Category: Ethics

Book Review: Lombard Street

Book Review: Lombard Street

This is a wonky book, and not for everyone.? It details the actions of monetary policy in the United Kingdom for much of the 19th Century.? In Great Britain, that was a century of incredible growth, and yet stability of the overall price level.? The Gold Standard worked, and the UK Government di not try to cheat on it, as it did in the early 20th century before the Great Depression.

One of Bagehot’s main ideas was that during a crisis, central banks should lend at a penalty rate without limit, and that would re-liquefy the marginal banks in the system that just needed a little to get by.? Bad banks would fail; good banks would not need to borrow.? We can contrast that with present policy of the Fed to lend against marginal collateral at favorable rates.? Ain’t no chance of us getting out of the problem that way.? All we do is create a new class of arbitageurs to extract money from the taxpayers, or Treasury note buyers.

The mangement of a good central bank is very conservative, and keeps a reserve large enough to avoid all disasters.? This again is the diametric opposite of the Federal Reserve, which was not in a conservative posture, and believes it can solve all of the credit problems through the wanton expansion of its balance sheet.

For a classic understanding of central banking, do not read Ben Bernanke.? Instead, read Walter Bagehot.? If you want to buy it, you can find it here: Lombard Street: a description of the money market.? Or, you can get it for free here.

PS ? Remember, I don?t have a tip jar, but I do do book reviews.? If you enter Amazon through a link on my site and buy things from them, I get a small commission, and you don?t pay anything extra.? I?m not out to sell things to you, so much as provide a service.? Not all books are good, and not every book is right for everyone, and I try to make that clear, rather than only giving positive book reviews on new books.? I review old books that have dropped of the radar as well, like this one, because they are often more valuable than what you can find on the shelves at your local bookstore.

What Do You Have To Hide? (III)

What Do You Have To Hide? (III)

If it wasn’t enough to have Bloomberg sue the Federal Reserve, now we have Fox Business News suing the US Treasury for refusing to disclose information asked for under the Freedom of Information Act [FOIA].

I don’t have much to say here (for now) because I have not seen the complaint yet, but I would say that American citizens are entitled to know the details of the bailout plans because they are a large part of the Federal budget, supported by our taxes.? The same is true for the actions of the Federal Reserve, because they are messing with the value of the US Dollars we hold.

What does the Treasury have to hide?:

  • How were the amounts of relief chosen?
  • Who qualifies for relief, and why did you turn some away?
  • Why did AIG get special treatment?
  • Why didn’t you bail out Lehman?
  • What Constitutional authority do you have for doing any of this?
  • Why do you think that auto companies can get relief here, given the terms of the bailout bill?

This is a mess, though less of a mess than the one at the Federal Reserve.? Our choices are hard today because of previous choices where we relaxed monetary/credit policy at points where it would have been painful.? We are facing far more pain today as a result.

It;s a pity that the incoming administation doesn’t get it.? Reducing leverage slowly should be priority number one.

Book Review: Once in Golconda

Book Review: Once in Golconda

When I think about the present market difficulties, I think about both the situation as a whole, and the personalities involved.? We might look at Bernie Madoff as a poster child for the current distress, but back during the Great Depression. we might have considered Richard Whitney.

Though the conditions are different, when conditions move from boom to bust, cheaters get revealed — those who were relying on good times in order to make good on promises gone wrong.? Both Madoff and Whitney had sterling reputations as well, and they both played a significant role in the trading of the market.

Perhaps big frauds require seemingly upright men who command trust from their peers.? Practices that can be gooten away with during a bull phase of the market will fall flat during the bear phase.

Aside from the Whitney story, Once in Golconda tells the story of boom and bust for the financial economy as a whole.? Taking chances ramped up, supported by a too-easy monetary policy.? After the peak, opportunities were few, and few had the spare capital to invest in ventures that were seemingly rich, as measured against boom conditions.? Such is the nature of scarce liquidity after a boom.

