Category: Quantitative Methods

Blog Notes

Blog Notes

Once again, I have an article the Baltimore Business Review.? You can download it here.? My article is on page 40 of the PDF.

The Baltimore Business Review is unique, a collaboration between Towson University, and the Baltimore CFA Society.? The CFA Institute highlighted it in the past year, though I can’t find the link.

My article deals with what drives residential housing prices, and sadly, it comes to rather ordinary conclusions.? I hate it when I get a normal? conclusion.

Have a read, and tell me what you think.

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Second note: I will be the conference blogger for the NYSSA International Financial Reporting Conference taking place on January 10th.? There is a discount code for Aleph Blog readers: Aleph10, where you save 10%.? Note to CFAs: there is another code where you can save 20%, but I don’t remember what it is.

Accounting is important, and if you are a fundamental investor, it pays to understand it well.? I write this as one who had to learn a lot after becoming an actuary.? I might not know the nuances of all accounting, but I had to learn a lot as I did life insurance accounting, which is more complex than the accounting of most industries.

This is a conference worth attending, though many will ignorantly sneer at accounting conferences.

Sincerely,

David

Selling Options Cheaply (Did You Know?)

Selling Options Cheaply (Did You Know?)

Tom Brakke, the Research Puzzler, has started up yet another site to display bits of interesting information that he has run across — Research Puzzle Pieces.? His first piece was an interesting one, and I would like to give you my spin on it.

You may remember some of my writings in this area:

One major ploy of Wall Street is to induce people who need to stretch their income to buy a high yielding security that has weak protections.? All of the options are held by the bond seller.? They might think:

  • If things go really bad, we can default.? We’ll start another firm later; thank God for limited liability, and forgetful lenders.
  • If things go neutral-to-bad, and we need to conserve cash, we just pay with more bonds at a slightly higher rate.? In that scenario, there is no way we could borrow more at a similar rate, so we win there as well.
  • If things go okay, and we don’t have cash needs, we pay the coupon and bide our time.? (This is the only good scenario for bondholders.)
  • If things go really well, we call the bonds after the first year, paying off the investors who probably do not have great reinvestment options.

For the bondholder, the upside is capped, and the downside is 100%.? The optimal outcome is that you get paid principal & interest to the stated maturity from this bond that is deep in junk territory, CCC+/Caa1-rated, where the proceeds of the deal don’t increase the value of the firm, but are paid as a dividend to the equity holders.

As I said, the bond issuer holds all of the options here.? And what might you get as yield? 8.5-9.0%?? Given the risks here, that is not enough.

Problems of a Yield-Starved Market

PIK bonds and bonds from dividend deals tend to default with higher frequency and severity than equivalently rated deals lacking PIK and/or dividends.? But people invest, hoping that they will come out okay, even in the face of structural bond weakness.? They need the income, because they don’t have enough capital.

This is not a problem unique to investing.? As for PIK toggle bonds, securities underwriting is not all that much different from insurance underwriting.? In the first part of the bull phase of the cycle, pricing/risk margins decline due to competition.? After that, terms & conditions get weakened before the cycle turns.

It is common to see protections in debt securities decline as we get closer to the end of the credit/equity risk cycle.? We may have months to go here, or maybe two years to the peak at most, but we are living on borrowed time in the debt markets at present.? One more sign: premiums paid for loan participation and junk bond closed-end funds.? Most junk closed-end funds are at a premium, which means that there is an incentive to sell more junk debt.

What a world.? Let Bernanke know that his plan to make people take more risk is working, but when you do, tell him it is working for bad, not good.? As for my clients, we are reducing credit risk.

Another Penny Stock to Avoid

Another Penny Stock to Avoid

I received a “newsletter” today from Legendary Stocks.? Now with a name like “Legendary Stocks,” you would think the companies would have a long prior existence.? But the stock mentioned I can’t even find on EDGAR, which is different from all the other penny stocks I have analyzed.

As with all the rest, this doesn’t smell good.? This is a company with small revenues, negative earnings, and negative book value.? Though it trades in the US under the ticker IMNG, I can’t find much data on it.? Even their website has no investor data.? That is abnormal.

Oh, this was a part of Legendary Stocks, 5-point type size? disclaimer:

Legendary stocks has been contracted to receive and manage budget of eight hundred thousand dollars by a third party prime star communications agency for coverage of iMing. In addition, The Legendary stocks expects to receive new subscriber revenue as a result of this advertising effort. [Emphasis mine]

Leaving aside the concept that many Chinese stocks listed in the US are scams, where assets and earnings are misrepresented, there is little independent data to work with here.

But given the 93% decay rate on promoted penny stocks, I predict that by my next birthday, 12/5/2013, IMNG will trade for less than 10 cents a share, adjusted for reverse splits from the present.

I say to all who hear me: avoid promoted stocks.? Buy what you have analyzed: don’t trust what others think, even me.

Problems in Life Insurance

Problems in Life Insurance

I am not an FSA, but I am an actuary.? That said, I am not presently practicing inside a life insurance company, so as I write this, there may be some things that I get wrong.

