Category: Stocks

Can You Carry The Position?

Can You Carry The Position?

My post yesterday on corporate bond spreads was received well.? I want to amplify one point that I did not make strongly enough.? During market crises, asset values cheapen not only in response to likely losses over the long run, but the possibility that there might be forced sellers due to:

  • Reduction of leverage because of asset values declining
  • Reduction of leverage because of brokers lending money get skittish
  • Reduction of leverage because of rating agency downgrades
  • Reduction of leverage because of client withdrawals
  • Reduction of leverage because of an increased need for capital from the regulators
  • Arbitrage from falling prices in related markets

This can temporarily self-reinforce falling asset prices, until unlevered (or lightly levered) buyers find the returns from the assets to be compelling.? Though my piece yesterday was more fun to write, this makes the argument plain.? Can you carry the asset through hard times?? What about the rest of the asset holders?

The concept of weak hands versus strong hands is a very real issue, and for those with a subscription to RealMoney, I recommend these four classic (Labor of love) articles of mine:

Managing Liability Affects Stocks, Pt. 1
Separating Weak Holders From the Strong
Get to Know the Holders? Hands, Part 1
Get to Know the Holders? Hands, Part 2

These articles are core to my thinking, and I spent a lot of time on them.

My Disclaimer is Part of my Philosophy

My Disclaimer is Part of my Philosophy

Disclaimer: David Merkel is an investment professional, and like every investment professional, he makes mistakes. David encourages you to do your own independent “due diligence” on any idea that he talks about, because he could be wrong. Nothing written here, or in my writings at RealMoney is an invitation to buy or sell any particular security; at most, David is handing out educated guesses as to what the markets may do. David is fond of saying, “The markets always find a new way to make a fool out of you,” and so he encourages caution in investing. Risk control wins the game in the long run, not bold moves.

Additionally, David may occasionally write about accounting, actuarial, insurance, and tax topics, but nothing written here or on RealMoney is meant to be formal “advice” in those areas. Consult a reputable professional in those areas to get personal, tailored advice that meets the specialized needs that David can have no knowledge of.

My disclaimer dates back five years.? It’s at the bottom of my blog, and is there for a reason: I get things wrong.? Now, I like to think that I get things right more often, but let’s just look at the gritty downside for a moment.? I wrote a series of articles at RealMoney on using investment advice.

Using Investment Advice, Part 1
Using Investment Advice, Part 2
Using Investment Advice, Part 3
Tread Warily on Media Stock Tips

I wrote these with Jim Cramer in mind.? Now, I like Jim Cramer; he says a lot of bright things.? But when you talk about so many things, and put out so much content, particularly on TV, you have to be careful.

I don’t have 0.1% of the exposure that Mr. Cramer has, but I care what happens to my readers.? (I think Jim does too, but the shell has to get hard when one is that exposed, or, you’ll give up speaking and writing.)? So, when I make notable errors, it hurts me double.? I usually have my cash on the line when I write, or at least, my reputation, which is more valuable (you only get one of those).

Today was my worst relative performance day in a long time.? Deerfield Capital, National Atlantic, and Gehl, all did badly.? I bought more Deerfield today, and I’ll put out a post on my thoughts soon.? That said, March is off to a bad start with me, after a tremendous first two months of the year.

So, I am eating my crow, lightly seasoned, and with humility.?? Always do your own due diligence when you read me, because I get it wrong now and then, at least in the short run.

Full disclosure: long DFR NAHC GEHL

Berkshire Hathaway — The Anti-Volatility Fortress

Berkshire Hathaway — The Anti-Volatility Fortress

I?ve commented on Buffett?s Shareholder letter now for the past five years.? Those who know me well know that I admire Buffett and Berky, but not uncritically.?? Also, I view Berky as primarily an insurance company, secondarily as an industrial conglomerate, and thirdly as an investment company.

Onto the letter:

From page 3:

You may recall a 2003 Silicon Valley bumper sticker that implored, ?Please, God, Just One More Bubble.? Unfortunately, this wish was promptly granted, as just about all Americans came to believe that house prices would forever rise. That conviction made a borrower?s income and cash equity seem unimportant to lenders, who shoveled out money, confident that HPA ? house price appreciation ? would cure all problems. Today, our country is experiencing widespread pain because of that erroneous belief. As house prices fall, a huge amount of financial folly is being exposed. You only learn who has been swimming naked when the tide goes out ? and what we are witnessing at some of our largest financial institutions is an ugly sight.

Buffett starts out with the cause behind most of our current problems in financial companies.?? There are too many houses chasing too few people, and inadequate underwriting of the financing, because of a misplaced trust in the rise of housing prices.

From page 4:

Though these tables may help you gain historical perspective and be useful in valuation, they are completely misleading in predicting future possibilities. Berkshire?s past record can?t be duplicated or even approached. Our base of assets and earnings is now far too large for us to make outsized gains in the future.? (emphasis his)

Buffett has been honest on this point for years.? As the business grows, it is unlikely to find opportunities as good in percentage terms as it did when it was smaller.? That?s normal, even for the best investors.

In our efforts, we will be aided enormously by the managers who have joined Berkshire. This is an unusual group in several ways. First, most of them have no financial need to work. Many sold us their businesses for large sums and run them because they love doing so, not because they need the money. Naturally they wish to be paid fairly, but money alone is not the reason they work hard and productively.

Buffett hits on what I think is one of the great secrets of good capitalism.? The best capitalists are not purely money-motivated, but are idealists, aiming for excellence as they serve others though their businesses.? In the best businesses that I have worked in, we did it because we loved what we did.? That?s a key for all good businesses, from the CEO down to the clerk.

From page 7:

Long-term competitive advantage in a stable industry is what we seek in a business. If that comes with rapid organic growth, great. But even without organic growth, such a business is rewarding. We will simply take the lush earnings of the business and use them to buy similar businesses elsewhere. There?s no rule that you have to invest money where you?ve earned it. Indeed, it?s often a mistake to do so: Truly great businesses, earning huge returns on tangible assets, can?t for any extended period reinvest a large portion of their earnings internally at high rates of return.

This is the core of Buffett the businessman.? He understands the need to redirect free cash flow to the opportunities that offer the best returns.? He knows that certain businesses will never be more than niches, and like a good farmer would, harvests his specialty crop each year, but doesn?t plant much more the next year.

He goes on for two pages on how he distinguishes between businesses, considering their long-term competitive advantage, return on investment, and capital intensiveness.??? It?s a good read, and very basic.? If it weren?t for the fact that many companies operate more for the good of management than shareholders, you might see this in operation more broadly.? (And you would see opportunities diminish for private equity as far as big deals go.? Private equity keeps public management teams on their toes, for the bigger deals.)

From pages 9-11, Buffett discusses his insurance businesses, and spends much less time on them than in prior years.? It is not as if there isn?t a good story to tell.? Are underwriting profits down?? Yes, but only by 10%.? The rest of the P&C insurance industry is struggling with the same problems, and is likely doing worse in aggregate.? I think that some major disasters will have to happen to re-energize earnings here.? Berky is an anti-volatility asset, and always does relatively better when the rest of the insurance industry is hurting.

On page 11, Buffett comments on his utility businesses.? Earnings are up in this line.? These are a natural fit for Berky, with their earnings yield considerably above Berky?s cost of float, and earnings that tend to do well when inflation is higher.? Expect Buffett to buy more here, but only during some significant pullback in utility stock prices.

