Category: Speculation

When Things are Nuts

When Things are Nuts

When Everything is Strong

When Everything is Strong, Redux

It Would Have Happened Already

It Would Have Happened Already, Redux

Four recent posts of mine.? They warn against assuming that trends will continue.? This past week, we gained some evidence that trends won’t continue.? I’m not talking about the upset in commodities, led by silver and crude oil.

Those matter little compared to the low yields for Treasury bills and notes (from Bloomberg.com).

3-Month 0.000 08/04/2011 0 / .01 -0.005 / -.005 05/06
6-Month 0.000 11/03/2011 0.06 / .06 0 / -.000 05/06
12-Month 0.000 05/03/2012 0.16 / .16 -0.01 / -.010 05/06
2-Year 0.625 04/30/2013 100-04+ / .55 0-01? / -.024 05/06
3-Year 1.250 04/15/2014 100-29? / .93 0-01? / -.020 05/06
5-Year 2.000 04/30/2016 100-21? / 1.86 0-03 / -.020 05/06
7-Year 2.625 04/30/2018 100-20 / 2.53 0-02 / -.010 05/06
10-Year 3.625 02/15/2021 104-00 / 3.15 0-01 / -.004 05/06
30-Year 4.750 02/15/2041 107-24? / 4.29 -0-17 / .030 05/06

These low rates threaten the repo market and money market funds.? They also force people into riskier investments.

This is why I view the commodity market weakness as a hiccup.? Speculators, those that follow momentum, got ahead of themselves.

But there is weakness in Europe that should not be ignored.? Will Greece be tossed out of the EU or not?? Given past actions, the answer is no, but who can tell for sure?

We face cross-currents here, there is no yield for savers, which makes many speculate.? But speculation in commodities has blown up recently.? What to do?

Personally, I would edge into commodities, and commodity-related stocks.? When one-year Treasury rates are so low, it is an incentive to buy stuff/commodities.? Why should I hold a worthless dollar when I can hold a lump of copper?

This is a guess, and it is only a guess, but I would favor commodity strength over the weakness in short-term bond yields.? Play it carefully, and wait for strength before joining in.

Why Amateurs Should Invest in Common Stocks

Why Amateurs Should Invest in Common Stocks

There is a benefit to investing directly in common stocks as an individual.? I’ll let Buffett help me explain this:

?I am a better investor because I am a businessman and I am a better businessman because I am an investor.?

My own life is one of having been an amateur investor, and became a professional investor over time.? My mother is an excellent amateur investor, one whose record would put 90%+ of professionals to shame.? I know some great amateur investors, but they are not the norm.? If they were the norm, we would not have lots of financial intermediaries trolling for business.

After yesterday’s piece, I want to say that though most amateur investors do not beat index funds, there is still one big reason to buy individual common stocks: it can make you a better businessman.

As an example, I had? never worked in a marketing department in my life, but because of my investing, and study of marketing on the side, I was able to lead a revamp of a marketing department, leading to a threefold increase in sales in five years.? Return on equity went from 10% to 50%, aided by the booming stock market of the ’90s, but that was only a help.

Technical specialists have to ask, “Do I want to remain a technical specialist, assuming that I have that option, or do I want to broaden my skill set and learn the economics of the business that I serve?”? Those that invest in stocks, and study them carefully learn practical economics.? You may earn money or you may not.? You may beat the market or you may not.? But you will become a more valuable employee, because you will grasp more and more about what makes your company tick economically.

I can tell you that while I was in insurance, the brightest move I made was investing in stocks privately, and studying equity and bond investment intensively.? It made me more valuable to my bosses, and helped me understand my own company better.? It made me better in interviews as well.? Questions that were designed to see if I could think beyond my narrow specialty became easier for me.

Now, some of the successes came with failures.? For a while, I told my kids never to mention the name “Caldor” to me.? Yeh, Michael Price may have lost a billion on that one, but I more than took my licks.? Until you lose a decent amount, you don’t really understand how the market works.? You can call it market tuition, but like tuition at college, you don’t know how much value you will get out of what you have paid.

I encourage new investors to paper-trade.? I did that when I was young.? It allows you to experiment and learn about what you think works in the market, without consequences.? I think it helps ease the transition into investing.? When you start investing, your emotions will be a lot higher, but it helps a lot to have a guiding theory going into it, it helps control the emotions that will come.? It took me 5-10 years to discipline my emotions, and think about markets rationally, not emotionally.

