Month: September 2008

Redacted Version of the FOMC Statement

Redacted Version of the FOMC Statement

The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to keep its target for the federal funds rate at 2 percent.

Strains in financial markets have increased significantly and labor markets have weakened further. Economic growth appears to have slowed recently,activity expanded in the second quarter, partly reflecting a softening of householdgrowth in consumer spending. and exports. However, labor markets have softened further and financial markets remain under considerable stress. Tight credit conditions, the ongoing housing contraction, and some slowing in export growthelevated energy prices are likely to weigh on economic growth over the next few quarters. Over time, the substantial easing of monetary policy, combined with ongoing measures to foster market liquidity, should help to promote moderate economic growth.

Inflation has been high, spurred by the earlier increases in the prices of energy and some other commodities.commodities, and some indicators of inflation expectations have been elevated. The Committee expects inflation to moderate later this year and next year, but the inflation outlook remains highly uncertain.

TheAlthough downside risks to growth andremain, the upside risks to inflation are bothalso of significant concern to the Committee. The Committee will continue to monitor economic and financial developments carefully and will act as needed to promote sustainable economic growth and price stability.

Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman; Christine M. Cumming;Timothy F. Geithner, Vice Chairman; Elizabeth A. Duke; Richard W. Fisher; Donald L. Kohn; Randall S. Kroszner; Frederic S. Mishkin; Sandra Pianalto; Charles I. Plosser,Plosser; Gary H. Stern; and Kevin M. Warsh. Ms. Cumming voted asVoting against was Richard W. Fisher, who preferred an increase in the alternatetarget for Timothy F. Geithner.the federal funds rate at this meeting.

=-=-=–==–==-=-=–=-=-=-=-=-==-=-=-=–=

Of Note:

  • No move, they are happy with the current policy.
  • Even Richard Fisher is happy with the current policy.
  • They will monitor economic and financial developments “carefully” now.
  • They see greater weakness in economic growth, labor markets, export growth, and the financial markets.
  • They are puzzled about inflation; they think/hope it will decrease soon.? (Watch for a surprise in the third quarter GDP deflator that undoes the surprise in the second quarter.)

The markets seem to be taking it in stride.? I’m glad they didn’t cut; perhaps they’ve learned something from the emergency cuts that they sterilized by not letting the monetary base grow much.? Sterilized interventions don’t do much.

Witnessing History

Witnessing History

I would like to post more at present, but my family and work have kept me busy.? A few notes:

  • There have been many who have suggested that FAS 157 (or 159)? is to blame for the current crisis.? Sorry, but that doesn’t fly.? The trouble does not stem from the accounting, but from the rotten investments.? High-quality liquid investments do not have problems getting priced for reporting purposes.? If you can’t get a liquid price, there is a reason for that.? Prices in illiquid markets jump around — that is a rule.
  • AIG might survive if? banks that face a lot of counterparty exposure decide to lend to them to minimize their own losses.? At this point, it looks unlikely, but it is possible that banks that would have large credit exposures to AIG would make a loan to AIG.? One other note, the $20 billion loan from their subsidiaries appears to be contingent on AIG getting significant help from other sources of financing.? No link, but from Bloomberg — ? “AIG hadn’t gotten access to the New York lifeline as of about 10:30 a.m., said David Neustadt, a spokesman for state Insurance Superintendent Eric Dinallo.
    “It would be part of a broader deal,”? Neustadt said. “If there’s no broader deal, then it doesn’t happen.” The regulators didn’t say yesterday that access to the cash would require such conditions.
  • So what does the FOMC do today?? My guess is that they loosen 25 basis points, or do something that gives an expectation of expanding the monetary base.? I suggested that this might have to happen last month, when I saw credit stress continuing to build in the banking system.
  • That said, the FOMC could stand pat, and offer to take in lower grade collateral via tri-party repos in order to help keep marginal instituions afloatt, while leaving the monetary base flat.? That’s been their default policy for the past year, and it may have delayed some of the credit stress, but it has not solved the basic problem of too much bad lending.? Not that the FOMC can solve it without buying all the bad debt, and extinguishing it in a burst of inflation.

