Category: Portfolio Management

Classic: Know Your Debt Crises: This Too Shall Pass

Classic: Know Your Debt Crises: This Too Shall Pass

The following was published at RealMoney on August 6th, 2007:

Editor?s Summary

The illiquid debt instruments at the heart of the current crisis are subject to regime shifts.

  • ?We?re in a periodic repricing of illiquid debt instruments.
  • Look for the time when the bulk of the losses will be reconciled.
  • Stick with the companies that have strong balance sheets.

I appreciated Cramer’s piece Friday morning, which picks up on many themes that I have articulated for the last four years here on RealMoney.? Here are a few:

  • Hedge fund-of-funds demand smooth returns that are higher than that which a moderate quality short-term fixed-income fund can deliver.
  • This leads to the creation of hedge funds that seek yield through arbitrage strategies.
  • And the creation of hedge funds that seek yield through buying risky debts, unlevered.
  • And the creation of hedge funds that seek yield through buying less risky debts, levered.
  • And the creation of hedge funds that seek yield through buying risky debts, levered.

In the short run, yield-seeking strategies work.? If a lot of players pursue them, they work extra-well for a time, as late entrants to the trade push up the returns for early entrants, with greater demand for scarce, illiquid securities with extra yield.? Pricing grids are a necessity for such securities, because the individual securities don’t have liquid secondary markets.? The pressure of demand raises the value not only of the securities being bought, but also of those securities that are like them.? (Smart managers begin to exit then.)

I’ve been through regime shifts in the markets for collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), asset-backed securities (ABS), residential-backed securities (RMBS) and commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS).? Something shifts at the back of the chain that forces everything to reprice.? For example:

1989-1994: After the real estate boom of the mid-1980s, many banks, savings & loans and insurance companies get loose in their lending standards and real estate investment, leading to a crisis when rent growth can?t keep up with financing terms; defaults ensue, killing off a great number of S&Ls, some major insurance companies and a passel of medium and small banks.

Late 1991-early 1993: The adjustable-rate mortgage market, fueled by demand from ARM funds, overbids for ARMs in an effort to provide a high floating rate yield.? As the FOMC loosens monetary policy, higher than expected prepayments force losses onto the ARM funds

Late 1993-late 1994: The FOMC threatens to, and does, start raising interest rates, which throws the residential mortgage-backed market into crisis.

Mid-1998-mid-1999: Long Term Capital Management blows up, forcing all manner of exotic ABS, CMBS and RMBS into the market for bids.? The bids back up, until the entire market reprices and then tightens in the space of one year.

1998-1999: Home equity ABS blow up, as defaults threaten to, and then do, emerge at levels far higher than anticipated.? Almost no originators survive.

1999-2001: Cruddy high-yield bonds reveal their true value as defaults threaten to, and then do, emerge.

2002-2003: The manufactured-housing ABS market blows up, as originators don?t take initial losses but roll borrowers over into new loans that reduce payments and extend payment terms, technically keeping the loans current.? The system collapses when the buildup of bad debts and repossessed homes becomes too great to roll over.

(Of the existing large securitization markets, only the CMBS market so far has not faced a real crisis, partly due to the influence of the B-piece buyers cartel: six or so firms that buy the junk-rated debt of deals and enforce credit quality standards on the individual loans by kicking out poorly underwritten loans.? But who knows?? Even that could be overwhelmed under the right circumstances.)

In each of these situations, there was a boom-bust cycle.? The markets did not adjust slowly and evenly to changing conditions; the transitions between ?boom? pricing, and ?bust? pricing were swift.? This is the nature of markets, particularly when enough debt is employed to amplify the process.

There is no conspiracy necessary to make the shift happen (though often the media will make it seem like there was one); the bubble pops when the financing proves insufficient to carry the assets.? After the bubble pops, it becomes a question of what the underlying assets can be liquidated for, allocating losses mercilessly according to the loan documents and bankruptcy priority.

Today the crises are nonprime lending, leveraged buyouts and other high-yield debt and over-leverage in the CDO market.? These will get worked out, as all other crises do, handing losses to those who speculated unwisely and allowing those who financed properly to prosper on the other side of the crisis.

As you invest, look for the time when more than half of the losses will be reconciled.? That will be near the bottom for homebuilders and housing finance.

That time may not come for another two years or so, but there will be money to be made once the crisis is mostly reconciled.? Just stick with the companies that have strong balance sheets.

Return to Tower Group

Return to Tower Group

A while ago, I wrote a piece on Tower Group after its stock price imploded, before it went down more, and attracted an acquisition offer from entities affiliated with the main owner of AmTrust Financial Services for $3/share. ?Here’s another letter, from a different respective reader:

Hello, David:

I’ve been a longtime reader of your columns (back to RealMoney) and have a lot of respect for your opinion as an investor and analyst, particularly your insights into insurance companies.

Merger arb has been a (small) part of my toolkit for the last 15 years but haven’t yet seen an insurance merger quite as complicated as TWGP’s acquisition by ACP Re and AFSI.? With an 8% discount to the offer price and about 4 weeks until the shareholder meeting, this one looks intriguing.

There’s a (wordy) analysis of the deal terms here:? http://seekingalpha.com/article/2106193-towers-merger-offers-opportunity-for-double-digit-annualized-returns .

A couple of specific questions about the deal, if you feel inclined to respond:

1.? Does Karfunkel’s potential conflict of interest in selling the part of TWGP he doesn’t want (commercial, personal) to the publicly traded company he chairs (AFSI) raise enough of a red flag that regulators may intervene?

2.? Are the NOLs owned by TWGP usable by ACP if there is a reverse takeover (TWGP the surviving entity) under Bermuda law?

3.? Does the price at which Karfunkel is selling the pieces to public entities using mostly public shareholders’ money raise any red flags to you?

As I said, I respect and enjoy your work and hopefully you enjoy it enough to continue.

