Category: Quantitative Methods

Sorted Weekly Tweets

Sorted Weekly Tweets

Market Dynamics

 

  • On Paradigm Shifts http://t.co/h68quEDX Hunter takes us through mental exercises 2 make us intelligently contrarian. “Invert, Always Invert” May 02, 2012
  • Hedgers’ net short position vanishes in US oil http://t.co/X0hLOWGB Commercial interests do not fear lower prices, could be bullish 4 crude May 02, 2012
  • There’s Plenty of Money for Junk http://t.co/vXML0Bao Presently the credit cycle is virtuous; vicious part is coming, but no appt set $$ May 02, 2012
  • Bad Models Mistook Housing Bust for Dot-Com Bubble http://t.co/IxC8m2mk Busts of assets that are heavily levered harder than unlevered $$ May 02, 2012
  • Best U.S. Real Estate With Self-Storage http://t.co/mxyHdK2U Self storage a winner in the past, may not do so well in the future; hi vals May 02, 2012
  • Marginal oil production costs are heading towards $100/barrel http://t.co/G2zNB5JS Same as my reasoning on high crude prices $$ May 02, 2012
  • Four-percent rule a relic, advisers say http://t.co/PrdHQy48 Better rule: 10y Tsy yield plus 0% if bearish, 1% if neutral, 2% if bullish $$ May 01, 2012
  • The remarkable resurgence in synthetic credit tranches http://t.co/1iIZ8ous Increases in the notional amounts of several corp bond swaps May 01, 2012
  • Contra: Black Scholes & the formula of doom http://t.co/flVNsYMx Debt levels & Asset-Liab mismatch largest causes of crisis not BS model Apr 30, 2012
  • Energy’s Pain is Consumer Discretionary’s Gain http://t.co/lM7UW0T7 I have been on the wrong side of this trade. Sigh. $$ Apr 30, 2012
  • Notes from the DoubleLine Lunch with Jeffrey Gundlach, Spring 2012 http://t.co/KDiqA5Sp Gives a good overview, w/a large topping of snark $$ Apr 30, 2012

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China

 

  • China’s Auditing Train Wreck http://t.co/UeIZtw06 Any Chinese firm listed in the US, the auditors should be subject to SEC scrutiny. $$ May 05, 2012
  • China bear Pettis says world coming around to his view http://t.co/lo1nGc7e Pettis isn’t a bear but a realist; invt-led growth overplayd $$ May 04, 2012
  • The Family and Corruption http://t.co/R4NwZ6od Family ties & group affiliation dominate economic/political power among Chinese Communists $$ May 04, 2012
  • Who is Fu? Chinese exile is ‘God’s double agent’ http://t.co/plyQhwtg Story of a Chinese Pastor in US & escape of Chen Guangcheng $$ May 02, 2012
  • Microblogs Survive Real-Name Rules?So Far http://t.co/5UItJjwj Even the CCP would have a hard time shutting down their Twitter-apps $$ May 02, 2012
  • Beijing?s secret: It?s not really loosening http://t.co/3RPhAOwH There is not enough demand in China 2 pay all of the high prices. $$ May 02, 2012
  • China’s Left Behind Children http://t.co/OL0gmSFE Economic growth that separates parents from children imposes significant costs on China $$ May 02, 2012
  • China Closes Unirule Website http://t.co/ItkW0p0A Founder receives award from Cato Institute; China government shuts down his website $$ May 02, 2012
  • China?s property boom has peaked, forever http://t.co/aLC2U8F8 Amount of deadweight in China property is so large that prices have peaked $$ Apr 29, 2012

 

Financial Services

 

  • Caution: Contents May Be Hot http://t.co/cp9yjbH3 I worry about ETF slippage from bad creation/redemption unit design & bad trading by users May 04, 2012
  • Well, That Was Awkward? http://t.co/zS5f6zAI Bank Chiefs’ Regulatory Concerns Met With Official Silence; maybe regulators getting fed up May 04, 2012
  • A talent shortage looms as the industry booms http://t.co/QGLZzzg7 Financial planners getting old/retiring faster than the Baby Boomers $$ May 04, 2012
  • 2nd attempt2 automate bond trading 1st failed RT @BloombergNews: Goldman preps trading system for corporate bonds | http://t.co/NceasmN7 May 04, 2012
  • Mortgage Rates in US for 30-Year Loans Fall to Record Low http://t.co/LPolAP5Q Mtge rates b nimble, MR b quick, MR go under limbo stick $$ May 04, 2012
  • Spending A Year On An M&A Bidding War Is Apparently Overrated http://t.co/tKguPYGy It’s well-known that scale acquirers underperform $$ May 04, 2012
  • Every liability has an asset, but not every asset has a liability. Some are owned outright. http://t.co/fB3ARju7 May 03, 2012
  • Canadians Dominate World?s 10 Strongest Banks http://t.co/qj6TOgA3 Ask again after their housing bubble pops, same 4 other fringe nations May 03, 2012
  • Pimco’s latest ETF shields against price spikes http://t.co/TmOrCIj2 I wonder if active ETFs will have more performance slippage. $$ May 02, 2012
  • Hedge Funds Hurt by Volatility http://t.co/ogoL62qT Hedge funds r vehicles that do better when credit spreads r tightening $$ May 01, 2012
  • Bond Market Is Creating A New Galaxy for Trading http://t.co/YgvNwz1j Dealer inventories thin; trading costs rise; electronic mkts start May 01, 2012
  • US banks still cutting commercial real estate exposure http://t.co/qsqIMRph Banks still rotating out @ an almost constant rate since 2009 $$ Apr 30, 2012
  • Largest U.S. Banks Resist Federal Reserve?s Credit Limits http://t.co/JndcrvWI Big banks need 2b broken up or shrunk; they don’t accept it Apr 29, 2012

