Category: Speculation

Time to Ditch the Style Box

Time to Ditch the Style Box

If you were trying to create a system for controlling investment risk in equity investing, how would you do it?? What I would do is look at the factors that are the least positively correlated in terms of return generation, and focus on them.

But what do investment managements consultants do?? They divide the world up into managers that look at two factors: large/mid/small capitalization, and value/core/growth.? This has been popularized by the Morningstar “Style Box.”

Looking over the last 15 years, the style box is very correlated with itself.? The lowest correlation is 75%, between largecap value and smallcap growth.? That is not a reason to categorize managers; the difference between the average largecap value and growth manger is teensy. It is even true between largecap value and smallcap growth.? And in more recent years, the correlations have been tightening to nearly 90% at worst.

So, consider country allocations.? Over the last 15 years, the correlations in developed markets have been 45% at worst, with the average being near 70%.? Looking at the last few years, both figures are higher.? My opinion: the advent of naive quantitative investing has pushed all correlations higher.

But now consider correlations across economic sectors.? Over the past 14 years, the correlations have been 32% at worst.? Across industries, which are more diverse than sectors, some of the correlations are negative, perhaps affording true diversification.

My point here is that those that look at capitalization size and value/growth are missing the boat.? If you classify managers based on that, you are focusing on minor concerns that do not aid much in diversification.? Better to focus on the industries that a manager invests in, and/or the countries that those companies are located in — there is a real oportunity to limit risks through either of those two methods.

Now, as for me, when I pick stocks, I start with the industry.? I ignore the factors in the style box.? I look for industries that are near the bottom of their pricing cycle, and buy the highest quality companies there.? For industries that are doing well, but are undervalued, I buy companies with undervalued growth prospects, with good quality balance sheets.

I strongly believe that the investment consultant community has shortchanged its clients by focusing on the “style box.”? Very little of the risks of the market result from factors in the style box, while much resluts from industry selection, which is a richer model.

So, as for me, if I have to be squeezed into the style box, call me midcap value with some style drift, buying companies larger and smaller, and outside the US, as conditions dictate.? I’m looking for the best value over the next three years, and I don’t like non-economic factors distracting me.? Why should that be such a crime, that the ignorant gatekeepers screen me out?

The risk model for the investment consultants is broken.? Let them find one that better reflects the way that the market works.

“There doesn’t seem to be a fundamental reason why.”

“There doesn’t seem to be a fundamental reason why.”

Until I read the last sentence of this Wall Street Journal article on AIG’s risk models, I felt somewhat sympathetic for the guy who developed the models.? Having developed many models in my life, I have seen them misused by executives wanting a more optimistic result, and putting pressure on the quantitative analyst to bend the assumptions.? Here’s the last paragaph:

On a rainy morning last week, Mr. Gorton briefly discussed with his Yale students how perplexing the struggles of the financial world have become. About 30 graduate students listened as Mr. Gorton lamented how problems in one sector caused investors to question value all across the board. Said Mr. Gorton: “There doesn’t seem to be a fundamental reason why.”

When I read that, I concluded that the poor guy was in over his head for years, and did not have the necessary expertise for what he was doing at AIG.? All good credit models contain something for boom and bust.? Creditworthiness of borrowing entities is highly correlated, especially during the bust phase of the credit cycle.? That said, to get deals done on CDO-like structures, the modeler can’t assume that correlations are as high as they are in real life, or the deals can’t get done.

But to my puzzled professor, there are fundamental reasons why.

  • Overlevered systems are inherently unstable.? Small changes in creditworthiness can have big impacts.
  • Rating agencies undersized subordination levels in order to win business.
  • Regulators allow regulated financials to own this stuff with low capital requirements, partially thanks to Basel II.
  • Much of the debt was related to Financials, Housing, and Real Estate, and all of those sectors are under pressure.
  • When financials ain’t healthy, ain’t no one healthy.

Now, for another look at the problem from a different angle, consider this New York Times article on Wisconsin public schools buying CDOs for teach pension plans.? As a kid, I played against a number of the schools mentioned in sports, etc., so many of these names bring back old memories for me.

