Insurance – Page 18 – The Aleph Blog

PIMCO in Theory and Practice, Part II

Posted on 1 August 20121 August 2012 by David Merkel

Things are weird when you write the second part of an article five years later.? I don’t have a strong opinion on some of the arguments between Felix Salmon and “Dutch_Book,” or maybe I have too many opinions, and they conflict.

But I wanted to offer some data on PIMCO that I have gathered, as I considered the arguments made by Felix.? Here it is:

A few points, Felix:

1) This is an old piece of mine, but it helps explain the investment strategies on PIMCO.? PIMCO is basically a bond quant shop that does carry trades, and sells overly expensive volatility.? If you want the non-technical paper written by Bill Gross on the topic, shoot me a DM or an e-mail, and I will pass it on.

2) PIMCO is now wholly owned by Allianz.? After the sale in 1999, Pacific Life held a 30% stake in PIMCO, but also had option to put their stake in the company to Allianz, which they exercised back in 2008.

3) When the acquisition of PIMCO happened, Allianz issued B-units to the management of PIMCO, subject to vesting, to give them an incentive to perform well.? The B-Units were entitled to 15% of PIMCO?s adjusted profits.? Allianz has the right to buy in the B-units, with the price driven by a formula.? As of the end of 2011, only 11% of the B-units remain outstanding. ?That figure comes from Allianz’ 2011 annual report (in English).? Allianz paid out ?449 million to PIMCO management in this program in 2011.

I?m just guessing, but I think all of the B-units will be bought in by 2013.

4) But that?s not all, in 2008 Allianz created M-units.? Those are options granted to PIMCO management off of a formula-driven price for PIMCO shadow stock.? Unlike the B-units, I can?t tell how much of PIMCO is being given to management.? It looks smaller than the B-Unit program.

In 2011, Allianz paid roughly ?40 million to PIMCO management from the M-unit program.? If my calculations are correct, the shadow stock price of PIMCO rose 33% in 2011.

All of the 2011 data can be found here.? Particularly look at pages 306-307. In terms of special compensation, it looks like Allianz paid around ?490 million ($640 million) to PIMCO management in 2011, and that does not include their salaries.

So I don?t know how much any single person got at PIMCO in 2011, but large payouts are not impossible.? It is worth noting that the payouts derived from many years of work, and PIMCO is a huge organization.

That’s all I have to say.? The data does not admit any more obvious conclusions for me.

On Life Insurance and Life Reinsurance

Posted on 30 July 2012 by David Merkel

I get good questions from readers.? Here’s one from this post:

Is there a reason why life reinsurance companies are better positioned then life insurers?

Don?t they face the same problems that they won?t be able to generate as they roll their portfolios into lower yielding bonds going forward (since rates have come down so much)?

Basically just wondering why you think RGA is cheap at 84% of AOCI adjusted book but not the rest of the life insurance industry at 35%-75% of tangible book?

Is it mostly due to your opinion of management?

I started to leave a reply and the normally reliable software glitched, and I lost it. Dejected, I decided to make it a post.

First, life reinsurance is much less competitive than life insurance.? Globally and in the US, the top 5 life reinsurers have ~80% of the market share.? Life insurance is far more fragmented, and has a decent slug of mutual insurers who don’t have an explicit profit motive.? (Note: many of the large mutuals are exceedingly well run, which makes the competition even stiffer.

Second, life reinsurance is mostly mortality exposure-based, versus life insurers which are mostly investment spread based.? The law of large numbers favors the life reinsurers over the insurers.? Low interest rates will not affect reinsurers as much as insurers.? Hint to those who analyze life insurers and reinsurers: look in the statutory statements, which have a lot more data than the GAAP statements for odd reserves that indicate a significant chance of losses if interest rates continue to remain low.

Third, life insurers have weaknesses in reserving practices for variable products with secondary guarantees.? There is no good way to calculate what a proper reserve should be.? The implied options are odd, and have no natural hedges.

That’s why I only own one life insurance company; one that has simple products.? Aside from low interest rates, valuations are low at life insurers because of lack of certainty over reserves.

So, much as I like RGA management, they are not the main reason why I like the company.? RGA executes well, and has an excellent reputation in its industry.

Here’s another question that I received via e-mail:

Prices of financial services stocks are too cheap for me to resist these days. ?I see companies like Citigroup as being just given away by Mr. Market.

?Within insurance, my equity exposure is limited to AIG, which I consider to be well managed, misunderstood, and priced attractively enough to continue holding. ?Over the past month other insurers have started to grab my attention (HIG, MFC, MET, PRU). ?HIG stands out as being the least sensitive to the possibility of a decade of financial repression. ?Do you have any favorites that you would care to share? ?This topic could make for a timely blog posting.

I responded:

Value trap.? Focus on sustainable ROEs that will validate book value.? The accounting of AIG is a quagmire, even after their disposals.

There is a further difficulty with life insurers at present.? The GAAP accounting standards do not fairly reserve for secondary guarantees on insurance and annuity policies; truth, as a life actuary and a financial analyst, the options offered are so complex and long-dated, that I?m not sure there is a way to value them.? Over the last 10-20 years, we knew that this could be an issue, but we are now seeing the issue creep in as stock performance ebbs.

But if you disagree, consider PNX, it has all of the issues, and then some.? Be sure to get the Statutory books of the companies you buy here, because that drives dividend payments to the indebted holding company.

And one more e-mail:

Hi David,?? I have enjoyed reading your blog for many years (even before GGG recommended it)

I have two questions for you about insurance companies in general — I know you are very busy, I am just hoping you can point me to some websites where I can do my own homework.

(1) If I want to check the financials of a number of mutual insurance companies, is there a consolidated source??? Do I need to pull the annual statements of each one and are the different state accounting rules comparable?

(2) As I understand it (and I am quite new to this so I may have this wrong) — mutual insurance companies use “statutory accounting”, which is different from US GAAP.??? Is there a website or library book that explains the differences between these two methods????? Does statutory accounting differ from state to state?

Again, I am sure you are very busy and I will have to do my own research / homework.? You seem to be more knowledgeable than most about insurance accounting, and I am hoping you can point me to some documentation that will help me gain a better understanding.