First I will handle the questions. ?Then I will hand out a few opinions.

On question 1, the answer is not likely. ? The regulators will disallow any situation where an acquisition would significantly impair the ratio of capital to required capital to bear risk [RBC]. ?Now, shareholders could be another matter. ?In this acquisition, two public companies that the Karfunkel families control are buying up the renewal rights to Tower Group Commercial Lines business (AmTrust Financial – AFSI), and Personal Lines business – (National General Holdings Corp -?NGHC, which recently went public).

With renewal rights, the AFSI & NGHC acquire the assets and the right to renew existing business at terms mutually acceptable to clients & companies, but they do not acquire anything that pertains to claims from business existing prior to the deal. ?In return, they pay money to ACP Re, Karkunkel’s private company owned by his grantor trust.

On question 2, the answer is not likely. ?When Argonaut bought out PXRE in a reverse merger, the NOLs were disallowed. ?Now, I’m not a tax expert, so maybe someone reeeeally clever can fox their way around this, but to me the answer is no.

On question 3, the answer is I don’t know. ?The public companies that he controls have the advantage that they aren’t taking on much risk in a renewal rights transaction. ?Whether they are paying the right price or not depends heavily on whether the reserving for claims at the Tower Group entities is overstated or understated. ?Prior under-reserving may not have been fully corrected. ?With smaller companies near bankruptcy, like Tower Group, there is the risk of death via many cuts.

That brings me to my main insight. ?Though there are no financing contingencies to this deal, ACP Re can walk away with no penalty if it merely wants to do so. ?If they find a material adverse change, the deal can die, and TWGP will have to pay ACP Re a breakup fee.

Like Fairfax Financial’s offer to buy Blackberry, Prem Watsa had the equivalent of a “free look.” ?Tower Group is desperate enough that they gave a “free look” to the Karfunkels and their allied companies. ?The deal is not a lock, and a lot depends on what is written when the late 10-K is finally filed.

Why delay the 10-K? ?My best guess is trying to get the claim reserves right. ?After having to revise reserves twice before, the odds of further revisions are significant. ?You have to understand that claim reserves for P&C companies are not a science, particularly for long-tailed lines, and Tower Group was overly aggressive in those lines.

But delay in filing the 10-K is not a positive sign. ?If you have confidence in the actuarial analysis of reserves, why delay the filing? ?Every other aspect of a P&C insurance company can be calculated within a few weeks of the year’s end. ?No mysteries, except for the reserves.

So, if ACP Re concludes that the likely claim payments from the legacy business are likely to be larger than the net amount they are paying for the legacy business ($67 million), ACP Re can walk away, with no breakup fee. ?In that scenario Tower Group could head to bankruptcy.

So, when I consider the arbitrage opportunities available by buying Tower Group common stock, I would pass. ?As a rule, I don’t short, though I would be tempted to do so here. ?Tower Group is a very complex company for its size, and as such, I have less confidence in its financials. ?Complexity in financial companies creates inflexibility, which can lead to trouble when regulators deny moving cash from one company to another, which might lead to default on debts.

Avoid this situation, and all of the companies involved. ?Buffett has his “Too Hard” pile. ?This one is too hard, because no one can know the claims that will be paid from aggressively written legacy business.

Full disclosure: no positions in the companies mentioned

 

On National Western Life

On National Western Life

From respected reader:

Just did a quick calc based on NWLI earnings and thought I would pass onto you as I know you at least used to hold it as a double weight. ?Let me know if you think there are major holes in this theory:

From the Annual Report:

“The yield on debt security purchases to fund insurance operations rebounded somewhat to 3.53% in 2013 from 3.37% in 2012 but was still below the 4.18% yield attained in 2011.”

So, investment yields improved, but are still down. ?Their unrealized gains in securities dropped from $541 million to $146 because of this, so this part of the “hidden value” in the shares went down.

But if rates can get back up to that 4.18%, a quick calc says that would cause annual earnings on their $9 billion investment portfolio to increase $58 million. ?If 2/3’s of this is credited to annuity holders, it leaves $19.5 million before tax for shareholders. ?32% tax from 2013 gives after tax earnings increase of $13 million or $3.57 increase in earnings per share.

If we could get yields back up to 5.5% like they were a few years ago, using the same calc would give an increase in EPS of $9.38, or a 1/3 increase in earnings.

It is still a double-weight here. ?It is not as cheap as it once was, but it is still cheap. ?Financial stocks should always be valued on a combination of price-to-book and price-to-expected-earnings.

Why? ?Because accrual items in the accounting can either be aggressive, fair or conservative. ?If aggressive, earnings will be overstated, and book value understated. ?If conservative, earnings will be understated, and book value overstated. ?For the most part, the two measures balance the squishy accounting.

Now as for the disclosures in the NWLI 10K, we need to note that more than 2/3rds of the bonds that they hold are “held to maturity.” ?That’s unusual, as is their policy where they don’t buy high yield bonds. ?Held to maturity means the value of the bonds amortizes over time, but price moves don’t affect the accounting, unless default is likely. ?Thus if interest rates rise, book value will not be affected much, but earnings will rise on a GAAP basis.

NWLI has a conservative investing culture, and in the present aggressive environment that is a *good thing.* ?Adjusting for the held to maturity securities, the adjusted price-to-book is 55%, and my estimate of future earnings is one-ninth of the current price. ?It is rare to find stocks trading at a significant discount to book and a single-digit P/E.

Full disclosure: long NWLI

Managing Berkshire Hathaway by Committee?

Managing Berkshire Hathaway by Committee?