So, there are benefits to investing in individual common stocks, but they may not be the ones you expected.? It will help you understand your business better, your industry better, and perhaps even your nation and the world.

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But, this is not to say that if you act as a bettor, rather than an investor, that you will benefit.? Think of Buffett’s quote above — business and investing go together.? Inside a corporation, one of the highest levels of what is done is the investing.? Buffett looks for businesses that will throw off gross profits well in excess of financing costs — that is different than most investors think, because Buffett is a businessman.

For budding businessmen, you could ask where business value is growing the most rapidly relative to the price that you pay — Earnings relative to price helps but there are sometimes aspects of businesses where growth in value does not reflect in the earnings statement.

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And, all of this is not to say that professionals do better than amateurs.? Professionals don’t do well, and they add on fees.

There is one area where professionals seem to do better, but I could be wrong.? If I am wrong, could someone send me some research?? As I pointed out yesterday, amateur investors tend to become greedy and fearful at the wrong times.? Professionals seem to be less prone to this problem, perhaps because of discipline.

As Baruch commented at my blog:

I think it is also something you can learn, because so much of investing skill is not innate, in my opinion, rather it really comes from an attitude, and an act of will. Discipline comes from will. The rest comes from a basic knowledge of accounting, markets and finance which anyone with a university education is capable of grasping. A lot of people without a university education are as well.

To which I will agree — it’s not that you need a high IQ, but a lot of general learning, wisdom on accounting, markets, and finance, and common sense.? Read stuff by Charlie Munger, the man is under-rated in the shadow of Buffett, but at least he has written? a book.? Would that Buffett would do the same.? There are many that interpret him, but I would like to hear how he views investments in theory in full, so that the rest of us could benefit.? In many ways he has surpassed his teachers, Ben Graham and Phil Fisher.

So Warren, could you give us the 21st century version of “The Intelligent Investor?”? That could be an invaluable legacy that many would thank you for, as much as they do for Ben Graham today.

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Final note — if you invest in common stocks, it is likely you will underperform the major averages until you gain wisdom and discipline.

The Jeans for the Scene — In, Out, or Ob?

The Jeans for the Scene — In, Out, or Ob?

I was minding my own business, doing research when I saw an ad that showed a back view of a woman in very tight jeans, with the text: “If you think I?m hot you should see this stock! OBJE”

Remember my rule, “Don’t buy what someone wants to sell you.? Buy what you have researched for yourself.”? It is true with physical objects, but even more true where the goods are immaterial, and quality cannot be easily verified, as with stocks.? So when I hear a pitch for a stock through advertising, I am immediately skeptical.

Now, I am not the first to the scene here, partially because I delayed. 24/7 Wall Street noted that OBJE has a going concern problem.? Good job, Doug.

But there is more: where is the company located?? In a residence in Florida.? Not much for a company with a market cap of 30MM+.? But what else is located there?? These businesses:

Quite a lot to be going on in one residence.? But wait, the woman who lives there, who was a crucial part of OBJE’s strategies has been let go by OBJE.? Curious, huh?

Now the current CEO, Robert Federowicz has done many things, but nothing worthy of being a CEO of a small public company.

He previously served as Chief Information Officer of a start-up international power development company and as government affairs liaison for an international power company. From 2005 to 2009, Mr. Federowicz was an Owner and Operator of a fitness gym in Houston, Texas. During 2010, he served as an Account executive for Screentek, Inc., a seller of LCD screen technology for laptop computers.

Of course the company has press releases touting its non-existent products.? And there are penny stock touts that pick up the furor.? Just because a stock has a low price does not make it a buy.

Then there is the investor relations page at their website.? No credible company lays on the “buy us” mantra so thick.

That leaves us with the hard data.? Let me start with the opening lines from the risk disclosures in the 10K:

BECAUSE WE HAVE NOT PRODUCED A SAMPLE OF OUR OBSCENE BRAND JEANS AND COMPLIMENTED PRODUCTS, THESE PRODUCTS, MAY NOT WORK OR FIT PROPERLY AND/OR THE PRODUCTION COST CAN EXCEED EXPECTATIONS

OUR LACK OF AN OPERATING HISTORY GIVES NO ASSURANCE THAT OUR FUTURE OPERATIONS WILL RESULT IN PROFITABLE REVENUES, WHICH COULD RESULT IN THE SUSPENSION OR END OF OUR OPERATIONS

WE ARE A NEW COMPANY WITH NO OPERATING HISTORY AND WE FACE A HIGH RISK OF BUSINESS FAILURE WHICH WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF YOUR INVESTMENT

As of the date of this prospectus, we have earned no revenue. Failure to generate revenue will cause us to go out of business, which could result in the complete loss of your investment.