My response:

1a)? Consolidated source: https://eapps.naic.org/insData/ , but most companies will send it to you if you ask.? Haven?t been turned down yet, aside from Berkshire Hathaway? and I?m working on that.

1b) Generally, you have to pull each one.? Some companies will do a combined set of schedules for their investments.? When I got AIG 3 years ago, there were 60+ books?

1c) There are slight differences by state, but most of the time you can neglect that.

2a) Mutual companies use statutory accounting, but so do stock companies for the state?s analysis of insurance subsidiary solvency.? And, though stock companies use GAAP for reporting to shareholders, many mutual companies will have an internal pseudo-GAAP basis for analyzing long-term profitability, and for management bonuses, yeh.? Statutory accounting is in some ways more critical than GAAP even for stock companies, because that determines how much cash can be distributed to the holding company, which is crucial if the holding company needs to make interest payments, or wants to make dividend payments.? This is one reason why actuaries often price products by calculating marginal distributable earnings.

2b) I have attached what I think is a short primer on GAAP vs Stat accounting.? This is a big topic, and the NAIC sells all manner of resources at high prices with all of the gory details.? This should give you a good start.? I general, the volunteers from the actuarial societies put out some good summary stuff, but you have to hunt for it.

Keep fighting the good fight.? Bloggers are the conscience of Wall Street and DC?

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Life insurance is tough because there is uncertainty on claim payment on timing, and uncertainty of investment earnings.? The latter is usually more serious, because the law of large numbers does not help.? Add in the valuation issues, and now you know why a life actuary primarily invests in P&C insurance companies, life reinsurers, and simple life companies.

Full disclosure: long RGA

Missing Earnings Estimates

Posted on 28 July 201229 July 2012 by David Merkel

Missing earnings estimates hurts in the short run, but it doesn’t mean much if there is no indication that the overall earnings trend has changed.? If the overall trend in earnings has turned down watch out.? Prices can fall as for Zynga and Facebook.

Then you have something like Reinsurance Group of America [RGA].? It recently missed earnings by 12 cents. $1.77 expected, $1.65 actual.? You should want your companies to miss estimates every now and then.? It raises the probability that the accounting is honest.? With a company like RGA, earnings comes down to how many/few large value life insurance policy deaths they have in a quarter.? You are subject to the “law of small numbers” even with the second largest life reinsurance block in the world, because it is the big policies that matter.

Even this does not qualify as a bad quarter for RGA.? Can’t remember a time when they lost money, but they have missed by far more.? Often I have bought shares on such a day; I did not get any on the brief lousy open after the earnings announcement.

With RGA, I hope the price goes down.? I will buy more.? Why?

It rarely misses earnings.? The company is conservative with guidance, and usually beats.? Cumulatively, over 2 years it always beats.
Life Reinsurance is an oligopoly.? It is one of the less competitive areas of the insurance industry.
It is valued at less than 8x current earnings, which are expected to grow, and less than book value, and even book value less AOCI.
You have actuaries running the place.? Actuaries have an ethics code.? I’ve met the management; talked with them on the phone.? Occasionally been on their conference calls.? They seem honest and competent.? I have worked for dishonest and/or incompetent insurance management teams occasionally.? I know what they feel like.? One thing dishonest insurers do is always make earnings by shorting reserves, and then, when the reserving imbalance is too great, deliver a lollapalooza of a bad quarter which more than erases the seeming excess earnings.

That RGA would deliver a slight miss is encouraging to me.? The accounting is honest.? RGA is the #2 or #1 firm globally in what it does.? Unlike the deceased Scottish Re, it was conservative in M&A.? It let Scottish Re overpay for deals, while it sat back and saw an undercapitalized competitor cobble together a life reinsurance block nearly as large, but one that was unprofitable, because of the high prices paid to get it, and the opaque holding company structure (worthy of AIG in miniature).

More generally, when a company misses earnings:

Does it revise current guidance?? If it doesn’t it may be temporary, and a fluke of accounting rules.? Look at the accruals to give you a clue.
How are industry dynamics?? If everyone is missing estimates, there is a reason to mark future prospects down.
Analyze where companies in similar industries have been taken private.? That serves as a ground floor for where valuations could go.

And with that, I leave you with RGA.? I have argued for years that Buffett should buy it.? Excellent company, does not need guidance.? Could take over his inferior #5 position in life reinsurance which has lost money and become #1 … and then the life reinsurance industry will have no more pure plays.? Kind of sad, but logical, because larger P&C reinsurers benefit from the diversification.

So RGA missed earnings.? Who cares?? A little lower and I load the boat.

Full disclosure: long RGA

The Education of a Mortgage Bond Manager, Part II

Posted on 20 July 2012 by David Merkel

In much of my life, I have been thrust into situations for which I was not ready, and ended up rebuilding the wheel, or came up with an unorthodox approach that worked.? But a lot of the problem came down to the question of time horizon.? How long can you buy and hold, even if temporary market conditions make you squeamish?

I remember the first CMBS bond that I bought in 1998: it was the longest AAA tranche of a Nomura deal, which was out of favor at the time.? I did a lot of work analyzing the deal, and concluded that the bond was a lot safer than many competing bonds and offered more yield.? In early 1999, when I described this purchase to the investment committee of a charitable board the I was on, one said, “Only 7%, and you are locked in for 14 years?”? I said that stock valuations were high, and that 7% was a great return.? It was a great return, and far better than the stock market over the same time period, though I could not have known that at the time.

I became an advocate for CMBS in my firm as I realized that the hot product being offered would have the majority of its cash flows come at the 10-year maturity, but there would still be some level of withdrawals.? After some modeling, I realized that the best strategy was investing 80-85% of the money 10 years out, while leaving 15-20% of the money as pseudo-cash: 2 years out or shorter.? Of all of the mortgage bond categories, only CMBS offered assets with a ten-years or more duration, with minimal credit risk.

I used Charter/Conquest as my software.? It enabled me to set a consistent set of macroeconomic principles to evaluate a large number of properties in different economic areas.? The software would project the cash flows? of each property, given the assumptions that you fed it.

I spent time analyzing geography and property types.? I had a decent idea as to what areas of the country were doing badly, and with what property types.