While reading about portfolio companies today, I ended up reading this piece about Berkshire Hathaway. ?Not that great of an article, and it got worse when I read this:

Then there is the big question, “Who will replace Warren Buffett (Trades, Portfolio)?” He is now 83 years old. There is no official word on who will take over, but in his letters to shareholders he takes time to praise many of the investment managers working for him. The current consensus seems to be that Berkshire will be run by committee. The company has plenty of assets and superior management, so it should continue to operate efficiently. [emphasis mine]

That’s not the way BRK works. ?BRK is a group of businesses, run by men (male & female) who love their businesses, and would rather be running their businesses than taking a vacation. ?When Buffett dies, and he *will* die one day, much as shareholders might like to hope otherwise, BRK will likely be managed much as it is today. ?BRK relies on self-motivated managers that do their part to ?make the company work. ?Given the level of independence, it is the only way it can work, absent the possibility of considerable centralization after Buffett’s death.

The same applies to the management of the small central office. ?Public stock portfolio management is separate from the purchase of private companies (with some informal overlap). ?Operational management is limited, aside from efforts to fix lagging subsidiaries (think of Tracy Britt Cool). ?The next CEO of BRK will have to have multiple skills, but he won’t have to “do it all” as Buffett does. ?He will have to delegate yet further.

Think: how many people can understand all of the following:

  • The economics of a wide number of industrial businesses
  • The economics of one of the biggest insurers & reinsurers of the world
  • The quantitative aspects of Buffett’s derivative bets
  • Clever investing in public equities
  • Ability to acquire attractive public and private companies and on attractive terms
  • Minimizing tax impacts in the process
  • How to continually motivate the managers of a spread-out empire of companies

The successor to Buffett will likely be little different than Buffett — a capital allocator who motivates his many managers. ?At the size of BRK, private equity skills may be more valuable than public equity skills. ?BRK is a conglomerate, with considerable diversification. ?Even a passing look at the corporate org chart screams “Big!”

You want a sharp delegator/decision-maker at the head of BRK. ?He will hand off many responsibilities to others, but hold onto the core jobs of allocating capital, and evaluating/rewarding managers.

Anything else is suicide for BRK. ?That said, it’s not impossible that a future CEO would radically streamline BRK, and turn it into something more like GE. ?That would be a big mistake, but it would look like low hanging fruit, because of the many similar businesses that could be combined. ?Purchasing and central office services could be combined as well. ?That might improve profits in the short-run, but it would destroy the unique corporate culture that Buffett has created.

Far better to have a “fixer” correcting the edges of the corporation like Tracy Britt Cool, or David Sokol, than to wholly change the healthy culture of a corporation, with uncertain rewards.

Full Disclosure: Long BRK/B for myself and clients

 

Classic: Ways to Cut Risk

Classic: Ways to Cut Risk

This was published in late 2007 at RealMoney. ?I don’t know exactly when.

=-=-=-=-=-=-===-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-==-=-=-=-==-=-===-==-=-=-=====–==-=-=-

I came into the investment business through the back door as an actuary and a risk manager. For more than a decade, I worked inside several large life insurance companies creating investment products. My team?s dirty secret? We just wanted to clip a smallish profit on the assets, without taking much risk ourselves. If we could do that, and produce a reliable investment result for our clients, we were happy.

That was my job then; in a different sense, it is my job now.? My goal as a writer, commentator, and independent money manager is to take much of the risk out of personal investing while retaining most of the profit potential.

Nobody can avoid every up and down in the market. What you can do, however, is to ensure that you don?t get crushed when the market rolls over. My own portfolio is a case in point. Over the last seven years, starting in September of 2000, my investment process has yielded an annualized return of 20% a year.? I manage to a long horizon, so I don?t try to cut losses in the short run.? I am willing to take pain if I feel that the underlying fundamentals are intact.? I had only one losing year in that time, but it was a doozy. During four months in 2002, my portfolio lost 32% of its value.? I was shaken, but I scraped together my spare cash and invested. Over the next 16 months, my portfolio rallied 86%, which I found about as astounding as the 32% loss.?

The experience taught me that risk control works. Oddly enough, though, risk control doesn?t get a lot of attention. The most popular books and websites on investing spend nearly all their time focusing on the prospect of big returns; they rush over the matter of how to avoid big losses or how to deal with these losses when they happen. The result? Many people sour on investing because they take risks they don?t intend and lose a lot of money. They conclude that the investment game is rigged against them and they leave investing.

 

It doesn?t have to be that way. Let me suggest five simple ways you can control your worst tendencies, reduce your risk and become a happier investor.

Spread your bets around. The most basic rule of risk control is to diversify your investments. It is also the most neglected rule.

Perhaps the neglect is because most people don?t understand what diversification means. For starters, it means building a buffer against all the stuff you would prefer not to think about?unemployment, sickness, a horrible bear market, etc. Before you start investing, you need three to six months of living expenses set aside in bank deposits, money market funds and short-term bond funds. Having this cushion protects you from having to sell investments in an emergency, which in turn allows you to take risk with your remaining assets.

On top of your emergency funds, your portfolio should include a dollop of high quality bonds that mature in anywhere from two to 10 years. For older people, bonds cushion the downside of the total portfolio and ensure that you can?t be devastated by a stock market downturn. For younger people, bonds provide an additional benefit?you can sell them to buy stocks or other investments if the market plunges and you spot tempting bargains. So how much of your portfolio should you devote to bonds? As little as 20% of your portfolio if you?re in your twenties and a risk taker; 50% or more if you?re above 65 or naturally cautious.

Once you?ve got your emergency funds and your bonds stowed away, it?s time for stocks?and, once again, diversification should be your starting point. You don?t want to bet your entire future on a handful of stocks or on one industry or even on a single country. The easiest way to ensure that you?re widely diversified among many different stocks is to invest in a mutual fund or exchange-traded fund that holds scores of individual stocks, representing a multitude of different industries.