This is a fun book.? You can see the gathering storm as liquidity grows, and markets boom.? You can see the increasing furor nearing the peak.? At the peak, you can’t hear much.? During the fall you can hear investors go through the five stages of grieving as they watch their investments die.

This is a good book, well-written, and appropriate for our era.? I recommend it.

If you want to, you can buy it here: Once in Golconda (Wiley Investment Classics)

PS ? Remember, I don?t have a tip jar, but I do do book reviews.? If you enter Amazon through a link on my site and buy things from them, I get a small commission, and you don?t pay anything extra.? Such a deal if you wanted to get it anyway?

What Do You Have To Hide? (II)

What Do You Have To Hide? (II)

Ding!? Round one ends in the legal fight between Bloomberg, LP, and The Federal Reserve.? The Columbia Journalism Review provides a summary, as does Bloomberg itself.

Some preliminaries:

  • Here’s the original complaint.
  • Here’s the amended and expanded complaint.
  • Here’s a redacted version, showing the changes.? (Please note I scanned two bitmap documents, and did OCR on them, and ran a document compare — there may be some errors here, but I did the best that I could.)? The main expansion of the complaint is the inclusion of a request for documents related to the Bear Stearns rescue.? It also clarifies that it is looking for loan records.
  • Here’s the the Fed’s answer to the amended and expanded complaint.

The Fed’s basic response is that no documents exist for some of the requests, that it has turned over some documents, but is holding onto pages of 231 documents for which they claim to have an exemption under FOIA.? They claim exemptions 4 and 5, which are (from Wikipedia):

  • 4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
  • 5) inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;

This is just my take, and I could be wrong, but it seems to me that the Fed refuses to disclose on the grounds that the documents are sensitive since they contain confidential financial information, or, they involve inter- or intra-agency communication, such as with the Treasury, or inside the Fed itself.? Point 5 seems to be a pretty broad exemption, but it remains to be proven whether the information is of such a nature that only an inter-agency suit could force divulging the data.

I repeat my five points from my last piece on why they might want to hide the information:

  • The Fed is breaking its own rules, and lending on collateral that it publicly said that it wouldn?t lend against.
  • They are playing favorites with institutions, and don?t want that to be revealed.
  • The assets in question are technically in compliance with the rules of the Fed, but are worth far less than the amount loaned against them.
  • Certain banks would be embarrassed by revealing what they own.
  • It?s just a power game, and the Fed thinks it is above the law, particularly during a crisis (that it helped to cause).

As pointed out in the Bloomberg article above, there is a good possibility that they are trying to hide the amount that they have lost already.? Also, as I have pointed out in my last piece on this topic, the insurance industry discloses everything with their assets, and it does not harm them.? It would not hurt banks to do the same, and certainly if it is a matter of this one limited disclosure, the confidentiality of the banks would probably not be materially harmed.

So, Federal Reserve, what do you have to hide?

Bailouts are Unfair to Those Who are not Bailed Out

Bailouts are Unfair to Those Who are not Bailed Out

If you run a large corporation in trouble, there is a drill that you must follow.

  • In measured tones, tell the public that liquidity is no issue, and that you are more than capable of meeting all obligations.
  • Scream loud behind closed doors to Congress/regulators, saying that you have been a prudent manager, but the economic environment is beyond belief.? You need help and you need it now, and the change in administration might be too late for you.
  • Explain how many other jobs would be lost if you disappeared.? (A canard, because the company won’t disappear.? The equity might be canceled, and some factories closed and jobs lost, but most of the jobs and factories will continue with the bondholders as the new owners.)
  • In the crisis atmosphere, judgment will be suspended (as it was before the Iraq war and at the debates over the bailout), and legislators will vote for something that won’t work, but must be done out of the appearance that Congress must be doing something to fix matters.? Anything to justify their existence…
  • Receive the bailout, and thank them for their wise decision on behalf of the American people.
  • When the bailout monies fail ask for more.? (Think of AIG; you might even get really soft terms.)
  • Because Congress has bought into the original premise of bailing you out, they will do it again to protect their investment.? Regret has set in, and Congress will easily “double down” to throw good money after bad protect their investment.? Remember, Congressmen are facile at speaking to the ignorant populace, but aside from Ron Paul, few have any significant understanding of economics.? As my best boss once said, “I wouldn’t trust him to run a hot dog stand.”