BECAUSE OUR CURRENT OFFICER AND DIRECTOR DOES NOT HAVE SIGNIFICANT EXPERIENCE IN STARTING A JEANS PRODUCTS COMPANY AND WE LACK CUSTOMERS AND SUPPLIERS, OUR BUSINESS HAS A HIGHER RISK OF FAILURE

BECAUSE WE ARE SMALL AND DO NOT HAVE MUCH CAPITAL, WE MUST LIMIT OUR MARKETING ACTIVITIES. AS A RESULT, OUR SALES MAY NOT BE ENOUGH TO OPERATE PROFITABLY. IF WE DO NOT MAKE A PROFIT, WE MAY HAVE TO SUSPEND OR CEASE OPERATIONS

OUR PRODUCTS MAY NOT FIND ACCEPTANCE FOR OUR PRODUCTS IN HIGH END BOUTIQUES AND DEPARTMENT STORES.

OUR OPERATING RESULTS MAY PROVE UNPREDICTABLE WHICH COULD NEGATIVELY AFFECT OUR PROFIT

OUR SOLE OFFICER AND DIRECTOR MAY NOT BE IN A POSITION TO DEVOTE A MAJORITY OF HER TIME TO OUR OPERATIONS, WHICH MAY RESULT IN PERIODIC INTERRUPTIONS AND EVEN BUSINESS FAILURE

(and she has been let go)

KEY MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL MAY LEAVE THE COMPANY WHICH COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT THE ABILITY OF THE COMPANY TO CONTINUE OPERATIONS

IF OUR COMPANY IS DISSOLVED, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THERE WILL BE SUFFICIENT ASSETS REMAINING TO DISTRIBUTE TO OUR SHAREHOLDERS

IF WE ARE UNABLE TO GAIN ANY SIGNIFICANT MARKET ACCEPTANCE FOR OUR PRODUCTS OR ESTABLISH A SIGNIFICANT MARKET PRESENCE, WE MAY BE UNABLE TO GENERATE SUFFICIENT REVENUE TO CONTINUE OUR BUSINESS

MANAGEMENT’S ABILITY TO IMPLEMENT THE BUSINESS STRATEGY MAY BE SLOWER THAN EXPECTED AND WE MAY BE UNABLE TO GENERATE A PROFIT

IF WE ARE UNABLE TO MANAGE OUR FUTURE GROWTH OUR BUSINESS COULD BE HARMED

OUR PRODUCT MAY NOT BE ABLE TO DISTINGUISH ITSELF IN THE MARKET AND WE MAY BE UNABLE TO ATTRACT ENOUGH CUSTOMERS TO OPERATE PROFITABLY, WITHOUT A PROFIT WE MAY HAVE TO SUSPEND OR CEASE OPERATIONS

WE MAY BE UNABLE TO MAKE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS AT ACCEPTABLE COST, WE MAY HAVE TO SUSPEND OR CEASE OPERATIONS ENTIRELY WHICH COULD RESULT IN A TOTAL LOSS OF YOUR INVESTMENT.

COMPETITORS MAY ENTER THIS SECTOR WITH SUPERIOR PRODUCTS, INFRINGING OUR CUSTOMER BASE, AND AFFECTING OUR BUSINESS ADVERSELY.

SINCE OUR SOLE OFFICER AND DIRECTOR CURRENTLY OWNS 100% OF THE OUTSTANDING COMMON STOCK, INVESTORS MAY FIND THAT HER DECISIONS ARE CONTRARY TO THEIR INTERESTS YOU SHOULD NOT PURCHASE SHARES UNLESS YOU ARE WILLING TO ENTRUST ALL ASPECTS OF MANAGEMENT TO OUR SOLE OFFICER AND DIRECTOR, OR HER SUCCESSORS

Notable, because she was let go with little fanfare, aside from an 8K.

THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL UNCERTAINTY ABOUT OUR ABILITY TO CONTINUE OUR OPERATIONS AS A GOING CONCERN

THE ENACTMENT OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT MAY MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR US TO RETAIN OR ATTRACT OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS, WHICH COULD INCREASE OUR OPERATING COSTS OR PREVENT US FROM BECOMING PROFITABLE.