From that page:

Somewhat incongruously, MidAmerican also owns the second largest real estate brokerage firm in the U.S., HomeServices of America. This company operates through 20 locally-branded firms with 18,800 agents. Last year was a slow year for residential sales, and 2008 will probably be slower. We will continue, however, to acquire quality brokerage operations when they are available at sensible prices.

From page 13:

Last year, Shaw, MiTek and Acme contracted for tuck-in acquisitions that will help future earnings. You can be sure they will be looking for more of these.

and

At Borsheims, sales increased 15.1%, helped by a 27% gain during Shareholder Weekend. Two years ago, Susan Jacques suggested that we remodel and expand the store. I was skeptical, but Susan was right.

?

From page 15:

Clayton, XTRA and CORT are all good businesses, very ably run by Kevin Clayton, Bill Franz and Paul Arnold. Each has made tuck-in acquisitions during Berkshire?s ownership. More will come.

Buffett understands that most good acquisitions are little ones that can be used to increase organic growth of the subsidiary. ?Same thing for intelligent capital spending, as at Borsheim?s.? He may keep a tight hold on free cash flow, but he listens to his subsidiary CEOs, and usually gives them enough to invest to improve the businesses.

Also look at the countercyclical nature of Buffett?s acquisitions.? He is willing to buy real estate sales franchises in this environment, if they come at the right price.? Much as I am a bear on housing, this is the right strategy, if you have a strong enough balance sheet behind it.

On pages 12 and 14, net operating income improved in Manufacturing, Service, and Retailing Operations, and fell in Finance and Finance Products.? He doesn?t discuss it, but there was a loss in life and annuity.? Berky mainly does life settlements there, a business I regard as somewhat malodorous because it undermines the life insurance industry, by weakening the concept of insurable interest.? Also, leasing didn?t do that well, as Buffett points out.

On page 15, I don?t have a strong opinion on his stock positions? they are a little more expensive than I like to buy, but he has to deploy a lot more money than I do, and has a longer time horizon.? His focus on long term competitive advantage is exactly right for his position in the market.

On page 16, Buffett discusses his derivative book:

Last year I told you that Berkshire had 62 derivative contracts that I manage. (We also have a few left in the General Re runoff book.) Today, we have 94 of these, and they fall into two categories. First, we have written 54 contracts that require us to make payments if certain bonds that are included in various high-yield indices default. These contracts expire at various times from 2009 to 2013. At yearend we had received $3.2 billion in premiums on these contracts; had paid $472 million in losses; and in the worst case (though it is extremely unlikely to occur) could be required to pay an additional $4.7 billion.

?

We are certain to make many more payments. But I believe that on premium revenues alone, these contracts will prove profitable, leaving aside what we can earn on the large sums we hold. Our yearend liability for this exposure was recorded at $1.8 billion and is included in ?Derivative Contract Liabilities? on our balance sheet.

?

The second category of contracts involves various put options we have sold on four stock indices (the S&P 500 plus three foreign indices). These puts had original terms of either 15 or 20 years and were struck at the market. We have received premiums of $4.5 billion, and we recorded a liability at yearend of $4.6 billion. The puts in these contracts are exercisable only at their expiration dates, which occur between 2019 and 2027, and Berkshire will then need to make a payment only if the index in question is quoted at a level below that existing on the day that the put was written. Again, I believe these contracts, in aggregate, will be profitable and that we will, in addition, receive substantial income from our investment of the premiums we hold during the 15- or 20-year period.

?

Two aspects of our derivative contracts are particularly important. First, in all cases we hold the money, which means that we have no counterparty risk.

?

Second, accounting rules for our derivative contracts differ from those applying to our investment portfolio. In that portfolio, changes in value are applied to the net worth shown on Berkshire?s balance sheet, but do not affect earnings unless we sell (or write down) a holding. Changes in the value of a derivative contract, however, must be applied each quarter to earnings.

?

Thus, our derivative positions will sometimes cause large swings in reported earnings, even though Charlie and I might believe the intrinsic value of these positions has changed little. He and I will not be bothered by these swings ? even though they could easily amount to $1 billion or more in a quarter ? and we hope you won?t be either. You will recall that in our catastrophe insurance business, we are always ready to trade increased volatility in reported earnings in the short run for greater gains in net worth in the long run. That is our philosophy in derivatives as well.

?

Okay, so Buffett is long high yield credit, and seemingly receiving a pretty reward for it (the numbers seem too good, what is he doing?), and is long the US and other equity markets by writing long-dated European puts.? Sounds pretty good to me on both, though I?d love to see the details on the high yield, and on the equity index puts, Berky will be vulnerable in a depression scenario (it would be interesting to know the details there also).

?

Buffett is behaving like a long-tail P&C insurer, and he is willing to take on volatility if it offers better returns.? Berky is almost always willing to take on catastrophe risks, if they are more than adequately compensated.? If you are uncertain about this, ask the financial guarantors, they will tell you.

?

On page 17:

?

There?s been much talk recently of sovereign wealth funds and how they are buying large pieces of American businesses. This is our doing, not some nefarious plot by foreign governments. Our trade equation guarantees massive foreign investment in the U.S. When we force-feed $2 billion daily to the rest of the world, they must invest in something here. Why should we complain when they choose stocks over bonds?

?

Indeed, what?s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.? Why should the rest of the world buy our depreciating bonds, when they can buy our companies, which in my opinion, often offer much better prospects?? As Buffett puts it later, we are force-feeding dollars to the rest of the world? the decline in value is to be expected.

?

Also on page 17:

?

At Berkshire we held only one direct currency position during 2007. That was in ? hold your breath ? the Brazilian real. Not long ago, swapping dollars for reals would have been unthinkable. After all, during the past century five versions of Brazilian currency have, in effect, turned into confetti. As has been true in many countries whose currencies have periodically withered and died, wealthy Brazilians sometimes stashed large sums in the U.S. to preserve their wealth.

?

Clever move, and emblematic of the shift happening in our world where resource- and cheap labor-driven nations grow rapidly, and build up trade surpluses against the developed world.? Their currencies have appreciated.

?

Also on page 17:

?

Our direct currency positions have yielded $2.3 billion of pre-tax profits over the past five years, and in addition we have profited by holding bonds of U.S. companies that are denominated in other currencies. For example, in 2001 and 2002 we purchased ?310 million Amazon.com, Inc. 6 7/8 of 2010 at 57% of par. At the time, Amazon bonds were priced as ?junk? credits, though they were anything but. (Yes, Virginia, you can occasionally find markets that are ridiculously inefficient ? or at least you can find them anywhere except at the finance departments of some leading business schools.)

?

The Euro denomination of the Amazon bonds was a further, and important, attraction for us. The Euro was at 95? when we bought in 2002. Therefore, our cost in dollars came to only $169 million. Now the bonds sell at 102% of par and the Euro is worth $1.47. In 2005 and 2006 some of our bonds were called and we received $253 million for them. Our remaining bonds were valued at $162 million at yearend. Of our $246 million of realized and unrealized gain, about $118 million is attributable to the fall in the dollar. Currencies do matter.

?

