiful as that was… it offered unlimited liquidity to (ahem) “quality” assets at a price.? (Quality has been redefined for now.)

    At a time like this, a bevy of survey articles come out to describe what has gone wrong.? Some tell of how aggressive players overplayed their hands as the willingness to take risk dried up.? In this case, they boil it down to bad lending models, whether subprime mortgages, bank debt for LBOs, or internal leverage inside hedge funds.? Other articles point at historical analogies, looking for something that might tell when the crisis will end.? The two years compared, 1987 (dynamic portfolio hedging) and 1998 (LTCM), do offer some help, but are not adequate to deal with an overall mortgage lending problem, and a large external debt, getting larger through the current account deficit.

    Is information failure the best way to describe it?? I don’t know; there were a lot of savvy people (myself included) who could see this coming, but could not put a date on it.? Toward the end of almost any bull market, underwriting gets sloppy, and the mess that it leaves usually persists until early in the next bull phase.? That’s the nature of human beings, and the markets they create.

    As I have stated before, central bank policy can help marginal entities refinance, but is no good at aiding balance sheets that are truly broken.? As you analyze your own assets, be sure to ask which entities need financing over the next two to three years, and how badly they need the help.? Don’t play with companies that are at the mercy of the capital markets.? Even if in the short run, after a volatility event, stocks tend to do well, there may be more volatility events than just one.? This first one is over financing; there will be defaults later.? Be ready for the volatility that will come from them.

    Tickers mentioned: CPNLQ BAC CFC

    Private Equity — Operators or Glorified Condo-flippers?

    Private Equity — Operators or Glorified Condo-flippers?

    1. In commercial real estate, operators that are willing to “feed their properties” during bad times get respect, and sometimes even lower financing costs from those who lend to them.? In a similar vein, and perhaps it is making a virtue out of necessity, it was interesting to see KKR offer to pump money into their specialty finance affiliate.? Don’t get me wrong, they haven’t become altruists, but a longer-term orientation is refreshing, perhaps.
    2. Arb spreads remain wide on deals though they have come back significantly recently.? For a gauge of that, simply look at a graph of the Merger Fund.
    3. Who can get out of what?? Well, private equity [PE] got the Home Depot board to cave in to a lower offer.? Guess they needed the money.? But what of other private equity deals?? I suspect more will lower prices as well, but not all of them; some deals will break up.? But what of the banks committed to lending money on deals?? Many of them are doing all they can to get off the hook, but so many banks surrendered their flexibility to exit deals in order to get the business during the boom phase.? Now they are paying for it, or, at least, considering paying for it, since losses look like they will be 10-12% of the amount loaned, as they sell the loans to institutional investors.
    4. “There is pressure to deploy,” said Ilan Nissan of law firm O’Melveny & Myers. “This business is about using resources to buy and sell companies. No one is making money by holding.“? To me, that what’s wrong with private equity.? If PE is just a larger version of condo-flippers, it has little reason to exist.? Improving operations and marketing would be far better things to do.
    5. Somewhat off-topic, back to the Fed Model, since that deals with the tradeoff of debt for equity, much like PE firms do.? I felt that Dr. Hussman’s methods were mistaken, and so I commented over at A Dash of Insight:Even though his regression fit well, there were two things amiss. One, how many models did he try before he published his model? Did he do a specification search? When I did my model, I did only two passes over the data, and the first was accidental because I didn’t have a lengthy corporate yield series. The Moody’s series is one of the few that goes back a long way, and Bloomberg did not carry it. I wanted to use BBB corporates from the start, but could not find a series, so I did one pass with Treasuries.

      http://alephblog.com/2007/07/09/the-fed-model/

      Second, after doing the analysis, the rest of his results rely on an extrapolation from the recent past to the further past. Dr. Hussman is the one who argues that the 80s are unique, but that is a large part of the data that he uses to estimate his backcast. No matter how good the fit, it is not safe to do extrapolations. Too many structural things change over time in capitalist economies.

    That’s all for now.? I might have the strength for one more post tonight.