If, like me, you prefer to buy individual stocks, you have to balance your desire to be widely diversified against how much money you have to invest and?just as important?how much time you have to spend researching companies. My minimum for reasonable diversification is 15 stocks. When I started investing as a serious amateur back in 1992, I started with 15 stocks in my portfolio, and I bought $2,000 of each of them. Since then I?ve made maybe a dozen serious investing mistakes, but because I had my money diversified among many companies, none of my mistakes ever cost me more than 2% of my total capital.

These days I?m even more diversified: I run with 35 stocks, which is close to the maximum an individual can hope to track and research. Generally I devote an equal amount of money to each of my stocks?an equal weight, in investment jargon?because usually I can?t tell what my best ideas are. When a position gets more than 20% away from its target weight, I consider whether I should bring it back to equal weight or sell the whole thing.? Occasionally I deviate from equal weighting, but only when I have a very safe stock that is grossly undervalued. I never go above a double weight, which means that a single stock rarely accounts for even 6% of my overall portfolio.

 

The final way I diversify my portfolio is intellectually. I try to listen to as many viewpoints from as many different people as I can. I do this because the ideas of all but the most careful investors are internally correlated. They reflect some idea of what the economy is likely to do in the future, and they lean toward companies that fit that view. Some investors love companies with high P/E multiples and incredible growth stories. Other investors?and I?m one of them?love companies in distressed industries that are going for a song. You should listen to both camps. Doing so insures that you learn to think about investments from a wide number of perspectives. It makes investing more businesslike.

Here?s one trick you might find handy. As I gather my ideas from a wide number of sources, I print them out, and place them in a pile next to my computer.? I try to forget who gave me the idea, which forces me to look at the idea fresh, without the biases that come from trusting an authority figure.

Follow the cash. Most investors pay a lot of attention to how much a company earns; few investors realize how easily management can manipulate those earnings with fancy accounting. To reduce risk in the stocks you buy, keep an eye on a company?s cash flow as well as its earnings.

Your first step should be to look with a questioning eye at the non-cash, or accrual items, on the company?s financial statements. These include entries for such things as depreciation, inventory adjustments, or bad debt allowances. Cash is certain, but non-cash items such as these are anything but. Earnings can be thrown up or down by how quickly management decides to write down the value of a new factory or by how much it estimates its inventory of rotary-dial phones is really worth. The accounting industry tries to set guidelines for accruals, but management still has a lot of leeway.

For non-accountants, the easiest way to sniff out possible trouble is to compare the earnings statement with the cash flow statement?specifically the top segment of the cash flow statement, which shows ?cash flow from operations.? This is the amount of cold hard cash the company?s operations are generating, before making any payouts to lenders or shareholders, or investing in new equipment. In most cases, if a company?s earnings are growing, its cash flow from operations should also be going up, since higher earnings just about always mean more cash going through the business. So what if a company says its earnings are growing, but its cash flow isn?t?? You should be very, very wary. The financial statements aren?t necessarily bogus, but you have to puzzle out how a company?s earnings can be rising without throwing off more cash.

Sometimes there is no good answer to this puzzle. Remember Sunbeam, the small-appliance maker that hired ?Chainsaw Al? Dunlap to goose its business? I owned the stock in 1996 when Dunlap came on the scene. But after two earnings reports I became suspicious. ?All of these restructuring efforts are improving earnings, but they?re not producing cash from operations,? I thought. ?What gives?? I concluded something fishy was going on, so I sold for a nice gain. Over the next six months, the stock rose by 60%?then plunged 90% as it became clear that most of Sunbeam?s increase in earnings was the result of accounting shenanigans, not real business gains.

Love the unloved. Most people avoid industries that are under stress.? Who can blame them?? The industry outlook is horrible; there can?t be anything good here.?

I take a different view. I believe that some of the safest plays you can make consist of buying financially strong names in weak sectors. These companies are usually cheap in comparison to their earnings and to their book values. You can find out more about how to spot undervalued companies by visiting the website of Tweedy Browne, the famous value-investing firm, and reading their excellent paper on What Has Worked In Investing (http://www.tweedy.com/library_docs/papers/what_has_worked_all.pdf).

In addition to the standard measures, I look for companies with good bond ratings.? The ratings agencies are out of favor now, because of the current furor over securitization, but they produce the best single measure of a company?s creditworthiness. The raters award the best ratings to companies that can generate cash well in excess of what is needed to pay all their creditors and that possess a low ratio of debt to assets.

 

Once I?ve bought a stock, I try to be patient, because the payoff is usually not instantaneous. In 2001, when steel stocks looked horrible, I bought Nucor, the soundest company in the industry. Steel companies dropped like flies in 2002 and the stock did nothing?until the end of the year, when enough steel-making capacity had been closed down that steel prices began to rise. Nucor flew, and I made a nice profit.

The key to making this contrarian strategy work is to not overdo it. Some industries?newspapers, say, or fixed-line telecom companies?truly do have questionable futures. You have to analyze each situation on its own merits.? At present, my favorite industries are insurance, energy, agriculture/food processing, cement, and chemicals.

 

My value-hunting approach means that most of the stuff I buy is not popular. I veer away from firms that are pioneering new technologies or markets. Such companies are easy to get enthusiastic about, but difficult to value because there are so many unknowns.

When I talk about the companies I own, the response is often, ?You invest in obscure stuff.? What do you think about Google?? I don?t have an opinion on Google.? I can?t tell you whether it will produce enough profits over the years to justify its current price or not.? So much depends on future tastes and competition. I?d rather own cement companies; they are very difficult to make obsolete.

Take emotion out of it You should look over your portfolio two to four times a year. In my own case, I follow a very structured process. I take all of the investment ideas that I have gathered up since my last portfolio pruning, and rate them on valuation, momentum, and accounting quality to arrive at a composite measure of their overall desirability. I compare these ideas to the companies that are already in my portfolio.

This sounds complicated and so it is. But exactly how you do your ranking is less important than having a system for comparing the stocks in your existing portfolio to the alternatives that the market is offering you. Your goal should to take some of the emotion out of investing. You don?t want to fall in love with the companies that you already own. To avoid this, I try to pinpoint what companies in my ideas list are better than the median idea in my portfolio.? These become purchase candidates and I do further research on them.