As a CEO with a company in trouble, the objective is to get your foot in the bailout door.? Once inside, it will be difficult for the government to turn its back on you.

And, that is why Congress should refuse to bail out firms, even those that are too big to fail, unless they are taken through bankruptcy first.? Congress invariably throws good money after bad, and we as a nation are the poorer for them doing it.? I have no doubt that the automakers will get bailed out, but it is the wrong decision.? Better they should go through the bankruptcy process so that they can reconcile their cost structures, than that the US government should subsidize unionized auto workers.

The More Things Change, The More They Remain The Same

The More Things Change, The More They Remain The Same

I’ve been asked by a number of readers for my opinion on the economic team being put together by the incoming Obama administration.? I’m not that excited, but then Bush Junior’s economic team was pretty consistently disappointing.? What we have is a bunch of Clinton-era retreads in Summers, Orszag, and Geithner.? Bob Rubin may not be there, but those that learned from him are there.

And, this is change.? I have sixty cents sitting next to me.? That’s change also.? Moving from Paulson to Rubin’s students is exchanging one part of the intellectual framework of Goldman Sachs for its cousin.? As Ron Smith said to me off the air when I was recently on WBAL, the economic advisors of Bush and Obama are members of the same intellectual country club.? There is little real change there.

But, look at it on the bright side.? The best part of the Clinton administration was the Treasury Department and the affiliated entities.? Perhaps that will be true of the Obama administration as well — pragmatism ruling over dogmatism, and a fear of freaking out the bond market.? Could be worse.? Save us from misguided idealists (perhaps Bernanke — a pity he didn’t pick a different dissertation topic), who think they know how to fight economic depression, but really don’t, and waste a lot of time and money in the process.

As it is we get two new programs this morning that are more of the same😕 Keep expanding the Fed’s balance sheet; don’t think about the eventual unwind.? Create more protected lending programs that encourage lenders to flee unprotected areas of the market for protected areas.? Do anything to shift debt from private to public hands; but don’t do anything that truly reconciles bad debt.

I do have a beef with the selection of Geithner, though.? This Bloomberg piece gives a sympathetic rendering of his attempts to deal with derivatives.? He tried to achieve consensus of all parties.? My view is that the areas where he could achieve compromise were areas that were important but not critical.? He needed to take a bigger view and question the incredible amounts of leverage, both visible and hidden, that we were building up and focus on what regulatory structures could properly contain the increased leverage, lest the gears of finance grind to a halt, as they have done today.

We can be less sympathetic, though.? Chris Whalen’s (Institutional Risk Analytics) opinion of him is quite low, or, as he was quoted in this NYT article:

?We have only two things to say about Tim Geithner, who we do not know: A.I.G. and Lehman Brothers,? said Christopher Whalen of Institutional Risk Analytics. ?Throw in the Bear Stearns/Maiden Lane fiasco for good measure,? he said.

?All of these ?rescues? are a disaster for the taxpayer, for the financial markets and also for the Federal Reserve System as an organization. Geithner, in our view, deserves retirement, not promotion.?

Ouch.

?He was in the room at every turn of the crisis,? said another executive who participated in several such confidential meetings with Mr. Geithner. ?You can look at that both ways.?

This Wall Street Journal editorial is similarly bearish.? Geithner was in the room on every bad decision, and a few non-decisions.

Or, just consider some of the questions that should be put to Geithner.? They are significant.

My view is that he is a bright guy who is out of his league in trying to deal with the aftermath of the buildup in leverage, that has lead to the collapse in leverage that we all face.? Now, I can’t be that critical of him, because he has been cleaning up after the errors of many, a small fraction of which he bears some responsibility for.