 

US Fiscal/Regulatory Policy

 

  • CEOs rank Texas tops for business, California worst http://t.co/jWEIGP89 8th year in a row for this survey; high taxes/regs annoy CEOs $$ May 04, 2012
  • Exposing the Medicare Double Count http://t.co/HIVIx3lJ Same $$ being spent twice, must borrow the difference. May 02, 2012
  • Coburn: `We Ought to Totally Revamp Our Tax Code’ http://t.co/71WquMIf Very similar to my proposals; simplify code eliminate deductions $$ May 02, 2012
  • U.S. Considers Notes That Float http://t.co/jynXGcYG Intermediate-dated Tsy floaters would trade above par, neg yields like TIPS $$ May 01, 2012
  • Trying to Shed Student Debt http://t.co/0GmvckOn Lawmakers Rethink Bankruptcy-Law Ban on Walking Away From Education Loans $$ #slavery Apr 30, 2012
  • Can the US Economy Recover Without a Housing Recovery? http://t.co/Tqy4l8J3 It will probably have to try w/o housing’s assistance $$ Apr 30, 2012
  • Central Bank paper suggests house prices have ?over-corrected? http://t.co/KDrXCkzy Have Irish housing prices overshot? Tough 2 say. $$ Apr 30, 2012
  • http://t.co/KbnUO93s Treasury floaters could b issued @ premium 2 par 2 inflation speculators allowing the Tsy 2 finance @ negative rates Apr 30, 2012
  • U.S. Perfecting Formula for Budget Failure, Says Bowles http://t.co/vlLQzZ8q It’s nice 2b a part of a nation that is a global leader 😉 $$ Apr 30, 2012
  • Will TARP Make a Profit? That’s the Wrong Question http://t.co/MZBHaO51 Conflicting govt goals make policy hard 2 implement & interpret $$ Apr 30, 2012
  • You will buy more Govvies, or else http://t.co/DLrnyb9u Financial Repression, Quantitative Easing, Debt Monetization, Hyperinflation $$ Apr 30, 2012
  • On Student Loans, Accounting Gimmicks, Electric Cars, FX and a note on SS http://t.co/2BCB9nAi Hodgepodge of insight from @brucekrasting $$ Apr 30, 2012
  • ?The Treasury should be issuing 100 year or perpetual bonds until the market can?t stand it anymore to lock in these ? http://t.co/gXMUXW4C Apr 30, 2012
  • The floating YTMs will probably be negative, as interest rate speculators will pay more than par for the floating rat? http://t.co/OSmE7QuJ Apr 30, 2012

 

Eurozone

 

  • The euro crisis just got a whole lot worse http://t.co/XSqmQnGv Election of Hollande may lead2 Euozone policy paralysis; growth v austerity May 04, 2012
  • Making eurozonians, or not http://t.co/JmuO5OXC The Eurozone was never a natural place to set up a shared currency. $$ May 04, 2012
  • Madness in Spain Lingers as Ireland Chases Recovery http://t.co/BXdYSX5e Ireland may b rebounding, as Spain’s slump deepens #austerity $$ May 02, 2012
  • Why the New York Times?s Paul Krugman is clueless about the European economic crisis http://t.co/xMuzZXC7 Aside frm Ireland no austerity yet May 02, 2012
  • Core infection and eurozone PMIs http://t.co/xr97yPgD Core of the EZone sluggish @ a time when it can least afford it $$ #depressionary May 02, 2012
  • ECB Measures Pushing Domestic Bonds Into Domestic Banks, Planting Seeds for Euro Disintegration http://t.co/HAITJJnX Yeh, this da future $$ May 02, 2012
  • The rise in the Eurozone money supply has not improved credit conditions http://t.co/rYazqcuP Euro M3 diverges from bank loans $$ May 01, 2012
  • The ECB lending to periphery governments via “backdoor SMP” http://t.co/uQeG2QQK How to stuff the ECB full of Eurofringe debt, c/o LTRO $$ May 01, 2012

 

Rest of the World

 

  • Brazil: cutting at any cost? http://t.co/mh3vN1Te Pushes up asset & price inflation, as currency held down 2aid exporters; unsustainable $$ May 04, 2012
  • Turkey Credit Rating Outlook Cut by S&P on Worsening Trade http://t.co/pFDzEhZl Wide current account def & hi external financing needs $$ May 02, 2012
  • Once poster child of crisis, Iceland recovers http://t.co/Sgr2wTGl Letting banks fail & stiffing foreign creditors -> winning solution $$ May 02, 2012
  • Which emerging economies are at greatest risk of overheating? http://t.co/olHdiYRE A gauge from the Economist on which Em Mkts r2 hot $$ Apr 29, 2012

 

Company News

 