I also look at the companies in my portfolio that are below the median in desirability, and I ask why I?m keeping them. In many cases, the companies are less desirable because they?ve gone up in price and are no longer as cheap as the once were. In other cases, they?re less desirable for the opposite reason? the company?s business has deteriorated and shows no signs of turning around. Every three to four months, I typically sell two or three companies from my 35-stock list and replace them with more promising companies from the ideas list. I typically hold a stock for three years.? Many of my ideas go against me at first, but often turn and make money for me later.

 

Smart money is slow money. If a stockbroker or financial planner tells you that you?ll miss a huge opportunity if you don?t buy right now, ignore them. A smart investor moves at his or her own pace.

To make sure that you don?t get pressured into buying something, it?s nearly always a good rule to avoid salespeople. Stockbrokers, financial planners, mutual fund salespeople and even the experts on the television all have financial incentives that can pull them in directions opposite to what?s in your best interest. Before buying any stock or any financial product, you should do a bit of background reading so that you understand what you?re buying and how much rival products cost. In many cases?insurance is a good example?you?ll find that the simplest product is your best buy. Complexity in insurance, and many other investments, is usually a cover for increased fees.

Especially when it comes to buying stocks, patience is your best friend. If an idea seems like a sure thing, sit on it for a month.? If the idea is still a good one, you will usually still have time to act on it.? If the idea is a bad one, the extra time will help you do further research and may make its problems evident.

One of the best ways to make money is to avoid losing it. When I approach new ideas, I try to ask how likely it is that I will lose money, and how much I could lose if I am wrong. I lose about 20% of the time. Six times in the last 15 years, I have lost half my money on an investment. Those are actually pretty good numbers. I can?t avoid all losses, but if I wait, take my time and do my research, I can limit my losses, and make money on the rest of my ideas.

Tightening Starts When?

Tightening Starts When?

This will be short, because in this case, as picture is worth a thousand words. ?What sent the market lower today? This:

central tendency_1915_image001

The likely time for FOMC tightening shrank today, despite the many words saying that nothing was different. ?This is the first time since the Fed started giving enhanced guidance that the time for tightening actually moved backwards (closer to the present). ?Should we be surprised that long bonds fell, and equities less so?

As Light As Hydrogen

As Light As Hydrogen

Okay let?s roll the promoted stocks scoreboard:

Ticker Date of Article Price @ Article Price @ 3/18/13 Decline Annualized Splits
GTXO

5/27/2008

2.45

0.040

-98.4%

-50.8%

BONZ

10/22/2009

0.35

0.001

-99.7%

-73.0%

BONU

10/22/2009

0.89

0.001

-99.9%

-79.1%

UTOG

3/30/2011

1.55

0.000

-100.0%

-95.1%

OBJE

4/29/2011

116.00

0.167

-99.9%

-89.7%

1:40

LSTG

10/5/2011

1.12

0.010

-99.1%

-85.7%

AERN

10/5/2011

0.0770

0.0001

-99.9%

-93.4%

IRYS

3/15/2012

0.261

0.000

-100.0%

-100.0%

Dead
RCGP

3/22/2012

1.47

0.300

-79.6%

-55.1%

STVF

3/28/2012

3.24

0.420

-87.0%

-64.5%

CRCL

5/1/2012

2.22

0.026

-98.8%

-90.6%

ORYN

5/30/2012

0.93

0.110

-88.2%

-69.5%

BRFH

5/30/2012

1.16

0.515

-55.6%

-36.3%

LUXR

6/12/2012

1.59

0.009

-99.4%

-94.7%

IMSC

7/9/2012

1.5

0.900

-40.0%

-26.1%

DIDG

7/18/2012

0.65

0.042

-93.5%

-80.7%

GRPH

11/30/2012

0.8715

0.085

-90.3%

-83.5%

IMNG

12/4/2012

0.76

0.045

-94.1%

-88.9%

ECAU

1/24/2013

1.42

0.240

-83.1%

-78.8%

DPHS

6/3/2013

0.59

0.010

-98.3%

-99.4%

POLR

6/10/2013

5.75

0.070

-98.8%

-99.7%

NORX

6/11/2013

0.91

0.210

-76.9%

-85.2%

ARTH

7/11/2013

1.24

0.360

-71.0%

-83.6%

NAMG

7/25/2013

0.85

0.164

-80.7%

-92.2%

MDDD

12/9/2013

0.79

0.320

-59.5%

-96.4%

TGRO

12/30/2013

1.2

0.220

-81.7%

-100.0%

VEND

2/4/2014

4.34

4.900

12.9%

187.3%

3/18/2014

Median

-93.5%

-85.2%

Tonight’s loser-in-waiting is HydroPhi Technologies [HPTG]. ?This one can’t even get basic science right. ?It claims to be able to split water into hydrogen and oxygen, and then recombine them to create energy. ?Circular processes in general lose energy, otherwise we would have perpetual motion machines.

And behind the vapid analysis is an uber-loser. ?His analyses never pan out over one year. ?A clever speculator might make money occasionally, but not regularly, because the stocks he pumps are like this one. ?Little revenues, negative earnings, negative net worth. ?This is a recipe for disaster.

Think about it — if you had a miracle energy technology, would you merge your company with a failed internet advertising company “BigClix?” ?I would think not. ?You would keep your company private and enjoy the significant profits.

As it is, there are no profits, so where is this great energy technology? ?This is a scam, and laws should be revised to allow prosecution of those who write such promotional garbage as we have seen. ?It is no good to have the 4-point type disclaimers telling some of the truth, while the big type says “Buy, buy BUYYY!!!” ?Also, as far as the web version of this promotion goes, the promoters pour in half a million. ?As it says in the 4-point type:

Third Party Advertiser IMPORTANT NOTICE: Esquire Media Services Inc (EMS) has managed up to a $500,000 USD advertising production budget as of January 21, 2014 in an effort to build industry and investor awareness for HydroPhi Technology Group Inc (ticker symbol: HPTG).?

