Photo Credit: Ruin Raider || It is important to recognize the limitations of any system. Don’t overestimate what is possible.

Well, the last installment in this series was 2009. I ran a Guaranteed Investment Contract [GIC] desk at Provident Mutual from 1992-1997. I also managed our internal stable value funds for our pension line of business. This was during a period where increasingly Stable Value Funds were being replaced by bonds and bond funds being wrapped by a type of derivative that would allow for “benefit responsive payments,” called a “wrap contract.”

Now, I know I lost most of you with the last paragraph. Definitions:

Guaranteed Investment Contract: A group annuity issued by a life insurance company. It is like a bond, paying principal and interest until it matures. But it is more secure than most bonds because it is an insurance liability, which has a higher bankruptcy priority than a bond issued by the insurance company. Also, a GIC will pay money out sooner if there is a need to pay “benefit responsive payments.” Absent default, the value of a GIC never falls. Its value accrues like a savings account, because it is an annuity from a life insurer.

Benefit Responsive Payments: In Defined Contribution Pension Plans (401k, 403b, 457, etc.), if a participant dies, gets disabled, leaves his current employer, gets served with a QDRO [Qualified Domestic Relations Order — child support, alimony], exchanges funds in the stable value fund for noncompeting funds (funds that are not short-to-intermediate fixed income), etc., then the GIC may pay benefits out early at book value.

Stable Value Funds: Funds that buy investments that absent default, only appreciate, and thus act like a savings account, but with much better yields. Those can be insurance contracts (rare now), or bonds wrapped by “wrap agreements.”

Wrap Agreements: Derivative instruments that receive money if benefit responsive payments occur and the market value of the wrapped bonds is higher than the book value, and pay money if benefit responsive payments occur and the market value of the wrapped bonds is lower than the book value. The objective is that benefit responsive payments go to the beneficiary at book value, and no one else in the Stable Value Fund is affected.

Why am I Writing This?

I received an email from a lady working at a major investment bank, asking me where she could find independent commentary regarding stable value funds, because most of the commentary is produced by the stable value fund managers themselves. Why is that so? Stable Value Funds are complex beasts. Typically only insiders understand them. She was wondering how the funds were doing given the rapid increase in interest rates. This is the toughest scenario for stable value funds.

The Math

Let’s define terms first.

BV: Book value — the accrued value of the stable value fund assets so far.

MV: Market Value — the market value of the assets now, if we are able to liquidate the assets at current prices.

AYTM: Annualized Yield to Maturity — the annualized rate that the assets are yielding at current market prices. Note that if you have the SEC Yield, that is the Semiannual yield to maturity, sometimes called the bond-equivalent yield [YTM]. To convert YTM to AYTM:((1 + YTM/2)^2) -1 = AYTM.

D: Effective Duration — The first derivative of Market Value with respect to AYTM. For those that have not taken Calculus, or have forgotten what that means, it measures the sensitivity of market value to small moves in the AYTM. A bigger D means the market value changes more than a smaller D. (And always remember, as interest rates rise, the value of all ordinary bonds goes down.

It is called effective duration, because on a present value basis it measures the weighted average time at which you can expect to receive the cash flows, typically measured in years.

CR: Credited Rate — Though all of these values are artificial in some sense (channeling my best Matt Levine), this one is the most artificial. It means this: in the past the book value accrued to its current value. Now, over the length of time expressed by the Effective Duration, what should the current credited rate be in order for the book and market value to converge? The credited rate is a figure that is like a “heat-seeking” missile, always adjusting (monthly or quarterly) to new conditions as the book value chases the market value. When book value is above market value, the credited rate slows down relative to the AYTM. When the book value is below the market value, the credited rate speeds up relative to the AYTM.

So what’s the issue here?