There are two areas that concern me in life insurance accounting at present.? The first is that there is no good way to estimate the reserves for products that have secondary guarantees.? Yes, many actuaries can create models to try to estimate what the reserves should be.? But when you are dealing with variables that are less than predictable ? withdrawal assumptions, investment performance, etc., the results are often less good than desirable.

As a result, there have been reinsurance deals done to eliminate or reduce the formulaic reserves on secondary guarantees.? As a former boss of mine at AIG liked to say, ?I drop my deficiency reserves in the Atlantic Ocean.?? In other words, a Bermuda reinsurer with weaker reserving standards would absorb the secondary guarantee risk, even if it was another AIG subsidiary.? The same can be done through securitization and Special Purpose Vehicles.

Two articles on the topic:

  1. Experts Fear Life Insurers Are Courting Reserve Risk
  2. Captive SPVs: Shadow industry or necessary tool for life insurers?

But here is the more recent problem: allowing insurance companies to use their own models for reserving.? If the results of banks using the Basel Standards were bad, this has the potential to be worse.

You want all setting of reserves/accruals in financial companies to be conservative, and not manipulable by the companies, lest solvency be compromised.

When I was active in pricing, reserving, and cash flow modeling, I felt I had some of the best modeling out there, because most actuaries don?t understand complex regression models, and the components of investment return.

But I would never use my models to set the reserves.? That goes too far.

You don?t want to hand over reserving rules to one hired by the company, no matter how ethical he might be.? That way lies disaster.? There are always subtle pressures put on actuaries to be less conservative, because companies face pressure to show good earnings in the short-run.

Think of the mostly European quants, accountants and actuaries using the Basel standards.? Giving them the authority to set their own reserves for credit using internal models led to setting the reserves too low.? You want to have checks and balances.? You don?t want to have players serving as their own umpires.? So what if the statutory standards are too tight?? That just means earnings will be delayed, not eliminated.? Risk margins should be received as earned, and never capitalized.? Besides, the current crisis shows us that we never truly understand the parameters of the distribution.

Now, the rules in question are Statutory rules, affecting solvency, but not earnings, which come from GAAP.? What Statutory affects is the degree of solvency for subsidiaries, and the amount of free cash flow available to the holding company in the short-run.

This gives a lot of flexibility to management teams, and there is a lot more room to be liberal or conservative in terms of overall leverage policy.? In the short run, there could be a self-reinforcing cycle driving up the prices of life insurers as the less conservative buys the more conservative, resets their reserves, and uses the excess cash flow in the short run to acquire more companies.

Now for three quotations from this Wall Street Journal article on the topic:

Critics of the plan say they fear insurers will go overboard in their effort to placate investors who have grumbled for several years about subpar returns, draining the industry of reserves that could be needed in future financial crises. Many publicly traded life insurers are struggling to post the midteens returns on equity that shareholders want. Analysts say it is too soon to calculate how the new method will filter through to returns.

“This a significant and historic vote for the NAIC, moving forward on a substantive change in policy,” said Thomas Sullivan, a partner with PwC’s regulatory advisory business, and a former Connecticut insurance commissioner.

Once insurers can free up capital, “you could see more competitively priced products to consumers and/or improved financial flexibility for insurers,” Mr. Sullivan said.

Others are less optimistic. The move to principles-based reserving “is one of the most important developments in the history of life insurance,” said Joseph Belth, a professor emeritus of insurance at Indiana University and editor of the Insurance Forum. “Future generations of executives, regulators and consumers will have to deal with the financial carnage.”

Benjamin Lawsky, superintendent of the New York Department of Financial Services, had urged fellow regulators to vote no in a letter dispatched last week.

“The insurance industry weathered the financial crisis well precisely because of the careful reserving state regulators have historically required,” Mr. Lawsky said Sunday. “To ignore the lessons of the financial crisis and deregulate the industry, allowing them to keep less in reserves, is unwise.”

Listen to the New York Department of Insurance, which is the giant among pygmies.? They understand insurance regulation, versus most of the others states that don’t, who don’t deserve? a vote.? Listen to Joe Belth, who has fought against all manner of insurance frauds.? He deserves to be listened to as an elder statesman, unlike many others who think loosening up standards will produce some great outcome.

Principles based reserving will be less transparent than current standards.? Think of it this way.? Under the old rules, everyone was using the same algorithm.? You could ask questions about the inputs to it, and whether they were reasonable.? Under the new rules, regulators not only have to ask questions about inputs, but about the algorithms.? I can tell you from my experience, New York and the large states will be challenged trying to regulate that.? The small states?? They can’t even handle the present standards.

Now, it is not a done deal that these standards will come into existence.? Note from this article:

With the adoption of the Valuation Manual and prior approval of revisions to the Standard Valuation Law, the NAIC and Academy can present this as a package to state legislatures for consideration in early 2013. This package must be approved by 42 jurisdictions that represent states in which at least 75 percent of direct premiums are written before PBR takes effect. ?

Both New York and California are against this, and they have 18% of the market.? 8% more against, and this is dead.? Also, I know from my own forays back in 2000, when I led the effort to modernize Maryland’s life insurance investing code that it is very difficult to convince legislators to adopt new standards that they don’t understand.? I succeeded, and mainly because I was able to explain how excesses would be curbed.? With this legislation, I have no idea how you pitch it, aside from the braindead “More flexibility is good for the life insurance industry,” pitch.
I do not stand behind the American Academy of Actuaries.? I was a member of that for years, but I do not see them as promoting the good of all, but only that of the insurance/benefits industries.
Two more articles:

And to put my money where my mouth is, I am willing to testify against this legislation in state capitols as needed.? Maybe I get the fun of going back to Annapolis, but where else might I go?