I created what I called the black bucket.? Property types and geographic areas that I did not like were assigned to the black bucket, and if the? black bucket got big enough, we did not play in the deal.? It was a good method, and one CMBS expert at a bulge-bracket bank said to me that it was the most rigorous means of testing CMBS that he had run into.? Most buyers were far more trusting, and tended to buy quality issuers that were taking advantage of their reputation.

By having an independent standard of value where I worked, I did better than competitors.? I did not follow fads; I followed value to the greatest extent that I knew.

Brokers would be puzzled on why I turned down deals from good dealers, or why I bought deals from originators that were subpar.? My lesson was dig into the details, and ignore names.? Analyze the data, avoid the marketing.

Doing your own analysis is a lot of investing.? Ignore the puzzled expressions of your brokers, and buy what you have determined is valuable.? More in part 3.

The Education of a Mortgage Bond Manager, Part I

Posted on 14 July 2012 by David Merkel

You might remember my “Education of a Corporate Bond Manager” 12-part series.? That was fun to write, and a labor of love, but before I was a corporate bond manager, I was a Mortgage Bond Manager.? There is one main similarity between the two series — I started out as a novice, with people willing to thrust a promising novice into the big time.? It was scary, fun, and allowed me to innovate, because in each case, I had to rebuild the wheel.? I did not have a mentor training me; I had to figure it out, and fast.? Also, in this era of my career, I had many other projects, because I was the investment risk manager for a rapidly growing life insurer.? (Should I do a series, “The Education of a Financial Risk Manager?”)

One thing my boss did that I imitated was keep notebooks of everything that I did; if this series grows, I will go down to the basement, find the notebooks, and mine them for ideas.? When you are thrust into a situation like this, it is like getting a sip from a firehose.? Anyway, I hope to do justice to my time as a mortgage bond manager; I have been a little more reluctant to write this, because things may have changed more since I was a manager.? With that, here we go!

Liquidity for a Moment

In any vanilla corporate bond deal, when it comes to market for its public offering, there is a period of information dissemination, followed by taking orders, followed by cutoff, followed by allocation, then the grey market, then the bonds are free to trade, then a flurry of trading, after which little trading occurs in the bonds.

Why is it this way?? Let me take each point:

period of information dissemination — depending on how hot the market is, and deal complexity, this can vary from a several weeks to seven minutes.
taking orders — you place your orders, and the syndicate desks scale back your orders on hot deals to reflect what you ordinarily buy and even then reduce it further when deals are massively oversubscribed.? When deals are barely subscribed, odd dynamics take place — you get your full order, and then you wonder, “Why am I the lucky one?”? After that, you panic.
cutoff — it is exceedingly difficult to get an order in after the cutoff.? You have to have a really good reason, and a sterling reputation, and even that is likely not enough.
allocation — I’ve gone through this mostly in point 2.
grey market — you have received your allocation but formal trading has not begun with the manager running the books.? Other brokers may approach you with offers to buy.? Usually good to avoid this, because if they want to buy, it is probably a good deal.
bonds are free to trade — the manager running the books announces his initial yield spreads for buying and selling the bonds.? If you really like the deal at those spreads and buy more, you can become a favorite of the syndicate, because it indicates real demand.? They might allocate more to you in the future.
flurry of trading — many brokers will post bids and offers, and buying and selling will be active that day, and there might be some trades the next day, but…
after which little trading occurs in the bonds — yeh, after that, few trades occur.? Why?

Corporate bonds are not like stocks; they tend to get salted away by institutions wanting income in order to pay off liabilities; they mature or default, but they are not often traded.

By this point, you are wondering, if the title is about mortgage bonds, why is he writing about corporate bonds?? The answer is: for contrast.

period of information dissemination — depending on how hot the market is, and deal complexity, this can vary from a several weeks to a few days.? Sometimes the rating agencies provide “pre-sale” reports.? Collateral inside ABS, MBS & CMBS vary considerably, so aside from very vanilla deals, there is time for analysis.
taking orders — you place your orders, and the syndicate desks scale back your orders on hot deals to reflect what you ordinarily buy and even then reduce it further when deals are massively oversubscribed.? When deals are barely subscribed, odd dynamics take place — you get your full order, and then you wonder, “Why am I the lucky one?”? After that, you panic.
cutoff — it is exceedingly difficult to get an order in after the cutoff.? You have to have a really good reason, and a sterling reputation, and even that is likely not enough.
allocation — I’ve gone through this mostly in point 2.
grey market — there is almost no grey market.? There is a lot of work that goes into issuing a mortgage bond, so there will not be competing dealers looking to trade.
bonds are free to trade — the manager running the books announces his initial yield spreads for buying and selling the bonds.? If you really like the deal at those spreads and buy more, you can become a favorite of the syndicate, because it indicates real demand.? They might allocate more to you in the future.
no flurry of trading — aside from the large AAA/Aaa tranches very little will trade.? Those buying mezzanine and subordinated bonds are buy-and-hold investors.? Same for the junk tranches, should they be sold.? These are thin slices of the deal, and few will do the research necessary to try to pry bonds out of their hands at a later date.
after which little trading occurs in the AAA bonds — yeh, after that, few trades occur.? Same reason as above as for why.? Institutions buy them to fund promises they have made.

Like corporate bonds, but more so, mortgage bonds do not trade much after their initial offering.? The deal is done, and there is liquidity for a moment, and little liquidity thereafter.

Again, if you’ve known me for a while, you know that I believe that liquidity can’t be created through securitization and derivatives.? Imagine yourself as an insurance company holding a bunch of commercial mortgage loans.? You could sell them into a trust and securitize them.? Well, guess what?? Only the AAA/Aaa tranches will trade rarely, and the rest will trade even more rarely.? The mortgages are illiquid because they are unique, with a lot of data.? You would have a hard time selling them individually.

Selling them as a group, you have a better chance.? But as you do so, investors ramp up their efforts, because the whole thing will be sold, and it justifies the analysts spending the time to do so.? But after it is sold, and months go by, few institutions have a concentrated interest to re-analyze deals on their own.

And so, with mortgage bond deals, even more than corporate bond deals, liquidity is but for a moment, and that affects everything that a mortgage bond manager does.? More in part 2.