Interest rates have risen rapidly, after dwelling at low rates for a long time. Back when I was developing a stable value product in 1996, I knew this was the disaster scenario for stable value. More than most actuaries at the time, I had realistic interest rate scenario models the reflected the true volatility of interest rates. I would create 10,000 full yield curve scenarios over a 10 year period, then analyze the ones where the stable value fund failed. Failures occurred in the scenarios where short rates rose rapidly.

Wait. How can a stable value fund fail? If the credited rate drops below zero, practically it has failed. The fund sponsor will credit zero in such a situation, but it will face the problem of participants exiting to non-competing options, worsening the problem. The stable value fund may not be able to return book value to its participants.

But this isn’t bad for everyone, at least not yet

I don’t think everyone needs to worry, though. The edge cases, those who have taken too much risk at the wrong time should worry. for the worst-managed funds, there is some risk of a “run-on-the fund.”

I did a little digging around the large stable value managers, at least among those who publish all their data publicly. I’m not naming names, I have my own liability risk here. There are a number of insurance companies running their stable value plans at durations higher than 5, and their ratio of market value to book value is near 85%. If you are in such a situation, move your stable value assets to a balanced fund for 30 days, then move that to a short-to-intermediate term bond fund. You will escape the low-yielding and possibly defaulting stable value fund. You will also earn more from the bond fund.

At present, most stable value funds have a market value to book value is between 91-95%. If you are in a fund like that, don’t worry, unless a panic happens because of the funds running at long durations. Then do the same shuffle that I suggest: move your stable value assets to a balanced fund for 30 days, then move that to a short-to-intermediate term bond fund. You will escape the low-yielding and possibly defaulting stable value fund. You will also earn more from the bond fund.

Other Issues

There is also the risk of stretching for yield. Though the bond managers who manage fixed-income portfolios for stable value funds are generally conservative, when rates are low, many bond managers take chances that don’t work out. As such if the YTM/AYTM of the asset manager seems aggressive, maybe pare back. (If it is more than 1.5% above Treasuries, consider leaving.) If something seems too good to be true, it very well may be too good to be true.

Conclusion

Say what you will about Stable Value Funds, they are more opaque than other investments. As such, they deserve more scrutiny. It is not a bad idea now for most participants to move your stable value assets to a balanced fund for 30 days, then move that to a short-to-intermediate term bond fund. You will escape the low-yielding and possibly defaulting stable value fund. You will also earn more from the bond fund.

I don’t think most people have to do this, but it is not a bad strategy for all. Take your opportunity and move stable value money to a balanced fund. Then if you don’t like the volatility, move to a short-to-intermediate term bond fund.

Graph Credit: Aleph Blog || How do you feel about 3.00%/year nominal returns over the next 10 years? That’s less yield than the 10-year T-note

Stocks always beat bonds. Stocks always beat bonds. Stocks always beat bonds. Stocks always beat bonds.

Quite a mantra. And for those with a long time horizon, this is true. What I am telling you this evening is if you want that to work for you, your time horizon should be greater than ten years. With the ten-year T-note yielding 3.41%, the S&P 500 at 3946 indicates likely nominal returns of 3.00%/year over the next ten years. Though the bond market has had a lousy year, many of the times I wrote about this over the last few years, the S&P 500 had return expectations in line with a 10-year single-A corporate bond. When the market indicates returns lower than a 10-year T-note, it is still quite expensive (95th percentile).

As the end of December 2021 was near the recent highs, so the end of June 2022 was near the recent lows, projecting a nominal 3.32%/year return for the S&P 500 over the next ten years. The weak rally of the last eleven weeks has reduced future returns to 3.00%.

So what to do? For me, not much. I have always kept my asset allocation around 70% risky, 30% safe. I am near that now, and don’t feel the need to panic. I like the stocks that I own for me and my clients. We are up this year. All that said, I haven’t had a good year prior to this since 2013. Versus the broad market, my performance has been poor as value has lagged, and I am more value-y than most value managers.

The histogram above attempts to show scenarios when likely returns per year were within 1% of where they are now. Positive returns are expected with a considerable left tail.