SINCE WE ANTICIPATES OPERATING EXPENSES WILL INCREASE PRIOR TO EARNING REVENUE, WE MAY NEVER ACHIEVE PROFITABILITY

IF WE CANNOT SECURE ADDITIONAL CAPITAL, OR IF AVAILABLE CAPITAL IS TOO EXPENSIVE, OUR BUSINESS WILL FAIL.

WE DO NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT CAPITAL TO CONTINUE MAINTAINING OUR REPORTING STATUS.

What do you see when you review the most recent 10K and 10Q?? They are starving for liquidity, and have negative earnings and a negative net worth.? This is not a recipe for success.

This would have been obvious from the share offering as well, which was done at far lower prices.

If I worked for the SEC, I would ask this question — who was willing to buy the shares after the offering, creating prices that would deceive others?? Answering that question could reveal networks that cheat.

 

It Would Have Happened Already, Redux

It Would Have Happened Already, Redux

I went to a set of presentations at Towson University this evening and heard two panels on the investment outlook — one domestic, one international.? What fascinated me was the relative unanimity of opinion.? All or almost all agreed that:

  • Bonds are overvalued.
  • Stocks are slightly undervalued.? Large Cap Value is attractive.
  • Commodities, especially gold, are a bubble.? ETFs are driving that bubble.
  • Interest rates will rise soon.
  • Avoid emerging markets.
  • Inflation is coming.

As I listened to the relative unanimity of opinion, I began to think, “Okay, what can go wrong with this?? If they are all invested to reflect these outcomes, maybe we will see things run more against them before an eventual correction takes place.

I think that some of what I heard at Towson University this evening does express the consensus for a number of markets.? Now the consensus is not always wrong — in the middle of a move the consensus is usually right.? But these calls, aside from equities, call for a change in direction.

Beyond that, a rise in bond yields would increase competition for stock valuations.

Also, some agreed that the Dollar was the best of a bunch of bad currencies, and would remain as the global reserve currency.? But then they said that commodities were a bubble.? Okay, stop.? If you say that all major currencies in the world are bad, what will you do to maintain purchasing power?? Buying commodities no longer looks so bad.? Commodities become what most currencies aren’t — a store of value.

I did not hear one argument for deflation this evening, nor did I hear anyone discuss the overindebted nature? of the American public.? There were many, many comments about the overindebted US government, but few comments on how it would affect other US investments.

Look, I am not saying that those in the panels are wrong — some of those biases are mine.? But when you hear little difference in the spread of opinions, it should make you re-examine your theses, because it is possible that all money has been committed to an idea, and even if the idea is right, we should see a counter-rally the other way before the smart money is proven right.

In closing, remember, if it were certain, prices would have adjusted already.? What this says is that we are not certain.

It Would Have Happened Already

It Would Have Happened Already

After we went and got the pizzas for the birthday celebration of my youngest son, my second-youngest daughter (younger still) said, “Elizabeth [oldest daughter] says that gas prices will reach $6/gallon this summer.”? I said, “If it were that certain, it would have happened already.”? I added that there is a tendency for gas prices to rise a little in the summer, but that it wasn’t always so, and that refiners are not running at capacity, as it was the last time gas prices spiked.

This piece is a warning against listening to those that say something is certain to happen when the present price is far from what is predicted.? If it really were that certain, it would have happened already.

I have my guesses, but I am not certain how the global economy or the markets will change from here.? Beware certainty in matters economic.? It blinds us to alternative ideas that might be less risky or more profitable.

Thus when you run across rhetoric like:

  • Interest rates must rise.
  • The US Dollar must fall.
  • The US Government will go broke.
  • Inflation must rise from here.
  • The stock market is too high and will soon fall from here.

Be skeptical.? There may be some wisdom there, but the result is not certain, or it would have happened already.

When Everything is Strong, Redux

When Everything is Strong, Redux

It has been a long day, but I want to add one note to Thursday night’s piece: I would not sell the market immediately.? The summary of my recent research is that market moves from undervalued to overvalued, to more overvalued.? At more overvalued, momentum of the market slows down.? This is the time to exit before the correction occurs.? Momentum is still strong enough, but when momentum gets average when valuations are high like today, it would be a time to exit.? We are not there yet.

As for what is weak, there is housing.? Dark supply.? Many investments in housing are pre-planned losses.? Probably better to be in money market funds.