  • Buffett?s CTB Adds Chicken Eviscerators in Dutch Purchase http://t.co/K6Q3NGt2 Buffett’s firm is no chicken; it has a lot of guts! 😉 $$ May 04, 2012
  • Sorry, really sorry… May 04, 2012
  • Ackman Rejects Canadian Pacific Deal Ruling Out CEO Pick http://t.co/KYe970NJ Pick is former CEO of $CP rival $CNI – Bad blood; good CEO May 02, 2012
  • Impressive work Mr. Einhorn. The analyst that wrote up the question deserves praise; if you did that… http://t.co/tSTWxqBa May 01, 2012
  • Phillips 66 aims to run more shale oil http://t.co/tC7NBfLO LD: + $COP $PSX First day of trading for the new $PSX. Combo up 2%+ so far $$ May 01, 2012
  • Value investing does not mean cheap. It means margin of safety. Cemex does not have that. Look at the debt. $CX $$ http://t.co/ydklVkth May 01, 2012
  • Falcone Agrees To Step Aside http://t.co/bYgLxMMV “a final agreement may not be reached, and a bankruptcy filing was still possible” $$ Apr 30, 2012
  • Delta to buy US refinery for $150 million http://t.co/IsK9xsDu If zero is dumb & 100 is very dumb, this one scores in the 90s. $$ Apr 30, 2012
  • Discuss “At $1.7 billion, Nook is worth more than Barnes http://t.co/xOz6skwP Spin off Nook 2 create value $$ $BKS $AMZN #interneteatsbooks Apr 30, 2012
  • @ampressman Would it have been value-enhancing to $BKS 2 sell the whole Nook unit 2 $MSFT, in your opinion? $$ Apr 30, 2012

 

Statistical Analysis

 

  • trading-and-the-null-hypothesis http://t.co/QpYutOTb Problem:No academic journal wants2 publish studies with ‘no result’ as their conclusion May 04, 2012
  • . @thenumb47 Allows for too much of a specification search; would be good to require disclosure of everything tried but not published $$ May 03, 2012
  • Have to allow for accidents! RT @incakolanews: just scrub the word “validate” and I think you have a great idea May 03, 2012
  • Thus my proposal for economists: come up w/research idea: goes 2a database. Randomly assigned economist will analyze & trash/validate it $$ May 03, 2012
  • Unlike double-blind studies, raw statistical research allows health analysts to inject their own bias into the analysis, as economists do $$ May 03, 2012
  • Analytical Trend Troubles Scientists http://t.co/bzcAIpHG Health researchers using statistics like economists find ambiguous results $$ May 03, 2012

 

Miscellaneous

 

  • 14 Lessons From Benjamin Franklin About Getting What You Want In Life http://t.co/BWAjCz1l Advice from 1 of the wealthiest men of America $$ May 04, 2012
  • Is Wall Street Meeting God’s Expectations? http://t.co/5H5j2QGG Many Christians misuse the Bible; almost all non-Christians misuse it $$ May 03, 2012
  • What would Jesus trade? http://t.co/Dkrfwt9k Many Christians misuse the Bible; almost all non-Christians misuse it; another example $$ May 03, 2012
  • And in a more honest way than Google RT @SconsetCapital: Long good, short evil. May 03, 2012
  • Apparel-Swapping Millennials Eschew Stores and Malls http://t.co/B7jq2dcY “Is that a new outfit?” “Well, it’s new to me!” An odd trend $$ May 03, 2012
  • @TheStalwart Kasriel was different enough that he will be missed, kind of like the sound of one hand clapping $$ #littledoghasbuddhanature May 01, 2012
  • The record 4 tallest bldg s/b based on weighted average height; weighting based on cross-sectional area @ height http://t.co/03HNZ0BB $$ Apr 30, 2012
  • So if you have something thin at the top, it wouldn’t count 4 much. A rectangular parallpiped would get full credit 4 height $$ #usingmath Apr 30, 2012
  • That would work, simpler than mine $$ RT @Pollack7: @AlephBlog Meh.Highest continuous occupancy floor. Apr 30, 2012
  • As the smartest boss I ever had said “Make bets, but never bet the franchise.” http://t.co/qWdHX3BS Apr 30, 2012

 

Monetary Policy

 

  • Bernanke Charts New Mission For Fed: Financial Stability http://t.co/6RrWEQws Fed has a hard enuf time w/a double mandate, triple will b wrs May 02, 2012
  • Then again, if focusing on financial stability forces the Fed to be more restrained in its monetary policy, that would be good. $$ May 02, 2012
  • Bernanke: Be Humble! http://t.co/6icSHD1K The picture says it: http://t.co/OqOflqsI Humility in BB’s view: leaving monetary policy loose $$ May 01, 2012
  • My Speech Delivered at the New York Federal Reserve Bank http://t.co/DbAhOdQR An Austrian let loose amid the marble palace in NYC?! Wow. $$ Apr 29, 2012

 

US Politics

 

  • Renewed Hope that Jon Corzine, President Obama’s Top Tier Campaign Bundler, Will Face Criminal Charges http://t.co/wCLrXFve J. Tavakoli $$ May 01, 2012
  • Occupy Wall Street Plans Global Protests in Resurgence http://t.co/0FLjKfiJ #OWS won’t b effective until they organize as a 3rd party $$ + May 01, 2012
  • Or, organize to influence the Democrats the way the t-party does the Republicans. #OWS is irrelevant until then, b/c it doesn’t do anything May 01, 2012
  • Is that a bailout in your pocket? http://t.co/8xwW4Cbi Boyazny, panel’s populist, replied that the credit markets had become ?undemocratic? May 01, 2012
Correlating Risky Assets

Correlating Risky Assets

Asset allocation is tough, because the correlations are not stable.? Here’s an example: in the 90s, at many conferences that I went to, I was told that one of the smartest moves you could make was to invest heavily in every new class of Asset Backed Security [ABS] created, because they all tighten in yield spread terms after issuance, leading to price gains.