So What Might Happen?

My view here is that the Fed will overshoot in tightening, leading the stock market to new lows in this bear market. Ray Dalio has said something like this. Looking at the ’70s or the Great Financial Crisis are not what I would look at. My best analogy here is the dot-com bubble.

I remember from that era how many people said that Fed policy was irrelevant to growth stocks. When the yield curve inverts, those who finance long assets with short-term debt blow up. During the dot-com bubble, that was mostly tech firms. The banks were mostly not affected. That is true today, as the banks are in good shape.

So expect:

• The yield curve to get more inverted
• Stocks to fall, especially growth stocks
• Real GDP will decline
• Commodities will suffer
• The Fed will panic, and loosen in 2023

That’s all for now. I have been going through a hard period in my life, thus I have not been posting much.

Image credit: Diverse Stock Photos || Would that those shiny coins were the real thing. Metal coins are real. Code, not so.

As I have said before, look at the underlying economics of an investment rather than its external form. It doesn’t matter whether it is public or private. The form of an investment does not affect its returns, for the most part.

I grew up in investing as a risk manager within life insurance and fixed income. We faced three main risks: credit, liquidity, and duration. We had lesser risks as well, like FX, sovereigns, convexity, etc. My main goal was to see the firm survive under all reasonable circumstances. My secondary goal was to improve profitability over those same circumstances.

In doing that, we could make some small “side bets.” Buy an underpriced Canadian dollar bond. Buy a broken convertible bond of a beaten down company. Buy underpriced MBS where the models are overstating refinancing risk. Things like that. We could not make those side bets too large, but we could put a few on to try to make some money for the firm.

We would match assets against our likely liability cashflows. We knew that 99%+ of the time, we would be fine.

I can’t imagine what the so-called crypto banks are thinking. Much as they deride banking generally, they don’t have the vaguest idea of what they are doing. They should hire an investment actuary to limit what they do.

Imagine a world where banks don’t care about currency risk, and some fail because the temptation to reach for yield causes them to buy asset in currencies that are weak… leading them to lose capital on net.

This is the nature of crypto lending and borrowing. As Aristotle might have said, “Crypto is sterile.” It doesn’t produce anything. So don’t lend out crypto for a return… you may lose you principal in the process. There is no good reason why you should earn a return exceeding Treasuries plus 1% in lending crypto.

But no one in crypto considers risk control. In one sense, I’m not sure how it could be done, unless you limit yourself to one major cryptocurrency — Bitcoin or Ethereum.

The grand questions should be:

• Can I be sure of making payments over the next three months?
• Is my leverage low enough that the mélange of assets that I own will be able to cover my liabilities?
• Is there anything I can do to promote long-term survival?

With cryptocurrency banks and stablecoins these concerns are ignored. They take risks that no bank or insurance company would take and with far less capital than would be reasonable.

I encourage you to sell your crypto and buy gold, stocks, bonds, and other dollar-denominated assets.

Image credit: All images belong to Aleph Blog

Well, finally the bear market… at 3/31/2002 the S&P 500 was priced to return a trice less than zero in nominal terms. After the pasting the market received today, that figure is 3.57%/year nominal (not adjusted for inflation). You would likely be better off in an ETF of 10-year single-A rated bonds yielding 4.7% — both for safety and return.

I will admit that my recent experiment buying TLT has been a flop. I added to the position today. My view is that the long end of the curve is getting resistant to the belly of the curve, and thus the curve is turning into the “cap” formation, where the middle of the curve is higher than the short and long ends. This is a rare situation. Usually, the long end rallies in situations like this. The only situation more rare than this is the “cup” formation where the middle of the curve is lower than the short and long ends.

I will have to update my my old post of “Goes Down Double-Speed.” We’ve been through three cycles since then — bear, bull, and now bear again. People get surprised by the ferocity of bear markets, but they shouldn’t be. People get shocked at losing money on paper, and thus the selloffs happen more rapidly. Bull markets face skepticism, and so they are slow.