Young People Should Favor Low Discount Rates

Young People Should Favor Low Discount Rates

Where should the discount rate for liabilities on a defined benefit pension plan be set?? This sounds like a boring issue that should be solved by bureaucrats or actuaries.? And yes it *is* boring, though nerds like me have a keen interest in the topic.

Here’s the issue, who should bear the costs?? Should it be future generations, or the generation that is receiving the benefits?? I am guessing that most people reading this agree with me, and argue that the generation receiving benefits should bear the costs, and pre-fund their retirements.

But that has not been the case.? Rather, the Baby Boomers and prior generations have pushed costs onto future generations.? How did they do it?? Parties that looked at the incredible returns of the 80s & 90s assumed that equity markets were magic, and always threw off large returns.? These same parties were reluctant to recognize the 2000s? We’ve had a lost decade-plus, which has caused most DB plans to go into deficit.

But the assumed investment rate was high going into it: 8-10%/year.? The is the danger of mindlessly importing returns from the past, without asking the question, “Was there anything special about he past that should lead us to adjust the past returns?”? P/E multiple expansion would mean-revert.? It usually does, and longer-term measures like the Q-ratio and CAPE10 showed that valuations at the peak were severely high.? Since then, the market has treaded water, as the companies in aggregate grow into their valuations.

Financial markets cannot forever outgrow their economies.? Eventually we rely on cash flows from businesses to validate the value of the underlying businesses.? Dividends, buybacks, and mergers and acquisitions serve to distribute the value of what companies do for those who own them.

The high assumed investment rates forestalled corporations and governments from contributing to their DB plans.? Why should they?? After all, they expected to earn a ton of money off their investments.

But imagine for a moment that they had been reasonable, and said “we shouldn’t expect to earn more than long Baa-rated bonds.? That’s still a little liberal for me, but an improvement on most current reasoning.

The effect today would be to have discount rates around 4.6%.? How many firms and governments do that?? (Why do I hear crickets?)

If governments had followed a formula like “use the Long Baa bond yield for the discount rate,” they would not have been as generous with pensions.

There is still time to make some Baby Boomers pay more in taxes (even me).? It would be wise for younger people to urge the boards that run the DB pension plans of their municipalities to adopt a long Baa bond yield as their discount rate.? The underfunding will be horrifying, but if investment return exceed that, contributions and taxes should decline.

Thus I say to the young; lobby for lower discount rates, that there might be more taxation in the short-run, and less in the long-run.

On Human Fertility, Part 2

On Human Fertility, Part 2

I write about this every now and then, because human fertility is falling faster then most demographers expect.? Using the CIA Factbook for data, the present total fertility rate for the world is 2.47 births per woman that survives childbearing.? Last year it was 2.50, and in 2006 it was 2.90.? 2.10 is replacement rate.? At the current trend, the world will be at replacement rate in 2022.? That’s a lot earlier than most expect, and it makes me suggest that global population will top out at 8.5 Billion in 2030, lower and earlier than most expect.

Have a look at the Total Fertility Rate by group:

The largest nations for each cell are listed below the graph.? Note Asian nations to the left, and African nations to the right.

Africa is so small, that the high birth rates have little global impact.? Also, AIDS consumes their population, as do wars, malnutrition, etc.

The Arab world is also slowing in population growth.? When Saudi Arabia is near replacement rate at 2.26, you can tell that the women are gaining the upper hand there, which is notable given the polygamy is permitted.

In the Developed world, who leads in fertility?? Israel at 2.67.? Next is the US at 2.06, slightly below replacement.? We still grow from immigration.

Quoting from my prior piece, why is this happening?? There are many reasons why the total fertility rate is declining:

  • Educating females makes many of them want to have fewer kids, whether the reason is pain, effort, wanting to work outside the home, etc.
  • Contraception is more widely available.
  • The marriage rate is declining globally.? Willingness to have children is positively correlated with marriage.
  • Governments provide an illusion of support, commonly believed, that the government can support people in their old age, so people don?t have kids for old age support.

The rapidly slowing rate of childbearing will have global population peak in the early 2030s at a level in the lower 8 billions, unless there is some further change to attitudes on children that makes people have more or even fewer kids.

Some of those changes may come from:

  • governments looking to stem a shrinking population that is causing a future problem with their social welfare programs.? (Note: in general, whatever governments offer, people don’t have materially more kids. Once women are convinced that kids are more of a burden than an advantage, they do not easily shift from that view, even if that view is wrong.)
  • Various religious leaders realizing that the women are not with the program of growing their ranks, where contraception has become quietly common.? I am speaking mostly of Catholics and Muslims here.
  • Abortion, especially for sex selection reasons becomes more or less common.? Growth in future population depends heavily on the level of fertile women, and if they are being killed or not at birth in places like China, India, the satellite countries of the former Soviet Union, etc… fewer women means a lower growth rate, and unhappier societies 20+ years out.