    Tickers mentioned: KFN HD

    A “Sour Sixteen” Thoughts on the Real Estate Markets

    A “Sour Sixteen” Thoughts on the Real Estate Markets

    Before I begin this evening, let me just mention that I have expanded my blogroll. These are the blogs that are on my RSS reader at present. As I add more, I will add them to my blogroll. One more thing before I start: the comeback on Friday was nice, but I don’t think this is the end of the troubles; the leverage issues still aren’t dealt with, though the money markets (CP, ABCP) may be getting reconciled in the short term. Tonight’s topic is the mortgage market:

    1. Reduction in capacity is the rule of the day. Who is shrinking or disappearing? Lehman’s subprime unit, Thornburg (shrinking), Luminent (cash injection under distress), American Home (what were the auditors thinking?), Capital One (closing Greenpoint), Countrywide (layoffs), Accredited, HSBC’s US mortgage unit, and more.
    2. Who has lost money? Who has decided to pony up more? Carlyle ponies up, Bank of China, speculators including Annaly, and many others, including IKB, BNP Paribas, and British, Japanese and Chinese banks. The losses are mainly a US phenomenon, but not exclusively so.
    3. Thing is, in a credit crunch, before things settle down, everyone pays more. The CEO of Thornburg suggests that the mortgage markets aren’t functioning. Well, if excellent borrowers aren’t getting loans, he is correct. After risk control methods are refined, new capital finds the better underwriters, who underwrite better loans. For those with good credit, any imbalances should prove temporary.
    4. Now what do you do if you are a surviving mortgage lender, and you can’t get enough liquidity to lend? Raise savings and CD rates. (A warning to readers: no matter how tempting, do not lend to mortgage lenders above any government guaranteed threshold on your deposits.)
    5. Could the Truth in Lending Act cause loans to be rescinded? As I commented, If TILA claims are successful, there would probably be a breach of the reps & warranties made by the originator. I think there is a time limit on the reps and warranties though, and I’m not sure how long it is.
      If a securitized loan has to be taken by the originator, the AAA part of the deal will prepay by that amount. Losses will be borne first by the overcollateralization account, and then the tranches, starting with the most junior, and then moving in order of increasing seniority. If a bank goes insolvent as a result of this, any claims against the bank by the securitization trust would be general claims against the bank.

      Very interesting, Barry. Thanks for posting this. It’s just another reason why in securitization, it is better to be a AAA holder, or an equity holder. They have all of the rights — the AAAs when things are bad, and the equity when things are good to modestly bad.

    6. Or, could Countrywide, and other lenders run into difficulties because they might have to buy back loans that they modify the terms, if they are pre-emptive in doing so, rather than reactive to a threatened default? On the other hand, modifications are generally allowed for true loss mitigation, or if they are loss neutral to the senior investors. But what if the servicer offers modification to someone with a subprime loan who really doesn’t need it? Not likely in this environment. Almost everyone who took out a subprime loan expected to refinance. Modification is just another way of getting there.
    7. What could fiscal policy do to get us out of this mess? Maybe expand Fannie and Freddie, or FHA? Or have a bailout from some other entity, as Bill Gross or James Cramer might suggest? I’m a skeptic on this, as I posted at RealMoney on Thursday:

      David Merkel
      Every Little Help Creates a Great Big Hurt
      8/23/2007 5:09 PM EDT

      So there are some that want the US Government to bail out homeowners. Need I remind them that on an accrual basis, we are running near record deficits? Never mind. In another 5-10 years, it won’t matter anymore, because foreigners will no longer fund the gaping needs of the US Government as the Baby Boomers retire.But so as not to be merely a critic, let me suggest an idea to aid the situation. Income tax futures. We could speculate on the amount the US Government takes in, and the IRS could use it for hedging purposes. One thing that I am reasonably sure of: tax rates will be higher ten years from now, and I would expect the futures to reflect that.