What are the possibilities given where the market is now? When the market is expecting 3.57% nominal, give or take one percent, what tends to happen?

The Fed cares about things in this order:

• Preserve their own necks
• Preserve the banks, and things like them
• Fight inflation
• Fund the US Government
• Promote nominal GDP growth, though they will call it reducing labor unemployment. The Fed really doesn’t care about labor unemployment, or inequality. They are a bourgeois institution that cares about themselves and their patrons — those who are rich.

I know this post is “all over the map.” My apologies. That said, we in a very unusual situation featuring high debt, high current inflation (that won’t last), war, plague, and supply-chain issues. How this exactly works out is a mystery, especially to me — but I am giving you my best guess here, for whatever it is worth. It’s worth than double what you paid for it! 😉

Full disclosure: long TLT for clients and me

Photo Credit: Marco Verch Professional Photographer || With some private investments, you can’t tell what the value truly is. Third party professional help occasionally assists dishonesty

Part of my career was based on concealing volatility. I sold Guaranteed Investment Contracts. I helped design and manage several different types of stable value funds. Life insurance contracts get valued at their book value, regardless of what the replacement cost of an equivalent contract would be like presently.

Anytime an investment pool with no current market price has a book value above the underlying value of the investments that it holds, there is risk to those holding the investment pool. The amount of risk can be small yet significant with some types of money market funds. It can be considerably larger in certain types of pooled investments like:

• Various types of business partnerships, including Private REITs, Real Estate Partnerships, Private Equity, etc.
• Illiquid debts, such as private credit funds, and notes with limited marketability, whether structured or not.
• Odd mutual funds that limit withdrawals because they offer “guarantees” of a sort. That applies to Variable Annuities with riders offering guaranteed benefits, if the life insurer becomes insolvent.
• One-off investment liquid partnerships that are secretive and unusual, like Madoff. The underlying may be illiquid, but the accounting may be fraudulent. Or, the accounting may be fine, but the assets listed are not what is in custody. (With small funds, analyze the auditor, trustees, and custodian.)
• The value of a company touted by a SPAC promoter may be worth considerably less than what is illustrated.
• Any investment in public equity or debt pool where the positions are concentrated, and they own a high percentage of the float, or a high amount of the securities relative to the amount that gets traded in an average month. Think of Third Avenue Focused Credit, or Archegos.

I have consistently encouraged readers to “look through” their pooled investments, and consider what the underlying is worth. If you only have a vague idea of what the underlying investments are, look at their public equivalents. A rising tide lifts almost all boats, and a falling tide does the opposite.

There is a conceit within private equity, private credit and private real estate funds that they are less risky; there is no volatility, because we cannot produce an NAV. They have the same volatility as the publicly traded funds, but the volatility is concealed. If trouble hits the public markets 50-75% of the way through the life of a private fund, it will have difficulty selling their investments at levels anywhere near the book value previously claimed by the sponsors.

With consent of the limited partners, perhaps they extend the life of the fund to try to recover value, but that also imposes an opportunity cost on holders who were expecting proceeds from the fund on schedule.

Remember as well that in a scenario like 1929-1932, private funds will be wiped out with similarly leveraged private funds. Aleph Blog has consistently warned about the possibility of depression, plague, war, famine, bad monetary policy and aggressive socialism. We have gotten plague, war, and bad monetary policy. Famine in a sense may come from the Ukraine war and trade restrictions on Russia, at least for the African countries that buy from them.

Thus I encourage readers to avoid private investments that promise no volatility, like the stupid ads for Equity Multiple that run on Bloomberg Radio. All investments involve some type of risk. Just because you can’t or don’t measure the risk doesn’t mean that there is no risk.

Don’t listen to investment sales pitches which tell you to avoid the volatility of the public equity and debt markets, when they are taking the exact same risks in the private market, and they cannot or will not measure the risks for you, no matter how thick or thin the “disclosure” document is.

