Category: Currencies

All or Nothing at All

All or Nothing at All

I had some “down time” today (taking my third child to junior college), when I could sit and think about some of the issues in the markets, when all of a sudden, a weird correlation hit me.? Similarities between:

  • The near bankruptcy of the Equitable back in the early 90s.
  • Neomercantilism
  • The relationship of Moody’s and S&P to MBIA and Ambac.

Now, I write as I think, so at the end of this, I hope to have a theory that links all of these.? For now, let me tell a story.

When I was younger, I worked for AIG in their domestic life companies.? While I was there 1989-92, the life insurance industry was undergoing a lot of troubles from overinvestment in mortgages and real estate.? Many companies were under stress.? A few went bankrupt.? One big one was probably insolvent, and teetered in the balance — the Equitable.? I was the juniormost member of AIG’s team.? I have a lot of stories about what happened, and why AIG lost and AXA won.? If readers want to read about that, I’ll write about it.? For now though let me mention what I did:

  • Produced an estimate of value of the annuity lines in four days.
  • Estimated the “hole” in reserving for the Guaranteed Investment Contract line of business (accurate within 10%, according to the writedown they took later)
  • Wrote an analysis of AXA that indicated that we should take them seriously (probably ignored).
  • Analyzed the Statutory statement, the Cash Flow testing, and Guaranteed Separate Account filing (Reg 128), and came to the conclusion that the latter two were in error.? (Those filings, I later learned, forced the NY department to
    tell Equitable that it had to find a buyer, because they could not believe the rosy scenarios.)
  • Analyzed the investment strategies that the Equitable employed in the late 80s.? (They doubled down.)

Two years after that, I was at the Society of Actuaries annual meeting, where I met a well-known actuary who had worked inside the corporate actuarial area of the Equitable during the critical years.? I.e., he watched and analyzed the assets and the liabilities as they arose.? The conversation went something like this:

David: What was it like working inside the Equitable during that period of fast growth?

Corporate Actuary: It was amazing.? It took everything we could do to stay on top of it, and still we fell behind.

D: Didn’t you think that perhaps you were offering guaranteed rates that were too attractive?

C: We wondered about it, but with money coming in, everyone felt great about the growth.? We simply had to find ways to productively deploy all of the cash flow.

D: But wait.? Didn’t the investment department have a difficult time investing all of the proceeds?? With that much money coming in, the likelihood of making severe errors would be high.

C: Were you a bug on the wall at our meetings?? Yes, that is exactly what happened.? The money came in faster than we could invest it prudently.

D: Wow.? I thought that was what happened, but it amazes me to hear it confirmed.

They offered free options, and surprise, investors took them up on them.? They couldn’t make enough to fund the promises, and undertook a risky strategy in the late 80s that I called “double or nothing.”? The strategy failed, and they almost went broke, except that AXA bought them, pumped in a little capital, and then the real estate market turned.

What’s my point here?? Twofold: one, rapid growth in financial institutions is rarely a good thing; it usually means that an error has been made.? Two, there is a barrier in many financial decisions, where responsible parties are loath to cry foul until it is way past obvious, because the cost of being wrong is high.

So what of my other two cases?? With the neomercantilists, which I have written about more at RealMoney, they entered into the following trade: sell goods to the US and primarily take back bonds.? This suppressed inflation in the US, and lowered interest rates, because their bond buying reduced the excess supply of bonds.? In one sense, through export promotion, the neomercantilistic countries sold their goods too cheaply, and then had little current use for the US Dollars, since they did not want their people buying US goods.? So, they took the money and bought US bonds, probably too dearly.? Certainly so, after taking the falling US Dollar into account.

With the major rating agencies and the major financial guarantors, they are locked in a co-dependent relationship, one that I highlighted in a RealMoney article three years ago.? The financial guarantors are next to a cliff, and the rating agencies have a choice:

  • The guarantors are clearly in trouble, but how bad is it?? Do we push them over the edge to save our franchise, at a cost of a lot of forgone revenue in the short run?
  • Or do we sit, wait, and hope that things are not as bad as the equity markets are telling us?? This could preserve our ability to make money, and the government is giving us pressure to go this way, for systemic risk reasons.? Besides, someone could bail them out, right?