Again, what is clear is that the guy advising the school one of the school districts barely understood the ABCs of what he was doing, and the district trusted him.? I’ll say it again, if you don’t understand it, or you don’t have a trusted friend on your side of the table who does understand it, don’t buy it. Also, relatively high yields on seemingly safe investments typically don’t exist.? Beware the salesman that offers high yields with safety; there is usually one of four things involved:

  • Financial leverage
  • Options sold short
  • Low credit quality of the underlying debt instruments
  • Foreign currency risks

These deals fall far short of the “prudent man rule” in my opinion.? Not only is the salesman culpable in this case, so are the board members that did not do proper due diligence.? For something this complex, not reading the prospectus is amazing, even though it might not have helped, given the complexity of the beast.? At least, though, a board member should read the “risks and disclosures” section of the prospectus.? There is usually honesty there, because that is what the investment bank is relying on to protect themselves legally if things go bad.

The districts should have accepted a lower rate of return on their investments, and asked the taxpayers for contributions to the pension plans, etc., to make up any deficits.

We will probably see many more stories like this over the next year.? Politicians and bureaucrats are often short-sighted, and look for “that one little thing” that will magically close a gap in the budget.? It’s that little bit of fear of the taxpayers and other stakeholders that caused “that one little thing” to become so tempting.? But now they have to live with the bad results; heads will roll.

Blame Game III

Blame Game III

I went on a shopping trip today to buy a desk for my two youngest children (10, 6), both girls.? As I drove, I listened to radio C-Span, because it is “guilt week” for the NPR stations in the area.? In hindsight, I would have rather listened to the begging from the NPR affiliates than what I heard on C-Span.

The program that I heard was hearings on the financial crisis.? All of the testimony fell into the bucket of “not me, there are evil people who tricked us.”? My daughters must have found my negative commentary to be funny.

We have the government that we deserve.? Congress listens to self-interested loonies, rather than seek out those with intelligence that don’t have an axe to grind.? When I wrote the pieces, Blame Game, and Blame Game, Redux, what I tried to express is that there are a lot of parties to blame in our current crisis, and that everyone should ‘fess up their culpability.

With that, I want to add on a few more responsible parties:

29) FICO srcoring enabled loan underwriting to decouple from the local bank investigating the character of the borrower.? There is something lost when the underwriter does not explore the qualitative aspects of the borrower.

30) The fools who wrote that said that it is easy to make money in stocks or real estate.? They always show up near the end of the cycle.

31) Dojo suggests the Prime Brokers — How about the Prime Brokerage business model followed by most banks and investment banks which allowed their speculative clients to go ?nuclear? in any marketplace as long as they had a credit facility and a cell phone. A $10 million hedge fund run out of a basement in Westchester County NY or Orange County CA could control $1 Billion worth of goodies in many cases. Yikes!! A bit severe, but there is some validity there.

32) dlr suggests the FDIC — The bank regulators at the FDIC. It was their JOB to maintain oversight of the banking industry. Every regulator who allowed the banks they were monitoring to giving liar loans, or pick a rate loans, or zero down payment loans, and didn?t call a halt, should be fired for malfeasance. The regulators who had oversight of Washington Mutual and Indy Mac should be fired. And their BOSSES should be fired. Right up to Shiela [sic] Blair. I think that all of the banking regulators deserve blame here, plus the Bush administration, who encouraged malign neglect.

My main point is this: if you are defending your core constituency in this crisis, you are at least partially wrong.? There are so many culpable parties, that few are blameless.

Final note: in many ways, this is a proper comeuppance to US policy that encourages home ownership.? Policy was trying to push home ownership to 70%+, when reality should have said “be happy with a stable 60%.”? Home ownership is not an unmitigated good.? Many cannot truly afford it, and the government tricks them into buying what they cannot afford with reasonable probability.

Curves and Corporate Credit

Curves and Corporate Credit

Just a brief note on corporate bonds.? When I was a corporate bond manager 2001-2003, I learned a lot about inverted curves.? It was a tough time.? But what kind of inversion am I talking about?

Ordinarily, when there is little doubt over the creditworthiness of a company, the amount of incremental yield over Treasuries (spread) rises with the length of the security.? This is normal, leaving aside times when the yield curve is flat or inverted, because usually, the risk of default rises with time with even the best securities, because the future is less certain than the present.

The second stage is an inverted spread curve for a given company, which given a positively sloped Treasury yield curve, might leave the corporate yield curve positively sloped, but less so than Treasuries.? This indicates moderate worry over the credit risk of the company in question.? (Note: during a time of credit stress, the Treasury curve is almost always positively sloped, as the Fed tends to loosen during times of credit stress.)