There is no significant advantage in the private market over the public market. Indeed, the reverse may be true. (Yes, I meant all of the ambiguity there.) Look to the underlying, and invest accordingly. Look at fees, and try to minimize them. Prize transparency, because it reduces risk in the long run. Those who are honest are transparent.

Photo Credit: mark m || Every now and then, a change in tactics is justified

In 1994, there did come a limit where valuations of long debt undershot and started to come back. After more thought, the short-term yield effect of convexity hedging probably peaks out around 2.5-3.0% on 30-year mortgages. Unless the Fed becomes an aggressive seller of the their long bonds, and now-long MBS, I don’t see long rates going past their recent highs.

As such, I am likely to begin buying a little bit of long Treasuries as a hedge against market weakness induced by the likely Fed overshoot. Recently the short-term correlation between stocks and 30-year Treasuries has seemed to go back to stocks down, bonds up, and vice-versa.

That’s all for now.

Image Credit: Aleph Blog with help from FRED || Look at the mortgage rates fly!

Okay, you might or might not remember the last piece. But since that time, 30-year mortgage rates have risen more than 1%. Is the Fed dawdling? Maybe, but the greater threat is that they become too aggressive, and blow up the financial economy, leading us into another decade-long bout of financial repression.

As it stands right now, mortgage rates are in a self-reinforcing rising cycle, and it will not end until the Fed raises the Fed funds rate until it inverts the Treasury yield curve. But if I were on the FOMC, I would ignore inflation and the labor markets, and I would watch the financial economy to avoid blowing things up.

The FOMC won’t do this. They are wedded to ideas that no longer work, or may never have worked, like the Phillips Curve. They imagine that the macroeconomic models work, when they never do. They forget what Milton Friedman taught — that monetary policy works with long and variable lags. Instead, in tightening cycles, the FOMC acts as if there are no lags. And, in one sense, they are correct. The financial economy reacts immediately to FOMC actions. The real economy, with inflation and unemployment, may take one or two years to see the effects.

And because the FOMC forgets about the lags, they overshoot. The FOMC, far from stabilizing the economy, tends to destabilize it. We would be better off running a gold standard, and regulating the banks tightly for solvency. Remember, gold was never the problem — bad bank regulation was the problem.

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One more thing — the Fed needs to be quiet. The chatter of Fed governors upsets the markets, as do Fed press conferences and the dot-plot. The Fed was most effective under Volcker and Martin. They said little, and let their actions be known through the Fed’s Open Markets Desk. That allowed the Fed to surprise and lead the markets. The current Fed (since Greenspan) made the mistake of following the markets. Following the markets exacerbates volatility, and promotes oversupplying liquidity.

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At present I am pretty sure 30-year mortgage rates will rise to 6%, and maybe 7%. No one is panicking enough on this, so it will likely go higher. MBS hedging is a powerful force, and will continue until people no longer want to buy houses at such high interest rates.

Photo Credits: Jen and www.david baxendale.com with help from pinetools || The casino is exciting. The scale is honest and unrelenting.

I want to give an update to one of the major concepts of Ben Graham, in order to make it fit the modern era better. Ben Graham said:

“In the short run, the market is a voting machine but in the long run, it is a weighing machine.”

https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/831517-in-the-short-run-the-market-is-a-voting-machine quoted from The Intelligent Investor

So let me modify it: In the short run, the market is a casino, but in the long run, it is a scale. Is this an improvement? Probably not, but speculation has become so rampant that it may be a necessary modification to change voting machine to casino.

The voting machine makes sense, but typically we think of voting as being democratic. We only get one vote per person. Markets are different. Someone who brings a little money to the market will not have the same influence as the one who brings a lot of money to the market. Thus my analogy of the casino, though typically casinos will place limits on how much the casino will wager. They want to avoid random large losses so that they can live to extract money from rubes for many years to come. The winner can brag that he “broke the bank,” but the casino survived to play on.