Though Buffett got scared out of many of his foreign currency positions over the last few years, intellectually he was right about the direction of the US dollar, and made decent money off it.? The Amazon position was a home run in bond terms.? Bill Miller benefited from that one as well.? (I also endorse the comment on occasional inefficient markets.)

?

On page 18:

?

At Berkshire, we will attempt to further increase our stream of direct and indirect foreign earnings. Even if we are successful, however, our assets and earnings will always be concentrated in the U.S. Despite our country?s many imperfections and unrelenting problems of one sort or another, America?s rule of law, market-responsive economic system, and belief in meritocracy are almost certain to produce ever-growing prosperity for its citizens.

?

This is one of America?s greatest sustainable competitive advantages.? We allow more flexibility and failure than anywhere else in the world.? We have a relatively open and free system of markets and government.? Woe betide us if we change this.

?

On pages 18-20, Buffett takes on employee stock option accounting and pension accounting.? He believes options should be expensed, and that companies should bring down their assumptions for investment earnings, because they are unrealistically high.? I agree on the latter, and on the former, I think full disclosure is good enough.? Accounting rules are important, but investors (like Buffett) look for long-term free cash flows, which are largely unaffected by accounting rules.

?

I don?t think the market is fooled in either case.? Companies with large stock option grants and high assumed earning on pension plans both tend to trade cheap.? Their earnings quality is light.

?

Finally, on page 20:

Whatever pension-cost surprises are in store for shareholders down the road, these jolts will be surpassed many times over by those experienced by taxpayers. Public pension promises are huge and, in many cases, funding is woefully inadequate. Because the fuse on this time bomb is long, politicians flinch from inflicting tax pain, given that problems will only become apparent long after these officials have departed. Promises involving very early retirement ? sometimes to those in their low 40s ? and generous cost-of-living adjustments are easy for these officials to make. In a world where people are living longer and inflation is certain, those promises will be anything but easy to keep.

?

Ummm? say it again, Warren.? I?ve been saying this for years.? Hey, throw in multiple employer trusts as well.

?

With that, I would offer two observations about this letter from Warren.? First, it is shorter, and contains less data on the businesses, particularly the insurance businesses, but then, it was a quiet year.? Second, he had less in the way of ?soap box? issues this year.

?

In closing, Berky had a good year, and I have little to quibble with in this letter.? Another good job, Warren.

Break Up AIG!

Break Up AIG!

Recently at RM, I wrote:


David Merkel
Buy Other Insurers off of the Bad AIG News
2/12/2008 2:54 AM EST

Sometimes I think there are too many investors trading baskets of stocks, and too few doing real investing work. I have rarely been bullish on AIG… I think the last time I owned it was slightly before they added it to the DJIA, and I sold it on the day it was added. Why bearish on AIG? Isn’t it cheap? It might be; who can tell? There’s a lot buried on AIG’s balance sheet. Who can truly tell whether AIG Financial Products has its values set right? International Lease Finance? American General Finance? The long-tail casualty reserves? The value of its mortgage insurer? I’m not saying anything is wrong here, but it is a complex company, and complexity always deserves a discount.

You can read my articles from 2-3 years ago where I went through this exercise when the accounting went bad the last time, and Greenberg was shown the door. (And, judging from the scuttlebutt I hear, it has been a good thing for him. But not for AIG.)

AIG deserves to be broken up into simpler component parts that can be more easily understood and valued. Perhaps Greenberg could manage the behemoth (though I have my doubts), no one man can. There are too many disparate moving parts.

So, what would I do off of the news? Buy other insurers that have gotten hit due to senseless collateral damage (no pun intended). As I recently wrote at my blog:

If Prudential drops much further, I am buying some. With an estimated 2009 PE below 8, it would be hard to go wrong on such a high quality company. I am also hoping that Assurant drops below $53, where I will buy more. The industry fundamentals are generally favorable. Honestly, I could get juiced about Stancorp below $50, Principal, Protective, Lincoln National, Delphi Financial, Metlife… There are quality companies going on sale, and my only limit is how much I am willing to overweight the industry. Going into the energy wave in 2002, I was quadruple-weight energy. Insurance stocks are 16% of my portfolio now, which is quadruple-weight or so. This is a defensive group, with reasonable upside. I’ll keep you apprised as I make moves here.

What can I say? I like the industry’s fundamentals. These companies do not have the balance sheet issues that AIG does. I will be a buyer of some of these names on weakness.

Position: long LNC HIG AIZ

Look, back when AIG had a AAA rating, there was a reason to hold the whole thing together, because of cheap financing.? Today, AIG suffers from a conglomerate discount, because no one can understand the balance sheet.? (Can anyone inside AIG understand all the exposures that they face?)

Simpler is better.? Simple companies get better valuations, and the managers are sharper at financial controls, because they don’t have to cover as much ground.? They can focus.? So it should be for AIG, if they want to unlock value.? (Perhaps AIG is the Citigroup of the insurance industry…)

Full disclosure:? long LNC HIG AIZ

Is the PEG Ratio a Valid Concept?

Is the PEG Ratio a Valid Concept?

This piece is a work in progress, so I solicit your feedback on it. How could it be improved?

=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

I enjoy it when my expectations are proven wrong, because it means that I learned something in the process. When I began preparation for this post (which will probably have two parts, because I am having difficulty posting files, tables and pictures at my blog), I expected to write a post that would conclude that the PEG ratio (P/E divided by the anticipated growth rate expressed as an integer) is a nifty market artifact, but had no sound theoretical grounding.

The answer to the question in my title is complex. The answers are No, Sometimes, and Yes.

  • If you?re a deep value investor: No.
  • If you?re a moderate value or core investor: Sometimes.
  • If you?re a fundamentally-driven moderate growth investor: Yes.
  • If you?re an aggressive growth investor: No.

When I did my earlier post on my version of the Fed Model, I began by showing that it was a simplification of the simple version of the dividend discount model [DDM], which states that the value of a stock is equal to the present value of its future dividends. I?m going to do the same thing here with a few changes:

? I can?t prove what I am stating analytically, that is, by manipulating equations. I?m going to do it through scenario analysis and regression.

? My piece on my Fed model used the simple DDM. This piece uses a three-stage DDM. The stages are growth, transition, and maturity. For those with access to a Bloomberg Terminal, my implementation is a more conservative version of what they did.

Three-Stage DDM Assumptions

  • ? Initial forecast earnings (E1)
  • ? Initial dividend payout ratio as a portion of earnings (PR1)
  • ? Growth rate of earnings in the first phase of the model (g)
  • ? Length of the first phase (5 years)
  • ? Length of the second transition phase (6 years)
  • ? Ultimate earnings growth rate in maturity (6%)
  • ? Ultimate payout ratio in maturity (50%)
  • ? Discount rate for the dividend stream (ks), otherwise known as the required rate of return (i.e., what does an investor have to expect to earn in order to get him to part with his cash?)

In brief, in the first phase of the model, earnings grow at a rapid rate, and dividends are paid at a relatively low rate, in the second (transition) phase, the earnings growth and dividend payout rates grade linearly into the rates of the ultimate phase. The resulting dividend stream gets discounted at a discount rate reflecting the riskiness of the company.