Next is an inverted yield curve, where short term yields are moderately higher than long term yields.? This indicates significant worry over the credit risk of the company.

Finally, there is an inverted dollar (price) curve for the company.? This is where default is viewed as a likelihood.? The prices of the longest-dated bonds reflect current estimated recovery levels after default.? Short-dated bonds may trade near par. (Par: usually $100, also usually the amount of principal remaining to be received.)

This is a qualitative/quantitative way of thinking about the corporate bond market during a time of credit stress.? What percentage of the market falls into each bucket?

  • Not inverted
  • Inverted spread curve
  • Inverted yield curve
  • Inverted dollar price curve
  • In default

The more names in lower categories, the greater the degree of credit stress.? For companies with multiple issues of bonds, it is a simple way of characterizing the market, even in the absence of rating agencies.? (As a closing aside, equity implied volatility tends to rise as a company goes down the list.)

Wait, that’s not quite a close, and not an aside.? That is another way to lookat corporate bonds.? As the implied volatility of the equity gets higher, the more they migrate down the list.? Remember, leaving aside bank loans, usually only stable companies issue corporate debt.? As their prospects get less certain, implied volatility of the equity rises, and their debt moves down the list.

Blame Game

Blame Game

Some people don’t like the concept of blame.? They view it as useless because it wastes time in looking for a solution.? I will tell you differently.? Blame is useful because it identifies offenders, which is the first step in eliminating the problem.? The trouble is that few have the stomach to get rid of the offenders.

So, as I traveled home from prayer meeting with my children last night, we listened to a radio show discussing the current credit crisis.? This was a good discussion, unlike many that I hear.? But the discussion (on NPR) eventually focused on “who should we blame?”? Okay, here is my incomplete version of who we should blame:

1) The Federal Reserve, especially Alan Greenspan.? For the past 20 years, we couldn’t let the economy have a severe, much less a moderate recession.? Rates were reduced before significant pain was felt by those who had borrowed too much.? The 1% Fed funds rate in 2003 was the pinnacle of that effort.? It created the ultimate bubble; there is nothing left to reflate in 2008 from easy monetary policy.

2) Congress and the Presidency — they encouraged undue leverage in a variety of ways:

a) Fannie, Freddie, the FHLB, and more: Everyone has gotta live in a single family home.? Gotta do that.? Thomas Jefferson’s ideal was that we should encumber future generations so that marginal buyers could live in houses beyond their means.? They compromised lending standards more and more, along with private lenders as the boom went on.

b) The SEC: in a fiat currency world, controlling the currency means controlling leverage of financial institutions.? The SEC waived leverage restrictions on the investment banks in 2004, leading to a boom, and a bust. Big bust.? Ginormous bust — how many large standalone investment banks are left?

c) Particularly the Democrats in Congress defended the GSEs as their own pet project.? I am not bashing the CRA here; I am bashing the goal of having everyone live in a house beyond their means.

d) We offered a tax deduction on mortgage interest, and a limited exemption on capital gains from selling a home.? There is no good reason for these measures.

e) And, the Republicans in Congress who favored deregulation in areas for which it was foolish to deregulate.? Much as I favor deregulation, you can’t do it if you have fiat money (unbacked paper money).? In that case you must restrain the growth of credit.

f) The Bush Jr. Administration — they did not enforce regulations over financial institutions the way that the law would demand on a fair reading.? Again, I’m not crazy about regulation, but unless you have a gold standard, or something like it, you have to regulate the issuance of credit.

g) Their unfunded programs with promises to the future; the states and Federal Government always promise today, and don’t fund it.? Hucksters.

3) Lenders steered borrowers to bad loans.? There was often implicit fraud, and in some cases, fraud.? The lenders paid their staff to do it.

4) Borrowers were lazy and greedy.? What? You’re going to enter into a transaction many times your income or net worth, and you haven’t engaged helpers or friends to advise you?? Regardless of the housing price mania, you should have gone slower, and done more homework.? Caveat emptor — you neglected that.

5) Appraisers were slaves of the lenders who wanted to originate and sell.

6) Those that originated MBS did not check the creditworthiness adequately.? They just sold it away.? Investment banks did not care where a profit was coming from in the short run.