Bill Hwang and his CFO were formally charged with fraud today. What did they do? They synthetically borrowed a lot of money from investment banks to own huge amounts of a few companies. Their buying pushed the prices of the stocks higher, allowing them to borrow more against the positions. But eventually as the stocks they owned had some bad results, the margin calls on his positions wiped him out as the stock prices fell. The scale trumped the casino.

The same is true of crypto and meme stocks. Cryptocurrencies require a continuing inflow of real cash (admittedly fiat money) in order to appreciate. If people stop buying crypto on net, and that may be happening now, cryptocurrencies will decline. The scale says crypto is a zero — no intrinsic value. The casino begs for more people to bring real money to buy fake money.

That applies to meme stocks as well. You can throw a lot of money at a stock and it will rise. But for it to stay there or rise further, it will need increasing free cash flows to validate the value of the firm.

Going back to crypto, it lacks any link to the real economy. Crypto will only become legitimate when you can buy groceries and gasoline at a fixed amount of bitcoin that varies less than the same price in US dollars.

As a final note on the Scale versus the Casino, I give you Elon Musk. He borrows against his shares of Tesla to buy Twitter.

He either did not realize or ignored the fact that he could lose his stake in Tesla if the price of Tesla falls enough. Do you really want the margin desk to control your fate? This may not totally impoverish Musk, but it is not impossible that he could the entirety of his holdings of Tesla in order to keep his holdings of the unprofitable Twitter. All it would take is for short sellers to push Tesla below $740, and then the margin desk starts selling his shares into a falling market. Momentum, aided by an agreement leading to forced selling.

The market abhors a vacuum. So it is for those who assume that things will continue to go right for them.

Photo Credit: John.U || Look at all those eggs in one basket! The owner *is* watching it carefully, right?

Jason Zweig recent wrote an article on owning stock in the company that you work for. Then today in his WSJ newsletter he asked the following question:

What’s the most concentrated investment position you’ve ever had? (In other words, what single investment made up the greatest proportion of your portfolio?) Did it work out well or poorly? What did you learn from it?

I have one article to answer both questions called Life with Wife. It’s a cute article which runs through two times in my life where I had an overly concentrated investment position. The first one was regarding The St. Paul (acquired by The Travelers), where I took my first big bonus, and put it all into shares of The St. Paul. I got derided for doing that by my colleagues in the investment department, but with a AA balance sheet, trading at 55% of tangible book value, and 8x forward earnings, I felt I had a reasonable provision against adverse deviation — a margin of safety. If you read the article, you will see that I almost doubled my money in six months, then sold. At the peak it was half of my net worth, and I had a mortgage then.

So should you invest in your own company? Well, are you working for Tesla or Enron? I am being facetious here, as the guys at Enron thought they were working for a cutting-edge company like Tesla. But any analyst worth his salt would have seen that free cash flow at Enron was deeply negative.

I have a neighbor who is a Tesla mechanic. As I was mowing my lawn one day, he waved me over. He wanted advice. He hinted to me how much his Tesla shares were worth. He had consulted an investment advisor who had told him to sell the wad, and the advisor would create a growth and income portfolio allowing him to retire (he is in his 60s). But he was conflicted, because Tesla was doing so well. He asked me what I would do if I was in his shoes. (Note: the TSLA shares were likely 95% of his net worth.)

I said, “Do half, or sell 10-20% per year over time, until you do sell half.” Doing that frees you from the binary decision that you might regret. After selling half, if the price goes up, you still have more capital gains. If the price goes down, you sold some at a good time. You can be happy with yourself no matter what. I have no idea what my neighbor did. Hopefully he sold some.