No one is equal to solving this crisis.? It is bigger than our government, which made an intellectual mistake in thinking that it could promote prosperity through Greenspan-like monetary policies, which almost everyone lionized while they were going on, except a few worrywarts like me, James Grant, etc., who followed the buildup of leverage in the Brave New World.? Now we face its collapse; let’s just hope and pray? that it doesn’t lead to worse government than what we have now.

PS — If I were offered the opportunity to fix things, I would take it, and:

The last one I like the least, but I’m afraid it would have to be done.? Phase two would be:

  • Move to a currency that is gold-backed.
  • Replace the Fed with a currency board.
  • Create a new unified regulator of all depositary institutions.
  • Slowly raise bank capital requirements, and make them countercyclical.
  • Bring all agreements onto the balance sheet with full disclosure.
  • Enforce a strict separation between regulated and non-regulated financials.? No cross-ownership, no cross-lending, no derivative agreements between them.
  • Bar investment banks from being publicly traded, and if regulated, with strict leverage/risk-based capital limits.
  • Move back to balanced budgets, and prepare for the pensions/entitlements crisis.

On that last one, there are few good solutions there, but we would have to try anyway.? So it goes.

Bring Out Yer Dead! (thud)

Bring Out Yer Dead! (thud)

I’ve been beating the avoid the US automakers drum for six years now.? When I was a corporate bond manager, one of the first things that I did was sell 90% of my Ford and GM bonds that I inherited from the prior manager.? When I began writing for RealMoney, I wrote pieces like this:

David Merkel
Open Letter to General Motors’ CFO
By David Merkel
RealMoney.com Contributor

12/9/2004 11:11 AM EST
URL: http://www.thestreet.com/p/rmoney/davidmerkel/10198313.html

General Motors (GM:NYSE) BEARISH
Price:?$38.14??|??52-Week Range:?$36.90-$55.55

  • GM should refinance at least half its 2005 and 2006 maturities while rates remain low.
  • The company’s future is threatened by any increase in bond yields.
  • Position: None

    Sir: Though I am not as bearish as my friend Peter Eavis on the prospects for your company, I do want to give you some friendly, if unsolicited, advice: Refinance at least half of your 2005 and 2006 maturities while rates remain low.

    With over $50 billion of principal coming due in the next two years, the future of GM (GM:NYSE) is threatened by any increase in bond yields. With the likely weakness in the dollar, yields on Treasury obligations are unlikely to remain this low, in my opinion. Further, though spreads for GM and GMAC are not at historically tight levels, spreads in the corporate bond market are at levels not seen since 1997. Take advantage of the demand (both domestic and international) for yieldy paper while you can. For that matter, do another convert deal. It may put a ceiling over your stock price (but, hey, isn’t there one there now?), but the convertible arbs will give you cheap financing while you figure out how to make your auto operations profitable (and design cars that people crave).

    Though your ratings are stable from Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s at present, who can tell how long that will last? GM and GMAC debt are only one notch above junk at S&P, and I can tell you that you will have a hard time selling debt if you ever do get downgraded by S&P. Even if Moody’s leaves you an investment-grade rating, I will tell you that there is not enough buying capacity in the bond market for crossover credits of your size. Your yields would have to rise to the point where equity investors find your bonds an interesting speculation, as was true of auto bonds in mid-2002.

    Further, do you want to be subject to the vicissitudes of your cousin Ford (F:NYSE) ? If they catch cold, you may too, at least in the eyes of the ratings agencies. But I digress.

    It is always better to seek financing when it is offered, rather than when you need it. Your spreads are not going to get materially tighter, in my opinion, absent a partial refinancing that gives the bond market more confidence in how you will meet your short-term obligations.

    I wish you nothing but the best, if for no other reason than as a U.S. taxpayer, I don’t want to bail GM or Ford out.