7) Servicers did not demand a high price for their services, making it hard for them to service anything but solvent borrowers.

8) Realtors steered people into buying more than they could rationally afford; I’m not saying they did that on purpose, but their nature was to sell to get the highest commissions.

9) Mortgage insurers and financial guarantee insurers — because of the laxness of accounting rules, they were able to offer guarantees significantly in excess of what they could pay in the deepest crisis.

10) Hedge funds, investment banks and their investors — they demanded returns that were higher than what was sustainable.? They entered into businesses that would not survive difficult times.

11) Regulators let themselves be compromised by those following the profit motive.? Many hoped to make money after joining private industry later.

12) America.? We let ourselves become short-term as a culture, encouraging short-term prosperity, regardless of the cost.

13) Neomercantilists — they lent us money, because they wanted they export sectors to grow for political reasons.? This made our interest rates too low, encouraging overinvestment and overconsumption.

14) Average people who voted in Congress, and demanded perpetual prosperity — face it, we elect those that govern us, and there is the tendency in America to love the representative that brings home the pork, while hating Congress as a whole.? Also, we need to bear with recessions, and let them do their work, and not force our government to deal with them.

15) Auditors that did a cursory job auditing financial entities.? As the boom went on, standards got lower.

16) Academics who encouraged a naive view of diversification, and their followers who believe in uncorrelated returns.? In a bad economy, everything is correlated, and your statistics from a good economy don’t matter.

17) Pension and other funds that believed the academics.? It is amazing what institutional investors will fund, given the mistaken idea that correlation coefficients are stable.? Capitalistic economies are unstable by nature!? Why should we expect certain strategies to workallo the time?

18) Governmental entities that happily expanded government programs as the boom went on.? Now they are talking about increased taxes, rather than eliminating programs that are of marginal value to society.? Governments should not rely on increased taxes from capital gains, or real estate tax assessments.

19) Those that twitted “doom-and-gloomers,” and investors who only cared if markets went up.? It is hard to write about what could go wrong in the markets.? Many call you a wet blanket, spoiling their fun, and alleging that you are a short, or some sort of misanthrope.? The system is biased in favor of happy talk.? Just watch CNBC.

20) Me, and others who warned about the current crisis. Perhaps we weren’t clear enough.? Maybe our financial interests made us look like we were talking our books.? I know that I spent a lot of time on these issues, but in the short run, I was still an investor, trying to make money in the markets, hoping that what I feared would not occur.? Now I am getting my just desserts.

This is an incomplete list.? I invite you to add others to the list in your comments.

Entering the Endgame for Monetary Policy, Part II

Entering the Endgame for Monetary Policy, Part II

Here’s my updated graph of the composition of the Fed’s balance sheet, with modifications as suggested by some of my readers:

As you can see, the percentage of the Fed’s balance sheet containing Treasuries, whether held for itself, or together with the government is declining.? Let’s look at it another way that contains some editorializing by me:

By lower quality assets, I simply mean assets less creditworthy than the US Government or its agencies.? That’s an estimate on my part.? Why does balance sheet quality at the Fed matter?? If the Fed wants to extend credit, it can more easily do so by having higher quality assets, like Treasuries.? Now, the Fed can lose money, and it means that seniorage profits that go to the US Treasury get reduced, or go negative, which implies increased borrowing or taxation.

Credit: The Economist

I can’t remember which Greek philosopher said something like, “Democracy is doomed when people learn that they can vote to get money for themselves from the public treasury.”? I know Tyler and de Tocqueville said something like that as well.? At a time like this there are a lot of demands on the public treasury, and they are growing:

There is a trouble here.? In the absence of a functioning market, how can the bureaucrats at the Fed figure out the right prices/yields to charge?? This is the same problem as valuing level 3 assets, but without a profit motive to aid in focusing the efforts of the businessman.

Now, the little graph above (from The Economist) describes the real cause of the problems.? As in the Great Depression, there was too much debt financing of assets.? The debt was more liquid than the assets, as well.? Borrow short, lend long.? Oh, and remember, the graph above does not contain the hidden debts of the Federal Government (Medicare, Social Security, and old unfunded DB plans), the states (low funded DB plans and unfunded retiree medical plans), and corporations (poorly funded DB plans).? Nor does it take account of the synthetic leverage from derivatives.