We ask too of the Fed in bad times, and in good times, we don’t ask them to restrain the banks as much as we ought.? The problems we face today stem from the monetary and banking laxity from the mid-90s to 2007.? There’s a lot of bad debt out there, and no easy way to change it.? We are witnessing history now, as leverage collapses in big complex institutions, and in small places too (home mortgages), and we realize that even the government is too small to deal with the problems that they let grow for over a decade, and we didn’t care while the good times rolled on.? At present, the main open question is whether the defaults are big enough to trigger another wave of defaults.? As for that question, I don’t know the answer, but will try to gauge the risks as time moves on.

I will post later after the FOMC statement.

AIG Borrows from Itself

AIG Borrows from Itself

The Governor of New York, possibly thinking about his tax base, and perhaps 30,000 jobs, has allowed AIG to borrow $20 billion from its subsidiaries.? Details are scant, but this can be one of three things:

  • AIG has surplus assets in its NY-domiciled subsidiaries in excess of their risk-based capital requirements.? If true, borrowing against these would be a no-brainer that should have been pursued long ago.? Favoring this view is the NY Governor, who says AIG is “extraordinarily solvent.”
  • AIG has surplus assets in its NY-domiciled subsidiaries, but not in excess of their risk-based capital requirements.? Borrowing against these would be a risky gamble, because it lowers the amount of risk margin available to absorb adverse deviations.
  • Some combination of both — say that AIG has only $15 billion in surplus assets in its NY-domiciled subsidiaries… $5 billion would reduce risk margins.

The risk here is that you end up with insolvencies of some of AIG’s subsidiaries.? Though poential losses to policyholders would be unlikely to be large, assessments would be made to other insurer though the state guaranty funds in order to keep policyholders whole, but potentially at a cost to the other insurers.

This has the potential to look really bright or really stupid, and in a short amount of time, too.? Final note: It’s not impossible, but I would be surprised if the Federal Government or the Federal Reserve intervenes on AIG when it would not with Lehman.

Investing in Financial Stocks is Tough

Investing in Financial Stocks is Tough

At RealMoney, I wrote an article in 2005 called, Buyers Beware: Financials are Different.? In addition to many other things I mentioned there, I gave six ways that financials were different:

  • Tangible assets play only a small role in a financial company. What constrains the growth of an industrial company? The fixed assets (plant and equipment) limit the technical amount of product that can be delivered in a year. Demand is the ultimate limiting factor, but this affects financial, industrial and services businesses alike. But with a financial company, sometimes the limits are akin to a service business (“If only we had more trained sales reps”), but more often, capital limits growth.
  • The cash flow statement plays a big role with industrials and utilities, but almost no role with financials. One of the great values of the cash flow statement is the ability to attempt to derive estimates of free cash flow. Free cash flow is the amount of cash that the business generates in a year that could be removed with the business remaining as functional as it was at the start of the fiscal year. Deducting maintenance capital expenditure from EBITDA often approximates free cash flow. Cash flow statements for financials cannot in general be used to derive estimates of free cash flow because when new business is written, it requires capital to be set aside against the risks. Capital is released as business matures. In order to derive a free cash flow number for a financial company, operating earnings would have to be adjusted by the change in required capital.
  • Sadly, the change in required capital is not disclosed anywhere in a typical 10K. Depending on the market environment, even the concept of required capital can change, depending on what entity most closely controls the amount of operating and financial leverage that a financial institution can take on. Sometimes the federal or state regulators provide the most constraint. This is particularly true for institutions that interact closely with the public, i.e., depositary institutions, life and personal lines insurers. For entities that raise their capital in the debt markets, or do business that requires a strong claims-paying-ability rating, the ratings agencies could be the tightest constraint. Finally, and this is rare, the probability of blowing up the company could be the tightest constraint, which implies loose regulatory structures. Again, this is rare; many companies do estimates of the economic capital required for business, but usually regulatory or rating agency capital is tighter.
  • Financial institutions are generally more highly regulated than non-financial institutions. There are several reasons for this: the government does not want the public exposed to financial risk or systemic risk; guarantee funds are typically implicitly backstopped by the government (think FDIC, FSLIC, state insurance guaranty funds, etc.); and defaults are costly in ways that defaults of non-financials are not. The last point deserves amplification. In a credit-based economy, confidence in the financial sector is critical to the continued growth and health of the economy. Confidence cannot be allowed to fail. Also, since many financial institutions pursue similar strategies, or invest in one another, the failure of one institution makes the regulators touchy about everyone else.
  • Rapid growth is typically a negative. Financial businesses are mature, and there is a trade-off between three business factors: price, quantity and quality. In normal situations, a financial institution can get only two out of three. In bad times, it would be only one out of three.
  • Because of the different regulatory regimes, financial institutions tend to form holding companies that own the businesses operating in various jurisdictions. Typically, borrowing occurs at the holding company. The regulators frown at borrowing at the operating companies, unless the borrowers are clearly subordinate to the public served by the operating company. This makes the common stock more volatile. In a crisis, the regulators only want to assure the safety of the operating company; they don’t care if the holding company goes bust and the common goes to zero. They just want to make sure that the guaranty funds don’t take a hit, and that confidence is maintained among consumers.

In general, accruals are weaker than cash entries in accounting.? Not all accruals are created equal either.? Some are less certain to be collected/paid, and some are further out in the future than others.

Financial stocks are generally bags of accrual entries in an accounting sense, with some more certain than others.? E.g., a short-tail personal lines P&C insurer’s accounting is a lot more certain than that of an investment bank.

This is why management quality matters so much with financial stocks.? The managements of financial companies must be competent and conservative, and all the more so to the degree that the accruals that they post are less certain.? Companies that grow too rapidly, or lack obvious risk control are to be avoided.

Looking at the Present Concerns

I own a bunch of insurance companies, but no banks or other financials.? Why?? Insurers are profitable and cheap, and are not under threat from credit risk to the degree that other financials are.? Consider the threats to AIG, Citi, Lehman, Merrill, GM, Ford, Wamu, etc.? The companies that got into trouble grew too fast, levered up too much, neglected risk control disciplines, and more.

Now their valuations have been crunched, and their financing options are limited.? Fortunately there are the options of last resort:

  • Have you maxed out trust preferred obligations? Other subordinated debt?
  • Have you maxed out preferred stock?
  • Have you issued convertible debt to monetize volatility?
  • Have you diluted your equity through secondary IPOs, rights offerings, PIPEs, and/or deals with strategic investors?
  • Have you sounded out investors in your corporate bonds about debt-for equity swaps?
  • And, unique to Fannie and Freddie, have you asked the US government for a capital infusion or a debt guarantee?

Given that Bear got a guarantee, perhaps others could too, though I think the US Government is far less willing now.? I could also add another point: have you sold your most valuable liquid assets?

With the crises being faced by financial companies, there is a rule that separates the survivors from the losers: Losers sell their best assets, and play for time.? Survivors/winners sell their worst assets and hunker down — they have enough financial slack that they don’t have to engage in panic behavior.

In an environment like this, where there is a lot of uncertainty, avoiding suspect financials is prudent.? This applies to those who take on the risks from such institutions when the decisions have to be made quickly on whether to buy them or not.? Thus I would be careful on the equities of any buyers in this environment, and would be a seller of any company that is a rapid buyer during this time of financial stress.

Full disclosure: no positions in companies mentioned.? I own SAFT LNC AIZ MET RGA HIG UAM among insurers, and might buy some more….

What of AIG?

What of AIG?