Ugh, I went through this back in 2001-2002, when the rating agencies changed their methodology to become more short-term in nature.? Funny how they always do that in bear markets for credit.

So, what’s the common element here?? Each situation has a major financial entity at the core.? Underpriced goods or promises were made in an effort to attract revenue.? When the revenues came too quickly, errors were made in deploying the revenues, whether into goods or bonds.? The faster and the larger the acquisition of the revenues, the larger the problem in deployment.

In each of these situations, then, there is a cliff:

  • Do the rating agencies push the guarantors over?
  • Does the NY department of insurance force Equitable to find a buyer?
  • Do neomercantilistic nations keep sucking down dollar claims in exchange for goods, importing inflation, or do they finally give up, and purchase US goods, and slow down their own economies, and the inflation thereof?

This is what makes practical economics tough.? Cycles that are self-reinforcing eventually break, and when they break the results can be ugly.? Why else are credit cycles long and benign in the bull phase, and short and sharp in the bear phase?

Book Review: The Volatility Machine

Book Review: The Volatility Machine

There are some books that were important to forming the way I think about economic problems, but if I write about it, I feel that I can’t do justice to the quality of the book. The Volatility Machine, by Michael Pettis, is one of those books. Michael Pettis was a managing director at Bear Stearns, and an adjunct professor at Columbia University when he wrote it.

The book was written in 1999-2000, and published in 2001. It explains how economic activity in the developed world travels into the smaller markets of the developing world, amplifying booms and busts. Coming off the Asian/Russian crises of 1997-1998, it was a timely book. During boom periods, capital flows from the developed countries to the developing countries; during bust periods, capital gets withdrawn. There is a kind of “crack the whip” effect, where the tail feels the change in direction the most.

Borrowing short is a weak position to be in, as the Mexican crisis in 1994 showed us, as the Fed raised rates and the tightening spilled into Mexico, which was financing with short-term debt, cetes. The same is true of corporations that finance with short debt; they are ordinarily less stable than firms that finance long. The Volatility Machine explains why the same forces apply to both situations.

Buffett has said, “It’s only when the tide goes out that you learn who’s been swimming naked.” Rising volatility is that tide going out, and it reveals weak funding structures and bad business/government plans. Booms set up the overconfidence that leads some economic parties to presume on future prosperity, and choose financing terms that are less than secure if the market turns.

Countries that are small and reliant on continued capital inflows are vulnerable to volatility. In the 1970s-1990s, that was the developing countries. Today, the developing countries vary considerably. Some have funded themselves conservatively, some have not, and a number are net capital providers. The US is the one reliant on capital inflows. So what would Michael Pettis have to say in this situation?

You don’t have to look far. Today, Michael Pettis is a professor at Peking University’s Guanghua School of Management. He is studying China from the inside, and writes about it at his blog (I read it every day, and will add it to my blogroll the next time I update it), China financial markets. Among his most interesting recent posts:

China’s latest batch of numbers aren’t good

Chinese pro-cyclicality makes predictions so difficult

More on why high share prices don?t mean Chinese banks are in good shape

The new China-Europe-US world order

Things have gotten grimmer in China

His views are complex and nuanced, and reflect the sometimes asymmetric incentives that politicians and policymakers face.? When I read his writings on China, I am simultaneously impressed with the rapid growth, and with the potential fragility of the situation.

So, enjoy his blog if that is your cup of tea.? If you want to learn how international finance affects developing economies, buy his book.

Full disclosure: if you buy the book through the link above, I will receive a pittance.

Seven Brief FOMC Notes

Seven Brief FOMC Notes

1) From an old post at RealMoney:


David Merkel
Nominate Fisher for the ‘FOMC Loose Cannon’ Award
6/1/05 4:05 PM?ET

It was pretty tough to dislodge William Poole, but if anyone could win the coveted “FOMC Loose Cannon” award in a single day, it would be Richard Fisher, after suggesting that the FOMC was “clearly in the eighth inning of a tightening cycle, we’ve been doing 25 basis points per inning, it’s been very transparent, and very well projected by the Federal Open Market Committee under the leadership of Chairman Greenspan,” and, “We’re in the eighth inning. We have the ninth inning coming up at the end of June.” [quoted from the CNBC Web site] Why don’t they have media classes for rookie Fed governors and Treasury secretaries? Even if he’s got the FOMC position correct, typically the Fed governors come out with a consistent message, and then, they cloak and hedge opinions, in order not to jolt the markets.