I didn’t believe it then, and that was a good thing, because the most exotic of ABS classes got whacked in the financial crisis.? As it was was, I had already seen debacles in Franchise Loan ABS (spit, spit), and Manufactured Housing (post-1997 vintage).? At a conference for Life Insurance, I was a skunk at the party in 2006, as one ignorant presenter suggested that AAA structured assets never went bad.? History already taught us better, and as I tried to say to the then-CEO of Principal Financial as he was exiting the conference, he needed to look at the mezzanine and subordinated structured product in his company.? Free consulting, but but worth more than the consensus.? As far as I can tell, he didn’t listen.? For many reasons the stock price is lower today.

I have many other tales where in fixed income (bonds), everyone “followed the leader,” which worked in the short run, but failed in the long run.? The point is that investor behavior correlates asset classes.? There may be underlying economic differences, such as owning a natural gas producer and utility that uses natural gas, but most of those differences get erased as most investors seek portfolios immune from factors of secular change.

So as new asset or sub-asset classes are introduced, in the short-run they are uncorrelated, and likely rally, because few own them.? But after the rally, many now own it, and the future correlations are high because so many own it.? The correlations ultimately depend on two things: the underlying economics, and investor behavior.? Investor behavior is the dominant aspect of pricing.

I don’t think there is a lot of diversification in most risky asset classes from an economic standpoint.? Does it matter whether a business is public or private??? I think the answer is no.

What that means in the present environment is that there is a gap between business risk, and those that finance business risk.? In other words, there is a difference between investment grade bonds, and risk assets.? That’s the negative correlation in this market.? Do you want diversification?? Buy some ETFs that invest in long high investment grade debt.? You will not get any effective diversification out of buying different classes of risky assets.? Those are already owned by those that compete with you.

Promises to pay from sound entities that can be relied upon in the future behave very differently than risky assets.? In your asset allocation, to the degree that you need real diversification, look at that as the critical distinction.? All other distinctions are secondary at best.

On Distribution Formulas

On Distribution Formulas

Before I get started this evening, I would like to offer an apology to those that read my recent piece, Simple Retirement Calculator.? I didn’t define all of the terms in the piece, and so here are the definitions:

  • DB plan — defined benefit plan, a pension plan that offers a certain benefit, and the cost of funding that benefit varies.
  • DC plan — defined contribution plan, a pension plan that allows for a certain level of contributions, and the benefit achievable varies.
  • 100% J&S — 100% Joint & Survivor.? In an annuity, its payment is the same regardless of who dies first.? The one surviving does not see any reduction in payments.? In 50% J&S, the one surviving get only half the payment after the first spouse dies, which allows for a higher initial benefit than 100% J&S.
  • CR — cash refund.? Some people getting an annuity hate, really hate the idea that the insurance company might make money off of them if they die early.? The cash refund option says that heirs receive the difference between the premium paid and benefits paid.? The cost of this option is a slightly lower benefit.
  • Indexed — the annuity benefit rises with inflation, usually the CPI.

Now the table in the article tried to show how much of a person’s salary would be replaced at retirement, given a certain level of saving.? Another way of viewing it would be how many years of income would the accumulated value of savings be relative to their final salary at age 70.? That’s the “Accum Years Ending Pay.”? It’s surprising how few years of ending pay a person accumulates unless they save a lot.

That’s all.? Other questions, forward them my way, but please, ask, don’t demand…

-=-=-==–=-=-=-==-=–=-=-=-==–=-==–=-==-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

Now there was one more item from my piece Simple Retirement Calculator, the line that read 4% — i.e., pay out 4% of the lump sum annually, an assumption that has fairly broad acceptance for managing a lump sum without annuitizing it.? I myself came to endorse the 4% rule in 2001, after doing a series of analyses using what I thought was a good risk, inflation, and asset allocation model, concluding that the average person had 95% odds of not going bankrupt if they took just 4% of the initial sum invested, adjusted for inflation annually, as a distribution.

The data through 2000 did not allow for a “lost decade” like the one we have recently experienced.? During such a time, marginal returns on capital became very low.? GDP growth slowed, and yields on Treasuries fell.

Going back to Ben Graham, who when bullish never let his asset allocation go above 75% stocks (risky assets), and 25% bonds, and when bearish never let his asset allocation go below 25% stocks (risky assets), and 75% bonds, in the same sense, I use this to offer a new distribution rule for those that don’t annuitize and have to manage a lump sum:

As a percentage of your assets, spend no more than the 10-year Treasury yield annually, plus:

  • 0% if the situation is bearish (risk assets are highly priced)
  • 1% if the situation is neutral
  • 2% if the situation is bullish (risk assets have depressed prices)

As for determining risk posture, I would use things like the Q-ratio, Shiller’s CAPE, and the difference between Moody’s Baa and Aaa spreads to be my guide.? At present, by those measures it would leave me halfway between neutral and bearish in the intermediate-term, and so I would be look to distribute only 2.5%/year from endowments as income.

Chintzy?? Today yes, but it respects the idea that depressionary conditions may persist longer than we might otherwise expect.? It also adjusts as inflation rises, to the degree that it gets reflected in Treasury yields, which may be held down by the Fed.? In such a case of the Fed constraining longer Treasury yields, gold prices and the prices of other materials may rise dramatically, because there is no penalty for holding commodities in real terms.