      Position: long tax payments

    8. Beautiful San Diego, where my in-laws live. What a morass of default and foreclosure, as is much of California. Good blog, by the way.
    9. For those who have read me at RealMoney, the troubles in residential real estate came as no surprise to me, though many at Wall Street were either surprised, or feigning surprise.
    10. One other easy way that we can tell that we are in a residential real estate bear market is the incidence of fraud. Face it, in a bear market, the scams play to the fear of people, whereas in a bull market, they play to their greed.
    11. What effects will the increase in consumer debt, including mortgages, have on the economy? Well, the Fed Vice-Chairman wrote a piece on it, and the answer is most likely slower growth in consumer expenditure, and greater sensitivity of demand to interest rate movements.
    12. What happens when the equity and debt markets get shaky? Commercial landlords in New York City and London get nervous. Personally, I wouldn’t be that concerned, but perhaps some of them overlevered? (Hey, remember how MetLife sold a large chunk of their NYC properties for record valuations? Good sales.)
    13. How much value will get wiped away before the residential real estate bust is done? $200 billion to several trillion (implied as a worst case by the article)? I lean toward the several trillion figure, but not strongly.
    14. Something that trips people up about the mortgage troubles, is that little has been taken in losses so far, why is there such a panic? Markets are discounting mechanisms, and they forecast the losses, and bring the currently expected present value of losses to reflect on the value of the securities. Beyond that, weak holders of mortgage securities panic and sell, exacerbating the fundamental movements.
    15. Why are credit cards doing well when mortgages are doing badly? This is unusual. What it makes me think is that there is a class of homeowner out there thinking: “The mortgage? I’m dead, no way I can pay that. I have to look forward to renting in the future, and I don’t want to destroy access to my credit card.”
    16. Finally, ending on an optimistic note: even if housing is so bad, in a global economy, it may not mean so much to the stock market. That’s my view at present, and why I am willing to be a moderate bull, even as I continue to do triage on my portfolio. (PS — that graph entitled, “Trouble at Home,” is scary.)
    Fed Up with Impotent Monetary Policy

    Fed Up with Impotent Monetary Policy

    So the Fed opens up the discount window, and drops the rate 0.5%, banks go gonzo, right?? Well, no, I wouldn’t call it a “brisk business.”? A lot of the “business” was in and out in short order, for average borrowings of $1.2 billion.? For the discount window of its own to make a real dent in monetary policy, we would need to see more than $10 billion of net borrowings, because the Fed is decreasing the monetary base by $10 billion through other actions.? As it is, after the discount rate was decreased, there was a flurry of action, and then nothing.? So, in order to keep the monetary base up, the Fed injects temporary liquidity of $17.25 million, the most in 2 weeks (i.e., since permanent temporary injections started).? Does this have a big impact on the Fed funds rate?? No, it closes out the day at 4.875%, which is close to the average level of 4.90% over the past two weeks.? The number looks big, but it is meaningless.? Look at the monetary base or one of the monetary aggregates; they haven’t moved much.? Should we expect a lot of incremental economic action of out of this?? I don’t think so.

    Onto the Commercial Paper Market.? CP outstanding had its biggest weekly drop since 2000. It is down almost 10% over the past two weeks.? Most of the decrease is asset-backed CP.? Bill Gross declares that the ABCP market is “history.”? He’s wrong.? Again.? ABCP will remain but with safer classes of asset-backed securities, wider spreads, and larger margins of safety, at least until the next lust for yield comes upon us. ;)? As it is, the safer parts of the ABCP market are beginning to function normally, albeit at higher spreads.

    Things can get bad in the ABCP market, particularly if you are an issuer that doesn’t have a big balance sheet.? That’s what happened to Canada’s Coventree.? For banks issuing ABCP, it should not be as big of a problem; many banks will step up and make up the loss.? If the risk is $891 billion in commercial paper, I would be surprised if the losses were more than 2% of that amount.? At $18 billion, that is no threat to the system, though some rogue money market funds might get whacked.

    Now corporate bond issuance is returning, though some of it is replacing CP.? I expect that effect to stop soon.? Things are returning to normal in corporates, though high yield will take more time.

    This article helps point out that the Fed, though still powerful, has reduced powers because less of the financial system consists of depositary institutions. ABS and mutual funds have picked up the slack.? What that implies is that ordinary bond buyers are willing to take on the risks that depositary institutions once did.? That reduces the power of the Fed.

    As for this article, I’m sure Fed Governors are thinking, “What’s next?? Are we just running from fire to fire, or is there a systemic way to restore order?”? I’m not so sure here.? I think a permanent injection of liquidity would do it, temporarily, but there are so many places where leverage got too great that are in loss positions now.? For the Fed, the only real question should be, how much did our banks lend to the overleveraged?