Okay, so Fisher dissented.? So he hasn’t had a predictable tone since becoming a Fed Governor.? Big deal.? The Fed needs more disagreement, and more original thought generally, even if it is wrong original thought, just to challenge the prevailing orthodoxy, and force them to think through what are complex decisions that might have unpredictable second order effects.

2) I hate the phrase “ahead of (behind) the curve,” because there is nothing all that clear about where the curve is.

3) Watch the yield curve, and note the widening today.? That is a trend that should persist, regardless of FOMC policy.

4) Rate cutting begets more cutting, for now.? The current cuts will not solve systemic risk problems embedded in residential real estate, and CDOs, anytime soon.? They will help inflate China (via their crawling dollar peg), and healthy areas of the US economy.

5) Where is the logical bottom here?? How much below CPI inflation is the Fed willing to reduce rates before they have to stop, much less raise rates to reduce inflation?? My guess: they will err on lowering rates too far, and then will be dragged kicking and screaming to a rate rise, as inflation runs away from them.? The oversupply in residential housing will cause housing prices to lag behind the price rises in the remainder of the economy.

6) Eventually the FOMC will resist Fed funds futures, but for now, the Fed continues to obey the futures market.

7) The stock market loves FOMC cuts in the short run, but has not honored them in the intermediate-term.

Time to Begin Increasing Credit Risk Exposure

Time to Begin Increasing Credit Risk Exposure

Ugh, today was a busy day.? My views of the FOMC were validated as to what they would do and say, though I was wrong on the stock market direction on a 50 bp cut.? The bond market direction I got right.

Look at this post from Bespoke.? Ignore the percentage increase, and just look at the raw spread levels.? Better, add an additional 3%+ (for the average Treasury yield) to the current 685 spread, for a roughly 10% yield.? When you get to 10% yields, the odds tip in your favor on high yield.? That said, today’s crop of high yield corporate debt is lower rated than in the past.? Don’t go hog wild here, but begin to take a little more risk.? I was pretty minimal in terms of credit risk exposure for the last three years, owning only a? few bank loan funds, the last of which I traded out of in June 2007.

With fixed income investing, if I have a broad mandate, I start by asking a few simple questions:

  • For which of the following risks am I being adequately rewarded?? Illiquidity, Credit/Equity, Negative Convexity (residential mortgages), Duration, Sovereign, Complexity, Taint, Foreign Exchange…
  • What are my client’s tax needs?
  • How much volatility is my client willing to tolerate?
  • How unconventional can I be without losing him as a client?
  • What optical risks does he face from regulators and rating agencies, if any?

One of my rules of thumb is that if none of the other risks are offering adequate reward, then it is time to increase foreign bond positions.? That is where I have been for the past three years, and now it is time to adjust that position.? With respect to the list of risks:

  • Illiquidity: indeterminate, depends on the situation
  • Credit/Equity: begin adding, but keep some powder dry
  • Negative Convexity: attractive to add to prime RMBS positions at present.
  • Duration: Avoid.? Yield curve will widen, and absent another Great Depression, long yields will not fall much from here.
  • Sovereign Risks: Avoid.? You’re not getting paid for it here.
  • Complexity/Taint:? Selectively add to bonds that you have done due diligence on, that others don’t understand well, even if mark-to-market may go against you in the short run.
  • FX: Neutral.? Maintain core positions in the Swiss Franc and the Yen for now.? Be prepared to switch to high-yield currencies when conditions favor risk-taking.

That’s where I stand now.? The biggest changes are on credit risk and FX.? That’s a big shift for me.? If you remember an early post of mine, Yield = Poison, you will know that I am willing to have controversial views.? Also, for those that have read me here and at RealMoney.com, you will know that I don’t change my views often.? I’m not trying to catch small moves.? Instead, I want to average into troughs before they hit bottom.? If you wait for the bottom, there will not be enough liquidity to implement the change in view.

Deflation or Inflation?  Why Choose?

Deflation or Inflation? Why Choose?

Some of the commentary regarding inflation and deflation misses the point.? We are presently faced with both rising consumer price inflation and asset deflation.? Not a fun combination, to say the least.? It puts the FOMC into a real box.? To borrow an analogy from the Bible, Greenspan ate sour grapes, and Bernanke’s teeth are set on edge.