On Aviva, Six Years Later

Posted on 5 July 2012 by David Merkel

I note this article about Aviva plc.? I took grief from Amerus Group’s IR department during the merger six years ago for my commentary at RealMoney.? Here is an example of my writing that theStreet,com made public.? Thanks, TSCM.

Like many foreign acquirers of US life insurers, the bids were too aggressive, and Aviva paid far too much for Amerus Group.? Overpaying for US life companies, particularly for newcomers to the US is not uncommon; Old Mutual did even worse with F&G Life back in 2001.? (And if you like, look at the amount of capital they pumped in, before selling it to Harbinger Group for a 90% loss. Ouch, Ouch, OUCH!!!)

So Aviva is not the worst, but has done badly.? Would that they had listened to intelligent advisors, instead of destroying value via the Amerus purchase.? The price is down 60%+ since then.

On Internal Indexes, like LIBOR

Posted on 5 July 2012 by David Merkel

When I was a life actuary, following the deferred annuity market, the concept of market-value-adjusted annuities arose.? Annuity values could react like bonds to:

An external index rate, or,
An internal index, driven off of the new money rate for annuities

Now, the internal index sounds soft, but it is not so.? Yes, you can lower your new money rate but reserves grow on indexed products.? You can raise your rates, but reserves will shrink.? It’s not perfect here, but the internal index will work over the long haul.

So when I look at LIBOR and potential manipulation, I don’t see a lot of reason for concern.

When bond deals are priced, the relative yield is what is priced; it does not matter what the benchmark is, roughly the same overall yield would have been obtained.? Spreads are a way of expressing the excess yield over equivalent maturity government or AA bank (swap/LIBOR) yields.? They are a result of the process, not a driver of the process.

If 3-month LIBOR were replaced by the on-the-run 3-month Treasury yield, new deals would be priced, and the spreads would be higher by the TED (EuroDollar – Treasury) yield spread.

When I was a bond manager, dealer desks would often try to sell or buy bonds off of unusual benchmarks.? I would always make the necessary adjustments to calculate the option adjusted spread over interpolated swap rates, with further adjustments for the degree of premium or discount to par.? (Note: A premium bond carries extra credit risk because if it defaults, the most you can recover is par.? Opposite for discount bonds.? There is a mathematical method for calculating the amount of yield tradeoff between premium/par/discount bonds, even in the absence of a credit default swap [CDS] market.? You assume that the spread over swap is the CDS premium, and calculate the annual cost of insuring the premium to par.? Deduct that from the current spread, and you have the hypothetical true par spread.? Once you have that, you can make rational swap trades.)

What I am trying to say is that benchmarks/indexes aren’t all powerful.? Bright bond investors look past them, and analyze the economics of the situation.? Same for intelligent borrowers; they know that LIBOR rises during times of financial stress.? If you are a floating rate investor/borrower, you ought to analyze the rate that your investment/loan is tied to.

Many commentators with knowledge of the situation think that lawsuits regarding LIBOR will amount to little (one, two).? Yes, there may have been some manipulation in a micro-sense for some banks, but in terms of having a big effect on many, I don’t think that is possible.? There might be some degree to which borrowers benefited and savers/lenders lost.? That’s a tough case to press on any side.? Courts favor borrowers, and they benefited from any manipulation.

In closing, I don’t think much will come from the “LIBOR scandal” the same way that nothing will come from the “rating agencies scandal.” Both are examples of summarizing information/opinions that investors can use at their own risk.? They are not fiduciaries; those who use the information do so at their own risk.

Do Insurance Stocks Do Better than Average Over the Long-Run?

Posted on 27 June 201227 June 2012 by David Merkel

Why should insurance companies be such a good place to invest?? That’s a great question, and I will try to outline an answer.? Before I do, let me draw a few distinctions:

I’m not talking about life companies, they are far more capital encumbered then P&C companies.
I am also not talking about title, mortgage, or finance insurers.? They are too risky, and that was my opinion in the early 2000s.
Health insurers have a different model, much more subject to regulation.
Many insurance companies that don’t survive 10 years as a public company do poorly.? They did not underwrite well.
Small companies tend to fail disproportionately.
We aren’t talking about specialty companies.

What I am talking about are non-microcap companies with stable P&C liability structures and conservative reserving.? Boring, maybe.? Simple, somewhat, but you try setting up a competitor to them.? It takes some doing.? That is the competitive advantage; it is the barrier to entry.? Few companies have diversified liabilities; fewer reserve conservatively.

Thus I highlight P&C companies with ten year track records.? Here are the good ones: ACE, Chubb, Cincinnati Financial, Donegal Group, HCC Insurance, Markel, ProAssurance, RLI, Selective Insurance, Travelers, United Fire Group, W.R. Berkley, Arch Capital, Alterra Capital Holdings, PartnerRe, Everest Re, Renaissance Re, White Mountains, Progressive, State Auto Financial, and Erie Indemnity.

And here are the trailing ones: American Financial Group, Baldwin & Lyons, EMC Insurance, Navigators Group, XL Group, Allegheny Corporation, American National, Allstate, and Horace Mann.

And two really lousy ones: CNA Insurance and Meadowbrook Insurance Group.

On the whole, the outperformers more than absorb the underperformers, though I can’t prove that, for these reasons:

Hasn’t happened much in a while, but P&C insurance companies do occasionally die & disappear.? Think of Reliance Insurance Company.
Sometimes P&C companies make very bad underwriting decisions, lose a dramatic amount of money, and their stock prices fall enough that they get taken over, e.g., PXRe would be an example.
I may be guilty of selection and survivor bias by sticking with diversified bigger firms that are at least 10 years old.? I know of a lot of smaller firms that flame out because they take too much underwriting risk due to hubris and/or inexperience.

To do a complete study, we would have to use the CRSP database, which has all of the data for stocks not currently living.? We would see the losses from insolvencies, and the losses/gains fhereof.? It would take place at the halfway point for US efforts, which would be 4 seconds ahead of the Greeks as they hurried to compete/complete at constant speeds.