What we are seeing at present is not a reduction of the debt structure of the economy, but a shift from public to private hands.? That can lead to four results, when the debt of the US Treasury is so large that it cannot be serviced:

  • Inflation when the Fed monetizes the debt,
  • Depression from vastly increased taxes,
  • Debt repudiation (whether internal, external, or both), or
  • Japan-style malaise for a long time.

Japan-style malaise is sounding pretty good. ;)? No growth for several decades while the government debt bloats, and financial balance sheets slowly normalize.? Trouble is, we don’t internally fund our debts.? At some point, our creditors will tire of throwing good money after bad, and then the next cycle can begin in earnest, when the neomercantilistic nations give up, and accept that their investments in the US are worth a lot less than they had thought, and allow their currencies to come to a fairer level against the US dollar.

Financial intermediation has limits.? Financial and economic systems function better at lower levels of leverage if you want it to be sustainable.? Granted, you can have big boom phases if you pile on the leverage, but they will be followed by big bust phases, where the deleveraging is painful.

All of the government’s/Fed’s choices are bad here.? Dr. Bernanke is on a hopeless task, and his theories, borne out his academic studies of the Great Depression, means that we will get a new sort of Great Depression.? There is no easy solution; it is merely a situation where we choose which poison we want to take while the deleveraging goes on.? My guess is that we see some combination of malaise plus inflation.

As Martina McBride said in her song “Love’s the Only House,” “Yeah, the pain’s gotta go someplace.”? The pain is going somewhere; our policymakers are merely determining where.

PS — I am by nature a moderate optimist.? I invest in equities, and many of my sub-theories of the world, i.e., how well will the life insurance business fare, and how well will global demand fare versus that of the US, are being tested now, and I am finding myself the loser on both counts.? Yeah, the pain’s gotta go someplace

Accounting Rules Do Not Affect Cash Flows

Accounting Rules Do Not Affect Cash Flows

At my congregation, I have a friend who is a lawyer at the Justice Department.? (Such is life for a congregation located near DC.? I am one of the few that does not derive his income from the government.)? He has asked me a couple of times about SFAS 157, and the effect it is having on the current crisis.? My recent comment to him was:

Accounting is a way of portioning economic results by time periods.? It doesn’t affect the cash flows, but tries to allocate economic profits proportional to release from risk.? If we were back in an era where the financial instruments were simple, then the old rules would work.? But once you introduce derivatives, and securities that are called bonds, but are more akin to equity interests, you need to mark them to market.

Equity instruments have always been marked to market, because of their volatility.? Similarly volatile debt instruments should be marked-to market.? Even the the old-style “hold-to-maturity” bonds would get marked down if there was a “permanent impairment of capital.”? Even today, the same rules apply, the companies could specify certain volatile bonds as hold-to-matutrity or available-for-sale.? But when the auditors look at the bonds, and ask what the market price is, the challenge is to explain why there is no permanent impairment of capital.

Those that are complaining about SFAS 157 and SFAS 133 are barking up the wrong tree.? They wouldn’t be complaining if the companies in question had not bought inherently volatile assets.? These accounting rules reveal the results of their actions.? The regulators could ignore the rules of FASB, and allow the financial institutions to balue them otherwise. The regulators have a different attiuude; they don’t care about profitability, but they do care about solvency, and avoiding “runs on the bank.”
A very well-established rule in academic finance is that changes in accounting rules do not have much impact on stock prices on average, because they don’t affect cash flows, and free cash flows are the major basis for evaluating stock prices.? If a financial company holds an impaired security, eventually that will factor into the cash flows regardless of what the accounting rules are.
There are a number of articles today on this issue:

FASB has offered a little more room to interpret the mark-to-market rules, but only a little.? Congress could mandate more latitude, though I think it would be a mistake.