Gains and losses are not purely random, they tend to streak.? Here’s my stylized view of how an equity/credit cycle works:

  1. After a washout, valuations are low and momentum is lousy.? People/Institutions are scared to death of equities and any instruments with credit exposure.? Only rebalancers and and deep value players are buying here.? There might even be some sales from leveraged players forced by regulators, margin desks, or “Risk control” desks.? Liquidity is at a premium.
  2. But eventually momentum flattens, and yield spreads for the survivors begin to tighten.? Equities may have rallied some, but the move is widely disbelieved.? This is usually a good time to buy; even if you do get faked out, and momentum takes another leg down, valuation levels are pretty good, so the net isn’t far below you.
  3. Slowly, but persistently the equity market rallies.? Momentum is strong.? The credit markets are quicker, with spreads tightening to normal-ish levels.? Bit-by-bit valuations rise until the markets are fairly valued.
  4. Momentum remains strong.? Credit spreads are tight. Valuations are high, and most value-type players have reduced their exposures.? Liquidity is cheap, and only rebalancers are selling. ?(This is where we are now.)
  5. The market continues to rise, but before the peak, momentum flattens, and the market meanders.? Credit spreads remain tight, but are edgy, and maybe a little volatile.? This is usually a good time to sell.? Remember, tops are often a process.
  6. Cash flow proves insufficient to cover the debt at some institution or set of institutions, and defaults ensue.? Some think that the problem is an isolated one, but search begins for where there is additional weakness.? Credit spreads widen, momentum is lousy, and valuations fall to normal-ish levels.
  7. The true size of the crisis is revealed, defaults mount, valuations are low, credit spreads are high.? A few institutions and investors fail who you wouldn’t have expected.? Momentum is lousy.? We are back to part 1 of the cycle.? Remember, bottoms are often an event.

You could call part 4 of my stylized cycle “borrowed time.” But it is borrowed time that can last a long time.? At the end of the bull cycle, the equity market catches up to the credit market, creating a situation where the valuation of the equity can no longer be sustained by further increases in leverage (part 5 leading to part 6).

Note to readers

I will be sending part 1 of my Impossible Dream research to clients this coming week.? In the next week, those that have asked for the research will get part 1, and clients will get part 2.? The week after that, those that have asked for the research will get part 2, and I will publish part 1.? The week after that, I will publish part 2.

When I was a corporate bond manager, I was relatively open about my ideas, because I knew that imitation was a lot more difficult than it seemed.? That is still true now.? But out of honor to my clients, they get the first look, and requesters get second look, and casual readers get third look.

The Holy Grail Projects

The Holy Grail Projects

When I started my asset management business, I did not know what I was doing.? I probably still don’t, though finally I have a little more assets under management than I have of my own assets managed by my strategies.? I learned that I needed to manage both stocks and bonds, in order to provide both enterprising and safe investments, respectively.

But in an environment like this, where bonds are overvalued in general, is the safe option safe?? My methods of bond management produce rather blah yields at a time like this, because I am trying to preserve capital.

But then potential investors talk to me, and they ask two things of me.

1) Can’t you create a strategy that shifts between your stock and bond strategies, such that we can minimize losses and maximize gains?

2) Can’t you create a bond strategy that provides more yield on average, while still preserving capital?

I am tempted to say, “If I had such a strategy, I would be employing it from my yacht.”? Then again, the last time I went out on he open seas, I was as sick as a dog.? Time for a new analogy.? Okay, I am searching for the Holy Grail.? Not likely to find that… and as Calvin noted, if all of the alleged relics from the days of Christ were real, the amount would be a large multiple of what was there.

All that said, there are some cofactors for each problem that might work.? With bonds (problem 2), there are momentum effects, as well as mean-reversion effects.? Those can complement the intelligent bond manager who looking at the situation may see risk and return out of line, or fairly priced.

I may have a solution to this problem, which partially benefits from the ideas of Mebane Faber.? Buy the bond classes where the prices are above their 200 day moving averages.? This is an oversimplification, but it seems to work.

But stocks are more difficult, and I do not know whether I will end up with a solution here or not.? Here’s the trouble:

  • Stocks are driven by earnings expectations
  • Stocks are driven by valuation
  • Valuation is drive by cost of capital, as well as yield spreads.
  • Cost of capital is on average similar to BBB bond yields.
  • There are still momentum effects, as well as mean reversion effects

I don’t have a solution to the first problem, though I am struggling with it.? Truly if anyone had a good timing algorithm, would he share it?

Everything Old is New Again in Bonds

Everything Old is New Again in Bonds

Unconstrained strategies for bonds are hot now with yields so low.? But wait. Let’s take a step back.? What do we mean by a constrained strategy?