It’s easy to affect the price of a company that has bad fundamentals. ?It’s overvalued to start; it will only be more overvalued at the crest of the promotion. ?If you attract a bunch of people to the pump-and-dump who want to play the momentum, some may think they will be clever enough to scalp a quick profit along with the insiders. ?Some of them win, and others lose. ?Others believe the advertising, and stay to lose a ton.

Seth Klarman recently said,??It might not look like it now, but markets don?t exist simply to enrich people.? ?This needs to be remembered by all. ?Markets are for trading, and trading is a negative-sum game. ?Those who buy & hold valuable businesses for a span — that is a positive-sum game, because the underlying asset is appreciating.

To close: don’t buy promoted stocks. ?Never. ?Those who are paid directly or indirectly to encourage you to buy are at best sub-agents for the seller — they aren’t on your side. ?In buying promoted stocks, it’s like going to Vegas, minus the fun. ?You will lose. ?You will lose a lot. ? The house edge is fixed — it’s only a question of how much you will lose.

Avoid promoted stocks. ?As I often say: “Don’t buy what someone else wants to sell you, buy what you have researched and know has value.”

The Idea of Contributory Defined Benefit Plans

The Idea of Contributory Defined Benefit Plans

In the good old days, there were Defined Benefit [DB] plans for pensions, and only those. ?Why were those good?

  • The sponsor took care of the investing
  • Participants received a level, or inflation-adjusted payment.
  • Payments offered longevity insurance — you could not outlive them.

Then, by accident, the 401(k) plan, and other defined contribution [DC] plans came into existence. ?Employees could invest their money pretax, and make money during the bull markets of the ’80s and ’90s. ?Many companies terminated their DB plans, and replaced them with DC plans, cash balance plans, etc.

DC plans were attractive to most participants because:

  • They could see the value easily — it was expressed in a single number, and a higher number is always better, right?
  • The employer match was an obvious source of value.
  • Since most of the plans were participant directed, many enjoyed control of the asset allocation, particularly in bull markets.
  • The benefits were portable, they did not rely on continued employment with the same firm.
  • They could take loans against their ?balances.

After the bull market of the ’90s, what did participants in DC pension plans lose?

  • They weren’t natural investors, so they lost there through underperformance. ?Fear and Greed led them to lose.
  • They lost longevity insurance — it is a lot cheaper to get it early, when you don’t need it.
  • As interest rates fell, so did the ability to buy a future income ?by buying an annuity. ?Yes, the balance was higher, but you could not earn as much from it with safety.
  • Managing a lump sum for income is a very tough task, and one that most average investors are not equipped to tackle.

This is why I would like to propose replacing DC plans with DB plans, but give employees the option of adding more to their DB plans, and making DB plans portable. ?This would require:

  • Making DB plans tax-favored relative to DC plans. ?Drop the tax-advantaged status for DC plans.
  • Have standard transfer assumptions for the valuation of DB plans.

The great advantage of contributory DB plans is that they divide responsibilities/advantages where they are best held:

  • Plan sponsors are better at investing than participants.
  • DB plans provide longevity insurance.
  • If participants want to save more, they can do so, buying streams of future income.

I know this piece is nonstandard — out of step with the current “reality.” ?If pensions were structured this way, it would save many people a lot of headaches:

  • How do I invest?
  • How can I lock in a good future income for life?
  • How can I get more than what the company is putting aside for me?

Contributory Defined Benefit plans would divide the duties of pensions properly. ?Participants would decide how much to save, and sponsors would invest and provide longevity insurance. ?Can you think of a better way to do pensions? ?I’m all ears.

“Different from the Consensus”

“Different from the Consensus”

At a recent investment competition that I attended, one of the judges asked the question to all teams, in a somewhat long-winded way, “How is your opinion different than the consensus?” ?Perhaps because I have heard it for too many years, I got a little tired of it.

So what is the consensus? ?There is no “consensus” document that is publicly available.

  • The consensus could be any collection of factors that justifies the current market price.
  • The consensus could be generally agreed upon ideas of a large majority of “sell side” analysts.
  • The consensus could be a few critical factors that are widely agreed on.

A correct insight that is different from that of the majority is valuable. ?But the majority is often right, at least in the short run. ?I often found as a buy side analyst that some sub-industry sectors were rationally priced and there were no plays to be made.

Therefore I would say don’t force yourself to be different from the consensus. ?If you have good reasons to be different from the consensus, pursue those views.

Sometimes the best answer is, “I don’t know,” or “This seems fairly priced to me.”

You don’t always have to make a decision. ?Even Buffett has a “Too Hard” pile for documents. ?As an aside, he tossed Assurant into the “too hard” pile, while I immediately embraced the IPO. ?And yes, I did have a view that was different than the seeming consensus.

Some say, “Not to Decide is to Decide.” ?Well, yeah, but as investors, we have to guard against false certainty. ?We will be hurt more by wrong actions we take than by right actions that we miss. ?There’s more than one fish in the sea. ?If you can’t find a good opportunity, well, keep looking. ?Peruse 13Fs of clever investors for ideas. ?Look for good companies in bad industries. ?Those will make you different than the consensus.

Don’t ever feel forced into making an investment decision. ?If it is not compelling, pass it up and wait. ?Yes, time is money, but haste makes waste. ?Particularly where fear or greed is involved, there are real risks of making bad decisions. ?Channel your inner Vulcan, and be as dispassionate as possible.

There is a consensus in investing, but it is an abstract thing, and not easily measured. ?Don’t aim to be different than the consensus; aim to be right, because often the consensus is right, and there is no reason to invest in a given company.