Mark-to-market accounting should pay a role in valuating volatile financial instruments.? Now that financial institutions have bought financial instruments more volatile than tha buy-and-hold attitude of the old days would have done, ther rules must adjust to present a fair value.
I don’t see any way that lets the markets gain from the suspension of the rules.? The rating agencies will still do calculations of risk based liquidity on financial firms to set ratings.? Here’s a way to test though.? Go back to my old proposal that we have two income statements and two balance sheets.? Let the market see both a fair value and an amortized cost appproach.? If fair value is distorting, then investors will welcome and use the amortized cost figures in their calculations.? More information is better than less, and it is trivial to add back an amortized cost balance sheet and income statement.
For complex balance sheets in volatile times, I know which one that investors will prefer — fair value.? Let the advocates of eliminating fair value explain why reducing information to investors is such a great benefit.? In the end the cash flows will be the same, and maybe it will take a little longer, but the results of bad investment decisions will be revealed, and the same firms will fail — perhaps in yet more ugly ways, as their shenanigans will go on longer, with less to recover for the bondholders, and wiping out the equity entirely.
In the absence of fair value, suscpicion will take the place of information, and companies will still get marked down as failure takes place in fixed income assets classes.? The same things will happen, just in a messier way.? You can’t fight the cash flows arising from bad investment decisions, and too much leverage.
AIG Borrows from Itself

AIG Borrows from Itself

The Governor of New York, possibly thinking about his tax base, and perhaps 30,000 jobs, has allowed AIG to borrow $20 billion from its subsidiaries.? Details are scant, but this can be one of three things:

  • AIG has surplus assets in its NY-domiciled subsidiaries in excess of their risk-based capital requirements.? If true, borrowing against these would be a no-brainer that should have been pursued long ago.? Favoring this view is the NY Governor, who says AIG is “extraordinarily solvent.”
  • AIG has surplus assets in its NY-domiciled subsidiaries, but not in excess of their risk-based capital requirements.? Borrowing against these would be a risky gamble, because it lowers the amount of risk margin available to absorb adverse deviations.
  • Some combination of both — say that AIG has only $15 billion in surplus assets in its NY-domiciled subsidiaries… $5 billion would reduce risk margins.

The risk here is that you end up with insolvencies of some of AIG’s subsidiaries.? Though poential losses to policyholders would be unlikely to be large, assessments would be made to other insurer though the state guaranty funds in order to keep policyholders whole, but potentially at a cost to the other insurers.

This has the potential to look really bright or really stupid, and in a short amount of time, too.? Final note: It’s not impossible, but I would be surprised if the Federal Government or the Federal Reserve intervenes on AIG when it would not with Lehman.

My Interview on BizRadio

My Interview on BizRadio

On Wednesday afternoon I was interviewed on BizRadio’s The MoneyMan Report regarding my recent piece: The Fundamentals of Residential Real Estate Market Bottoms.? (Boy, did that get a lot of play all over the web.)

You can listen to the interviews here (at my site):

Or here (at their site):

The two segments together are about 15 minutes in length.

I enjoyed the interview, though it would have helped if I had done a little more homework into the prevailing philosophy of the show, and if I had been more clear about how to introduce me.? I sent them my bio, but they must not have looked too As it is, they never mentioned my employer (bad — I want them to be better known).? Nor did they mention my blog, so if someone wants to read the piece, they don’t know where to find it.

So, I get heard across Texas, and wherever else they syndicate their programming.? It’s interesting talking with people who are looking to make money, and had to say to them, “Not yet, not yet.”? But, I tried, and I did better than I expected.? I would be willing to do other radio shows as the opportunity arises.

The Fundamentals of Residential Real Estate Market Bottoms

The Fundamentals of Residential Real Estate Market Bottoms

This article was posted at The Big Picture this morning as I was guest-blogging for Barry.? That’s a first for me, and there is no better site to do it at.? I present the article here for those that did not see it at The Big Picture.

=–==–==–==–==-=-=–==-=-=-=-=–==-=-=-=-=-=–=-=-=-==-=-=-

This piece completes a series that I started RealMoney, and continued at my blog.? For those with access to RealMoney, I did an article called The Fundamentals of Market Tops, where I concluded in early 2004 that we weren?t at a top yet.? For those without access, Barry Ritholtz put a large portion of it at his blog.? I then wrote another piece at RM applying the framework to residential housing in mid-2005, and I came to a different conclusion: yes, residential real estate [RRE] was near its top.? Recently, I posted a piece a number of readers asked me to write: The Fundamentals of Market Bottoms, where I concluded we weren?t yet at a bottom for the equity markets.

This piece completes the series for now, and asks whether we are at the bottom for RRE prices. If not, when, and how much more pain?