The second situation in Life with Wife regarded my only significant private equity position, Wright Manufacturing, which makes the best commercial lawn mowers in the world. At that point, my holdings were 15% of my net worth, with no mortgage. The founder was throwing everything into growth, and sacrificing safety. If he hadn’t been my friend, I probably would not have invested with him. As it was, when I sold half, I had recouped my investment. After the Life with Wife article, I bought out several of the founder’s relatives, ending up with 2.2% of the company. I’ve made 5x on my money here, with distributions, and using the very thin “market” for shares. One of the founder’s sons leads the company now, and he is a far better manager than his father. I like this company, and am more likely to buy more than to sell at this point.

But at this point, it is only 10% of my net worth. I may offer to buy more, but I am thinking about it. It trades at 6x earnings, with a stronger balance sheet than the founder worked with, and a stronger competitive position. The most recent price is still below where I sold it to the second largest shareholder. Price discovery is tough when there are only 20 shareholders, and new shareholders may only enter at the pleasure of the board of directors.

Closing

So, over my life, I have reduced the relative amount at risk on my biggest positions. Does that make sense? Of course — I have less time to make up for mistakes as I grow older. The only people who should be taking high risks when they are old are who are ultra-rich. If they fail, they will still have enough for a moderate existence.

Be careful with concentrated positions. You need certainty about safety most, earnings second, and growth third. Otherwise you are a gambler, and most gamblers lose.

Photo Credit: House Photography || I always read a lot when I was young

This a is follow-up to When I was a Boy… which I wrote ~5 1/2 years ago. It is also a response to an article posted by Jason Zweig, who I have talked with once or twice, and emailed a little more than that. In that article, he asks the question:

How did you learn how to invest? Did you take a class, play a stock-market game in school, have a friend or family member as a mentor?

How Should Kids Learn to Invest?

If you read the original article, you would know that my original start was from two gifts of stock that male relatives in my extended family gave me in the 1960s. They picked two high-fliers — Litton Industries and Magnavox. Bought and held, by the mid-1970s both generated >80% losses when they were bought by another company.

Did I ever play the stock market game in school? Yes, once when I was in seventh grade (early 1973). Our school decided to play around and do an intersession between the two semesters. It was a two week course called “Bulls and Bears. How this Little Piggy Went to Market.” My favorite science teacher was teaching it. I realized that the game was utterly short-term and so I put all of my play money into AT&T warrants, knowing that if AT&T stock rose, the warrants would zoom up. Was I a smart kid, or what?

What. Well, AT&T when nowhere for those two weeks, and the same for the warrants. They were at the same price at the contest end, thus losing the commissions on both sides, and this was when commissions were high, prior to deregulation.

The three main things that taught me about investing were watching Wall Street Week with my Mom, borrowing books on investing at the Brookfield library, and reading the Value Line subscription that she purchased.

I probably read 10 books on investing before I was 18. Louis Rukeyser was an affable guide to the markets, including the elves, the guests, etc. (As an aside, Frank A. Cappiello, Jr. was a founding member of the Baltimore Security Analysts Society, and a frequent guest on his show. After all, where is Owings Mills, Maryland?)

With Value Line, I began to understand how corporations worked. The one-page descriptions of companies were just big enough to give me a good idea of what was going on, while not over-taxing a kid 12-21 years old.

I remember as a student at Johns Hopkins earning 16% on my money market fund in my freshman year.  I was only at Hopkins for three years 1979-1982, but those were tough years, particularly in the Midwest “Rust Belt.”  My father’s business earned little, but my Mom’s investing paid off.  Though not “working” she was making more off the family portfolio than my Dad was earning off his business.  As it was, to help my family then, I paid the last semester of tuition.  (My Mom later paid me back for that.)  I came back home in 1982 with $5 in my pocket.  Then I learned that I overdrew my bank account, costing me $10.

Oh, one more thing the clever and distinguished Carl Christ, who signed my Master’s Thesis at Hopkins, taught a class on investing in my junior year. I learned a lot, but the main thing I remember was writing a research report on a firm that made specialty paper — James River. My mother had owned it for a long time, but had sold her stake at an opportune time. When I wrote the report, she did not own it, and the stock had fallen from where she sold it. Dr. Christ had never heard of James River, an was fascinated at what was at that time a midcap firm in a underfollowed industry. I got an “A.” When I showed the report to my Mom, she bought it again, and made money of it.