A constrained strategy is one that limits the investments one can engage in either through:

  • Specifying an index that the manager is charged with beating
  • Specifying percentage limits for investments, split by categories such as credit quality, interest rate sensitivity, asset subclasses (ABS, RMBS, CMBS, Corporates, Agencies, etc.), and other variables
  • Barring investment in more funky fixed income instruments such as preferred stock, trust preferreds, junior debts, CDOs, ABS, RMBS, CMBS, etc.
  • Or some combination of the above.

There have been unconstrained strategies in fixed income before — they just weren’t called that.? Many value investors in the old days didn’t care what the legal form of the investment was — they only looked for an adequate margin of safety.? Their portfolios were a hodgepodge of debt and equity instruments.? Specialization in only doing debt instruments wasn’t common.

Most debt-only investments were constrained, particularly those from bank trust departments.? Of course, this was an era where investing in junk debt was not respectable for all but the most intrepid of investors.

With the advent of the 1980s we had two innovations: junk bonds and bond index funds.? The first took the world by storm with the demand for yield; I experienced that at the first insurance company that I worked for — they overloaded on junk bonds.? This was before the regulators began regulating bond credit quality more strictly.

The second took a longer time to germinate.? The first bond index fund came into existence in 1986 at Vanguard.? They couldn’t call it a bond index fund, because they could not exactly replicate the index.? There were too many bonds that were illiquid, and they could not buy them at any reasonable price.? Instead, they took an approach that we would call “enhanced indexing” today.? Match the interest rate sensitivity of the index, and the credit quality, but choose bonds that had more potential than the bonds in the index.

In that sense, though the SEC allows bond funds to be called index funds today, all bond index funds are enhanced index funds because there is no way to source all of the bonds.? And from my own days as a corporate bond manager, I learned that bonds in major indexes always trade rich.? From my piece, The Education of a Corporate Bond Manager, Part IX:

There was another example where I crossed bonds where it was legitimate ? if it was done to help a broker in distress.? One day, someone offered me a rare type of Capital One bonds at a normal level, and I asked whether the bonds in question were the ones that were in a major bond index, without saying that per se.? After figuring that out, I bought them at the level, and called a broker that was likely to be short the bonds to see if he wanted them.? He certainly did, and offered them at a three basis point concession to where I bought them, as opposed to ripping the eyeballs out (as the technical term went).

The whole set of two transactions took 15 minutes, and made $15,000 for my client.? What was funnier, was that my whole family came to visit me that day, my wife and at that time, seven kids.? They heard the two transactions, though I had to explain it to them later. To the second broker, I had each of the kids say ?Hi,? ending with the then three-year old girl who squeaked ?Hi.?? He said something to the effect of, ?I knew you had a large family, but it only really struck me now.?

That three-year old is now a beauty at twelve, and bright as anything, but I digress.? (They grow so fast… the nine-year old girl is cute as a button too.)

Bond management was once unconstrained by those who looked for total returns in the old days, and constrained in the old days by those who looked for yield.? (Many managers would not buy bonds that traded at a premium.)? Then the bond indexes became popular as a management tool.? In one sense, it freed bond management, because rather than hard constraints, they matched credit and interest rate sensitivities of the index.

But what that constrains is credit policy and interest rate policy.? One managing to beat a benchmark index has limited options.? What if you want to position for:

  • Widening credit spreads
  • Narrowing credit spreads
  • Rising interest rates
  • Falling interest rates
  • Yield curve steepening
  • Yield curve flattening
  • Outperformance/underperfomance of a given sector

Any sort of directional bet could go wrong, and more often than bonds that fit the idea of replicating the index parameters, but are special in ways that the index does not appreciate.? So rather than going “whole hog” with the bet, you merely lean toward it, such that if you are wrong, you won’t destroy the outperformance versus the index.

But in this modern world where derivatives are widely accepted as fixed income instruments, a la Pimco, fixed income managers can do a lot more.? There is more freedom to make or lose a lot of money.

The unconstrained strategy can be thought of? in two ways: always trying to earn a positive return with high probability (T-bills are the benchmark, if any), or being willing to accept equity-like volatility while the bond manager sources obscure bonds, or takes large interest rate or credit risks.

I prefer the first idea, because it is more conservative, and fixed income management should aim for safety on average.? As I have said before, I only believe in taking risks that are well-compensated.

But here’s a hard one.? With the yield curve so wide, shouldn’t a bond manager with an unconstrained mandate put a little into long bonds or long zeroes?? I would think so, but I wouldn’t put a lot there unless the momentum started to favor it.