As I close, I want to list a few nations that are below replacement rate, that would surprise some people:

  • Bahrain
  • Qatar
  • Lebanon
  • Azerbaijan
  • Georgia
  • Tunisia
  • North Korea
  • Uzbekistan
  • Iran
  • Brazil

And those the are close to replacement rate:

  • Turkey
  • Indonesia
  • UAE
  • Saudi Arabia (Wahabism is less strong than believed)
  • India
  • Mexico
  • Argentina

One last point, because the demographics profession has been slow to pick up on these shifts, if present trends continue, within 10 years, I believe you will see a scad of articles talking about the likely leveling off of global population and even future shrinkage of global population, and the effects thereof.? Always something to worry about…

Recent 13F filings

Recent 13F filings

I make changes to my portfolio and those of my clients once a quarter, where I trade out of 2-4 of my ~35 companies, and buy a similar number of new companies.? I have detailed that in this article.

But one thing that I do differently now is where I source ideas.? There are three places:

  1. Articles I read that seem to have good ideas.? I print them out and put them in a folder.
  2. My industry studies.
  3. Scanning the 13Fs of ~75 clever investors.? That’s the new part.

I’m not going to write a lot more commentary this evening.? I’m just going to give you a results dump.? I have already gone through my results and made changes to my clients’ portfolios, save for one stock that is a little illiquid, and will take some time to acquire.

As it is, I want to share the following data with you from my trolling through the 13F filings:

Number of investors adding a new stock:

CUSIP New Ticker Name
026874784

6

AIG AMERICAN INTL GROUP INC
25490A309

5

DTV DIRECTV
38259P508

5

GOOG GOOGLE INC.
50075N104

5

MDLZ Mondelez International, Inc.
65334H102

5

NXY NEXEN INC COMMON STOCK NPV
896945201

5

TRIP TRIPADVISOR INC
37045V100

4

GM GENERAL MTRS CO
399473107

4

GRPN GROUPON INC
46625H100

4

JPM JPMORGAN CHASE & CO
53071M880

4

LVNTA LIBERTY VENTURES – SER A

 

Umm, Groupon, GM?? Interesting.

Number of investors adding to a stock position:

CUSIP Increased Ticker Name
026874784

13

AIG AMERICAN INTL GROUP INC
38259P508

12

GOOG GOOGLE INC.
191216100

12

KO COCA COLA COMPANY
37045V100

11

GM GENERAL MTRS CO
24702R101

10

DELL Dell Inc
742718109

9

PG PROCTER & GAMBLE CO/THE
172967424

9

C CITIGROUP INC
50075N104

8

MDLZ Mondelez International, Inc.
65248E104

8

NWSA NEWS CORP
741503403

8

PCLN PRICELINE COM INC
037833100

8

AAPL APPLE INC
896945201

7

TRIP TRIPADVISOR INC
125509109

7

CI CIGNA CORP
78463V107

7

GLD SPDR GOLD TRUST
68389X105

7

ORCL Oracle Corp

 

The companies most held by my group of investors:

CUSIP Owned Ticker Name
38259P508

28

GOOG GOOGLE INC.
037833100

21

AAPL APPLE INC
594918104

20

MSFT MICROSOFT CORP
68389X105

17

ORCL Oracle Corp
026874784

15

AIG AMERICAN INTL GROUP INC
172967424

15

C CITIGROUP INC
478160104

15

JNJ JOHNSON & JOHNSON
931142103

15

WMT WAL-MART STORES INC
084670702

14

BRK.B BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC-CL B
24702R101

13

DELL Dell Inc
65248E104

13

NWSA NEWS CORP
060505104

13

BAC BANK OF AMERICA CORP
747525103

13

QCOM QUALCOMM INC
084670108

13

BRK.A BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC-CL A
191216100

12

KO COCA COLA COMPANY
949746101

12

WFC WELLS FARGO & CO NEW

 

Number of investors decreasing a stock position:

CUSIP Decreased Ticker Name
38259P508

16

GOOG GOOGLE INC.
594918104

15

MSFT MICROSOFT CORP
037833100

13

AAPL APPLE INC
931142103

12

WMT WAL-MART STORES INC
68389X105

10

ORCL Oracle Corp
17275R102

10

CSCO CISCO SYS INC COM
902973304

10

USB US BANCORP DEL
084670702

9

BRK.B BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC-CL B
060505104

9

BAC BANK OF AMERICA CORP
57636Q104

9

MA Mastercard Inc – Class A
65248E104

8

NWSA NEWS CORP
949746101

8

WFC WELLS FARGO & CO NEW
254687106

8

DIS DISNEY WALT CO
717081103

8

PFE PFIZER INC
92826C839

8

V Visa Inc-Class A Shares
931422109

8

WAG WALGREEN CO

 

Number of investors selling a stock entirely:

CUSIP Sold Ticker Name
25490A101

6

DTV DIRECTV-CLASS A
594918104

4

MSFT MICROSOFT CORP
931422109

4

WAG WALGREEN CO
87612E106

4

TGT TARGET CORP
032346108

4

AMLN AMYLIN PHARMACEUTICALS INC
037833100

3

AAPL APPLE INC
060505104

3

BAC BANK OF AMERICA CORP
57636Q104

3

MA Mastercard Inc – Class A
65248E104

3

NWSA NEWS CORP
871503108

3

SYMC SYMANTEC CORP
172967424

3

C CITIGROUP INC
78463V107

3

GLD SPDR GOLD TRUST
032511107

3

APC ANADARKO PETROLEUM CORP
53217V109

3

LIFE LIFE TECHNOLOGIES CORP.
855030102

3

SPLS Staples Inc
053332102

3

AZO AUTOZONE INC
086516101

3

BBY Best Buy Company Inc
64110L106

3

NFLX NETFLIX INC
844741108

3

LUV Southwest Airlines Co
256677105

3

DG DOLLAR GEN CORP NEW
91324P102

3

UNH Unitedhealth Group Inc
30161N101

3

EXC Exelon Corp
778296103

3

ROST ROSS STORES INC
690742101

3

OC OWENS CORNING NEW
46120E602

3

ISRG INTUITIVE SURGICAL INC
726505100

3

PXP Plains Exploration
88023U101

3

TPX TEMPUR PEDIC INTL INC
382388106

3

GR GOODRICH CORP
532791100

3

LNCR LINCARE HOLDINGS INC.

 

As a percentage of market cap, new positions added:

CUSIP New Ticker Name
G5784H106

NA

MANU MANCHESTER UTD PLC NEW
64107N206

27.49%

UEPS Net 1 UEPS Technologies Inc
06652K103

27.20%

BKU BANKUNITED INC
86663B102

26.98%

SNBC Sun Bancorp Inc
147154207

25.80%

CACB Cascade Bancorp
584404107

25.36%

MEG MEDIA GEN INC
09064Y307

23.66%

BIOF BioFuel Energy Corp.
269279402

14.54%

XCO EXCO RESOURCES
912318201

12.88%

UNG UNITED STATES NATL GAS FUND
121220107

12.21%

BKW BURGER KING WORLDWIDE INC
29788A104

10.06%

EOPN E2open, Inc.
G0585R106

10.03%

AGO Assured Guaranty Ltd.
25490A309

9.48%

DTV DIRECTV
44047T109

8.94%

HZNP HORIZON PHARMA INC
92343E102

8.74%

VRSN VeriSign Inc.
57686G105

8.58%

MATX Matson Inc
896945201

7.58%

TRIP TRIPADVISOR INC
39530A104

7.53%

GRH Greenhunter Energy Inc-Restric

 

Increases in positions as a percentage of market cap:

CUSIP Increased Ticker Name
G5784H106

361.97%

MANU MANCHESTER UTD PLC NEW
64107N206

27.49%

UEPS Net 1 UEPS Technologies Inc
06652K103

27.20%

BKU BANKUNITED INC
86663B102

26.98%

SNBC Sun Bancorp Inc
147154207

25.80%

CACB Cascade Bancorp
584404107

25.36%

MEG MEDIA GEN INC
09064Y307

24.24%

BIOF BioFuel Energy Corp.
912318201

15.09%

UNG UNITED STATES NATL GAS FUND
269279402

14.54%

XCO EXCO RESOURCES
121220107

12.21%

BKW BURGER KING WORLDWIDE INC
53635B107

11.90%

LQDT Liquidity Services, Inc.
29788A104

10.06%

EOPN E2open, Inc.
G0585R106

10.03%

AGO Assured Guaranty Ltd.
25490A309

9.48%

DTV DIRECTV
896945201

9.21%

TRIP TRIPADVISOR INC
779376102

9.21%

ROVI ROVI CORP
44047T109

8.94%

HZNP HORIZON PHARMA INC
92343E102

8.74%

VRSN VeriSign Inc.
57686G105

8.58%

MATX Matson Inc
760975102

7.60%

RIMM RESEARCH IN MOTION LTD
39530A104

7.53%

GRH Greenhunter Energy Inc-Restric
07556Q105

7.41%

BZH Beazer Homes USA Inc
194014106

7.06%

CFX Colfax Corporation

 

Decreases in positions as a percentage of market cap:

CUSIP Decreased Ticker Name
147154207

-28.97%

CACB Cascade Bancorp
98417P105

-27.68%

XIN XINYUAN REAL ESTATE CO LTD
624756102

-27.02%

MLI MUELLER INDS INC
06652K103

-26.06%

BKU BANKUNITED INC
64107N206

-24.77%

UEPS Net 1 UEPS Technologies Inc
86663B102

-21.46%

SNBC Sun Bancorp Inc
83545G102

-18.35%

SAH SONIC AUTOMOTIVE INC CL A
09064Y109

-15.81%

BIOF BIOFUEL ENERGY CORP
014481105

-15.75%

ALEX Alexander & Baldwin Inc
269279402

-13.78%

XCO EXCO RESOURCES
007865108

-11.85%

ARO Aeropostale Inc
205862402

-11.69%

CMVT COMVERSE TECHNOLOGY INC
G0585R106

-10.38%

AGO Assured Guaranty Ltd.
499183804

-10.21%

KNOL KNOLOGY INC
25490A101

-9.29%

DTV DIRECTV-CLASS A
74165N105

-8.79%

PRMW PRIMO WTR CORP
760276105

-8.36%

RJET REPUBLIC AWYS HLDGS INC
359360104

-8.22%

FFEX FROZEN FOOD EXPRESS INDS INC
440441400

-8.16%

HRZCA HORIZON TELCOM – CLASS A
647581107

-8.06%

EDU NEW ORIENTAL ED & TECH GRP I
939640108

-7.94%

WPO Washington Post
960908309

-7.67%

WPRT WESTPORT INNOVATIONS INC
871206405

-7.48%

SCMR SYCAMORE NETWORKS INC
863236105

-7.44%

STRA STRAYER ED INC
918866104

-7.31%

VCI VALASSIS COMMUNICATIONS INC
532791100

-7.07%

LNCR LINCARE HOLDINGS INC.