    Sincerely,

    David J. Merkel

    P.S. To the CFO of Ford: This goes for you as well. The numbers differ, your spreads are currently tighter than those of GM, but you lack one thing that GM has. GM could sell the non-auto financing assets of GMAC in a pinch, which is presently a very valuable franchise that you don’t possess. Refinance while the bond market is friendly.

    I also wrote pieces like this:


    David Merkel
    GM on “Death Ground”
    11/17/2005 5:15 PM EST

    The last time I used the phrase “death ground” it was with respect to Fannie Mae. It engendered some confusion then so let me explain the term. “Death Ground” is a term from Sun Tzu’s The Art of War. It is when a General faces a situation where an army unit is in nearly hopeless shape, and the General manuevers the unit into a place where flight is impossible, so that the unit will fight to the death, because they have nothing to lose. Soldiers that motivated sometimes win; it is a last-ditch strategy.

    That describes GM today. The CEO announced that in a letter posted on the Financial Times website, “I’d like to just set the record straight here and now: there is absolutely no plan, strategy or intention for GM to file for bankruptcy” GM faces a host of issues, revolving around legacy liabilities, poor design, poor marketing (reliance on sales, rather than everyday low pricing), high production costs, low flexibility, and high debt. Almost everything has to go right for GM to survive against much stronger competition; to me, that’s death ground.

    That’s not an exhaustive list. Add into that the possible sale of GMAC, which is the crown jewel of GM, and you can sense the desperation. This is not a company to be playing around with on the long side; truth is, the world doesn’t need GM when it has Toyota. Maybe the US government will bail out GM the way they did Chrysler, but I really wouldn’t expect that.

    Long GM debt was trading in the mid-60s this morning for a 12%-ish yield. It improved after the CEO’s statements this afternoon; the longs got a gift. I would take the opportunity to lighten up on long positions in GM stock, and any bonds dated past 2010. Take the $10-15 buck haircut off par, lest you have to settle for a recovery in the $30s five years out. (The 2036 7.75% zero-to-fulls are trading in the low $20s. Assuming an interest rate of about 7-9%, and a default 5 years out, that discounts a recovery in the mid-$30s.)

    Position: short FNM, long TM

    And this:

    GM: Less Has Changed Than Meets the Eye, by David Merkel

    6/30/2006 8:24 AM EDT

    The story of GM over the past few decades has been to sell off desirable assets to fund the core auto operations, close factories and reduce jobs in North America. Its recent round of adjustments is only different because of the desperateness of the situation. Even with the labor concessions being discussed, GM’s cost structure will remain higher than most of its competition.

    Consider the ratings agencies that are “inside the wall” and possess more information than other market participants. Even after the changes made, GM’s debt is rated Caa1 (negative outlook) by Moody’s and B (negative watch) by S&P. The ratings on GM’s debt reflect a highly speculative company with an uncertain future. The debt of GM, though the price is up from its lows still reflects significant uncertainty of full payment. Long debt trades in the mid-$70s.

    We still don’t know whether the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation will go for the sale of 51% of GMAC. GM has only made a dent in the total liabilities that it faces in pension and health care (active and retiree). Does the PBGC want to lose a claim on one of the more valuable aspects of the firm should it go under?

    Finally, sales have been disappointing, and discounting must be resorted to in order to “move the metal.” GM’s offerings have improved of late, but that might only be enough to get someone to buy a GM instead of a Ford. The improvements at GM don’t place the company on the same footing as Toyota or Honda from either a cost or marketability basis.

    GM may be able to eke out a small GAAP operating profit in the short run from the changes made. It is still in a lousy competitive position against firms with stronger balance sheets and lower cost structures. My estimate of the long-run outcome has not changed. Avoid the stock and unsecured debt of GM.

    P.S. At least GM is showing a little vigor relative to Ford (F:NYSE) , but that’s not saying much. Ford’s situation, if judged by the asset markets (stock, bond and credit-default swaps), has worsened relative to GM. Credit-default swaps now show Ford as more likely to default over the next five years than GM. What a mess.