I like the concept of the unconstrained strategy; indeed, it is what I am doing for clients, but it is of the first variety, try to make money for clients in all markets, and not just be a wild man in search of yield or total return.

I find the move to unconstrained mandates to be a return to what value managers did long ago, but in a more complex fixed income environment.? I wonder though, as to whether the future failures will invalidate the idea for most.? It is tough to manage any asset class while adjusting the risk level to reflect what should not be done in a given era, whether in equities or debt.? The danger comes from trying to maintain yield levels that are higher than what is sustainable.

Book Review: Boombustology

Book Review: Boombustology

For those that have read me for years at The Aleph Blog, this book will impart little that is new.? But, you get a set of powerful arguments in one integrated slim package.

I really liked this book.? The author took a broad view of bubbles, and developed five lenses through which to analyze them:

  • Microeconomics
  • Macroeconomics
  • Psychology
  • Politics
  • Biological (contagion) analogies

This picks up the growth in debt, the misaligned short-term versus long-term incentives, crowd behavior, imitation, political agreement with booms, finger-pointing during busts, etc.

This book integrates the ideas of Keynes, Minsky, the Austrian economists, Soros (reflexivity), and others.? The author was very willing to interact with the view of those that might not fully agree with him, and yet bring out the areas where they do agree.

And the author tests the five lenses on five bubbles:

  • The tulip bubble
  • The Great Depression
  • Japan in the late 80s
  • The Asian crisis in 1997
  • The US Housing Crisis 2006-?

Not surprisingly the crises chosen support the theory.? It would be interesting to see what the author would say on other bubbles, like the South Sea Bubble, the Tech Bubble, etc.

And so the author summarizes his case, and I think he does it well. But then he takes it a step further, and effectively says, “Well, is there an obvious bubble to point out now?”? And so he points out China.? The debts, the manipulation, malinvestment, bad incentives, etc.? You can read it for yourself and draw your own conclusions.

My main verdict on this book is that it provides a firm basis for evaluating bubbles.? I place it behind “Manias, Panics, and Crashes,” and “Devil Take the Hindmost,” but not by much.? To the author: Great job.

Quibbles

I disagree with the idea that booms and busts are a capitalist phenomenon.? Command-and-control economies do have booms and busts — the Great Leap Forward was a boom followed by a tremendous bust.? The effort to plant cotton in the Soviet Union was short-lived, leading to declining yields and destruction of the ecology of the Aral Sea.? There are more examples than this; at least in capitalism, the boom yields some decent rewards.

Who would benefit from this book:

Anyone who wants a better understanding of the boom-bust cycle will benefit from this book.? The author has nailed it in my opinion.? This book will help you to properly skeptical in the next unsustainable boom, and minimize your exposure to the bust.

If you want to, you can buy it here: Boombustology: Spotting Financial Bubbles Before They Burst.

Full disclosure: I asked the publisher for the book, and they sent it to me.

If you enter Amazon through my site, and you buy anything, I get a small commission.? This is my main source of blog revenue.? I prefer this to a ?tip jar? because I want you to get something you want, rather than merely giving me a tip.? Book reviews take time, particularly with the reading, which most book reviewers don?t do in full, and I typically do. (When I don?t, I mention that I scanned the book.? Also, I never use the data that the PR flacks send out.)

Most people buying at Amazon do not enter via a referring website.? Thus Amazon builds an extra 1-3% into the prices to all buyers to compensate for the commissions given to the minority that come through referring sites.? Whether you buy at Amazon directly or enter via my site, your prices don?t change.

Avoid Investment Scams and Bad Advice, Web Edition

Avoid Investment Scams and Bad Advice, Web Edition

I have had two prior posts on this topic, and I can tell you that Bonanza Goldfields and GTX Corp both cratered though they still live, sort of.? Bioneutral has done poorly, but has not cratered.

So today, while I was reading an article at Time.com, the liberal magazine, I clicked on a link but the page was not fully loaded, and I was transferred to this page.? As scams through postal mail die, so they must appear on the web.