    From Michael Sesit at Bloomberg, there are four things for the central banks to do in order to avert the crises: The world’s major central banks face four challenges as they strive to prevent the global financial system from unraveling and growth from stagnating: Acting in a concerted manner; improving transparency; deciding who gets bailed out and who doesn’t; and making sure whatever monetary medicine is administered doesn’t come with destabilizing side effects.

    All four are not easy.? I would argue that the last two are the most important, but that it is very difficult to legally discriminate between who needs it and who doesn’t.? Destabilizing side effects are part and parcel of monetary policy.? To the degree that the Fed can discriminate, it will eventually run the risk of being view as unfairly discriminatory, and unelected as well.

    So, I don’t see much happening here from monetary policy.? It is simply a question of how the excess leverage presents itself through the financial system.? So far, it has served up some notable troubles, the question is how much more before it burns out.? With residential housing prices sagging it may persist for a long while, until the Fed debases the currency such that debtors can pay back their debts in devalued terms.? It almost reminds me of the bimetalism of the late 19th century; debasing the currency to let a wide number of debtors off the hook.? Well, if the Fed doesn’t do it, maybe Congress will.? After all, Congress can do something targeted,and live with the political heat.? The Fed risks its independence if they look like they behave on behalf of the the few, nor the many.

    Money Market Malaise

    Money Market Malaise

    1. There was a decent amount of attention paid to this blog post from the WSJ Marketbeat blog. The sentiment for a cut from the bond and futures markets stems from the concept that what the Fed has done is inadequate to reliquefy the areas that they are targeting. Banks will face significant lending losses, and economic growth will stop, unless the FOMC acts in a major way. We are still waiting (since 5/3) for a permanent injection of liquidity, and we have until Thursday night to see how much good the discount window action has done.
    2. From the “not much good” camp, what good is it if healthy institutions pick up additional excess liquidity at rates above where they could they could borrow unsecured for 5 years in the bond market? Bank of America did not need the discount window down by 0.5% in order to take a stake in Countrywide.
    3. Here’s the current problem. It has been difficult for marginal borrowers to borrow in the Commercial Paper [CP] markets. Even strong names like American Express and Lincoln National went to the bond market to pay off maturing CP. But if you were a lower rated company, things were worse, like H&R Block, or GMAC, things are considerably worse. All they can rely on is pre-existing credit lines. After that, they are dependent on the kindness of strangers.
    4. Now, there is some hint that the troubles in ABCP are becoming more nuanced. Conduits with the highest quality collateral are getting rolled over. But how bad is it for real offenders? It is one of those cases where the ratings agencies are playing catch-up, let us say. Moves from AAA to CCC? Yes. Breathtaking. Sure ruins their ratings migration tables.
    5. For those with time, for a relatively complete article explaining some of the problems that money market funds face from subprime, look here. The risk isn’t the same risk as from asset-backed CP [ABCP] per se, but seems to stem from buying AAA floating rate bonds from CDOs owning tranches of subprime ABS.
    6. Those worrying about the carry trade blowing up can rest for a while. The Bank of Japan decided not to tighten. Japanese lending rates remain low a while longer, and the party goes on. I guess it will take the importation of inflation to make that change.
    7. Beware easy certainties. Just because the Fed cuts does not mean the market will rise, or that if it doesn’t cut, it will fall. On average, it is true the 6 months after a first cut, the market rises, and almost always rises after a full year the first cut.
    8. I previously asked who could benefit from incremental US dollar liquidity. I came up with a few possibilities, but one I did not come up with was Hong Kong, with their link to the US Dollar on one side, and their link to Chinese growth on the other. It is certainly worth a thought.

    Full disclosure: long LNC

    The Fed is Hopeful (oh, that h-word…)

    The Fed is Hopeful (oh, that h-word…)

    Only time for one post tonight.? I had a late meeting with some men from my church.? Away from that, my oldest son goes to college for the first time tomorrow, to St. John’s in Annapolis.? I will miss him, even though I will see him most weekends; he is a joy of a child to be around, and a really sharp thinker.? As an intern, he has impressed two investment firms with his acumen.? But what I will miss most is his good character.