Limitations of the Model

  • ? It is difficult to forecast earnings for next year, much less give a growth rate for the next 5 years. I use sell side estimates as an initial jumping off point.
  • ? Companies grow erratically.
  • ? The maturation of a company is rarely so linear.
  • ? The lengths of the first two phases are somewhat arbitrary, though the sell side typically does 5-year growth rates.
  • ? A 6% growth rate in maturity is consistent with long term nominal GDP growth, but it is still quite an assumption.
  • ? Payout rates and growth rates should be inversely correlated. To the extent that capital constrains business growth, a higher rate of dividend payout should result in a lower earnings growth rate.
  • ? The discount rate is difficult to calculate. Theoretically, it should be 2-3% percent higher than the highest yield on the longest, most subordinated debt or preferred of the company. If a company has no debt, compare it to the yields of bonds of other companies with similar put option implied volatility 20% or more out of the money. Then add 2-3% to those yields.
  • ? Payout rates and the discount rate should be negatively correlated. Companies with high payout rates will be judged to be less risky most of the time, and vice-versa.

All that said, the DDM is a model, and a richer model than the PEG ratio. My question became, ?Are there conditions where the results of the DDM resemble a PEG ratio?? The answer to that is yes, when:

  • The discount rate is 14% or lower
  • At lower discount rates, only for higher P/Es. For example at a discount rate of 8%, the PEG ratio works for P/Es 16 and higher.

Now I oversimplified my conclusions here. Look at this graphic:

Validity Space
Or, based off of that, consider this graph, which shows the PEG hurdle rates as a function of initial P/Es. and cost of capital (discount) rates:

Price-to-Value Graph

How did I come to this result? For differing levels of the discount rate, I varied P/E levels, calculating the initial phase growth rate that would make price equal to value in the DDM. Those P/E and growth levels gave me the PEG ratios. Those PEG ratios were often quite flat for higher P/Es at a given level of the discount rate of 14% or below. There is usually a bit of a smile or smirk, but you can see an average level.

At 16% or higher levels of the discount rate, the PEG ratio falls apart. At low levels of P/E the required PEG ratio should be low. At high levels of P/E, the required PEG ratio can be higher. The intuition here is that situations with high discount rates, and thus high risk, require high growth to fuel value in a DDM calculation.

At low discount rates, and low P/Es, the DDM says that value investors don?t need much growth at all in order to buy good values. If one considers the inverse of the P/E, the E/P, or earnings yield, when it is greater than the discount rate, it is hard to lose money, even when earnings don?t grow. Even more so when the dividend yield exceeds or is near the discount rate.

A Formula for the PEG Ratio Hurdle

Taking the average PEG hurdle rates for P/Es 16 and above, where price equaled DDM Value, for various discount and payout rates, I calculated a regression to give a more general PEG hurdle rate formula. The factors appeared multiplicative, so I used a formula that looked like this:

ln ( average PEG hurdle) = a + b * ln(discount rate) + c * ln(payout rate) + e (error term)

The regression had an adjusted R-squared of 98%, with all coefficients statistically significant at prob-values of 99% or better. a was 7.8646, b was -1.3169 and c was .0752. In summary form, the formula looks like this:

Average PEG hurdle = 26.03 * discount rate-1.3169 * payout rate0.0752

Pretty good, but after a little while, I asked if I could create a formula that better represented the curves in graph 2. So, I ran the following regression:

ln (PEG hurdle) = a + b * ln(discount rate) + c * ln(payout rate) + d * ln(P/E) + e (error term)

I had a debate as to how to censor the data. I threw out data points with negative PEG hurdles in the first analysis. In the second one, I threw out negative PEG hurdles, and PEG hurdles over 2.0x. On the second analysis, my reasoning was that if PEG hurdles over 2.0 are acceptable, we?re in weird times. Now perhaps that pre-judges the situation, but the right functional form for graph 2 eludes me here. Personally, I would use the second formula here:

Formula 1: Average PEG hurdle = 0.01823 * discount rate-1.6279 * payout rate0.1039 * PE Ratio0.1893

Formula 2: Average PEG hurdle = 0.02035 * discount rate-1.4215 * payout rate0.0941 * PE Ratio0.2704

Formula 1 has an R-squared of 76%, and with 2 it is 88%. The t-statistics are all significant at 99% levels.

Now, suppose I am a growth investor and I decide to apply formula 2. I look for stocks with PE ratios of around 20, my discount rate is 15%, and the dividend payout rate is around 10%. What annual earnings growth should I be looking for over the next 5 years? The formula says 36.6%. Pretty aggressive. At a discount rate of 12%, the growth rate drops to 26.6%.

What this points out in a way is the difficulty of making consistent money in growth stocks. The earnings growth rates needed to make money in excess of the discount rate on average over time is higher than most growth investors realize.

Growth investors overpay for growth. That is one of the reasons that I am a value investor.

One final note: Jim Cramer has a limit for what he is willing to pay for growth stocks ? a PEG ratio of 2.0x. Now, he?s a bright guy, so there are two ways that I can interpret this. 1) Since momentum plays a large role in Cramer?s investing, the 2.0x ceiling limits his risk while he plays momentum. Or, 2) he has longer periods of competitive advantage and transition than I do. I favor the first interpretation, because it is rare in my opinion that growth investors should pay over 1.5 times the growth rate for any investment, unless the barriers to entry are significant.

Summary

PEG ratios work for core and growth investors, but the PEG ratio hurdles needed for investment are lower than most investors think, so long as the expected rate of return (discount rate) is high.? As for me, I will stick with value investing, where the need for earnings growth is negligible.

Happy Hour with Cody and Rebecca

Happy Hour with Cody and Rebecca

I have never been on live television before; the only other times that I have been on any sort of television was when I taped two segments for TheStreet.com last October. We only did one take of each segment, so I guess that’s as good as live, though there was the possibility of re-taping.

So, it was interesting for me to be on Happy Hour yesterday.

What was I going to talk about? Well, that was uncertain until 2PM today. Cody wanted to talk stocks, but he also wanted to talk macroeconomics as well. I offered him seven stocks, four foreign, and three US insurers. He took the insurers. I offered him four macro topics, and he took the most topical one, Buffett’s offer to reinsure the muni business of the major financial guarantors.

As of 3PM, I had a problem, though. I hadn’t been able to connect to the internet all day long, and though I had talked with many people about Buffett’s proposal, I really did not have any in-depth knowledge of the proposal. The Waldorf Astoria’s free Wi-fi was not working for me, so I retreated to the business center for 20 minutes of catching up. That’s all it took to get the details hammered down, so I headed down to the Bull and Bear for the show.

I got there about four, and a perceptive staff member said, “Are you one of the guests? You have that look about you.” He then seated me at a nearby table and I pulled out my laptop, and wrote out my notes for what I would say. They read like this:

Guarantors:

Company that?s in trouble: sell your good business or bad business?

Buffett wants to buy the good business at what is a bargain price to him, leaving the bad business behind and less wherewithal to pay the claims, because the profit stream from the good muni business will be gone. NPV of the muni business is more than Buffett is offering. A company would only take up Buffett?s offer if they were desperate, or forced to by the regulators.

Now effect on Munis is limited, just because you might lose your guarantee doesn?t mean that the municipality can?t make payments.

Insurers:

  • ? Dragged down by financials
  • ? Dragged down by AIG
  • ? Assets are relatively clean (got religion 2001-2003)
  • ? Favorable demographics.
  • ? Growth in the markets will raise AUM.
  • ? Inexpensive on earnings and book.
  • ? High quality balance sheets.