That’s what would happen.? Now before I go, I want to leave charts behind for the stocks mentioned:

Above

Below

Well Below

So though I know many value investors think a lot of P&C insurers, my answer on whether they are a generally good industry to invest in is “possibly,” but not “certainly.”? There are advantages for sophisticated investors that can understand complex accounting and its limitations, as well as those that can sense whether a management team is conservative or not.? That may be part of the reason for how I limited the selection of companies above; I was trying to mimic what sort of companies tended to last a long time; they tend to be conservative.

That’s all for now; criticism is welcome.

Full disclosure: Long HCC , TRV

PS — I will be gone the next three days, and posting will be irregular, as it has been recently.

Sorted Weekly Tweets

Posted on 23 June 201223 June 2012 by David Merkel

A note to all of the actuaries in the audience, all three of you 😉 : an old friend from my GIC days is seeking a multi-talented actuary to work in the stable value business.? Must understand how wraps work, etc.? If interested, drop me a note, and I’ll send you the contact info.

On with the tweets:

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Eurozone

May not last long $$ RT @John_Hempton: @AlephBlog Spain imposing on bank junior bonds but prefs in Santander still trading at par! Strange. Jun 23, 2012
Buying Europe Banks Is Easy for Herro as Cheap Stocks Fall http://t.co/gfCOhY8q Key question here is accounting quality; not a buyer $$ Jun 23, 2012
Spain Said to Weigh Imposing Losses on Junior Bank Bondholders http://t.co/cD1hoAVa Fine, but they won’t fund jr debt for 20yrs or so $$ Jun 23, 2012
Spanish Aid Plan Is Flawed, Says IMF http://t.co/9V2FJ0Xc IMF doesn’t like the complexity of the E-Zone, wants it 2 behave like a nation Jun 23, 2012
Debt crisis: Angela Merkel defies Latin Europe and the IMF on bond rescue http://t.co/qTKEAr5O She who pays the $$ calls the tunes Jun 23, 2012
What?s So Special About the Euro Currency Area? http://t.co/oJWyrLAk Currency unions don’t work; must centralize or die $$ Jun 21, 2012
Merkel Balks at Sovereign Debt Purchases to Overcome Crisis http://t.co/UfuN4ae8 Physically, the crisis looks like it is wearing on Angela Jun 21, 2012
Spanish short-term debt costs reach alarm levels http://t.co/Dm8d2bsv Yields high enough that Spain unlikely to grow out of the debt $$ Jun 21, 2012
Cyprus Said to Face Europe Pressure for $13 Billion Aid http://t.co/z0etJBlX Who wants to maintain influence in Cyprus? Russia, E-zone? $$ Jun 20, 2012
‘ @aarontask He might b right. Key Q is how much Germans/Nordics/Dutch view themselves as Europeans 1st rather than Germans/Nordics/Dutch $$ Jun 20, 2012
Greek Leaders Poised to Agree on Three-Way Coalition http://t.co/JvAaPDDj It will be difficult for that coalition 2 hold together $$ Jun 20, 2012
Ma?ana-nomics at Los Cabos http://t.co/GtlAj4lY Weak Europoliticians blame US, when their banking system was overlevered & malregulated $$ Jun 20, 2012
G20 summit: perils of a half-baked rescue for Spain and Italy http://t.co/7E6jPK4W E-zone not ready 2 take strong actions; don’t force it $$ Jun 20, 2012
Is Spain past the point of no return? http://t.co/zCRF7qKo ??I suspect the ECB will have to be the buyer of last resort for Spanish bonds.?? Jun 19, 2012
Saddling Spain With Bank Burden Repeats Irish Error http://t.co/dWgYAUht Protect deposits, not bank bonds, preferreds, or stocks $$ Jun 19, 2012
“Which is why $JPM had the hedge there in the first place $$” http://t.co/o61frAFX Dimon Says ?Firewalls? May Halt Spread of Europe Crisis Jun 19, 2012
Germany set to allow eurozone bailout fund to buy troubled countries’ debt http://t.co/OEFi9UI9 Last refuge of scoundrels:blame speculators Jun 19, 2012
Fran?ois Hollande said meeting btw Ezone & Obama rescheduled4this morning2brief Americans on “mechanisms that allow us to fight speculation” Jun 19, 2012
Spanish Yields at 7% Show Investors Slamming Door http://t.co/JxGxNHDn Spain is slowly passing the “tipping point” into hopelessness. $$ Jun 18, 2012
Where is the relief? RT @jennablan: Where is the relief rally? Jun 18, 2012

FOMC Meeting/Press Conference

Fed Seen Extending Operation Twist and Avoiding Bond Buys http://t.co/qFOSA0rf Fed can’t do nothing, so it does something that is nothing Jun 21, 2012
RT @ezraklein: Hypothesis: Bernanke doesn’t do more because he doesn’t think he can. He says otherwise is because he doesn’t want the ma … Jun 20, 2012
Dr. Bernanke: Couldn?t increased unemployment be structural, after all, there is a lot more competition from labor in emerging markets? Jun 20, 2012
That’s all folks!!! Jun 20, 2012
Dr. Bernanke, Isn?t stagflation a possibility here? I mean, no one expected it in the ?70s either. $$ Jun 20, 2012
Q for Bernanke: If the Fed ever does shrink its balance sheet, what effect will it have on the banks? $$ Jun 20, 2012
Stocks trading off — correlated with future inflation rates; long Treasuries rallying nominal yields falling -> real rates stable-ish $$ Jun 20, 2012
What Bernanke is describing in terms of hedging and risk management has to be done in the insurance industry; actuarial risk analyses Jun 20, 2012
W/MBS rates, those mtges that are underwater don’t benefit, same for Alt-A & Jumbo; low rates don’t help many in residential real estate $$ Jun 20, 2012
Effect of Tsy ylds on corporate yields is stronger 4 AAA-A bonds, moderate 4 BBB bonds, little 4 junk & the effects get weaker w/maturity $$ Jun 20, 2012
That’s the wrap up for the central tendencies and averages of the FOMC’s additional data release. Anyone find those summaries useful? $$ Jun 20, 2012
Changes in Avg Target Federal Funds Rate at Year-End 2012-2014, Longer -0.07%, -0.10%, -0.22%, -0.09% $$ Levels: 0.30%, 0.50%, 1.11%, 4.11% Jun 20, 2012
Average appropriate timing of policy firming moved out 1.6 months to November 2013 $$ Jun 20, 2012
Changes in PCE Inflation central tendency 2012-2014, Longer -0.4)%, -0.07%, -0.12%, 0% $$ Levels: 1.48%, 1.76%, 1.77%, 2.00% Jun 20, 2012
Changes in unemployment central tendency 2012-2014, Longer +0.18%, +0.20%, +0.24%, +0.03% $$ Levels: 8.10%, 7.71%, 7.28%, 5.60% Jun 20, 2012
Changes in real GDP growth central tendency 2012-2014, Longer -0.50%, -0.37%, -0.11%, -0.04% $$ Levels: 2.13%, 2.57%, 3.28%, 2.44% Jun 20, 2012
+1 RT @bondscoop: Steve Liesman is the Fed’s Helen Thomas Jun 20, 2012
Fed wants to see long TIPS up in price relative to long nominal Treasuries. http://t.co/X5Gjt6jI Jun 20, 2012
@TheStalwart #FOMCGuesses OT extended, no QE3, central tendencies move back to where they were in January, shades lang down GDP, CPI, etc $$ Jun 20, 2012
C?mon, Ben, Just Say It; Please, Just Say QE3 http://t.co/ksIKxZ6C Sad that equity guys beg 4 stimulus; think OT extends; no QE3 yet $$ Jun 20, 2012