Over the past 24 hours, i have received half a dozen calls/messagesasking me what about AIG?? Before I start that, let me point to a few of my posts on AIG:

Let me say that it took this long for the price to fall below where it was when I left the firm in 1992.? For many firms with significant slack assets, they could have resisted this fall in the stock price, but AIG could not.

Why not?? It is a complex firm.? Complex firms have a hard time splitting/understanding the results of their various business units.? Management’s view of free cash flow is cloudy.

With AIG, the best thing that they can likely do is spin/sell off their US Life and P&C arms separately or together.? Those units have a relatively easy to determine value.? WIth the cash, AIG can focus on improiving the remaining units.? If they can’t do that, AIG is heading for the scrap heap.

Call me a bear here.? I have no idea how good the current management team will be, but so many are mezmerized by the past of AIG.

Another Look At Fannie and Freddie

Another Look At Fannie and Freddie

For what it is worth, I am the proud owner of a “Fannie Fraud Patrol” T-shirt.? The fraud patrol was a loose mix of investors who felt that Fannie Mae’s finances were misstated back in 2003.? My small contribution to the effort was showing that the fair value balance sheet was not compatible with the standard balance sheet.? That was a pretty basic finding for an actuary used to doing cash flow testing.

I did not post much on Fannie and Freddie after the partial takeover by the US Government, because there wasn’t all that much that I could add.? I had gotten my calls right, most notably:

If you followed those calls, you made good money, particularly the first one.

But with all of the fuss over the actions of the Treasury, I must note several items:

  • Congress has the power to reverse or modify what the Treasury has done.? (Not that I ever expect much out of Congress…)
  • Even if the Treasury succeeds in lowering mortgage rates, that does not mean much when borrowers aren’t capable of scraping together the proper downpayment.??? Lower interest rates do not stimulate economic sectors under stress, but do stimulate healthy sectors, as housing did in 2001-3, while industry suffered.
  • I don’t like being a wet blanket, but aside from preventing systemic risk from letting senior debt and agency MBS suffer credit risk (these are big things), there isn’t a lot to boast about in the takeover.? At best, this leads to the wind-off of two entities that never should have been created.? Housing should not be subsidized by US taxpayers.

To the free market purists, who I sympathize with, I say let the hybrids die.? Our government has meddled too much in lending markets, but it is egregious when they do so where there is a private profit motive.? This bailout delivered real pain to those that were equity holders, while protecting against systemic risk.? The moral hazard issue to equity and preferred holders is dead.? They can lose it all, or close to it.? This is real improvement.

To liberals I say the public interest has been protected.? Systemic risk is avoided.? It is better that those without the wherewithal to own homes rent, than that they strain to own.

To all of Congress I say, if the Administration comes to you asking for a rise in the debt ceiling, ask them to sell their mortgage-backed securities first.? Why should those with mortgages be favored over renters and freeholders?

Avoiding Doomed Sectors, Redux

Avoiding Doomed Sectors, Redux

Those that have followed me for a while know that I rotate industries.? The idea is to buy:

  • Strongly capitalized companies that are at their cyclical trough, or
  • Moderate-to-strongly capitalized companies where pricing trends are under-discounted.? Often these companies have positive price momentum.

Also, the idea is to avoid:

  • Sectors where valuation metrics are cheap, but the indutries are in terminal decline.
  • Weakly capitalized companies and industries where product pricing is weak.

The sectors to avoid are what I term “doomed sectors” though it applies better to the first example of the two.? My favorite example of a doomed sector is newspapers.? I don’t care how cheap they get, I am not buying.? They are obsolete.? As for the second example, think about depositary financial companies, or companies that take a lot of credit risk.? Eventually they will bounce back, but it will take a while.

Here’s my current industry ranks:

IndustryRanks-9-12-08
IndustryRanks-9-12-08

So, why don’t I dig through Hotels/Gaming, Air Transport, and Homebuilding?? Hotels are overbuilt.? Air Transport is a losers’ game; there are always romantic male entrepreneurs willing to invest at subpar prospective returns, because they like to see the planes fly.? Homebuilding?? There is a glut of homes.