HIG

  • ? Very diversified – P&C, Life, Group Benefits ? domestic and international
  • ? 1.2x book, 6.8x 2009 earnings
  • ? Quality company
  • ? Variable products sensitive to market movements

LNC

  • ? Still room for cost savings from the JP merger
  • ? Well positioned in life, annuity, and group benefits
  • ? 1.2x book, 8x 2009 earnings
  • ? Variable products sensitive to market movements

AIZ

  • ? The next AFLAC
  • ? Focused on specialty businesses that can obtain an above average ROE.
  • ? Warranties, Force-placed Homeowners, Individual Health, Small Group Benefits, Funeral (pre-need)
  • ? Deep management team ? they invest in their people
  • ? Good capital allocators
  • ? 1.8x book, 8.8x 2009 earnings

By the time I had written that, David Newbert, of ThePanelist.com showed up, and we began to talk. Nice guy with some heavy duty Wall Street experience. Then the Fanelli twins showed up; bright ladies.

By this point it was close to 5PM. A little powder for my face and balding pate, I am going second at about 5:13. I ask the staff for advice, and they simply tell me to be opinionated and energetic. I try to be self-effacing, but I steel myself up for the task.

The first guy completes and they go to break. I’m up! They tell me to look at Cody and Rebecca, and sooner than I can expect it, we’re off. I had committed my notes to memory, but as in war, as Cody and Rebecca interact with me, I have to deviate from what I jotted out. We talk about Buffett and the Financial Guarantors, then move to stocks. I talk about Hartford, and a little about Assurant, and then, we’re out of time! That was fast! I get to name Lincoln National at the end as an afterthought. (At one point, Cody lavishes praise on me, and I get a little embarrassed. So it goes.)

The rest of the show goes on in the crowded space of the Bull and Bear, and before you know it, it’s over. The staff efficiently shuts down, and in 10 minutes, there’s no trace of what went on before. Cody and I meet for dinner later. It’s good to re-sync in our friendship.

I hope to get a copy of the video clip to post at my blog. If so, you will see it here. I had a lot of fun, and they invited me back. Should I get back to NYC, I will be back on Happy Hour.

Full disclosure: long AIZ HIG LNC

Still More Odds & Ends (Twelve this Time)

Still More Odds & Ends (Twelve this Time)

1) I might not be able to post much for the next two days. I have business trips to go on. One is to New York City tomorrow. If everything goes right, I will be on Happy Hour with my friend Cody Willard on Tuesday.

2) As I wrote at RealMoney this morning:


David Merkel
Buy Other Insurers off of the Bad AIG News
2/12/2008 2:54 AM EST

Sometimes I think there are too many investors trading baskets of stocks, and too few doing real investing work. I have rarely been bullish on AIG? I think the last time I owned it was slightly before they added it to the DJIA, and I sold it on the day it was added.Why bearish on AIG? Isn?t it cheap? It might be; who can tell? There?s a lot buried on AIG?s balance sheet. Who can truly tell whether AIG Financial Products has its values set right? International Lease Finance? American General Finance? The long-tail casualty reserves? The value of its mortgage insurer? I?m not saying anything is wrong here, but it is a complex company, and complexity always deserves a discount.

You can read my articles from 2-3 years ago where I went through this exercise when the accounting went bad the last time, and Greenberg was shown the door. (And, judging from the scuttlebutt I hear, it has been a good thing for him. But not for AIG.)

AIG deserves to be broken up into simpler component parts that can be more easily understood and valued. Perhaps Greenberg could manage the behemoth (though I have my doubts), no one man can. There are too many disparate moving parts.

So, what would I do off of the news? Buy other insurers that have gotten hit due to senseless collateral damage (no pun intended). As I recently wrote at my blog:

If Prudential drops much further, I am buying some. With an estimated 2009 PE below 8, it would be hard to go wrong on such a high quality company. I am also hoping that Assurant drops below $53, where I will buy more. The industry fundamentals are generally favorable. Honestly, I could get juiced about Stancorp below $50, Principal, Protective, Lincoln National, Delphi Financial, Metlife? There are quality companies going on sale, and my only limit is how much I am willing to overweight the industry. Going into the energy wave in 2002, I was quadruple-weight energy. Insurance stocks are 16% of my portfolio now, which is quadruple-weight or so. This is a defensive group, with reasonable upside. I?ll keep you apprised as I make moves here.

What can I say? I like the industry?s fundamentals. These companies do not have the balance sheet issues that AIG does. I will be a buyer of some of these names on weakness.

Position: long LNC HIG AIZ

3) More on AIG. As Cramer said yesterday: One last thought on the AIG issue: if President and CEO Martin Sullivan were to step down, the company might be more of a buy than a sale!

Maybe. Sullivan is a competent insurance executive with the biggest insurance job in the world. Breaking up the company, and letting the parts regain focus makes more sense. As an aside, M. R. Greenberg was known to be adamant about his ROE goal (15% after-tax on average equity), but he also liked the company to have bulk (high assets ? he liked asset-sensitive lines), which is why the ROA slid in the latter part of his tenure.

4) Some praise for Cramer on the same topic. As he said yesterday: AIG let me have it after I said last year that I couldn?t value the stock. They told me that there was a 92-page disclosure document and they wanted to know if I even looked at it. I shot back that not only did I look at it, but I had people comb it, including the forensic accountant I have on staff. The issue was always that despite the disclosure that they had CDO exposure, we couldn?t figure out what the real exposure was and we questioned whether THEY could.

Nothing gets a management more angry than being told that they don?t know what they are doing, but I was marveling at the certainty that they expressed. I told them they had tons of disclosure, but their estimation of possible losses seemed chimerical. I couldn?t figure out how THEY could value the stuff when no one else could with any certainty until it was off their books or written down. OF course, insurance companies aren?t held to the same standards of mark-to-market that banks are. They used mark-to-model, and the model, we learned today ? the Binomial Expansion Technique ? was totally wrong and dramatically understated the losses. All of this cuts to the incredible level of arrogance and stupidity on the Street, making judgments that were anti-empirical on data that could not be modeled but had to be experienced and examined nationally. In short, they were scientific and certain about something that couldn?t be quantified by science and certainly couldn?t be certain about.

Aside from the quibble that insurers for GAAP purposes are subject to the same rules as banks, Cramer got it right here. It is a major reason why I have been skeptical about AIG. Complexity in financial companies, especially financial companies that grow fast, is warranted. It is an unforgiving business where moderate conservatism works best.

5) Brief NAHC note: the CEO purchased more shares in the last few days. At least, it looks like it. Could he be acquiring shares to combat Hovde Capital? Honestly, I?m not sure, but this is looking more interesting by the day.

6) A new favorite blog of mine is Going Private. This post on insurance issues in Florida was unusual for that blog, but I thought it was perceptive. I wrote similar things at RealMoney:


David Merkel
Move to Florida, Become a Reinsurer
3/27/2007 3:30 PM EDT

Interesting note in the National Underwriter on a Towers Perrin Study (also try here) describing how much Floridians will have to pay if a 1-in-250 hurricane hits Florida. Cost per household: $14,000, or $467 per year for 30 years. On a 1-in-50 storm, the figures would be $5,640, or $188 per year. There would also be a higher initial assessment as well. Note that the odds are actually higher than stated odds would admit. The stated odds of the large losses from the 2004 and 2005 storms happening in consecutive years would have been considered astronomical, but it happened anyway.