As for today’s folly, let read a part of the disclaimer:

Compensation

AmericanEnergyReport.com has been retained by an unrelated third party to perform promotional and advertising services intended to increase investor awareness of UnionTown Energy Inc. (UTOG). To date, AmericanEnergyReport.com has received five hundred thousand USD from an unrelated third party for performing these services. The services performed have included profiling the company on the AmericanEnergyReport.com website and issuing opinions concerning UTOG in newsletters and press releases. In addition, AmericanEnergyReport.com expects to receive an additional two million USD cash in future compensation for the continuation of the marketing program for an additional 3 months and to cover marketing vendors to pay for the costs of creating and distributing this report online in an effort to build market awareness. AmericanEnergyReport.com will disclose any future compensation. Anyone viewing the AmericanEnergyReport.com website or its newsletters and press releases should assume the hiring party or affiliates of the hiring party own shares of UTOG, which they plan to liquidate. Further, it must be understood that the liquidation of those shares may or may not negatively impact the share price. AmericanEnergyReport.com has received this amount as a production budget for advertising efforts and will retain amounts over and above the cost of production, copywriting services, mailing and other distribution expenses as a fee for our services. As such, our opinion is neither unbiased nor independent, and you should consider that when evaluating our statements regarding UTOG.

Since AmericanEnergyReport.com receives compensation from, and its owners, operators and affiliates may hold stock in, the profiled companies, there is an inherent conflict of interest in AmericanEnergyReport.com statements and opinions and such statements and opinions cannot be considered independent. AmericanEnergyReport.com and its owners, operators and affiliates may benefit from any increase in the share prices of the profiled companies. AmericanEnergyReport.com services are often paid for using free-trading shares. AmericanEnergyReport.com and/or its owners, operators and affiliates may be selling shares of stock at the same time the profile (or other information) is being disseminated to potential investors; AmericanEnergyReport.com will not advise when it or its affiliates decide to sell. Investors must make all investment decisions based on their own judgment of the market and the particular securities.

So, the writers get paid a lot, and may be paid? in the stock of those they write about?? No way they have independent opinions, and no wonder the type is so tiny and at the far bottom of the page.

Much as I like the prospects for oil, I do not believe that “Oil prices can only go up!”? That’s the language of fools.? In almost every economic environment, there can be significant setbacks to? a long-term trend, or even reversals.

The advertising appeals to the naive view that because other companies have reach share prices in the 30s, so might this stock. One of those comparable companies in that group is Northern Oil & Gas (NOG), of which my friend John Hempton is skeptical.

Now, I am not going to do a complete teardown of UnionTown Energy Inc.? At present, I am busy, and I know that companies that seek? paid analysts are usually crooked.? Why?? Simple.? Small companies with something good going keep it quiet, so that management can buy more of the company.? Unless they need more capital to build up plant and equipment, they don’t need to seek coverage.? Those that seek paid analysts to sing their praises are seeking for strength to sell into.

That’s how simple it is, and I record the price of UnionTown here: $1.55.? Also please note that the advertising campaign has run out and the price is now falling.? Caveat emptor.

Compensation
AmericanEnergyReport.com has been retained by an unrelated third party to perform promotional and advertising services intended to increase investor awareness of UnionTown Energy Inc. (UTOG). To date, AmericanEnergyReport.com has received five hundred thousand USD from an unrelated third party for performing these services. The services performed have included profiling the company on the AmericanEnergyReport.com website and issuing opinions concerning UTOG in newsletters and press releases. In addition, AmericanEnergyReport.com expects to receive an additional two million USD cash in future compensation for the continuation of the marketing program for an additional 3 months and to cover marketing vendors to pay for the costs of creating and distributing this report online in an effort to build market awareness. AmericanEnergyReport.com will disclose any future compensation. Anyone viewing the AmericanEnergyReport.com website or its newsletters and press releases should assume the hiring party or affiliates of the hiring party own shares of UTOG, which they plan to liquidate. Further, it must be understood that the liquidation of those shares may or may not negatively impact the share price. AmericanEnergyReport.com has received this amount as a production budget for advertising efforts and will retain amounts over and above the cost of production, copywriting services, mailing and other distribution expenses as a fee for our services. As such, our opinion is neither unbiased nor independent, and you should consider that when evaluating our statements regarding UTOG.

Since AmericanEnergyReport.com receives compensation from, and its owners, operators and affiliates may hold stock in, the profiled companies, there is an inherent conflict of interest in AmericanEnergyReport.com statements and opinions and such statements and opinions cannot be considered independent. AmericanEnergyReport.com and its owners, operators and affiliates may benefit from any increase in the share prices of the profiled companies. AmericanEnergyReport.com services are often paid for using free-trading shares. AmericanEnergyReport.com and/or its owners, operators and affiliates may be selling shares of stock at the same time the profile (or other information) is being disseminated to potential investors; AmericanEnergyReport.com will not advise when it or its affiliates decide to sell. Investors must make all investment decisions based on their own judgment of the market and the particular securities.

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