Rest of the World

Glencore Protests Bolivia’s Move on Mine http://t.co/OcIzatJ5 Bolivia has Venezuela envy; won’t end until Morales is shown 2b a fail. $$ Jun 23, 2012
Children of Mao’s wrath vie for power in China http://t.co/pWzj4Dbq All of the current ruling class survived the Cultural Revolution $$ Jun 22, 2012
Riskier Bets Pitched to Asia’s Rising Rich http://t.co/P6PjFqyR Yield is the oldest scam in the books; Asia’s brokers fleece clients $$ Jun 21, 2012
China warns its rare earth reserves are declining http://t.co/ve2e6PQq I doubt this, but if true -> significant scarcity of rare earths $$ Jun 20, 2012
Britain doomed, apparently http://t.co/WdvPCsxs Countries that don?t reset their systems through default, will experience money decay $$ Jun 20, 2012
Suicides, Arrests Show Trouble at Korean Savings Banks http://t.co/aP1fu6KS Pride drives suicides, rather than confession of wrongdoing $$ Jun 19, 2012
The UN’s Internet Power Grab http://t.co/LE704S74 Never surrender an advantage for no gain; does the Obama administration get that? $$ Jun 18, 2012
The Return of Egypt’s ‘Deep State’ http://t.co/i1IkbmMq Islamists & liberals checkmated by Egyptian Army 4 now. Liberals s/b glad $$ Jun 17, 2012
@dpinsen Agreed, better H/L would have been: “Egyptian Army reveals full control, ends show that played w/democracy 2 smoke out enemies” $$ Jun 17, 2012
Noda Ends Japan Nuclear Freeze, Risking Voter Backlash at Polls http://t.co/Jcoxl91Z He does the right thing, but will the voters agree $$ Jun 17, 2012

Banks

A History of Money Funds http://t.co/KXCpfCDz Let the critics of money market funds apply the same2banks; mark2market accounting. $$ Jun 23, 2012
Bank Investors Dismiss Moody?s Cuts as Years Too Late http://t.co/5cOsGOyG True. Moody’s should’ve done it in 2008; did politics stopthem? Jun 23, 2012
Citigroup Faces $5 Billion on Dollar?s Rise, Peabody Says http://t.co/5HZtJfvx So, on the heels of $JPM, $C has a currency mismatch? $$ Jun 21, 2012
Eminent domain for underwater mortgages could have biggest impact on banks http://t.co/NK9W0PyO Comments at end; disagreement welcomed $$ Jun 20, 2012

Central Banking

Bernanke Acknowledges Tsy Strategy @ Odds W/Fed Policy http://t.co/MqW6qda2 “Thx, Unca Ben 4letting us issue morre 30s” Ben:”Arrrgh!” $$ Jun 23, 2012
The Fed?s second best solution http://t.co/YJhiHbNd “collateral damage will mount, making the next policy steps even more excruciating.” Jun 21, 2012
Fed Born of Morgan?s Bailout Under Scrutiny After Dimon?s Loss http://t.co/7EHPlSvM How significant is it 4 Jamie D 2b on NY Fed board? $$ Jun 19, 2012
Krugman’s Intellectual Waterloo http://t.co/brrRB3CP Suggested possible Fed stimulus: blow housing bubble 2replace tech bubble $$ Jun 17, 2012
Also, the last H/L could have been: “Bernanke?s GDP View Invalidated as Economy Slows” FOMC has been lousy economic forecasters lately $$ Jun 17, 2012
Bernanke?s Inflation View Validated as Commodities Fall http://t.co/pjRKhXWv Median & Trimmed mean CPIs mot falling, better measures $$ Jun 17, 2012

Asset Management

Pimco?s Gross Warns of Risk Assets as Aberdeen Avoids Stocks http://t.co/pcqnMis6 Bill Gross signs on to deflation late & promotes it $$ Jun 23, 2012
Private Equity Has Too Much Money to Spend on Homes http://t.co/VPToSU8I Big buyers need to stay quiet if they want 2 make good returns $$ Jun 22, 2012
Simon Lack responds to AIMA’s hedge fund cheerleading http://t.co/VQq4s1O8 Backfill bias, IRR vs Buy&Hold, high fees, survivor bias $$ Jun 21, 2012
At 40,000 feet, Fidelity’s Danoff ponders Groupons http://t.co/BwOKJR8X Danoff is a survivor; he’s right it’s lonely 2b a stockpicker $$ Jun 21, 2012
Very good point. Wall Street is a 1-note Sam RT @chadstarliper: Has there ever been a time when Wall St didn’t think stocks were “cheap?” $$ Jun 20, 2012
Wall Street says stocks are bargains, but that assumes surging profits http://t.co/0c0iDdK6 Or at least growing sales w/flat profit mgns $$ Jun 20, 2012
America?s $8T corporate debt market faces liquidity drought as banks retreat from the trade http://t.co/rvXwFsjW Shouldn’t b that bad $$ Jun 19, 2012
Equities entail less risk than ?haven? investments http://t.co/u3befAMT Ain’t necessarily true; think of the Great Depression or 1871 $$ Jun 19, 2012
Valuation Matters…. Equity vs Bonds Edition http://t.co/23IikMDJ Earnings ylds v Tsy ylds unstable; Q-ratio, CAPE10, Price/resources bettr Jun 19, 2012
Biggest Stocks Beat S&P 500 Most in 13 Years as Valuations Fall http://t.co/7vLxG6VN Once valuations get so low, they must go up $$ Jun 18, 2012