So what does the FOMC do in such a situation?? We don’t have that much history to work with, but during the ’70s, the FOMC generally loosened.? Fixed income portfolios should tilt toward shorter duration, even though you are losing income, and away from the dollar.? It is probably still too early to begin taking a lot of additional credit risk, but the bet is getting more attractive by the day.

Now, there are a number of commentators that can’t wait one week, and say the FOMC should act now.? The economy is not like someone that you have to take to the emergency ward; one week makes little difference, and the FOMC will do better work if they are meeting each other face-to-face under normal meeting conditions, than over a conference call.

Given the present equity market distress, should we assume that the FOMC will do more than 50 basis points in January? Had you asked me last week, I would have said “no.”? The political pressure is a lot higher now, so I would say yes, they will do more.? It won’t help the areas under credit stress, but it will make it look like they are serious about “fixing the economy.”

We could see a move of either 75 or 100 basis points.? I debate internally how good Fed funds futures are in abnormal environments like this.? Under Greenspan, I sometimes felt that monetary policy had been privatized, and whatever the futures market said, the FOMC would do that.? I don’t know if Bernanke has the same faith that futures traders know what the right monetary policy is.? If I were a Fed Governor, I certainly would not have that confidence.? Once the yield curve gets to a certain slope, the recovery will come in time.? Making the curve steeper won’t make it any faster.

People are impatient, and their complaining causes the FOMC to overshoot on policy decisions.? The lag that monetary policy has is significant, and the FOMC in recent years has made it even slower through their policies of incrementalism.

There are several possibilities here for the FOMC action:

  1. They hold firm, and don’t lower much (50 bp), because price inflation is a concern.
  2. They take the judgment of the futures traders, and move a full 100 bp.? Or, they conclude that asset deflation is a bigger risk, and decide to make a bold statement.? After all, isn’t Bernanke the guy who never wants to see the Great Depression recur, and loose monetary policy can prevent that?? (I don’t think that’s right, but…)
  3. They split the difference, make bows to both camps in their language, and do a 75 bp cut.

The last of those seems most likely to me.? I have said in the past that the FOMC is:

  • Being politically forced to loosen more than they would like, and
  • Dragging their heels in the process.

That’s why I think we end up on the low end of where Fed funds futures will likely point tomorrow.? 75 basis points does not trip off the tongue, but will be a compromise position in the minds of Federal Reserve Governors who are puzzled at the present situation.? Because of political pressure, they know that they have to move big, but consumer price inflation will make them less aggressive.

Looking Beyond the Three Percent Horizon

Looking Beyond the Three Percent Horizon

Give the Fed some credit. Not literally, of course. Isn’t it their job to give us credit?

I haven’t talked a lot about Fed policy in a while, so I thought it was time to do an update. Five months have passed since my 3% sometime in 2008 call was made, and now it is becoming the received orthodoxy. That’s why I have to ask what is wrong with it, or better, what is the next phase beyond it?

Truly, I don’t know for sure, but I will offer out my thinking process. We are seeing rising unemployment and inflation at the same time. The bond market is rallying, anticipating falling Fed funds rates, but not forecasting rising inflation rates. (Buy TIPs!) In the spirit of watch what they do not what they say, let’s review the relevant Fed data.

We are in a period of asset deflation and consumer price inflation, so this is a difficult period to negotiate through. You can listen to facile comments from PIMCO; everyone is focused on economic weakness, and few are focused on rising inflation.

I think we get to a 3% Fed funds rate, but we don’t get much below it, because by that time, a 3% Fed funds rate will imply a negative real interest rate on the short end. Congress will have an implied inflationary bias, because the complaints will come more from asset deflation. They will kick nudge the Fed that way to the extent that they can.

The TED spread is not as wide as it once was, but it is still in a historically high range. Anything above 60 basis points implies stress. To reduce this the Fed has set up an auction facility, called the TAF. The TAF has been expanded, which allows for a greater variety of securities to be lent against. That’s the real novelty of the TAF. Not new liquidity but new collateral. That said, even the discount window is getting greater use. As a result, the Commercial Paper market is showing some life, even for asset backed commercial paper.