Full Disclosure: Long AIZ BRK/B

Sorted Weekly Tweets

Sorted Weekly Tweets

Rest of the World

  • China premier warns on economic slowdown as data fans stimulus talk?http://t.co/B4uN1uP6OU?Stimulus just leads 2more overcapacity & debt $$?Mar 14, 2014
  • Teslas in California Help Bring Dirty Rain to China?http://t.co/YTBdiM77Pi?Mining graphite adds 2 Chinese air pollution $$ Ironic, huh??Mar 14, 2014
  • Deeper Ukraine Invasion Lurks in Putin’s Warnings, ?’Provocations,’ Clashes in East?http://t.co/L5GbJqx8j6?1 mistake away from major war $$?Mar 14, 2014
  • Finland Trapped in Recession as Investment Fades?http://t.co/DL9m3nGy13?Punk global economy exhausted from 2 much stimulus & debt $$ $SPY?Mar 14, 2014
  • Norway?s Oil Stimulus Nears Tipping Point as Growth Fades?http://t.co/ct5Mt8RY5i?Government economics stimulus fails; ppl have 2much debt $$?Mar 14, 2014
  • Warnings From the Ukraine Crisis?http://t.co/lcC1RDpjRv?Not being George W. Bush is not a foreign policy. Let Nobel winner get a strategy $$?Mar 14, 2014
  • US Investigators Suspect Missing Malaysia Airlines Plane Flew On?http://t.co/dhM6rlQlf1?Engine Data Suggest Flight Airborne for 5 hrs $$?Mar 13, 2014
  • Treasury?s Lew Uses Mideast Toolkit to Back Ukrainian Bonds?http://t.co/QeyvWdDKZ1?Another example of ways to buy US credit with spread $$?Mar 13, 2014
  • Qatar World Cup: 400 Nepalese die on nation’s building sites since bid won?http://t.co/uUY4neKHbF?Slavery is alive & sick in Qatar $$?Mar 13, 2014
  • The Malaysia Airlines Disappearance Shows Technology’s Limits?http://t.co/dWgmOKk42v?Interesting read: rare cases of disappearing planes $$?Mar 13, 2014
  • Ukraine Starts Military Exercises as Russia Warns on East?http://t.co/8ZeISGvEcA?All u need is 1 significant mistake & u could have war $$?Mar 10, 2014
  • Israelis in Berlin Signal Middle Class Struggles at Home?http://t.co/mydWWz9j7M?It’s cheaper living in Berlin, forget the past, live well $$?Mar 10, 2014
  • China Strike Illustrates Shift in Labor Landscape?http://t.co/DDWIN8KLhM?Would rather work 4 a foreign firrm than Chinese firm $$ $FXI?Mar 10, 2014

 

Companies & Industries

  • $GLCH Gleacher & Co is liquidating. Looking at the price chart, it has seen better days?http://t.co/aIYv7zxrfd?$$ $SPY $TLT?Mar 14, 2014
  • IBM’s double dilemma?http://t.co/HJfljGY7Wq?If you buy back stock at levels over the company’s intrinsic value, you destroy value. $IBM $$?Mar 14, 2014
  • Even in its final days, Windows XP still looms large?http://t.co/m2VUtiTJIp?Last night friend told her hospital just upgraded to XP $$ $MSFT?Mar 14, 2014
  • BNSF pledges 2get caught up on ND ag shipments?http://t.co/XGah5Xmop6?$CNI made a similar promise in Canada recently. Coincidence? $BRK.B $$?Mar 13, 2014
  • Target Missed Alarms in Epic Hack of Credit Card Data?http://t.co/lYLAWDI04m?$TGT got ample warning from $FEYE & $SYMC but ignored it $$?Mar 13, 2014
  • Candy Crush Maker’s Realm Spans Across Continents?http://t.co/9dZyVNhqWp?A global firm that uses tax & regulatory haven 2 their advantage $$?Mar 13, 2014
  • ?Candy Crush? Maker Seeks Valuation Up to $7.6B?http://t.co/L1Kaf4WLjK?I would b wary here, not just the IPO, but a faddish company $$ $SPY?Mar 12, 2014
  • US Wind-Down Bill Clips $FNMA $ FMCC Shares?http://t.co/rZxsLenQk4?Would require most borrowers 2make down payments of >5%, lenders hit 2 $$?Mar 12, 2014
  • Fannie, Freddie Shares Plunge?http://t.co/XfNZ1Jv5Rv?Taxpayers should reap the reward for bailing out $FNMA & $FMCC as mtge gtees change $$?Mar 12, 2014
  • Buffett?s Berkshire Reaches $300B Market Cap?http://t.co/lqnyQ0F4sN?As he buys profiable businesses, growing retained earnings builds MC $$?Mar 10, 2014
  • Chiquita to Acquire Irish Fruit Distributor Fyffes in Stock Deal?http://t.co/MJBhJuuxM3?$CQB is no “top banana” in the fruit biz $$ $SPY?Mar 10, 2014