If you can avoid bad sectors, your performance will be pretty good.? That has helped me over the past eight years.

I like investing in the green zone, in industries that I think have a future.? Good picks there can last for years.? There is another way to play my industry model, though.? Put money in the top ten industries, and keep it there as the berst industries change.? The trouble is, it is a high turnover strategy, though it beats the index by about 6%/year.? I’m not sure what trading friction would do to the return advantage.

That’s my view on industry rotation.? I prefer playing for longer periods and slower trading, but the system can be used in a momentum mode.

Too Bad for Preferred Stock

Too Bad for Preferred Stock

From an old CC post:


David Merkel
Why I Don’t Like Preferred Stock
6/9/2006 9:19 AM EDT

If I take risk, I want a decent probability of getting paid for taking the risk, and paid well. If I don’t want to take risk, I want a high degree of certainty that I’m not going to lose money, and if I do lose money, it won’t be much.

Having been a corporate bond manager in my last job (2001-03), I learned that I had all of the downside of stocks, with little of the upside of stocks. (One exception: buying MBNA floating-rate trust preferreds in late 2002 for $68 — they were at par ($100) in less than a year, matching the performance of MBNA stock, but that is rare, outside of distress situations. Another exception: fixed-income risk arbitrage was, in many cases, wider than that of equity arbitrage … examples from that era: Golden State, Household International and Allfirst, but I digress…

The situation is worse with preferred stocks. At least with corporate bonds you have a priority call on the assets of the firm in insolvency. Preferred stock typically gets 10 cents on the dollar in insolvency vs. 40 cents or so on senior unsecured corporates and 80 cents on bank debt.

Preferred stocks are called preferred because the dividend on the preferred must be paid for the common stock to receive a dividend. But with speculative ventures where the common doesn’t pay a dividend anyway, that is a small safeguard. Another small safeguard is the ability of the preferred holders to elect a few directors if the dividend is not paid. Nice, but it usually doesn’t tip the balance of corporate governance.

The recent troubles with Fannie and Freddie preferreds, where they lost 80%+ of their value, has hurt the preferred stock market.? Well, good.? Preferred stock is a vehicle that hates volatility.? The preferred holder just wants to clip his dividend payments and receive his principal back eventually.? He doesn’t benefit if the common rises (I leave aside convertible preferreds), and he is not protected during times of default.

This applies to all hybrid debt, trust preferreds, etc.? They may act like fixed income securities in good times, but in situations of economic stress, they behave more like equity than debt.

Be wary of those that promise high income relative to safer strategies.? It is rare that they succeed.

What’s Going Well, and What’s Not

What’s Going Well, and What’s Not

The Wall Street Journal has an interesting article on the increase in exports from the US in today’s paper.? Also, they have this nifty interactive graphic that shows what areas of the US are benefiting most from exports.

Exports are a key to the new US economy.? Even though the dollar has rallied recently, it has become cheaper to manufacture many things in the US because the dollar is a lot cheaper than it was one to five years ago.? That makes US wages cheaper, and American workers are among the most productive in the world.

That’s the bright side of the US Economy, and it influences how I invest.? I pay more attention to global demand than to US consumer demand.

But now for the worries.

  • Money supply growth is anemic.? The Fed is not pushing on a string; the Fed is not pushing.? What strength they have is being directed toward solving financial market problems, not toward stimulating the US economy.? Banks are not expanding credit because they can’t afford to do it.
  • Residential real estate prices are likely (in my opinion) to fall another 10-20% across the US over the next two years.? That mortgage rates have fallen is a small help, but not enough to fundamentally change the situation.
  • The investment banks have cleared away some of their troubles, but they are still opaque, and their derivative books are possibly mispriced as a group.? Level 3 assets as a fraction of equity must come down.
  • Well, credit spreads have risen, but aside from financials, where are the junk bond defaults?? We had a ton of weak single-B and CCC issuance — where are the defaults?
  • There are a variety of weak finance companies that suffer in this environment, mostly due to their own foolishness: Chrysler, Ford, GM, AIG, mortgage insurers, and financial guarantors.