So, liquidity is increasing on the short end, to the point where a 1/4% cut in Fed funds has for practical purposes already happened. A formal 1/4% cut at the next FOMC meeting would do little except ratify what has already been done. Now there is weakness in the job market, and the PMI is signaling some weakness as well. The yield curve has moved down, particularly on the short end, to reflect expectations of more cuts from the Fed.

But TIPS yields are quiet, at least for now, and viewing the Fed as quasi-politicians, whose main goal in life is to avoid political pain, the path of least resistance is to loosen policy further. Fed funds futures and options are indicating the most likely outcome in on January 30th is a 50 basis point loosening. Ordinarily, because of the “gradualist” culture that has built up inside the Fed, I am reluctant to argue for loosenings other than 25 basis points. I think at this point, I have to argue for 50 basis points, but with the usual squishy language that pays heed to all potential threats, effectively saying, “But no more after this! Conditions are balanced!” We know better, though. The only real question is when rising consumer price inflation or a deteriorating Dollar (think of 1986) will be a sufficient counterweight to economic weakness.

The US Dollar is weak here, and that reflects the judgment of many actors as to the value of what they get paid back will be. My guess is that foreign investors sense that inflation is higher in the US than is stated in the Government’s statistics. Too many dollar claims (internal and external) chasing too few goods that they want to buy. What will dollar-denominated bonds be worth at maturity? (Judging by current yields, quite valuable for now.) And will the US Government allow significant US companies to be owned by the Chinese, or by Arabs? How free market is the US really? Will foreign governments stop policies that disfavor the purchase of US goods? Perhaps once they import enough inflation, they will.

With gold, crude oil, and a host of agricultural prices high, and with structural reasons for them to remain high, the FOMC won’t feel too happy as they cut rates. But cut they will, and then we get to see where the excess liquidity flows. Some will bail out banks, which will invest in safe instruments in areas of the economy not under threat. Loans in or near default will not be affected. Well, more on that later. Tonight’s post will be on credit issues.

In closing, a return to the problem that I posed at the beginning: So what’s wrong with the 3% Fed funds forecast, or better, what is the next phase beyond it? It could go several ways:

  1. Rising price inflation and a deteriorating dollar lead to an end to the cycle, and the Fed funds rate either stops falling, or has to rise to squeeze out inflation.
  2. Continuing asset deflation, and declining but still positive economic growth (as the government measures it) leads the Fed to continue to loosen, or stand pat in the face of rising consumer price inflation.
  3. Liquidity difficulties in the banking system morph into solvency difficulties, leading pseudo-M3 and credit to contract (after all the banks are doing the heavy lifting here, not the Fed) and the Fed starts to loosen aggressively.
  4. We get a “bolt for the blue” leading to something not currently predictable, but which leaves policymakers in a bind.
  5. We muddle along, get to something near a 3% Fed funds rate, and continue to muddle (think of 1992-1993).


Personally, I favor scenario 2. And, for those that like to invest, TIPS are reasonably priced. Insurance against scenario 2 is inexpensive, and relatively high quality. But be wary, because particularly in a Presidential election year, there could be significant surprises (part of scenario 4).

Long VIPSX

Depression, Stagflation, and Confusion

Depression, Stagflation, and Confusion

I’m not sure what to title this piece as I begin writing, because my views are a little fuzzy, and by writing about them, I hope to sharpen them.? That’s not true of me most of the time, but it is true of me now.

Let’s start with a good article from Dr. Jeff.? It’s a good article because it is well-thought out, and pokes at an insipid phrase “behind the curve.”? In one sense, I don’t have an opinion on whether the FOMC is behind the curve or not.? My opinions have been:

  • The Fed should not try to reflate dud assets, and the loans behind them, because it won’t work.
  • The Fed will lower Fed funds rates by more than they want to because they are committed to reflating dud assets, and the loans behind them.
  • The Fed is letting the banks do the heavy lifting on the extension of credit, because they view their credit extension actions as temporary, and thus they don’t do any permanent injections of liquidity.? (There are some hints that the banks may be beginning to pull back, but the recent reduction in the TED spread augurs against that.)
  • Instead, they try novel solutions such as the TAF.? They will provide an amount of temporary liquidity indefinitely for a larger array of collateral types, such as would be acceptable at the discount window.
  • We will get additional consumer price inflation from this.
  • We will continue to see additional asset deflation because of the overhang of vacant homes; the market has not cleared yet.? Commercial real estate is next.? Consider this fine post from the excellent blog Calculated Risk.
  • The Fed will eventually have to choose whether it is going to reflate assets, or control price inflation.? Given Dr. Bernanke’s previous statements on the matter, wrongly ascribing to him the name “Helicopter Ben,” he is determined not to have another Depression occur on his watch.? I think that is his most strongly held belief, and if he feels there is a modest risk of a Depression, he will keep policy loose.
  • None of this means that you should exit the equity markets; stick to a normal asset allocation policy.? Go light on financials, and keep your bonds short.? Underweight the US dollar.
  • I have not argued for a recession yet, at least if one accepts the measurement of inflation that the government uses.

Now, there continue to be bad portents in many short-term lending markets.? Take for example, this article on the BlackRock Cash Strategies Fund.? In a situation where some money market funds and short-term income funds are under stress, the FOMC is unlikely to stop loosening over the intermediate term.

Clearly there are bad debts to be worked through, and the only way that they get worked out is through equity injections.? Think of the bailing out of money market funds and SIVs (not the Super-SIV, which I said was unlikely to work), or the Sovereign Wealth Fund investments in some of the investment banks.

Now, one of my readers asked me to opine on this article by Peter Schiff, and this response from Michael Shedlock.? Look, I’m not calling for a depression, or stagflation, at least not yet.? At RealMoney, my favored term was “stagflation-lite.”? Some modest rise in inflation while the economy grows slowly in real terms (as the government measures it).?? A few comments on the two articles:

  • ?First, international capital flows from recycling the current account deficit provide more stimulus to the US economy than the FOMC at present.? Will they stop one day?? Only when the US dollar is considerably lower than now, and they buy more US goods and services than we buy from them.
  • Second, the Federal Reserve can gain more powers than it currently has.? If this situation gets worse, I would expect Congress to modify their charter to allow them to buy assets that it previously could not buy, to end the asset deflation directly, at a cost of more price inflation, and spreading the lending losses to all who hold longer-term dollar-denominated assets.? If not Congress, there are executive orders in the Federal Register already for these actions.
  • Third, in a crisis, the FOMC would happily run with a wide yield curve — they will put depositary institution solvency ahead of purchasing power.
  • Fourth, the Fed can force credit into the economy, but not at prices they would like, or on terms that are attractive.? In a crisis, though, anything could happen.
  • Fifth, I don’t see a crisis happening.? It is in the interests of foreign creditors to stabilize the US, until they come to view the US as a “lost cause.”? Not impossible, but unlikely.? The flexible nature of the US economy, with its relatively high levels of freedom, make the US a destination for capital and trade.? The world needs the flexible US, less than it used to, but it still needs the US.

One final note off of the excellent blog Naked Capitalism.? They note, as I have, that the FOMC hasn’t been increasing the monetary base.? From RealMoney:


David Merkel
The Fed Has Shifted the Way it Conducts Monetary Policy
12/21/2007 11:56 AM EST

Good post over at Barry’s blog on monetary policy. Understanding monetary policy isn’t hard, but you have to look at the full picture, including the presently missing M3. I have a proxy for M3 — it’s total bank liabilities from the H8 report –> ALNLTLLB Index for those with a BB terminal. It’s a very good proxy, though not perfect. Over the last years, it has run at an annualized 9.4%. MZM has grown around 12.8%. The monetary base has grown around 3%, and oddly, has not been spiking up the way it usually does in December to facilitate year-end retail.

The Fed is getting weird. At least, weird compared to the Greenspan era. They seem to be using regulatory policy to allow the banks to extend more credit, while leaving the monetary base almost unchanged. This is not a stable policy idea, particularly in an environment where banks are getting more skittish about lending to each other, and to consumers/homebuyers.

This has the odor of trying to be too clever, by not making permanent changes, trying to manage the credit troubles through temporary moves, and not permanently shifting policy through adding to the monetary base, which would encourage more price inflation. But more credit through the banks will encourage price inflation as well, and looking at the TED spread, it seems the markets have given only modest credit to the Fed’s temporary credit injections.