The Florida legislature can determine how the pain is shared, but they can?t legislate that the pain go away. No free lunch.

P.S. As an aside, the state of Florida is subsidizing reinsurance rates through its catastrophe fund. Ostensibly, Florida homeowners get a cut in rates, but the insurers give that cut only because their reinsurance costs are lower. Who?s the loser? The citizens of Florida will have to reach into their pockets to recapitalize the Hurricane Catastrophe Fund if big losses hit, and at the very time that they won?t want to do it. (Note to S&P: why do you give this state a AAA GO bond rating?)

Position: none mentioned


David Merkel
The Worst Insurance State In The USA
2/2/2007 3:52 PM EST

I don?t want to go on a rant here, but I do feel strongly about this. It ill-befits a state government to behave like a bunch of thugs, even if it pleases the electorate. For over two decades, the worst state to do business in as an insurer was Massachusetts. New Jersey was competitive for a while, and California was pretty bad on Worker?s Comp, but now we have a new state on the top of the heap: Florida.

The failure of the Florida property insurance market was due to the lack of willingness to allow rates to rise sufficiently to attract capital into the market. The partial socialization of risk drove away that capital. So what does the governor and legislature of Florida do to meet the crisis? Increase the level of socialization of risk, and constrain companies to a binary decision: accept profits that don?t fairly reflect the risks underwritten, or leave the state. (And, they might try to forbid insurers from leaving.)

In my opinion, if they bar the door to insurers leaving, or not being allowed to non-renew policies, it is an unconstitutional ?taking? by the state of Florida. No one should be forced to do business that they don?t want to do. Fine to set up the regulatory rules (maybe), but it?s another thing to compel parties to transact.

Okay, here?s a possible future for Florida:

1) By the end of 2007, many insurers leave Florida; the state chartered insurer now has 33% of all of the primary property risk.
2) Large windstorm damages in 2008-2009, $100 billion in total, after a surprisingly light 2006-2007.
3) Florida finds that the capital markets don?t want to absorb more bonds in late 2009, after the ratings agencies downgrade them from their present AAA to something south of single-A.
4) The lack of ability to raise money to pay storm damages leads to higher taxes, plus the high surcharges on all insurance classes to pay off the new debt, makes Florida a bad place to live and do business. The state goes into a recession rivaling that of oil patch in the mid-1980s. Smart people and businesses leave, making the crisis worse.

Farfetched? No, it?s possible, even if I give a scenario of that severity only 10% odds. What is more likely is a watered-down version of this scenario. And, yes, it?s possible that storm damages will remain light, and Florida prospers as a result of the foolishness of their politicians. But I wouldn?t bet that way.

Position: long one microcap insurer that will remain nameless


Marc Lichtenfeld
Florida Insurance
2/2/2007 4:17 PM EST

David,

While I don?t pretend to be the insurance maven that you are, I don?t believe it?s quite as black and white as you portray.

First, let me preface my comments by saying that I believe in free markets and don?t agree with the Governor?s plan, although I stand to benefit. Secondly, my insurance rates, while higher than I?d like are not too bad compared to others in the state.

That being said, I think something had to be done. In one scenario that you lay out, you describe smart people leaving due to higher taxes. That was already happening due to high insurance rates. Some people with affordable mortgages suddenly found their insurance rates skyrocketing from $2,000 to over $6,000. Lots of seniors on fixed incomes also saw their rates jump.

One factor in the housing slump is that buyers are having a hard time finding insurance on a house they are ready to close on. I know that three years ago, we were scrambling at the last minute to find an insurer who would write a policy ? and that was before all of the storms.

I?m not sure what the answer is. I fear that in an entirely free market, there will be very few insurers willing to do business here if there?s another bad storm.

Maybe that?s an argument that we shouldn?t be building major population centers right on the coast, but that?s another story.

Position: None



David Merkel
My Sympathies to the People of Florida
2/2/2007 4:45 PM EST

Marc,

I understand the pain that many people in Florida are in. I know how much rates have risen. What I am saying is that the new law won?t work and will leave the people of Florida on the whole worse off. Florida is a risky place to write property coverage, and the increase in rates reflects a lack of interest of insurers and reinsurers to underwrite the risk at present rates and terms.

We don?t have a right to demand that others subsidize our lifestyle. But Florida is slowly setting up its own political crisis as they subsidize those in windstorm-prone areas, at the expense of those not so exposed. Commercial risks must subsidize coastal homeowners. Further, there is the idea lurking that the Feds would bail out Florida after a real emergency. That?s why many Florida legislators are calling for a national catastrophe fund.

They might get that fund too, given the present Congress and President, but Florida would have to pay in proportionately to their risks, not their population. Other proposed bills would subsidize Florida and other high risk areas. Why people in New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio should pay to subsidize Florida and California is beyond me.

The new law also affects commercial coverages; the new bill basically precludes an insurer from writing any business in Florida, if they write homeowners elsewhere, but not in Florida. If you want to chase out as many private insurers as possible, I?m not sure a better bill could have been designed. The law will get challenged in the courts; much of it will get thrown out as unconstitutional. But it will still drive away private insurance capacity.

I?m not writing this out of any possible gain for myself. I just think the state of Florida would be better served, and at lower rates, with a free market solution. Speaking as an insurance investor, I know of half a dozen or so new companies that were contemplating entering Florida prior to the new law. All of those ideas are now dead.

I hope that no hurricanes hit Florida, and that this bet works out. If there is political furor now in Florida, imagine what it would be like if my worst-case scenario plays out.

Position: long a small amount of one microcap insurer with significant business in Florida

Florida had now dodged the bullet for two straight years. Hey, what might happen if we have a bad hurricane year during an election year? Hot and cold running promises; I can see it now!

7) One of the best common-sense writers out there is Jonathan Clements of the WSJ. He had a good piece recently on why houses are not primarily investments. Would that more understood this. There are eras where speculation works, but those eras end badly. You can be a landlord, with all of the challenges, if you like that business. You can own a large home, but you are speculating that demand for the land it is on will keep growing. That is not a given.

8 ) My favorite data-miner Eddy, at Crossing Wall Street comes up with an interesting way to demonstrate momentum effects. Large moves up and down tend to continue on the next day, and the entire increase in the market can be attributed to the days after the market moves up 64 basis points.

9) This is not an anti-Cramer day. I like the guy a lot. I just want to take issue with this article: ?Trading in CDOs Slows to a Trickle.?? The basic premise is that CDOs are going away because trading in CDOs is declining.? Well, the same is true of houses, or any debt-financed instrument.? Volumes always slow as prices begin to fall, because momentum buyers stop buying.

Short of outlawing CDOs, which I don’t think can be done, though the regulators should consider what financial institutions should be allowed to own them.? That would shrink the market, but not destroy it.? Securitization when used in a moderate way is a good thing, and will not completely disappear.? Buyers will also become smarter (read risk-averse) at least for a little while.? This isn’t our first CDO blowup.? The cash CDO vintages 1997-1999 had horrible performance.? Now we have horrible performance.? Can we schedule the next crisis for the mid-teens?