You’ll note that I have focused on financials.? That’s because in a credit-driven economy, if they are sick, then most of us are sick.

Regarding the fall in mortgage rates, that’s a good thing for financials, except that lending standards have tightened.? When we talk about the Fed “pushing on a string,” it means that when the banks are weak, lowering rates doesn’t do much; they can’t lend more because their balance sheets are weak.? With lower mortgage rates and tighter lending standards, the “pushing on a string” phenomenon reappears.? There aren’t that many people who can benefit from the lower rates, because many marginal buyers don’t have the wherewithal to meet the new lending standards.? That will change over time.? Indeed, when the Fed “pushes on a string” eventually their power is seen, delayed, but with a vengeance.? The same is true here, if mortgage rates stay low for long enough.

Things aren’t as bad as the bears put out, and are not as good as the bulls put out.? The economy is muddling with flattish growth as far as the average consumer sees, even if some export sectors are doing well.? That’s how I see it, and simplistic words like “recession” only cloud the picture.

Avoiding Doomed Sectors

Avoiding Doomed Sectors

It’s a tough market out there.? You can’t eat relative performance, and I am off a percent or two year-to-date.? I have made a number of moves in the portfolio recently:

  • Rebalancing sale of Jones Apparel
  • Rebalancing sale of Shoe Carnival
  • Rebalancing sale of Lincoln National
  • Rebalancing buy of ConocoPhillips
  • Sale of Gehl in entirety

In a bear market, I consider it unusual that I have gotten off so many rebalancing sales, but part of that is being willing to embrace an out-of-favor sector — retail.? That said, my cash position has risen to around 6%.

In this situation, being willing to embrace out-of-favor sectors, but not “doomed” sectors can pay off.? In my opinion, depositary and credit-sensitive financials are a doomed sector until the backlog of questionable names begins to diminish.? Fannie and Freddie are off the table, and didn’t S&P do us a favor by kicking them out of their indexes?? Surely they will add them to the Small Cap 600, right?? Sorry, no.? The cow is out in the pasture; closing the barn door won’t help.

Part of the trouble here is ripple, or, second-order effects.? Ordinarily, second-order effect diminish and get swallowed up by larger factors effecting the economy/markets.? But with financials, because of all of the layers of debt, the failure of a large institution can lead to a cascade of failures.? Much as I don’t like government bailouts, the reason why the Treasury stood behind the senior obligations of Fannie and Freddie was to avoid a cascade of failures, because their senior debt and guaranteed MBS are so widely held by financial institutions.

Until the institutions that can produce ripple effects either fail or conclusively survive, the bear market continues.? Bear markets are most often financing-driven; so long as financial firms are under stress, firms that rely on them for financing will be under stress as well.

Bailout Conditions for Lehman Brothers

On an unrelated note, what should be the terms for bailing out Lehman Brothers?

  • The government should only care about systemic risk, not specific risk, so they should only guarantee the derivatives counterparty of Lehman, with significant skin in the game from Lehman.
  • The equity, preferred equity, and subordinated debt of Lehman should be wiped out before the Treasury shells out one dollar.
  • Senior debtholders should take a haircut — they will get paid in new Lehman stock.

Lehman reports tomorrow, ahead of schedule.? Fears have led to a fall in the stock price.? It is quite possible that Lehman will report a good quarter to dispel doubts; it is also possible that they will announce a government takeover of some sort.? I can’t tell.? I do know that for the market to normalize, the big problem have to be resolved.? Lehman Brothers is one of those problems and it is not resolved yet.

Full disclosure: long LNC SCVL JNY COP

Theme: Overlay by Kaira