    At the time of publication, Merkel and/or his fund was short GM and Ford, though positions may change at any time.

    FInally there is this piece four months ago, where I said: As I have said many times before GM common is an eventual zero.? Same for Ford.? All the errors in labor relations over the years, compounded with interest, are coming back to bite, hard.

    Why throw good money after bad?? Why reward exceedingly lousy managers, and unions that have sucked the carcasses of the auto companies dry? Throw in $25 billion.? It won’t be enough.? Toyota and Honda are so much better managed, that they will win anyway.

    In 2002, we let 20+ steel companies die.? The valuable assets were bought up, union contracts were torn up, and the industry regained sanity.? The industry is in much better shape today, and able to compete against the rest of the world.

    We should do the same with the autos.? Let GM, Ford and Chrysler die.? Let Toyota, Honda, Daimler, Renault, Hyundai, Magna, Kirk Kerkorian (dreamer), etc., bid for the assets in bankruptcy.? Many jobs will be retained, though at fairer levels of compensation.? Remember my piece Rethinking Comparable Worth?? We are facing international comparable worth issues in labor in the auto sector now.

    Before there were the possibilities with government bailouts, GM and Ford said they had more than enough cash.? But when the carrot of cheap financing is in front of them, they tell their tales of woe.? Examples from the media:

    I could add to the examples in other sectors — MBIA and Ambac seem to be? headed to zero as well.? Another set of examples of too much debt and too little transparency.

    But to close on the automakers, I highlight the well-written article at the Curious Capitalist.? The companies are not as critical as their assets, which will be bought by others, and many of the jobs will be retained.? Any bailout will throw good money after bad, and will not preserve the auto industry here in the long run.

    Full disclosure: long HMC MGA

    What Do You Have To Hide?

    What Do You Have To Hide?

    Bloomberg sues the Fed for refusing to disclose what sort of collateral they are lending against.? I come at this from having worked in insurance for two decades.? Insurers have to disclose every asset that they own in their Statutory filings.? When I looked at a bank’s call report recently, I was surprised to see only summary data available.? The insurance industry has high disclosure, and it hasn’t hurt them.? Why should the Fed cower, and refuse to reveal what they are lending against?? Five possibilities, and none of them good:

    • The Fed is breaking its own rules, and lending on collateral that it publicly said that it wouldn’t lend against.
    • They are playing favorites with institutions, and don’t want that to be revealed.
    • The assets in question are technically in compliance with the rules of the Fed, but are worth far less than the amount loaned against them.
    • Certain banks would be embarrassed by revealing what they own.
    • It’s just a power game, and the Fed thinks it is above the law, particularly during a crisis (that it helped to cause).

    For another example, I would be happy to see who they are lending to in their CPFF program.? Are they lending a lot to AIG through CP?? Anyone else notice that AIG is A-/A3 from S&P and Moody’s which would make them A-2/P-2, and ineligible for the Fed to lend to, but S&P and Moody’s still have them at A-1/P-1.? Weird.

    In my opinion, there is no good reason why the Fed can’t disclose the collateral, and the institutions involved.? They assure us that they are being upright and prudent; let them prove it.

    “There doesn’t seem to be a fundamental reason why.”

    “There doesn’t seem to be a fundamental reason why.”

    Until I read the last sentence of this Wall Street Journal article on AIG’s risk models, I felt somewhat sympathetic for the guy who developed the models.? Having developed many models in my life, I have seen them misused by executives wanting a more optimistic result, and putting pressure on the quantitative analyst to bend the assumptions.? Here’s the last paragaph:

    On a rainy morning last week, Mr. Gorton briefly discussed with his Yale students how perplexing the struggles of the financial world have become. About 30 graduate students listened as Mr. Gorton lamented how problems in one sector caused investors to question value all across the board. Said Mr. Gorton: “There doesn’t seem to be a fundamental reason why.”