10) On Chavez, he is a dictator and not an oil executive.? Maybe someone could send him to school for a little while so that he could learn a little bit about the industry that he is de facto running?? As MarketBeat points out, take him with with a grain of salt.? Venezuelan crude oil needs special processing, much of which is done in the US.? If he diverts the crude elsewhere, who will refine it for sale?

11) I am really ambivalent about Bill Gross.? He’s a bright guy, and has built a great firm.? Some of the things he writes for the media make my head spin.? Take this comment in the FT:

That the monolines could shoulder this modern-day burden like a classical Greek Atlas was dubious from the start. How could Ambac, through the magic of its triple-A rating, with equity capital of less than $5bn, insure the debt of the state of California, the world?s sixth-largest economy? How could an investor in California?s municipal bonds be comforted by a company that during a potential liquidity crisis might find the capital markets closed to it, versus the nation?s largest state with its obvious ongoing taxing authority? Apply the same logic to the gargantuan size of the asset-backed market it has insured in recent years ? subprimes and CDOs in the trillions of dollars ? and you must come to the same logical conclusion: this is absurd. It is as if Barney Fife, television?s Sheriff of Mayberry in The Andy Griffith Show, promised to bring law and order to the entire country.

Most municipal defaults are short term in nature, even those of states, of which there have been precious few.? Ambac, or any other guarantor, typically only has to make interest payments for a short while on any default.? It is a logical business for them to be in… they provide short term liquidity in a crisis, while the situation gets cleaned up.? In exchange for guarantee fees the municipalities get lower yields to pay.

The muni business isn’t the issue here… the guarantors should not have gotten into the CDO business.? That’s the issue.

12) I try to be open-minded, though I often fail.? (The problem of a permanently open mind is that it doesn’t draw conclusions when needed.? Good judgment triumphs over openness.)? I have an article coming soon on the concept of the PEG ratio.? This is one where my analytical work overturned my presuppositions, and then came to a greater conclusion than I would have anticipated.? The math is done, but the article remains to be written.? I am really jazzed by the results, because it answers the question of whether the PEG ratio is a valid concept or not.? (At least, it will be a good first stab.)

Full disclosure: long AIZ HIG LNC NAHC

National Atlantic Notes

National Atlantic Notes

I have to be careful as I write this post, because I have agreements with my former employer. I will stick with what is publicly understood, and avoid internal knowledge of what my former employer thought when I last worked with them.

Today, after the close, Hovde Capital filed a 13D, seeking to own more than 17% of National Atlantic, and asking for seats on the board of directors. Now, what I want to say to my readers might agree with what Hovde Capital might want. Don’t make too much out of this. First, the New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance might turn Hovde down. Second, realize that any party acquiring 10% or more of any publicly traded company has to file two days after making any trade. That is the signal that I would be looking for.

National Atlantic is my largest holding, and I am aware of other parties considering buying National Atlantic, but they fail the urgency test for me. There’s lots of talk but no action. Don’t take any action off of Hovde’s SEC filing. There are too many uncertainties here, and wise investors will wait for favorable levels for investing.

Full disclosure: long NAHC

Ten Odds & Ends

Ten Odds & Ends

I’ve wanted to post on a bunch of little things for a while, and while it won’t make for organized reading, maybe we can have some fun with it?? Here goes.

1) If Prudential drops much further, I am buying some.? With an estimated 2009 PE below 8, it would be hard to go wrong on such a high quality company.? I am also hoping that Assurant drops below $53, where I will buy more. ? The industry fundamentals are generally favorable.? Honestly, I could get juiced about Stancorp below $50, Principal, Protective, Lincoln National, Delphi Financial, Metlife…? There are quality companies going on sale, and my only limit is how much I am willing to overweight the industry.? Going into the energy wave in 2002, I was quadruple-weight energy.? Insurance stocks are 16% of my portfolio now, which is quadruple-weight or so.? This is a defensive group, with reasonable upside.? I’ll keep you apprised as I make moves here.

2) Reader Steve brought this to my attention: Mark Gilbert at Bloomberg brought attention to a monetary policy game at the San Francisco Fed’s website.? So did the estimable Marketbeat blog at the WSJ.? The game used to be found at this link.? Alas, no more.? Maybe all of the attention crashed the site, after all, the SF Fed can’t afford a heavy-duty website like mine.? Okay, sorry, they get 10x the traffic that I do, more like The Kirk Report.

Perhaps the game was removed over the embarrassment from Gilbert playing the game and applying the current Fed strategy to the game, and finding inflation going through the roof.? Now, for those that want to play a monetary policy game, my current favorite is this one from the Bank of Finland.? In a true American version of the game, we would replace the manic announcer with clips of who else, Jim Cramer.? Nobody does it better.? Oh and for true junkies looking for monetary policy games, here is a list of some of them.

3) Dig the falling long bond.? Worst day since 2004.? Echoing what I said yesterday, there’s a lot of fear in that part of the market, and a lot of foreign interest.? Well, at the 30-year auction, foreign interest was light at the lowest yield since regular auctions began in 1977.? A few strong economic numbers can make fear temporarily dissipate.

4) Here’s what I posted at RealMoney today:


David Merkel
Moody’s Downgrades XL Capital Assurance
2/7/2008 3:34 PM EST

When the main rating agencies begin downgrading the lesser guarantors, the big guarantors are likely not far behind. Moody’s just downgraded XL Capital Assurance from Aaa to A3, and Security Capital Assurance From Aa3 to Baa3 (barely investment grade). Psychologically, the major rating agencies, Moody’s and S&P, have been taking baby steps toward downgrading Ambac, MBIA and FGIC. But first they have to do the lesser guarantors that are in trouble. As I have pointed out before, the major rating agencies are co-dependent with the major guarantors, and that will only throw the guarantors over the edge if hurts them more to leave the guarantors at AAA. That will cost them future revenues to cut the ratings of the major guarantors, but it might save their larger franchises. (Fitch, on the other hand, has less to lose and can downgrade with impunity.)

Now, the effects on the broader insured bond market are probably overestimated. There will be new entrants to take the place of the legacy companies that may have to go into runoff. The holding companies for the major guarantors could die, but a rescue of the operating insurance companies in runoff mode is more likely. Those who own equity in the holding companies or debt claims to the holding companies will not be happy with the results, though.

Watch for downgrades of the major guarantors. Unless a lot of new capital gets pumped into their operating insurance companies, the downgrades are coming, maybe within a month.

Please note that due to factors including low market capitalization and/or insufficient public float, we consider Security Capital Assurance to be a small-cap stock. You should be aware that such stocks are subject to more risk than stocks of larger companies, including greater volatility, lower liquidity and less publicly available information, and that postings such as this one can have an effect on their stock prices.

Position: none

Now after the close, MBIA offered stock at a 14% haircut to the closing price. ? Let’s see where the price closes tomorrow… it almost boils down to the number of buyers saying, “At a 14% haircut, there’s no way that it will close below that level.? We can buy and flip for an easy profit.”? In this case, though, there are 60%+ more shares after this issuance.? That’s some level of dilution.? MBIA may keep its AAA, but that says little for the value of holding company common stock.