Companies

DuPont selling Conoco at oil mkt trough $$RT @BarbarianCap: “Delta seals deal to buy Pennsylvania refinery” > hasn’t that been tried before? Jun 23, 2012
DuPont buying Conoco at oil mkt peak $$ RT @BarbarianCap: “Delta seals deal to buy Pennsylvania refinery” > hasn’t that been tried before? Jun 23, 2012
J.C. Penney Falls After Francis Leaves Amid Strategy Flop http://t.co/jfAVGj3V Rare setback 4 Ackman/Pershing on $JCP; retail is tough $$ Jun 20, 2012
Buffett Extends Real-Estate Bet With ResCap Pursuit http://t.co/ZsN6J0Pm Buffett is early, in my opinion, but has the capital to do it $$ Jun 18, 2012

Pensions

US public retiree benefits gap grows to $1.38T http://t.co/7bZ18GRB Gap widened by $120 billion since last year; thx Ben 4 low discnt rates Jun 20, 2012
Joe Nocera Is Wrong About Woonsocket’s Crisis http://t.co/Z3RM9UGO Harder2discharge muni “pension” bonds than renegotiate muni pensions $$ Jun 20, 2012
GM Seen Fueling Pension Deals as Employers Face Shortfall http://t.co/noz9auU0 Hope $MET & $PRU survive; guaranty funds limited in size $$ Jun 19, 2012
Terminal funding of DB pension plans will be a growing phenomenon if corps/states bite bullet and kick in more $$ to fund annuity purchases Jun 19, 2012
Problem to annuitants is companies can go broke; no PBGC coverage of annuities, and state guarantees r usually limited 2 $100,000 total $$ Jun 19, 2012

Media

Love the Leaker, Hate the Leak http://t.co/wiY7RwJU Value of releasing sensitive govt data to the public is in the eye of the beholder $$ Jun 21, 2012
How David Weidner Changed My Life http://t.co/g9LVJIWD @reformedbroker – how getting on @davidweidner ‘s Top 10 list gave him a big boost $$ Jun 19, 2012
+1 won’t watch RT @ReformedBroker: Bloomberg PR pushing their Meredith Whitney interview video hard today. They haven’t gotten the memo yet. Jun 19, 2012
Wrong: 20 rules that can save you from the Doomsday Cycle http://t.co/jLB0s2pL Why does Marketwatch give Paul Farrell space 2 write? $$ Jun 19, 2012
So long, suckers ? I?m leaving Wall Street http://t.co/x1Ju1fmZ David Weidner: Some lessons from 15 years observing the industry $$ Jun 19, 2012

Miscellaneous

Liquidity, Noise, and Signal http://t.co/cV15Mr2z Shorter the time period-> higher ratio noise/signal; leads2bad trades @ turning points $$ Jun 21, 2012
‘ @JATranfo Never criticized ECRI when out of favor; FWIW, I reverse-engineered their main model: industrial commod pxs & credit spreads $$ Jun 21, 2012
Lawmakers Push for Overhaul of IPO Process http://t.co/qhh7tX1V Every “fix” creates its own set of problems. Mania can hit auctions 2 $$ Jun 21, 2012
Yes $$ RT @Fullcarry: A point I have made many times in the past: the drop in yields the past decade is mostly due to a drop in real rates. Jun 20, 2012
Housing Starts in U.S. Fall 4.8% in May on Apartments http://t.co/PhMFwHQL Interesting contrary data; $EQR chart http://t.co/vleXkVAM $$ Jun 19, 2012
Asians Top Immigration Class http://t.co/Sir2IFxQ Certainly noticeable here in Ellicott City; most businesses have signs in Korean $$ Jun 19, 2012
Poorly reasoned: Court-Ordered Care ? A Complication of Pregnancy 2 Avoid http://t.co/DqmhsvkU Mothers w/child in womb uniquely affect child Jun 18, 2012
Please follow @jarrodwilcox, He has taught me many things, and I respect him a great deal #FF Jun 17, 2012
A Jewish-Asian Couple?s Union Leads to a Scholarly Interest in Intermarriage http://t.co/U3jfPkyK Both ethnic groups prize education $$ Jun 17, 2012

Comments

DavidMerkel’s discussion on “The New Yorker’s Newest Writer Is a Big Self-Plagiarist” http://t.co/g1i0YeF4 Writing belongs2those that paid Jun 20, 2012
“High energy particle physics is only a small part of science, and not adequate to measure the?” ? David_Merkel http://t.co/T4BrvWBj Jun 20, 2012
“Please, accidents per passenger mile would be better, rather than: “He also pointed to the fact?” ? David_Merkel http://t.co/Yg6r5N3X Jun 20, 2012
RE: @bloombergview Maybe DC city govt should start a reality TV show, w/prizes 2 the official who commits the most cr? http://t.co/lIXL6eMi Jun 20, 2012
RE: @bloombergview ?How will you deal with deferral of individual taxes on investment from DC plans, unrealized CGs, ? http://t.co/NY0Q3Ia5 Jun 20, 2012
“Cool picture, Ed. Thanks for sharing it.” ? David_Merkel http://t.co/Mg9lx0ij Jun 19, 2012
“Hitting the fiscal cliff won’t happen, and that’s too bad, because we need to discuss long-term imbalances” ? D_Merkel http://t.co/csiaLXlV Jun 19, 2012
“Here is a proposal for how rating agencies could be eliminated: http://t.co/rLrOK4vu…” ? David_Merkel http://t.co/q2mxmhpW Jun 19, 2012
“I trust ratings agencies more than mismanaged governments. Ratings are needed to provide?” ? David_Merkel http://t.co/vOdPJvzv Jun 19, 2012
“If this is representative of what the ruling Greek coalition will do, the government will fail?” ? David_Merkel http://t.co/HEe4GwHt Jun 19, 2012
“Much as we may dislike financial fraud, suggesting that those in the US that mismanaged their banks?” ? David_Merkel http://t.co/fEZQIo0h Jun 19, 2012
‘ @FilmCriticOne You say u want tax reform, but ur willing2let value grow untaxed through deferral? Get real; ability2defer is the issue $$ Jun 16, 2012