Also, in my senior year, I wrote my thesis on stock splits. As I said there:

This brings me to my conclusion: stock splits are a momentum effect, but it is larger when companies are still have a cheap valuation. Perhaps splits have no effect on stock performance — it is all momentum and valuation. To me, that is the most likely conclusion, and my thesis anticipated quantitative money management by 10+ years.

On Stock Splits

In the summer of 1982, I remember sitting down with Value Line in my family’s living room (quiet place, no TV) and selecting a paper portfolio of 40-50 stocks. I went through all 1700 stocks. I recorded the prices in the Milwaukee Journal, and then went to Grad School at UC-Davis. Over the next year the stocks in my “portfolio” appreciated at double the rate of the market. At that time, I was a TA for a Corporate Financial Management class. I showed it to the professor, and he said, “Oh, you have a beta of two.” I said, “No, this portfolio has stocks that are not as risky as the market. This is alpha, not beta.”

Several years later, I participated in the Value Line Investing Contest. I placed in the top 1%, but not good enough to win.

When my dissertation committee dissolved, I was forced to abandon my Ph. D. I took three actuarial exams on the fly in early 1986 and passed. I had an informational interview at Pacific Standard Life which sponsored the exams, and they hired me on the spot. (My boss’ secretary told me that the boss said, “No one can pass the first three exams on the first try.” Then a fellow employee told me later, “You didn’t negotiate hard enough. They would have hired you regardless.”)

When I worked for Pacific Standard Life, and later AIG, I got investment-related projects, because I was the one actuary that understood investing. During this time, I was managing my own portfolio, sometimes better, sometimes worse. I bought stocks, and mutual funds investing outside the US. I had a CTA in my portfolio. I tried investing in spectrum with the FCC, but that was a bomb. I settled on small cap value investing in the mid-1990s, which was a bad era for small cap value. Still, I managed to keep pace with the S&P 500.

In 2000, I had an email exchange with Kenneth Fisher (yes, the big guy of Fisher Investments). This led to he creation of my eight rules. As I wrote on portfolio rule three:

Let me give you a little history of how the eight rules came to be. In 2000, I had an e-mail discussion with Kenneth Fisher. I explained to him what I had been doing with small-cap value, and how I had done well with it in the 90s. He told me to forget everything that I’ve learned, especially the CFA syllabus, and look for the things that I can do better than anyone else. We exchanged about five or so e-mails; I appreciate the time he spent on me.

So I sat back and thought about what investments had worked best for me in the past. I noticed that when I got the call right on cyclical industries, the results were spectacular. I also noticed that I lost most when investing in companies that didn’t have good balance sheets, no matter how “cheap” they were in terms of valuation.

I came to the conclusion that size and value/growth were not the major determinants of my investing success. Instead, industry selection played a large role in what went right and wrong with my investment decisions. So, I decided to formalize that. I would rotate industries with a value bias. But that would have other impacts on how I invested. One of those impacts is rule number three.

Over the next ten years, I tore up the pavement, and would have been in the top percentile of mutual fund managers. And so I opened my own shop in 2010, to find for the next eleven years that value investing was overrated.

My life is bigger than my little company. I am a happy man. I know Jesus Christ; I have eternal life. Have there been disappointments? Of course. The one main positive I can say about my investing is that I rarely have big losses on any security. This is not due to stop losses; I pay attention to balance sheets and the cyclicality of markets.

Even at the age of 61, I am still learning. I am not a boy, obviously, but I am still absorbing new ideas. To all who read me, be life-long learners. I am closer to the end to my life than my beginning, but invest! Take your opportunities to learn and capitalize on them!

And remember, Judgement Day is coming. Are you ready? Investments will help you for now, but will be useless in the hereafter.