This views the asset markets through the eyes of a conservative but clever bond investor, who realizes that future equity returns are highly correlated with Baa-rated bond yields, and future bond returns are highly correlated with Treasury yields.

But, think of what this formula would have done in the early ’80s, when endowments were constrained, and they took little as income.? This formula would have anticipated the future, and allowed endowments to spend more aggressively, anticipating the recovery.

So let Treasury yields, the Q-ratio, Shiller’s CAPE, and the difference between Moody’s Baa and Aaa spreads be your guide in distribution formulas.? Better to distribute less now, than find yourself or your institution impoverished later.

Simple Retirement Calculator

Simple Retirement Calculator

Sorry that I have not been posting much of late.? April is always rough for me.? Taxes play some role in April, because I get a certain amount of my tax data late, but the main reason stems from some charitable boards on which I serve, which meet in/near April.

One of the questions that came to me was how we could educate some of the workers to put away more of their income for retirement, because we don’t have a Defined Benefit plan.? After a little discussion, I said that I could give them good friendly advice.? As most committees go, when someone volunteers to solve a problem, discussion ends.

Now, what I have done is pretty simple, and violates one of my rules — I don’t believe in constant compound interest.? Markets don’t work that way, but for some perverse simplifying reason, retirement planning models do.

What I have done is create a model for retirement income, attempting to express it in terms that someone non-knowledgeable could understand.? You can download the Simple Retirement Calculator (free to download) that I created.

My base case assumes 3% inflation, pay keeps pace with inflation, and the real return on investing is 2% over inflation.? Other assumptions: one works for 45 years from age 25 to 70, and that the options for payout are limited to those that respect spouses and heirs.

So what can one 25 years old expect from saving over a 45 year period of time?

Savings Rate
Salary Replacement 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15%
J&S 100% Cash Refund 22.9% 27.5% 32.0% 36.6% 41.2% 45.8% 50.4% 54.9% 59.5% 64.1% 68.7%
J&S 100% CR Indexed 15.1% 18.1% 21.1% 24.1% 27.1% 30.1% 33.1% 36.1% 39.1% 42.1% 45.2%
4% year 14.6% 17.6% 20.5% 23.4% 26.4% 29.3% 32.2% 35.2% 38.1% 41.0% 43.9%
Accum Years Ending Pay ?? 3.66 ?? 4.39 ?? 5.13 ?? 5.86 ?? 6.59 ?? 7.32 ???? 8.06 ???? 8.79 ???? 9.52 ?? 10.25 ?? 10.99

This table expresses what is needed in order to have effective income during retirement.? The average investor can’t control asset returns.

J&S 100% Cash Refund -> Spouse gets 100% after death of annuitant, heirs get a payment annuitants got less than the lump sum value at retirement.? Indexed benefits increase at the rate of the CPI.

With a 2%% real return, it takes a lot of saving to replace current income in retirement, even over 45 years. Note that the real return assumption has the largest impact on the results.

Much as I think DB plans are superior to DC plans for the average person, most companies in the present environment will not subsidize a DB plan to the degree that will allow a person to retire at the same level of purchasing power that they had while employed.

There are many ways that I could improve the results of this model, but the improvements would only be incremental.? The main point of this model indicates that most people do not save enough, if all of their retirement outcomes rely on a defined contributions plan.

Let me know what you think? in the comments below.? Thanks.

Tickers for the Current Rebalancing

Tickers for the Current Rebalancing

When I look at what stocks to switch to as I manage my assets, and those of my clients, I look for assets that may be more valuable than the market currently believes.? Most of that involves looking at industries and valuations, but that has led me to the following group of tickers:

ABC ACCL ADTN AET AKAM ALTR AMKR APA ARB ARKR ARO ARRS ARTNA AVY BBY BDX BEAM BGS BHP BIDU BLT BSX BX BZ C CACH CAG CAH CBG CCH CELL CF CFN CLF CMVT CNQR CODI COV CP CPB CPE CPSI CREE CSCO CSTR CSWC CTRP CZZ DD DFS DGX DHT DLPH DLX DRIV DVN DVR EBAY EEP EFC EFX EPAX ERIC FBHS FCX FDP FORR FSLR FTE FUJIY GD GKK GLDD GLW GNRC GOOG GT GTAT HAL HII HNZ HOGS HON HRC HWCC IACI IART IN IRE ISIL ITRI ITT IVC JBL JCI JCP JNPR K KFN KKR KLAC KNM KOP KRA LDR LIFE LLTC LMCA LOW LPS LSI LVLT MASI MCHP MCK MDCI MDRX MKC MOS MPC MRVL MS MSI MTG MWW NAV NE NFG NFLX NILE NLY NOK NTGR NTI NTIC NTK NTRI NUVA NVDA ONNN PC PCLN PHG PLCM PTNR QCOR QGEN QLGC QSII RAH RIMM RMD RUK SEMG SGX SIGI SLM SNE SNX SOHU SPLS SPN STE STJ STM STX SWKS SXT T TFX THOR TNDM TNS TRGT TRIP TSM TSRA TXN UTHR VAR VFC VOLC VPRT VRX VZ WBMD WBSN WDC WMB WMGI WNR WPI WST XRAY YHOO ZINC

Other ideas are solicited, but I think these companies as a group? will outperform over the next three years.