5) One reader wrote me, “mr. merkel — would you care at all to expound on point 2? it’s been the assertion of some that what makes the monoline threat a non-issue is specifically that there IS a harmony of interests in seeing ambac, mbia et al at least get to a point where they can run off their obligations. however, i must admit, i’ve not seen the case made with specificity — that is, what are the interests of the interested parties, and how do they conflict or coincide?”

Point 2 was the idea that a bailout would be tough to achieve, because of differing interests on the part of those being sought to bail out the guarantors. ? Here’s my rationale: different investment banks have differing levels and types of exposure to the credit risks covered by the guarantors.? Coming up with an equitable allocation of concessions would be tough, but not impossible.? Beyond that, you have all of the ways that the guarantors reinsured each other, which further tangles the web of promises.? A bailout could be done, given enough time, and enough angelic third-party experts to divide the pie perfectly.? Time is short here, and I suspect the rating agencies will lose patience, given their need to protect their franchises.

6) At present, the yield curve indicates a 2% Fed funds rate by mid-to-late 2008.? Uh, that’s not what I would do, but it seems pretty likely for now.? What kind of price inflation would get the attention of the Fed here?? Beats me; the slope of the yield curve today is adequate to allow banks to make money; if the Fed waits at these levels, the economy should recover over the next two years.

7) I liked the idea of this post at the American Prospect, but for a different reason.? Since I called the housing bubble very clearly over at RealMoney, and even subprime too, does that mean that I can criticize the Fed with impunity?? Constructively, of course.

8) From another reader, Bamboo: I have not seen much discussion of the statutory capital requirements of the financial guaranty insurers.? It seems that Article 69 of the New York Insurance Law is the critical statute.

Although the rating agencies do not consider mark to market losses in their evaulations of capital adequacy, do they affect statutory capital?

Is there a possibility that the financial guarantors will have to take a premium deficiency reserve for their structured finance business?

I would like to get a copy of article 69, but I can’t find one.? In general statutory regulations are less market-oriented than rating agencies and GAAP.? The problems usually show up faster on GAAP than Stat, leaving aside high growth situations.

9) Another reader, Bill Luby of VIX and More, writes: Hi David,

Once again, kudos for keeping up a consistently high quality of posting here.? Your thinking often sets my brain in motion — in a very good way.

If you don’t mind, I’d be interested to get your take on the current status of the bond insurer problem and how you think it might play out.? In addition to what happens to MBI and ABK, I am also interested in whether you think others with a stronger financial position (AGO?) might make significant gains in this space.

Cheers,

-Bill

Yes, AGO, Dexia (FSA), and Berky all do well from the turmoil.? Strong balance sheets benefit from increased volatility, even as weak balance sheets are harmed.

10) Finally, from Reader Scott, regarding Medicare and entitlements, “David, wondering your thoughts on how the situation gets addressed.? There is no question at all that the equation doesn’t solve, presently.? My current thoughts are that (1) taxes go higher – not even up for serious discussion; and (2) so do trade barriers.? we trade some protectionism, a la Europe, and reduced overall welfare, for a feel-good “leveling” of some of society’s current inequties.? our nation’s most influential demographic, old folks, who vote, are appeased. add to that, perhaps, some guest worker immigration policies.? second class citizens earning second-tier wages.? on balance, we begin looking a lot more like Europe, reversing the cherished myth of American exceptionalism, and staving off acceptance of the twenty-first being the China Century.? Care to comment?

Americans are exceptional, and that is not always a good thing.? We have fewer presuppositions than most of the world, and that leads to innovative solutions, a certain amount of unnecessary chaos, and occasional hubris.? We are probably heading for an era of leveling, but that is not certain.? Historically, it is likely.? Trade may be another matter; we may be getting close to a point where the rest of the world sees the value of freer trade, even if the US goes the other way.? Organized efforts against free trade are weak compared to protectionist eras.

As for old folks that vote, yes, that’s what makes this problem tough.? I’m not into doom and gloom, but I can see a negative self-reinforcing cycle coming.? If Bush, Jr., got smacked over his all-too-cautious attempt at Social Security reform (it would have done almost nothing, but listen to the squeals), can you imagine what true reform of a much bigger problem might entail?? We would need a full blown panic in the debt markets to get focus there, and as for now, foreigners are still very willing to roll over US debt denominated in US dollars.

Full disclosure: long AIZ, LNC

Five Thoughts on the Financial Guarantors

Five Thoughts on the Financial Guarantors

The Financial Guarantors are receiving a lot of attention these days, and for good reason.? I want to offer a few observations to give my own take on the problem:

1) With structured finance, the initial choice is “Do we ask a financial guarantor to bring the credit up to AAA, or do we do it through a senior-subordinate structure?”? A senior-subordinate structure has classes of lenders with differing rights to payment.? The AAA, or, senior lenders only take losses after the subordinate lenders (who are receiving higher yields) have lost all of their money.? In the present environment, S&P and Moody’s have been downgrading subordinates, and even some senior bonds in senior-sub structures.

This should lead to downgrades of MBIA and Ambac, eventually.? The rating agencies can’t keep downgrading bonds that are similar to those guaranteed by MBIA and Ambac, without downgrading them as well.? Remember, MBIA and Ambac were late to the party; their bonds are disproportionately weak because later lending standards were weaker.

2) The main difficulty with a bailout of the guarantors is that most interested parties have different interests.? That said, the beauty of a bailout is that the guarantor can sit back and pay timely principal and interest, while waiting for better times to come.

3) Did the rating agencies force the guarantors into the CDO business?? I’ve heard rumors to this effect, but it would be pretty easy to prove or disprove.? Look at when MBIA and Ambac entered the business, and look at the commentary from the rating agencies around it; if they are trumpeting diversification, then it is likely that they pitched it to the guarantors.? If not, then the guarantors did it on their own.

4) Even in a bailout of financial guarantors, current shareholders may find themselves diluted beyond measure.? Given current political pressures, those risks are elevated; remember that management teams want to keep their jobs, and that regulators have some say in that.

5) As I noted today at RealMoney:


David Merkel
Considering the “Margin of Safety”
2/5/2008 11:07 AM EST

Tim, I like your stuff, since I am a value investor. Be careful with XL Capital. The challenge is estimating what sort of guarantees they face from Security Capital Assurance. When I looked at them last, the potential payments could be huge — potentially larger than XL’s net worth, but hey, that’s the financial guarantee business. I looked at XL during my last portfolio reshaping — Finish Line also, and could not get past the potential risks. I had easier plays to go for, with less uncertainty, if also lower upside. I don’t try to hit home runs, so it makes it easier for me to not buy the stocks that are optically stupid cheap, but might have balance sheet issues. Cheap means that a company will have the capability to carry their positions through a downturn; it’s part of the “margin of safety” that we require.

Anyway, keep it up, and let’s see if we can’t make some money on our value investing.

Please note that due to factors including low market capitalization and/or insufficient public float, we consider Security Capital Assurance and Finish Line to be small-cap stocks. You should be aware that such stocks are subject to more risk than stocks of larger companies, including greater volatility, lower liquidity and less publicly available information, and that postings such as this one can have an effect on their stock prices.

Position: none

?XL was downgraded recently as a result of those guarantees.? I would be cautious here.

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Summary: there is still downside risk here.? Avoid the financial guarantors, and economic areas affected by the overleveraging of our credit markets. ? Stick with companies that have strong balance sheets.

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