Market Impact

  • Corporate Cash Pushes Further Into Corporate Bonds?http://t.co/Vk9PGzrItp?Corporate finance gets urge 2b a profit center @ wrong moment $$?Mar 14, 2014
  • Bio-finance? Why high-frequency trading makes stocks flock like birds?http://t.co/UB6jzwgjla?Reasonable defense of HFT H/T: @matt_levine $$?Mar 14, 2014
  • ETFs Get $41B Erasing Stock Withdrawals on Economy?http://t.co/l1hrnCWuel?This is y I advocate low turnover strategies $$ sell low, buy high?Mar 13, 2014
  • BlackRock Junk ETFs Push Buyers to Dark Corners?http://t.co/vjydZFBFwG?Same problem exists w/index bonds not in ETFs; high short interest $$?Mar 13, 2014
  • A man and his signals @reformedbroker?http://t.co/12SiH3ZkCp?No 1 has a set of signals that can be relied upon in all market environments $$?Mar 13, 2014
  • Wall Street and Casinos…Are They Similar??http://t.co/MYNALbXAJm?@howardlindzon tells us 2b prepared, understand mkts & not blame ump $$?Mar 13, 2014
  • Activist Investors Put Bondholders in Crossfire?http://t.co/k1BdJx1gR6?Investment grade corps offer little2no protection frm negative M&A $$?Mar 13, 2014
  • How Market Tops Get Made?http://t.co/Saa7j6zkCQ?Good piece by @Ritholtz on technicals of market tops. For dessert: http://t.co/VIGN6jhACy $$?Mar 12, 2014
  • Stock Market Surge Bypasses Most Americans, Poll Shows?http://t.co/IJ0S2rRx8x?People don’t get stocks; worse, they think they get housing $$?Mar 12, 2014
  • Chart of the Day: No Profits, No Problem??http://t.co/HpYPLqoOKP?IPO quality is down, & many private companies want to IPO. IP-uh-oh $$ $SPY?Mar 12, 2014
  • Bull Market Rivals ?90s at Half Valuation as Demand Broadens?http://t.co/YzXZDj9HlK?Profit margins were a lot lower & corp yields higher $$?Mar 10, 2014
  • Still Corporate Cash Everywhere?http://t.co/gseGZd38Th?How much $$ is encumbered? More derivatives today, which induces some calc bias $SPY?Mar 10, 2014

 

US Politics & Policy

  • Regulators Size Up Wall Street, With Worry?http://t.co/aQolfRq0Y4?Allowing big banks to fail, while protecting depositors is a solution $$?Mar 14, 2014
  • Senate Investigation of Bush-Era Torture Erupts Into Constitutional Crisis?http://t.co/qkqkAGiP9Y?Obama-era also; what he tell CIA 2 do? $$?Mar 13, 2014
  • CFPB targets “zombie” foreclosures after Reuters report?http://t.co/RohgKncAnm?What happens when an owner walks away & bank doesn’t f/c $$?Mar 13, 2014
  • How the NSA Plans to Infect ‘Millions’ of Computers with Malware?http://t.co/N72lYfxhr9?Another reason to end the existence of NSA $$ #nonsa?Mar 13, 2014
  • Raskin Confirmed by Senate as US Treasury?s No. 2 Official?http://t.co/TvwMcqj6eI?Maybe she’ll do as much at Tsy as she did at the Fed $$?Mar 12, 2014
  • ObamaCare’s Secret Mandate Exemption?http://t.co/s6OCOdwU83?HHS quietly repeals the individual purchase rule for two more years $$ $SPY $TLT?Mar 12, 2014

Central Banking

  • Fed Sends $79.6B in Profit to Treasury?http://t.co/W313rKFj2k?That profit is taken from the pockets of savers, it is not like manna $$ $TLT?Mar 14, 2014
  • Fed Nominees Vow To Fight for Recovery?http://t.co/KjdmHILaCV?Stanley Fischer & 2 blanks in the gun; really unimpressed w/shuffle Tsy/Fed $$?Mar 13, 2014
  • Yellen Job One Is Redoing Guidance Without Roiling Markets?http://t.co/2Hu8ALqIwW?Unlikely, her own work established current verbiage $$?Mar 12, 2014

?

Economics

  • Your Job Taught to Machines Puts Half US Work at Risk?http://t.co/a0WSKAEIom?W/o labor-saving innovation we wouldn’t b so well off $$ $SPY?Mar 12, 2014
  • Global Debt Exceeds $100T as Governments Binge, BIS Says?http://t.co/cDgYwRUI7A?When large amts of securities get issued -> underperform $$?Mar 10, 2014
  • Where’s Economics When We Need It??http://t.co/3SMaboCeG6?Games played by obscure mathematicians explaining a world that does not exist $$?Mar 10, 2014
  • Will Housing Bloom Again This Spring?http://t.co/KEHLTIKesD?There r2 many investors looking to make $$ in housing; makes further gains hard?Mar 10, 2014

Other

  • Want a Lasting Relationship? Give Up Sex [before marriage]?http://t.co/nxSBVl2QB2?Interesting piece that supports traditional morality $$?Mar 13, 2014
  • Vanishing Planes Since 1948?http://t.co/2mSC2NGByA?Interesting lost planes graphic @BloombergNews | Rare, but more common than expected $$?Mar 13, 2014
  • The Risk Behind Buffett’s Advice?http://t.co/LE6EGqinq2?Asset allocation driven by valuation & time horizon. Don’t B&H if you need the $$?Mar 10, 2014
  • Morgan Stanley, Goldman Said to Swap Fees for Deal Credit?http://t.co/dH1FwKNEsr?$$ less valuable 2 investment banks than pride $GS $MS $SPY?Mar 10, 2014

Wrong

  • Wrong: US to Be Energy Self-Sufficient by 2035: $BP?http://t.co/hr8TTFBpge?Many don’t notice how quickly production tails off w/new wells $$?Mar 13, 2014
  • Wrong: Repo Fire-Sale Plan Said Within Reach After Fed Sounds Alarm?http://t.co/Kzbgp20yRG?These r just band-aid solutions $$ $NLY $TLT $SPY?Mar 12, 2014

Retweets, Replies & Comments

  • Here’s to Martin Rimes @hitmarktrading, my 9,000th Twitter follower; thanks to all who follow me. $$?Mar 13, 2014
  • @Money_in_Stereo I’m writing an article about it tonight at Aleph Blog. This was last night’s article:?http://t.co/bjvqvgXRc5?$$ $BRK.B?Mar 13, 2014
  • @Money_in_Stereo Did anyone respond to you when you asked about the Harney Investment Trust $BRK.B ??Mar 13, 2014

 

Theme: Overlay by Kaira