Book Review: Accounting for Value

Book Review: Accounting for Value

Before I start this evening’s book review, I would like to ask a favor of my readers.? If you like my reviews, maybe you can say that they are helpful at Amazon.? I rank in the 2000s at present, which was a challenge to get to, because not many reviewers of finance, investing, and economics books get to levels like that.? So, to the degree that you like my reviews, and have extra time to do this, I appreciate it.? If not, no worries — I’ve well exceeded my expectations; I appreciate that you read me.

I have never taken a course in accounting.? But I have had to do accounting for most of my working life, including doing financial reporting inside life insurers, which is the most complex industry for accounting. I have even opined on 10+ financial accounting standards over time.? And Aleph Blog is a leading accounting website as a user of accounting. (Dubious distinction, I know, but when you are a blogger, you take what you can get. 😉 )

As a value investor, I have taken a skeptical view toward the accounting of the companies that I invest in.? Cash entries can be trusted; accrual entries are less trustworthy in proportion to the length of time and uncertainty to the collection of cash.

This book relates accounting principles to value investing principles, and it is uncanny as to how they overlap.? It also attempts to connect it to Modern Portfolio Theory [MPT] concepts where it makes sense, but with less success. (No surprise, because value investing has a decent theory behind it and MPT doesn’t.)

The cornerstone of this book is return on net operating assets [RNOA].? The idea is to split the company in two, and separate operating results from financing results.? Give little value to financing results, which are likely no repeatable, and give significant value to operating results.

Note: this means that there is no way of evaluating financial companies under this rubric, but that’s a common problem.? Financial companies are a bag of accruals; value is difficult to discern.? That is why I spend most of my time analyzing the management teams of financial companies to see if they are conservative or not.

The book offers two measures of accounting quality, the Q-score and the S-score.? You would have to do more digging to make these practical, but at least you get some direction in the matter.

There are two simple prizes that the book gives to readers:

1) Profit results mean-revert; don’t trust strong or weak current ROEs. (or RNOAs)

2) Stocks with low P/Es and P/Bs do well.? Each works well, but they work better together.? Maybe if Ben Graham were still alive, he would not have been dismissive of his life’s work at the end, value works.? It’s an ugly brain dead strategy, but it works.

Quibbles

None.

Who would benefit from this book: Those who want to improve their perception of investment value would benefit from this book.? If you want to, you can buy it here: Accounting for Value (Columbia Business School Publishing).

Full disclosure: The publisher asked me if I wanted the book, so I asked for the book and he sent it to me.

If you enter Amazon through my site, and you buy anything, I get a small commission.? This is my main source of blog revenue.? I prefer this to a ?tip jar? because I want you to get something you want, rather than merely giving me a tip.? Book reviews take time, particularly with the reading, which most book reviewers don?t do in full, and I typically do. (When I don?t, I mention that I scanned the book.? Also, I never use the data that the PR flacks send out.)

Most people buying at Amazon do not enter via a referring website.? Thus Amazon builds an extra 1-3% into the prices to all buyers to compensate for the commissions given to the minority that come through referring sites.? Whether you buy at Amazon directly or enter via my site, your prices don?t change.

Industry Ranks March 2012

Industry Ranks March 2012

I?m working on my quarterly reshaping ? where I choose new companies to enter my portfolio.? The first part of this is industry analysis.

My main industry model is illustrated in the graphic.? Green industries are cold.? Red industries are hot.? If you like to play momentum, look at the red zone, and ask the question, ?Where are trends under-discounted??? Price momentum tends to persist, but look for areas where it might be even better in the near term.

If you are a value player, look at the green zone, and ask where trends are over-discounted.? Yes, things are bad, but are they all that bad?? Perhaps the is room for mean reversion.

My candidates from both categories are in the column labeled ?Dig through.?

If you use any of this, choose what you use off of your own trading style.? If you trade frequently, stay in the red zone.? Trading infrequently, play in the green zone ? don?t look for momentum, look for mean reversion.

Whatever you do, be consistent in your methods regarding momentum/mean-reversion, and only change methods if your current method is working well.

Huh?? Why change if things are working well?? I?m not saying to change if things are working well.? I?m saying don?t change if things are working badly.? Price momentum and mean-reversion are cyclical, and we tend to make changes at the worst possible moments, just before the pattern changes.? Maximum pain drives changes for most people, which is why average investors don?t make much money.

Maximum pleasure when things are going right leaves investors fat, dumb, and happy ? no one thinks of changing then.? This is why a disciplined approach that forces changes on a portfolio is useful, as I do 3-4 times a year.? It forces me to be bloodless and sell stocks with less potential for those with more potential over the next 1-5 years.

I like some technology names here, some energy some healthcare-related names, P&C Insurance and Reinsurance, particularly those that are strongly capitalized.? I?m not concerned about the healthcare bill; necessary services will be delivered, and healthcare companies will get paid.

A word on banks and REITs: the credit cycle has not been repealed, and there are still issues unresolved from the last cycle ? I am not interested there even at present levels.? The modest unwind currently happening in the credit markets, if it expands, would imply significant issues for banks and their ?regulators.?

I?m looking for undervalued and stable industries.? I?m not saying that there is always a bull market out there, and I will find it for you.? But there are places that are relatively better, and I have done relatively well in finding them.

At present, I am trying to be defensive.? I don?t have a lot of faith in the market as a whole, so I am biased toward the green zone, looking for mean-reversion, rather than momentum persisting.? The red zone is pretty cyclical at present.? I will be very happy hanging out in dull stocks for a while.