    Into the fray, then.? It’s the WSJ’s word, but is the Fed genuinely hopeful?? If so, it’s on scant evidence.? Away from that, you have Governor Lacker, who tends to be a hawk, saying that it is the effect of the financial markets on the economy will drive Fed policy, not any volatility in the credit markets themselves.? Well, the present dislocation is worse than LTCM in many ways already.? LTCM did not gum up the mortgage repo market, or money market funds.? As it is, Central banks are still showing themselves willing (minus the Bank of England) to engage in a series of short term injections of liquidity.

    Why are money markets doing badly?? Asset-backed commercial paper [ABCP] makes up 50% of all money market fund assets, and those claims will have to be rolled over the next 1-3 months.? At a time like like this, the lack of alternatives is driving money market funds to grab T-bills and highly rated CP, even as those with higher ABCP exposure wonder what will happen if the ABCP conduits extend the obligation, and at the end of the extension period, are still inverted?? What will those that have to provide liquidity or credit support do?? This problem is not limited to the US; there have also been problems in Canada and Britain, but banks operating there have stepped up and taken the hit themselves.? Altruistic in the short run, but regulators and business partners have long memories, even when it is only implied promises getting broken.? (Hey, maybe the Fed can open up the discount window to non-bank ABCP conduits.? Please don’t… 🙁 )

    At a time like this, is it any surprise that the guy who created the money market fund is saying that the concept has been abused?? It was not meant to fund speculators in risky asset classes.? Not all ABCP does that, but that is what some of them are proving to be now.? But, perhaps it is fitting in its own warped way.? The introduction of money market funds (and the elimination of regulation Q, a ceiling on credited interest rates) helped prolong the inflation of the 70s, because the Fed couldn’t control liquidity the way that it used to; money market funds just kept supplying liquidity at interest rates investors found attractive.

    So, how tight is US monetary policy?? If you gauge it by T-bills, pretty tight.? At every percentage rise in the Treasury less fed funds spread like this, the Fed has loosened.? It could be different this time, but if so, the markets will be jolted, and by markets, I mean the debt markets, the money markets, etc.? The stock market will be down too, but that will be the least of our worries.? Even now, other types of consumer lending are starting to tighten.? With the markets already discounting a 50 basis point decrease in September, those markets will be tighter still if the Fed sounds like Governor Lacker.

    So things are bad in the US.? How about elsewhere?? WestLB CEO Alexander Stuhlmann says that he sees an increasing reluctance to lend to German banks.? The Bank of England lent to Barclays plc at a penalty rate at their discount window, and supposedly for no big reason.? (I hope the reason is innocent incompetence… I’m a shareholder.? Oops, there’s the h-word again, and it’s me.)


    The carry trade is getting squeezed, partly because currency option volatilities are rising.? How does this work?? Think of it this way.? The carry trade works by borrowing in a low interest currency, and investing in a high interest currency.? Assume for a moment that I approximately matched the maturities of the two trades (risk control!), but that I wanted downside protection from the trade going wrong, so I would buy an option that would stop me out at a certain level of loss (again, attempting to match trade maturity).? The higher the option volatility goes, the more costly it is to limit the risk on my trade, so as option volatility rises, the willingness to do the carry trade falls.

    Chinese Inflation? ? As I’ve said before, that is a threat to the recycling of the US current account deficit, and also a threat to US inflation levels.? Could that keep the FOMC from loosening?? Not yet.? We need to see more pain here.

    Finally, from the “don’t bite the hand that feeds you file,” the Bush Administration is worrying about the impact of sovereign wealth funds exerting undue influence on the US.? Oh, please, you worry about this now, after expanding our current account deficit like mad?!? At this point, the US has few options but to sell assets to all but dedicated enemies of the US; if we are not willing to cut back our current account deficit in other ways, and our debt becomes unattractive, there are two choices, let the dollar fall until US goods become compelling (with rising interest rates and inflation), or let them buy our assets.? We can’t freeload on the rest of the world forever (though we did sell much of the toxic CDO waste to unsuspecting naifs, we just don’t know who yet), eventually we will have to be willing to sell away large stakes in major US corporations.? (Or maybe all the surplus homes! 😀 )

    Full disclosure: long BCS

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