I am dubious that this will work, but I give the Fed credit for original thinking. Greenspan would have flooded us with liquidity by now. We haven’t had a permanent injection of liquidity in seven months, and that is a long time in historical terms. Even in tightening cycles we tend to get permanent injections more frequently than that.

Anyway, this is just another facet of how I view the Fed. Watch what they do, not what they say.

Position: noneThe Naked Capitalism piece extensively quotes John Hussman.? I think John’s observations are correct here, but I would not be so bearish on the stock market.

After all of this disjointed writing, where does that leave me? Puzzled, and mostly neutral on my equity allocations.? My observations could be wrong here.? I’m skeptical of the efficacy of Fed actions, and of the willingness of foreigners to extend credit indefinitely, but they are trying hard? to reflate dud assets (and the loans behind them) now.? That excess liquidity will find its way to healthy assets, and I think I own some of those.

Crunchy Credit

Crunchy Credit

My head feels like mush.? I have been struggling over creating a CDO pricing model with the following features:

  • A knockoff of the KMV model, using equity market-oriented variables to price credit.
  • Uncorrelated reduced discrepancy point sets for the random number generator.
  • A regime-switching boom-bust cycle for credit
  • Differing default intensities for trust preferred securities vs. CMBS vs. senior unsecured notes.

Makes my head spin, but at least the credit model is complete.? The rest of the model can be done tomorrow.

Ugh, so what was I going to talk about?? Oh yeah, the short term lending markets.? So the ECB makes a splash by showering temporary liquidity on the short end of the market.? That will reduce Euribor-based rates, but not US dollar-LIBOR based rates.? Check with Dr. Jeff for more on that.? Now, Dr. Jeff and I might not agree on the significance of this move, because I discount temporary injections of liquidity.? What will happen to liquidity conditions when the temporary injection goes away?? My view is that they will go back to how they were before the temporary injection.? The only way that would not be so is if the temporary injection somehow changes the willingness of parties to take risk, and I think most large investors can see through the temporary nature of the injection.? The ECB can keep short-term Euribor down for a while, but unless they make some of the injection permanent, conditions will revert.? People and institutions can’t be fooled that easily.

Topic two: the WSJ article on the credit crunch.? The author posits two disaster scenarios:

  1. A financial guarantor going down, or
  2. Many money market? funds? “breaking the buck.”

Here’s my view:? The financial guarantors have been too profitable for too long.? There will be parties wiling to recapitalize them, though not necessarily at values that make current equityholders happy.? They are not going broke; the major firms will be recapitalized.

Regarding the second fear, a few money market funds will break, but the wide majority of money market funds won’t.? Most short term debt managers are highly conservative, and don’t take inordinate risks.? To do so would threaten their franchise, which would be stupid.

Things are not good, don’t get me wrong, but it would be very difficult to destroy most of the investment markets on the short end of the yield curve.? Away from that, the actions of the ECB will only have modest impacts on USD-LIBOR.

Ten Notes on Our Crazy Credit Markets

Ten Notes on Our Crazy Credit Markets

This post may be a little more disjointed than some of my posts.? Recently I have been working on calculating the fair value for mezzanine tranches of a series of real estate oriented CDOs.? Not pretty.? Anyway, here are few articles that got me thinking yesterday:

  1. Let’s? start with CD rates.? Bloomberg had a nifty table on its system which I can’t reproduce here, except to point you to the data source at the Fed.? Note how one-, three-, and six-month CD rates have been rising, somewhat in sync with LIBOR, but widening the gap with Treasury yields. (Hit your “end” button to see the most recent rates…)
  2. As a result, I have been debating whether the FOMC might not do a 50 basis point loosen next Tuesday.? CDs aren’t the bulk of how most banks fund themselves, but they can be a way to get a lot of cash fast.? Remember that after labor unemployment and inflation, the Fed’s hidden third mandate is protecting the depositary financial system, particularly the portion that belongs to the Federal Reserve System.
  3. Now, I’m not the only one wondering about what the FOMC will do.? There’s Greg Ip at The WSJ, who speculates on the size of the cut, and whether the discount rate might not be cut even more, with a loosening of terms and conditions as well.? Bloomberg echoes the same themes.? Even the normally placid Tony Crescenzi sounds worried if the FOMC doesn’t act aggressively here.
  4. The US isn’t the only place where this is a worry.? The Bank of Canada cut rates yesterday, as noted by Trader’s Narrative, partly because of credit pressures in Canada and the US.? The Financial Times notes that Euro-LIBOR [Euribor] is also rising vs. Government short-term yields, which may prompt the ECB to cut as well.? Or, they also could cut their version of the discount rate, or liberalize terms.
  5. It doesn’t make sense to me, but the Yen is weakening at present.? With forward interest rate differentials narrowing as more central banks tip toward easing, I would expect the carry trade to weaken; instead, it is growing.? For now.
  6. As noted by Marc Chandler, the Gulf States have largely decided to keep their US Dollar peg.? I found the article to be interesting and somewhat counterintuitive at points, but hey, I learned something.? Inflation is rising in Kuwait after they switched from the US Dollar to a basket of currencies, because residential real estate prices are rising.
  7. Credit problems continue to emerge on the short end of the yield curve.? Accrued Interest has a good summary of the problems in money market funds.? It almost seems like Florida is a “trouble magnet.”? If it’s not hurricanes, it’s bad money management.? Then there’s Orange County, which has a 20% slug of SIV-debt in its Extended Fund.? It’s all highly rated, so they say, but ratings don’t always equate to credit quality, particularly in unseasoned investment classes.? Then there’s the credit stress from borrowers drawing down on standby lines of credit, which further taxes the capital of the banks.
  8. As a final note, both here (point 6) and at RealMoney, I was very critical of S&P and Moody’s when they decided to rate CPDO [Constant Proportion Debt Obligation] paper AAA.? I’ll let the excellent blog Alea take the victory lap though.? We finally have CPDOs that are taking on serious losses (and here).
  9. In summary, we are increasingly in a situation where the major central banks of our world are reflating their currencies as a group in an effort to inflate away embedded credit problems.? Most of the credit problems are too deep for a lowering of the financing rate to solve, though it will help financial institutions with modest-to-moderate-sized credit problems (say, less than 25% of tangible net worth — does the rule of thumb for P&C reinsurers apply to banks?).? This can continue for some time, and credit spreads and yield curves should continue to widen, and inflation (when fairly measured) should increase.? Some of the inflation will move to assets that aren’t presently troubled, perhaps commodities, and higher quality equities, which are doing relatively well of late.
  10. Quite an environment.? The big question is when the “free lunch” period for the rate cuts end, and the hard policy choices need to be made.? My guess is that would be in mid-to-late 2008, just in time for the elections.? Now, wouldn’t that spice things up? 🙂
Back in the Game

Back in the Game

After a lot of struggle (in my younger days I would have learned the coding, and reprogrammed the whole thing), my links are working again, though I have had to sacrifice the descriptive permalinks for now.? In the bargain, at least I upgraded to WP 2.3.1, which is a lot slicker than the old version.

For this evening, I want to offer you two unrelated thoughts on the markets.? The first is that the plan of the Treasury to freeze reset rates on subprime mortgages is a great big zero.? The real problem is too many homes chased by too few people able to afford them at current prices.? Subprime loans are a very modest portion of residential real estate finance.? Beyond that, the Treasury proposal does triage — separating borrowers into healthy, dead, and savable.? The savable are a small portion of a small component in the total residential financing scheme.? It will keep a few more people in their homes,? but that’s about it.? There will probably be court challenges from hedge funds that lose interest from the changes; they will probably win, because this is an illegal “taking” by the US Government.? That said, there is no way that I can see that they will be able to collect damages.

I said this was a zero, because paying the mortgage payment is not the problem here; it is the overhang of excess houses.? This does nothing to solve that problem.? My more radical solution of offering free US citizenship to anyone who buys a house in the US free and clear (for more than $250,000), is a non-starter for a wide variety of reasons, but it would kill two birds with one stone.? Clear up the excess houses, and solve the current account deficit problem.? A side benefit is giving wealthy foreigners a stake in the prosperity of the US.

Here’s my second thought.? Japan wants China to revalue its currency upward.? Perhaps that’s no big deal, but it reflects US dollar weakness.? China has been running a dirty crawling peg versus the US dollar, while letting other currency relationships languish.? As a result, the Euro and the Yen have gotten expensive versus the Yuan.? In this case, I think the Japanese are correct.? Let the US Dollar fall more, and let other nations buy our goods and services, rather than just swallowing our bonds (promises to pay later).

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