P&C Insurers and Reinsurers Look Cheap

After the heavy disaster year of 2011, P&C insurers and reinsurers look cheap.? Many trade below tangible book, and at single-digit P/Es, which has always been a strong area for me, if the companies are well-capitalized, which they are.

I already own a spread of well-run, inexpensive P&C insurers & reinsurers.? Would I increase the overweight here?? Yes, I might, because I view the group as absolutely cheap; it could make me money even in a down market.? Now, I would do my series of analyses such that I would be happy with the reserving and the investing policies of each insurer, but after that, I would be willing to add to my holdings.

Do your own due diligence on this, because I am often wrong.

Book Review: Pandora’s Risk

Book Review: Pandora’s Risk

This is two books in one, and very well done.? The main part of the book explains risk and uncertainty in general terms, such that most people can understand it.? But for those that can deal with complex math, the latter part of the book offers a lot of additional firepower.

Risk is a tough subject because history only vaguely informs you as to how bad things can get.? Past is not prologue.? There are two possibilities, the past contains and event that was so horrible that it can never happen again, or, the past does not tell you how bad things can be.

Market observers took the first view, that the Great Depression could not repeat.? As a result, few prepared for a situation where there was too much debt, and insufficient ability to service it.

The subtitle of the book is rightly “Uncertainty at the Core of Finance.” Not risk, but uncertainty.? The distinct is important, because risks are things that we know some things about the possible economic outcomes, and can control them to a degree.? Uncertainty is where we don’t really understand the dimensions of the outcomes, and have little if any control.

There is fundamental uncertainty to the simplest aspect of finance, money.? Money seems stable enough in the short-run, but every now and then it fails due to hyperinflation, or the slow steady failure in the store of value sense of moderate inflation over long periods.

Wealth itself is uncertain.? Even if you own it free and clear, there’s no way to tell what it will be exchangeable for next year, much less further out.? There are a lot of people who thought they knew what their homes were worth 5-7 years ago that are decidedly disappointed.

Government debt is uncertain, as governments think they can always roll it over, but political and other obstacles can lead to a refusal to pay when debt service becomes high relative to tax revenues.

Banking is uncertain, mainly because of borrowing short to lend long.? If banks limited themselves to facilitating transactions, a lot of the uncertainty would go away.? Banks would be a lot smaller, less profitable, and there would be fewer of them, and the economy would be more stable.? (Entities with longer liability structures, like pension plans, endowments, and life insurers would become the new source of lending. More would be financed through equity.)

Credit is uncertain.? During boom times, corporate bonds behave independently, and diversification evens out results.? As a result, corporate credit seems safer than it really is, and marginal ideas get to borrow.? During bust times, far more corporate debt defaults than would be expected — there’s almost no such thing as an average year.? It’s either feast or famine.

There are things that can be done to try to mitigate uncertainty: credit ratings, or any scoring system for assets, lending at a more senior level, and Value-at-Risk.? Also using more robust assumptions on possible outcomes, which would lead to smaller position sizes, less leverage, or more cash.

The book has a real strength in showing how the the assumption of normally-distributed risks fails dramatically in many cases, and offers alternatives that would work better.? Trouble is, once you realize how volatile the world really is, a lot of strategies either don’t work, or need to be scaled back.

The book praises actuaries as risk managers, with their ethic codes and stress tests, as opposed to quants with Value-at-Risk and no ethics code.? Banks and Wall Street would be better off in the long run hiring actuaries, who think about risk more holistically, and getting rid of the quants in their risk control departments.? Same for the regulators who evaluate banks.

There are other controversial ideas here: is it possible that the strong economic growth of the past is an anomaly?? Is it possible that growth for nations, and the world as a whole follows S-curves, like products and companies?

This is an ambitious book, and I like it a lot because it is willing to cross boundaries and apply the principles in one? area to another that seemingly should not receive it.? I liked it a lot, and would recommend it to many.

Quibbles

On page 17, he thinks of currency as a put option, but I think of it as 0% overnight commercial paper.? On page 37, he confuses Moses and Joseph, having Moses predict the 7 good followed by 7 bad years, when it was Joseph who did that.

Who would benefit from this book: Every financial regulator should have this book.? Every academic burdened by the lies of Modern Portfolio Theory should get this book.? Anyone who fancies himself to be a risk manager should have this book.? Finally, if you want to understand why financial markets are inherently uncertain, this book will teach you well.? If you want to, you can buy it here: Pandora’s Risk: Uncertainty at the Core of Finance (Columbia Business School Publishing).

Full disclosure: The publisher asked if I wanted the book.? I said ?yes? and he sent it to me.

If you enter Amazon through my site, and you buy anything, I get a small commission.? This is my main source of blog revenue.? I prefer this to a ?tip jar? because I want you to get something you want, rather than merely giving me a tip.? Book reviews take time, particularly with the reading, which most book reviewers don?t do in full, and I typically do. (When I don?t, I mention that I scanned the book.? Also, I never use the data that the PR flacks send out.)

Most people buying at Amazon do not enter via a referring website.? Thus Amazon builds an extra 1-3% into the prices to all buyers to compensate for the commissions given to the minority that come through referring sites.? Whether you buy at Amazon directly or enter via my site, your prices don?t change.