Before I start this piece, I have to deal with the issue of why RRE market tops and bottoms are different.? The signals for a bottom are not automatically the inverse of those for a top. Tops and bottoms for RRE are different primarily because of debt investors.? At market tops, typically credit spreads are tight, but they have been tight for several years, while seemingly cheap leverage builds up.? There is a sense of invincibility for the RRE market, and the financing markets reflect that. Bottoms are more jagged, with debt financing expensive to non-existent.

As a friend of mine once said, ?To make a stock go to zero, it has to have a significant slug of debt.?? The same is true of RRE and that is what differentiates tops from bottoms.? At tops, no one cares about the level of debt or financing terms.? The rare insolvencies that happen then are often due to fraud.? But at bottoms, the only thing that investors care about is the level of debt or financing terms.

Why Do RRE Defaults Happen?

It costs money to sell a home ? around 5-10% of the sales price. In a RRE bear market, those costs fall entirely on the seller. That?s why economic incentives for the owners of RRE decline once their equity on a mark-to-market basis declines below that threshold. They no longer have equity so much as an option on the equity of the home, should they continue to pay on their mortgage and prices rise.

As RRE prices have fallen, a larger percentage of the housing stock has fallen below the 10% equity threshold. Near the peak in October 2005, maybe 5% of all houses were below the threshold. Recently, I estimated that that figure was closer to 12%. It may go as high as 20% by the time we reach bottom.

Defaults occur in RRE when there would be negative equity in a sale, and a negative life event occurs:

  • Unemployment
  • Death
  • Disability
  • Disaster
  • Divorce
  • Large mortgage payment rise from a reset or a recast

The negative life events, which, aside from changes in mortgage payments, can?t be expected, cause the borrower to give up and default. During a RRE bear market, most people in a negative equity on sale position don?t have a lot of extra assets to fall back on, so anything that interrupts the normal flow of income raises the odds of default. So long as there are a large number of homes in a negative equity on sale position, a certain percentage will keep sliding into foreclosure when negative life events hit. For any individual, it is random, but for the US as a whole, a predictable flow of foreclosures occur.

Examining Economic Actors as We near the Bottom

Starting at the bottom of the housing ?food chain,? I?m going to consider how various parties act as we get near the RRE price bottom. At the bottom, typically Federal Reserve policy is loose, and the yield curve is very steep. Financial companies, if they are in good shape, can profit from lending against their inexpensive deposit bases.

This presumes that the remaining banks are in good shape, with adequate capacity to lend. That?s not true at present. Regulation has moved into triage mode, where the regulators divide the institutions into healthy, questionable, and dead. The bottom typically is not reached until the number of questionable institutions starts to shrink. Right now that figure is growing for banks, thrifts, and credit unions.

The Fed?s monetary policy can only stimulate the healthy institutions. Over time, many of the questionable will slow growth, and build up enough free assets to write off bad debts. Those free assets will come through capital raises and modest profitability. Others will fail, and their assets will be taken over by stronger institutions, and losses realized by the FDIC, etc. The FDIC, and other insurance funds, will have their own balancing act, as they will need to raise premiums, but not so much that it harms borderline institutions.

Another tricky issue is the Treasury-Eurodollar [TED] Spread. Near the bottom, there should be significant uncertainty about the banking system, and the willingness of banks to lend to each other. Spreads on corporate and trust preferreds should be relatively high as well. Past the bottom, all of these spreads should be rallying for surviving institutions.

Financing for purchasing a house in a RRE bear market is expensive to nonexistent, but the underwriting is strong. At the bottom, volumes increase as enough buyers have built up sufficient earning power and savings to put a decent amount down, and be able to comfortably finance the balance at the new reduced housing prices, even with relatively high mortgage rates relative to where the government borrows.

Many other players in RRE financing will find themselves stretched, and some will be broken. Consider these players:

1) Home equity lenders will be greatly reduced, and won?t return in size until well after the bottom is passed.

2) Many unregulated and liberally regulated lenders are out of business. The virtue of a strong balance sheet and a deposit franchise speaks for itself.

3) Buyers of subordinated RMBS have been destroyed; same for many leveraged players in ?high quality? paper. Don?t even mention subprime; that game is over, and may even be turning up now as vultures pick through the rubble. This has implications for MBIA, Ambac, and other financial guarantors, since they guaranteed similar business. How big will their losses be?

4) Mortgage insurers are impaired. In earlier RRE bear markets, that meant earnings went negative for a while. In this case, one has failed, and some more might fail as well.