    When I read that, I concluded that the poor guy was in over his head for years, and did not have the necessary expertise for what he was doing at AIG.? All good credit models contain something for boom and bust.? Creditworthiness of borrowing entities is highly correlated, especially during the bust phase of the credit cycle.? That said, to get deals done on CDO-like structures, the modeler can’t assume that correlations are as high as they are in real life, or the deals can’t get done.

    But to my puzzled professor, there are fundamental reasons why.

    • Overlevered systems are inherently unstable.? Small changes in creditworthiness can have big impacts.
    • Rating agencies undersized subordination levels in order to win business.
    • Regulators allow regulated financials to own this stuff with low capital requirements, partially thanks to Basel II.
    • Much of the debt was related to Financials, Housing, and Real Estate, and all of those sectors are under pressure.
    • When financials ain’t healthy, ain’t no one healthy.

    Now, for another look at the problem from a different angle, consider this New York Times article on Wisconsin public schools buying CDOs for teach pension plans.? As a kid, I played against a number of the schools mentioned in sports, etc., so many of these names bring back old memories for me.

    Again, what is clear is that the guy advising the school one of the school districts barely understood the ABCs of what he was doing, and the district trusted him.? I’ll say it again, if you don’t understand it, or you don’t have a trusted friend on your side of the table who does understand it, don’t buy it. Also, relatively high yields on seemingly safe investments typically don’t exist.? Beware the salesman that offers high yields with safety; there is usually one of four things involved:

    • Financial leverage
    • Options sold short
    • Low credit quality of the underlying debt instruments
    • Foreign currency risks

    These deals fall far short of the “prudent man rule” in my opinion.? Not only is the salesman culpable in this case, so are the board members that did not do proper due diligence.? For something this complex, not reading the prospectus is amazing, even though it might not have helped, given the complexity of the beast.? At least, though, a board member should read the “risks and disclosures” section of the prospectus.? There is usually honesty there, because that is what the investment bank is relying on to protect themselves legally if things go bad.

    The districts should have accepted a lower rate of return on their investments, and asked the taxpayers for contributions to the pension plans, etc., to make up any deficits.

    We will probably see many more stories like this over the next year.? Politicians and bureaucrats are often short-sighted, and look for “that one little thing” that will magically close a gap in the budget.? It’s that little bit of fear of the taxpayers and other stakeholders that caused “that one little thing” to become so tempting.? But now they have to live with the bad results; heads will roll.

    Fixing Securitization

    Fixing Securitization

    After reading jck’s piece Securitization: Not Guilty, I said to myself, “well said.” He cited a study that showed that misaligned incentives were more to blame than secutritization itself.? (Academic paper here.)? And he cited this clever piece from the seemingly erstwhile blog Going Private.

    Here’s my view.? I have lived through the first era of securitization, and I always thought that the equity/originator got off too easily.? They got their money out of the transaction too quickly, allowing themselves to profit if the deal survived for a while, and then died.? The equity of the deal should take the largest risks, rather than the subordinate certificates (most junior aside from equity).

    Here’s my solution.? Require that the deal sponsor and originators retain the full equity piece, and that the size be regulated to make it significant.? Further require that the equity is a zero interest tranche, where the excess interest builds up to protect the subordinate securities.? They get paid last out of any residual cash flows of the deal.? The size of the equity piece might vary from 1% of principal on credit card, auto and stranded cost ABS, to 10% on CDOs.? Note that the equity pieces cannot be traded here, they must be owned by the sponsors or originators.

    Now, if the equity only gets paid at the end, several things occur:

    • Sponsors/Originators have to be well capitalized.
    • They will be a lot more careful about credit selection, and not accept high-interest risky borrowers.
    • The subordinate certificates will get paid less interest, but with more certainty.

    Does this change the nature of securitization?? Yes, and in a good way.? Securitization is useful, but in its initial phases, it suffered from the equity not having enough at risk.? My proposal solves that.? Put the equity at the back of the cash flow bus, such that the originator never makes a gain on sale, and that part of the financial system will be sound once again.

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