The Best of the Aleph Blog, Part 14

The Best of the Aleph Blog, Part 14

This period of the Aleph Blog covers May through July of 2010.? The one big series that I started in that era was “The Education of a Corporate Bond Manager” series.? The idea was to describe how a neophyte was thrust into an unusual position and thrived, after some difficulties.

The Education of a Corporate Bond Manager, Part I

How I learned the basics, and survived 9/11.

The Education of a Corporate Bond Manager, Part II

How I learned to trade bonds, and engage in intelligent price discovery.

The Education of a Corporate Bond Manager, Part III

What is the new issue bond allocation process like, and what games get played around it?

The Education of a Corporate Bond Manager, Part IV

On the games that can be played in dealing with brokers.

The Education of a Corporate Bond Manager, Part V

On selling hot sectors, and dealing with the dirty details of unusual bonds.

The Education of a Corporate Bond Manager, Part VI

On dealing with ignorant clients, and taking out-of-consensus risks.

Then there was the continuation of “The Rules” series:

The Rules, Part XIII, subpart A

On the biases the come from yield-seeking.

The Rules, Part XIII, subpart B

Repeat after me, “Yield is not free.”

The Rules, Part XIII, subpart C

Reaching for yield always has risks, but the penalties are most intense at the top of the cycle, when credit spreads are tight, and the Fed?s loosening cycle is nearing its end.? It is at that point that a good bond manager tosses as much risk as he can overboard without bringing yield so low that his client screams.

The Rules, Part XV

Securitization segments a security into liquid and illiquid components.

The Rules, Part XVI

Governments are smaller than markets; markets are smaller than cultures.

A fundamental rule of mine, but one with a lot of punch.

The Rules, Part XVII

On the differences between panics and booms.

The Journal of Failed Finance Research

Much research fails quietly, but other researchers don’t learn about the dead ends.? Better that they should learn of the failures, and avoid the dead ends.

How I Minimize Taxes on my Stock Investing

Sell low tax cost lots and donate appreciated stock to charities.

Place Political Limits on Overly Compliant Central Banks

Gives a simple rule to control central banks so that they avoid the present troubles.

Yield, the Oldest Scam in the Books

Yes, offering yield is the oldest way to trick people into handing over their money.

A Summary of my Writings on Analyzing Insurance Stocks

A good place to get started if one wants to get up to speed on insurance stocks, but there is a lot there.

Economics is Hard; the Bad Assumptions of Economists Makes it Harder

Going over Kartik Athreya?s letter criticizing nonprofessional economics bloggers.? Why the math behind macroeconomics and microeconomics doesn’t work.

Why Are We The Lucky Ones?

When you are a part of a small broker-dealer, all manner of harebrained deals get offered to you.? This explores three of them.? Note: management did not ask my opinion on the fourth deal, and that is a large part of why they no longer exist.

One more note: the guy who was going to pledge $5 million of stock in example 2 for a $1 million loan?? The stock is worth $7,000 today.

Watch the State of the States

The economics of the states tells us a lot more about the national health because they can’t print money to buy national debts.? (Though they can can raid accrual accounts…)

We Might Be Dead In The Long-Run, But What Do We Leave Our Children?

My view is that neoclassical economists are wrong.? Aggregate demand has failed for four reasons:

  1. Overleveraged consumers will not readily buy.
  2. Citizens of overleveraged governments will not readily spend, for fear of what may come later from the taxman, or from fear of future unemployment.
  3. Aggregate demand is mean-reverting.? It overshot because of the buildup of debt, and is now in the process of returning to more sustainable levels.? The same is true of private debt levels, which are being reduced to levels that will allow consumers to buy more freely once again.
  4. When the financial system is in trouble, people get skittish.

The Market Goes to the Dogs, Which Chase Their Tail Risk

Complex and expensive hedging solutions, many of which embed some credit risk, can be less effective than lowering leverage, and (horrors) holding some cash.

Fishing at a Paradox. No Toil, No Thrift, No Fish, No Paradox.

This one had its detractors, because I believe the paradox of thrift is wrong.? Too much aggregation, and it does not allow the dynamism of the economy to adjust over time, even from severe conditions.

11.0010010000111111011010101000100010000101101000110000100011010011

11.0010010000111111011010101000100010000101101000110000100011010011

For fun, I decided to try running a test on the constant we call Pi in binary form [note headline].? Pi is the ratio of a circle’s circumference to its diameter.? It is many more things as well.? It is a unique number in mathematics.? As Linus said to Charlie Brown after meeting the kid named “Five,” “How about the name 3.14159?”? Charlie Brown says, “I think there are a lot of kids who would be named 3.14159.” (From memory, I could have botched it.)

I found on the web the first 2^15th power (32,768) binary digits for the “fractional” part of Pi. In decimal terms, it means Pi to a little more than 10,000 decimal places.

Pi is an irrational number.? That means it can’t be expressed as a fraction of two integers.? As such, in binary form, since the series does not terminate, the pattern of ones and zeroes should be random.? As such, we can do a “runs test” to see whether the number of runs is abnormal.? Too few runs: zeroes and ones alternate too frequently.? Too many runs: zeroes and ones do not alternate enough.

My expectation was that neither abnormality would occur.? But I had to follow the data to the conclusion.? As it the first 32,768 digits of Pi, it had too many runs, such that the probability of it being random was 1.26%.

I don’t know what to do with this, but my next experiment will be on the number e, 2.71828…

I’m good with math, but not great with it.? Advice is welcome…

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