 

Largest amount of stocks sold out in entire:

CUSIP Sold Ticker Name
147154207

-28.97%

CACB Cascade Bancorp
98417P105

-27.68%

XIN XINYUAN REAL ESTATE CO LTD
624756102

-27.02%

MLI MUELLER INDS INC
06652K103

-26.06%

BKU BANKUNITED INC
64107N206

-24.77%

UEPS Net 1 UEPS Technologies Inc
86663B102

-21.46%

SNBC Sun Bancorp Inc
09064Y109

-15.81%

BIOF BIOFUEL ENERGY CORP
014481105

-15.75%

ALEX Alexander & Baldwin Inc
269279402

-13.78%

XCO EXCO RESOURCES
007865108

-11.85%

ARO Aeropostale Inc
205862402

-11.69%

CMVT COMVERSE TECHNOLOGY INC
G0585R106

-10.38%

AGO Assured Guaranty Ltd.
499183804

-10.21%

KNOL KNOLOGY INC
25490A101

-9.29%

DTV DIRECTV-CLASS A
74165N105

-8.79%

PRMW PRIMO WTR CORP
760276105

-8.36%

RJET REPUBLIC AWYS HLDGS INC
440441400

-8.16%

HRZCA HORIZON TELCOM – CLASS A
939640108

-7.94%

WPO Washington Post
871206405

-7.48%

SCMR SYCAMORE NETWORKS INC
647581107

-7.47%

EDU NEW ORIENTAL ED & TECH GRP I
863236105

-7.44%

STRA STRAYER ED INC
918866104

-7.31%

VCI VALASSIS COMMUNICATIONS INC
532791100

-7.07%

LNCR LINCARE HOLDINGS INC.

 

Finally, a list of the largest companies held by my investors where there is still net buying going on:

G5784H106

NA

MANU MANCHESTER UTD PLC NEW
313549404

94.11%

FDML FEDERAL MOGUL CORP
451100101

92.72%

IEP ICAHN ENTERPRISES LP
25388BAD6

51.94%

DRIV DIGITAL RIV INC
09064Y307

40.95%

BIOF BioFuel Energy Corp.
63934E108

33.61%

NAV Navistar International Corp
708160106

31.98%

JCP PENNEY J C INC
254423106

31.23%

DIN DINEEQUITY INC
584404107

29.86%

MEG MEDIA GEN INC
64107N206

27.49%

UEPS Net 1 UEPS Technologies Inc
06652K103

27.20%

BKU BANKUNITED INC
86663B102

26.98%

SNBC Sun Bancorp Inc
76117W109

24.37%

RFP Resolute Forest Products Inc
92552V100

23.72%

VSAT VIASAT INC
896945201

23.44%

TRIP TRIPADVISOR INC
L00849106

23.41%

AGRO ADECOAGRO SA
549463AH0

22.73%

ALU LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES INC
405217100

21.86%

HAIN HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP INC
165167107

20.76%

CHK CHESAPEAKE ENERGY CORP
615369105

20.32%

MCO Moody’s
912318201

20.06%

UNG UNITED STATES NATL GAS FUND
812139301

19.92%

ZZ SEALY CORP
874054109

18.64%

TTWO TAKE-TWO INTERACTIVE SOFTWAR
205363104

18.40%

CSC COMPUTER SCIENCES CORP
92927K102

17.65%

WBC WABCO HOLDINGS INC
459028106

17.54%

INTL INTL FCStone Inc
92343E102

17.33%

VRSN VeriSign Inc.
42983D104

17.30%

ONE HIGHER ONE HLDGS INC
N7902X106

17.11%

ST SENSATA TECHNOLOGIES HLDG BV
913837100

16.53%

USAP UNIVERSAL STAINLESS & ALLOY
194014106

15.31%

CFX Colfax Corporation
N93540107

15.30%

VPRT VISTAPRINT N V
760975102

14.96%

RIMM RESEARCH IN MOTION LTD
269279402

14.84%

XCO EXCO RESOURCES
806037107

14.56%

SCSC Scansource Inc
79377W108

14.37%

SKS Saks Incorporated
M25082104

14.06%

CKSW ClickSoftware Ltd.
151290889

13.89%

CX CEMEX SAB-SPONS ADR PART CER
45166R204

13.86%

IDIX IDENIX PHARMACEUTICALS INC
H84989104

13.58%

TEL TE CONNECTIVITY LTD
064058100

13.57%

BK BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP
88033G100

13.46%

THC TENET HEALTHCARE CORP
53635B107

12.86%

LQDT Liquidity Services, Inc.
779376102

12.63%

ROVI ROVI CORP
121220107

12.21%

BKW BURGER KING WORLDWIDE INC
345838106

12.16%

FRX Forest Labs
79546E104

12.09%

SBH SALLY BEAUTY HLDGS INC
00724F101

11.91%

ADBE ADOBE SYSTEMS INC
65248E104

11.82%

NWSA NEWS CORP
421933102

11.64%

HMA HEALTH MGMT ASSOC INC NEW
24702R101

11.59%

DELL Dell Inc
31428X106

11.54%

FDX FEDEX CORP
62944T105

11.29%

NVR NVR INC
741503403

11.13%

PCLN PRICELINE COM INC
512815101

10.95%

LAMR LAMAR ADVERTISING CO
84264A102

10.87%

SSE Southern Connecticut Bancorp
037604105

10.57%

APOL Apollo Group Inc Cl A
90341W108

10.51%

LCC US Airways Group Inc
150870103

10.28%

CE CELANESE CORP-SERIES A
66988K102

10.24%

NCQ NOVACOPPER INC
191216100

10.21%

KO COCA COLA COMPANY
20854P109

10.09%

CNX CONSOL ENERGY INC
14040H105

10.08%

COF CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP
29788A104

10.06%

EOPN E2open, Inc.
12504L109

10.02%

CBG CBRE GROUP INC
489170100

9.97%

KMT Kennametal Inc.
871503108

9.90%

SYMC SYMANTEC CORP
G02602103

9.71%

DOX AMDOCS LTD COMMON STOCK GBP.00
30226D106

9.59%

EXTR EXTREME NETWORKS INC
25490A309

9.48%

DTV DIRECTV
G27823106

9.16%

DLPH Delphi Automotive PLC
774341101

9.09%

COL Rockwell Collins Inc.
880779103

9.08%

TEX TEREX CORP NEW
984332106

9.01%

YHOO YAHOO! INC
44047T109

8.94%

HZNP HORIZON PHARMA INC
45031U101

8.88%

SFI ISTAR FINL INC
447011107

8.68%

HUN HUNTSMAN CORP
66987E206

8.58%

NG NOVAGOLD RES INC
57686G105

8.58%

MATX Matson Inc
003881307

8.54%

ACTG ACACIA RESH CORP
887317303

8.36%

TWX TIME WARNER INC
53219L109

8.33%

LPNT LIFEPOINT HOSPITALS INC
808513105

8.28%

SCHW SCHWAB CHARLES CORP NEW
751212101

8.16%

RL RALPH LAUREN CORP
812139400

8.15%

ZZ Sealy Corp
370023103

7.92%

GGP GENERAL GROWTH PPTYS INC NEW
171779309

7.86%

CIEN Ciena Corp.
73172K104

7.73%

PLCM Polycom Inc
774415103

7.72%

ROC ROCKWOOD HLDGS INC
07556Q105

7.69%

BZH Beazer Homes USA Inc
31620M106

7.65%

FIS Fidelity National Information
39530A104

7.53%

GRH Greenhunter Energy Inc-Restric
103304101

7.42%

BYD BOYD GAMING CORP
257559203

7.42%

UFS DOMTAR CORP
20451N101

7.41%

CMP Compass Minerals
125581801

7.36%

CIT CIT GROUP INC.
45666Q102

7.27%

INFA INFORMATICA CORP
G3157S106

7.26%

ESV ENSCO PLC
251893103

7.23%

DV DeVry Inc.
256677105

7.14%

DG DOLLAR GEN CORP NEW
Y2573F102

7.09%

FLEX FLEXTRONICS INTL LTD
439734104

6.98%

HFBC HopFed Bancorp Inc.
20564W105

6.97%

SCOR COMSCORE INC
302130109

6.96%

EXPD Expeditors Int’l Wash Inc
95082P105

6.95%

WCC WESCO INTL INC (this can?t be right)
125509109

6.93%

CI CIGNA CORP
192446102

6.86%

CTSH COGNIZANT TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIO
588056101

6.75%

MERC Mercer International Inc.
232820100

6.69%

CYT CYTEC INDUSTRIES INC
591708102

6.68%

PCS METROPCS COMMUNICATIONS INC
90384S303

6.50%

ULTA ULTA SALON COSMETCS & FRAG I
868536103

6.46%

SVU SUPERVALU INC
413160102

6.44%

HLIT HARMONIC INC
204018105

6.39%

CPBC Community Partners Bancorp
382550101

6.24%

GT GOODYEAR TIRE &
265504100

6.18%

DNKN DUNKIN BRANDS GROUP INC
432589109

6.12%

HSH Hillshire Brands Co
918194101

6.08%

WOOF VCA Antech Inc
024061103

5.90%

AXL American Axle & Mfg Hldgs
233326107

5.86%

DST D S T SYSTEMS INC
58501N101

5.84%

MDVN MEDIVATION INC
867892101

5.75%

SHO SUNSTONE HOTEL INVS INC N
143130102

5.72%

KMX CARMAX INC
073302101

5.42%

BEAV BE Aerospace, Inc.
026874784

5.34%

AIG AMERICAN INTL GROUP INC
863667101

5.30%

SYK Stryker Corp
05615F102

5.30%

BWC BABCOCK & WILCOX CO NEW

 

That?s all for now.? Comments are welcomed below.