5) Do the GSEs continue to exist in their present form? That question never came up in prior bear markets, but it will have to be answered before the bottom comes. Will the FHLB take losses from their mortgage holdings? Will it be severe enough that it affects their creditworthiness? I doubt it, but anything is possible in this down cycle, and the FHLBs have absorbed a lot of RRE mortgage financing.

6) Securitization gets done limitedly, if at all. This is already true for non-GSE-insured loans; the question is how much Fannie and Freddie will do. My suspicion is near the bottom, as loan volumes increase, banks will be looking for ways to move mortgages off of their balance sheets, and securitization should increase.

7) The losses have to go somewhere, which brings up one more player, the US Government. Through the institutions the US sponsors, and through whatever m?lange of programs the US uses to directly bail out financially broken individuals and institutions, a lot of the pain will get directed back to taxpayers, and, those who lend to the US government in its own currency. It is possible that foreign lenders to the US may rebel at some point, but if the OPEC nations in the Middle East or China haven?t blinked by now, I?m not sure what level of current account deficit would make them change their policy.

That said, the recent housing bill wasn?t that amazing. Look for the US Government to try again after the election.

A Few More Economic Actors to Consider

Now let?s consider the likely actions of parties that are closer to the building and buying of houses.

1) Toward the bottom, or shortly after that, we should see an increase in speculative buying from investors. These will be smarter speculators than the ones buying in 2005; they will not only not rely on capital gains in order to survive, but they require a risk premium. Renting the property will have to generate a very attractive return in order to get to buy the properties.

2) Renters will be doing the same math and will begin buying in volume when they can finance it prudently, and save money over renting.

3) At the bottom, only the best realtors are left. It?s no longer a seemingly ?easy money? profession.

4) At the bottom, only the best builders survive, and typically they trade for 50-125% of their written-down book value. Leverage declines significantly. Land gets written down. JVs get rationalized. Fewer homes get built, so that inventories of unsold homes finally decline.

As for current homeowners, the mortgage resets and recasts have to be past the peak at the bottom, with the end in sight. (In my piece on real estate market tops, I suggested that after the bubble popped ?Short rates would have to rally significantly to bail these borrowers out. We would need the fed funds target at around 2%.? Well, we are there, but I didn?t expect the TED spread to be so high.)

5) Defaults begin burning out, because the number of the number of properties in a negative equity on sale position begins to decline.

6) Places that had the biggest booms have the biggest busts, even if open property is scarce. Remember, a piece of land is not priceless, but is only worth the subjective present value of future services that can be derived from the land to the marginal buyer. When the marginal buyers are nonexistent, and lenders are skittish, prices can fall a long way, even in supply-constrained markets.

For a parallel, consider pricing in the art market. Many pieces of art are priceless, but the market as a whole tends to follow the liquidity of the rich marginal art buyer. When liquidity is scarce, prices tend to fall, though it is often masked by a lack of trading in an illiquid market.

When financing expands dramatically in any sector, there is a tendency for the assets being financed to appreciate in value in the short run. This was true of the Nasdaq in the late ’90s, commercial real estate in the mid-to-late 1980s, lesser-developed-country lending in the late ’70s, etc. Financing injects liquidity, and liquidity creates confidence in the short run, which can become self-reinforcing, until the cash flows can?t support the assets in question, and then the markets become self-reinforcing on the downside, as buying power collapses.

The Bottom Is Coming, But I Wouldn?t Get Too Happy Yet

There are reasons to think that we are at or near the bottom now:

But I don?t think we are there yet, and here is why:

My best guess is that we are two years away from a bottom in RRE prices, and that prices will have to fall around 10-20% from here in order to restore more normal price levels versus rents, incomes, long term price trends, etc. Hey, it could be worse, Fitch is projecting a 25% decline.

Not all of the indicators that I put forth have to appear for there to be a market bottom. A preponderance of them appearing would make me consider the possibility, and that is not the case now.

Some of my indicators are vague and require subjective judgment. But they?re better than nothing, and keep me in the game today. Avoiding the banks, homebuilders, and many related companies has helped my performance over the last three years. I hope that I ? and you ? can do well once the bottom nears. There will be bargains to be had in housing-related and financial stocks.

Full disclosure: no positions in companies mentioned

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