Dimon for Fed Secretary

@dlevineMW @moorehn and pay cut. The same rumors were applied to Hank Greenberg $AIG 4 Tsy Secretary user Bush, Sr. Said the same then $$ Jun 19, 2012
Jamie kind2let us live in his world 😉 RT @ReformedBroker He’s hedging the Senate w/the House right now, y’all r just pawns in a bigger game Jun 19, 2012
Why should Jamie accept the demotion? $$ RT @moorehn: This is just Jamie practicing for confirmation hearings as Treasury Secretary, right? Jun 19, 2012

Tax Policy

Tax Panels Turn Focus to Investments http://t.co/sq6AnHdE Best poss is lowering corp tax rates, equalizing all tax rates for individuals Jun 23, 2012
How to Kill the Corporate-Income Tax http://t.co/T5MgnVuD Evens out personal income tax rates by class. Good, but what about deferral? $$ Jun 20, 2012

Modified Glass-Steagall

Posted on 16 June 201217 June 2012 by David Merkel

If you’ve read me for more than two months, you probably know that I am an actuary, though not a practicing actuary at present.? I grew up in the life insurance industry.? It’s an unusual place for an investor to start, but there are some advantages:

You learn some of the most complex accounting rules in business.
You learn the value of having a strong balance sheet, because when it slips, it is hard to get back.
You learn the value of simplicity, because many companies that wander from that die.
You get to know a lot of people with different bits of specialized knowledge, which you the actuary have to tie together.? And, respecting the older people in dead-end jobs which they do well goes a long way toward getting significant cooperation.
If you are a corporate actuary, as I sometimes was, potentially you become a good risk manager.
If are an investment actuary, you learn that risk control is far more difficult than it seems, and so you learn not to take obscure risks, and test a variety of modeling assumptions, because models can go wrong.
You build in margins for error if you are a pricing actuary, as I often was, and review actual results when setting assumptions.
You get to see regulation up close and personal, because you have to interact with 51 different regulators if you do valuation, cash flow testing, pricing, etc., with your home state regulators leading the way.

There’s more, but my topic this evening is financial regulation generally.? I’ve been thinking about it, and I have had a moderate shift in my views: I think it would be wise to reinstitute a modified version of Glass-Steagall, but modeled after the way that insurance regulation is done today.? For solvency regulation, insurers are much better regulated than banks.? The banking industry should imitate the insurance industry in a number of ways.

Here’s the main idea: Allow financial holding companies to own all manner of financial subsidiaries, but disallow:

Stacking of subsidiaries.? No A owns B, B owns C.? This allows capital to be stretched thin.
Cross-ownership and cross-lending: subsidiaries may not interlace their capital.
There may be no reinsurance or derivative agreements across subsidiaries.

This would bar complex ownership charts.? There would be a big box at the top, with lines to little boxes below, but only one level of depth, and no lines between subsidiaries.

Also:

Each subsidiary must be subject to its own regulator.? There must not be an overall regulator for “financial supermarkets.”? Keep it simple and focused.? Remember, the Fed has never been a good regulator.
Since financial holding companies die if they don’t get dividends, make the payment of dividends from any subsidiary to the parent company subject to the discretion of the regulators.? Regulators should not care about the holding companies, but only about the solvency of subsidiaries.
If a company is presently in two businesses with different regulators, the company must divide the business into two subsidiaries which each regulator can separately regulate.
Subsidiaries do not get to choose their regulators.? If there are potentially duplicate regulators, merge them and create one regulator if that makes sense.? Otherwise, make rules so that there is no ambiguity on who regulates what.

The view of the government toward financial holding companies should be this: we don’t care if you fail.? We do care if your subsidiaries fail, so if the solvency of any of them is getting marginal, dividends to the holding company will be cut off.

Now, I would prefer the rest of the financial industry mimic the insurance industry, in that State regulation is better than Federal regulation.? If you want to end too big to fail, split up banks into state subsidiaries.? Each state regulator would separately determine solvency issues, and would limit dividends back to the holding company.

Remember, we don’t care if holding companies go broke.? If a holding company goes broke, and all of the subsidiaries are solvent, the subsidiaries will easily be sold to other holding companies.? The creditors of the bankrupt financial holding company will divide the spoils after a year or so.? Cost to the taxpayers: zero.

And maybe, mimic the guarantee funds of the insurance industry, and let the financial subsidiaries self-fund the losses of their fallen competitors.? Cost to the taxpayers: zero.

Under this sort of arrangement, you can have “financial supermarkets,” but they would be very different, because the solvency of each part would be separately regulated.? You don’t want macro-regulators, they are far easier to fool; specialization in financial regulation is a plus; don’t give any credit to those who use a diversification argument.? We are focusing on risks, not risk.? Failure does not happen from risk in abstract, but from particular risks that were underrated.

Finally you need risk managers inside all regulated financial institutions that are either FSAs [Fellows in the Society of Actuaries] or CFAs [Chartered Financial Analysts].? I am both, though my FSA status is inactive, because I don’t pay the dues.? Why is this valuable?

You need organizations with ethics codes to teach and monitor the behavior of those within.? There are failures amid FSAs and CFAs, but society and legal punishment tends to decrease the occurrence.

If we did this, financial companies would be much more stable, and we would reduce the need for the FDIC.? There would be personal ethics standards among risk managers inside financial companies, and less reason for regulators to compromise from political pressure.

This is my modified version of Glass-Steagall, which gives financial industries most of what they want, but offers solvency protections far beyond what we have today.? Is this a good compromise, or what?