 

Full disclosure: long ORCL, WFC, SPLS, ESV, TEL

On Hedge Funds

On Hedge Funds

I don’t think hedge funds are an optimal way to manage assets.? Here are some of my reasons:

  • The fees are too high.? Why pay 2% of assets, and give up 20% of the profits?
  • Hedge funds, aside from Commodity Trading Advisers and Global Macro funds, tend to be correlated, yield-seeking, and volatility-averse.? Why pay up for correlated performance?
  • The statistics behind hedge fund marketing suffer from backfill bias, survivor bias, and a few other biases.

Actual returns from hedge funds trail buy-and-hold returns by a significant margin.? Investors in hedge funds are poor timers of investment.? Though past results do not indicate future returns, investors act like that.? No one will add money to a losing fund, even if that is the point where it might start to do better.

To me it seems that we are running into the limits of arbitrage.? Shorting is unnatural, and so are many derivatives.? How much do you have to pay up to get someone else to take the other side of the trade?

Only so much stock/bonds, etc., can be lent out and shorted with no additional cost.? Beyond that, shorts have to pay up, and that crimps their profits.

This is one big reason why I am happy to be a long-only value investor.? I only have to focus of businesses making money versus their current share price.? I don’t have to deal with the games surrounding shorting.? That simplifies my decision making considerably.

The Rules, Part XXXV

The Rules, Part XXXV

Stability only comes to markets in a self-reinforcing mode, from buy and hold (and sell and sit on cash) investors who act at the turning points.

Beyond the vicissitudes of the markets, there are businessmen.? They have a sense of what their capital costs.? They reason regarding acquisitions and selling off their own holdings/subsidiaries.? They ask themselves how permanent current financing conditions are likely to be.

They don’t play momentum; they just look for when buying or selling businesses makes sense.? The market, on the other hand, has many that only want to buy what is rising, and sell what is falling, to a first approximation.

The market is about business, not stock trading.? Businesses are primal, trading markets are secondary. When businessmen find a publicly-traded business trading at an attractive value, they buy it, particularly if there are synergies between the businesses.? Thus during the bust phase of equity and credit markets, M&A often consists of cash-rich firms buying out firms that are in distress.

The same is true in boom times.? Companies sell themselves, or subsidiaries to leveraged players who think the game will go on much longer than reality will bear.? The sellers sit on the cash; the buyers enjoy the losses when the bust comes.

Volatile markets favor those with strong balance sheets — those that can wait for a better day, or, those that can wait for better opportunities. In either case, they can wait; they do not have to buy or sell now.? They are experiencing no cash flows forcing them to action.

Those with strong balance sheets focus on return on book capital, and avoid leverage.? They look to grow the book value (“net worth”) of their company, and ignore secondary goals.? They are shareholder-oriented.? They take advantage of both sides of the boom-bust cycle — selling near peaks when return on capital is lousy, and buying near troughs when return on unlevered capital is fat.

This is simple stuff, but hard to execute, because the fear/greed cycle interferes with rational calculation.? Regardless, absolute valuation investors put in the tops and bottoms of markets by their selling and buying.? To the degree that technical analysis works, it is because they trace the bread crumbs of large valuation oriented investors.

That’s all for now.? Thoughts?? Give it to me in the comments.

 

Eliminating the Rating Agencies, Part 2

Eliminating the Rating Agencies, Part 2

After writing Eliminating the Rating Agencies, I felt there was room for improvement.? Part of that stems from reading critiques of the rating agencies that really don’t understand why ratings exist.? Ratings don’t exist to help average people, they exist to allow regulators to evaluate the credit risks of financial institutions.

The beauty of my prior proposal is that it can be applied to any credit instrument, even private placements for which there is no market.? Let me give an example.? In mid-2002 with the ten-year Treasury yielding 4.5% an investment banker approached me with a private bond deal — $50 million in total to finance the owner of real estate where the US Government had old computers that would be difficult to do away with.? The yield offered was 8% for 10 years, and S&P shadow-rated it “A.”? We bought 20% of the deal.? We were the biggest holder at $10 million.

Following my procedure in the prior article, the amount of capital that would have to be put up would be almost $2.2 million.? Now, that is likely too severe, but maybe the regulators would choose a percentage of that amount as the right amount for all fixed income securities.? Other securities that are not hedges would be considered deductions from capital.

Is the bond illiquid?? More spread -> more capital required.? The beauty of this system is that it does not care where the excess spread is coming from.? It just measures the present value of the uncertain spread, and realizes that it is a very good proxy for credit risk.? It can be applied to any bond, preferred stock, etc. fairly easily.

There would have to an additional analysis for asset-liability mismatch, but existing methods for measuring that are adequate.? In any case, the rating agencies would no longer be needed for measuring credit risk.? Regulators would simply review the calculations of the actuaries/quants, as they file their annual/quarterly statements.? The value of the uncertain portion of the fixed income assets would be the proxy for the total credit risk of the firm.? No rating agency needed to calculate that.

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