Category: Value Investing

Balancing Quality Against Valuation

Balancing Quality Against Valuation

A letter from a reader:

Hi David,

I am XXX, from India. I started reading your blog since few months. Few of the things i learnt, and much more are really complex for me to understand, the learning is ON.

Somehow i decided that ” being good value investor and control the behaviour” is a gift of long practice and learning. So it takes time and for me the learning is still in lower phase. I am in middle of understanding Financial statements.

But before that i want to invest and enjoy the power of compounding. Till now i used Mutual Fund, Fixed Deposit (bank) for my wealth creation. As part of my milestone, i want to go ahead with shares for my Kids education and retirement.

I like to Buy Consumer staples like Nestle india, Gillete India, Glaxo Smith?india which are past compounders.?Given a India’s Economic growth and Population growth, I foresee these socks can do well. But it is already at very high PE (Nestle – 42, GSk consumer- 39, GSK pharma – 52, Gillette -141). I don’t foresee any panic selling on these stocks. What i will do? how i do buy Quality business with good valuation?

Kindly guide.

thanks for sharing such wonderful posts.

Dear Friend,

You have described the optimal situation: buy businesses that have well-protected boundaries, and buy them cheap. ?I wish I could do that. ?Everyone would like to do that.

But that is where judgment comes in. ?I would rather own cyclical businesses with competent and honest management ?teams, than own high growth businesses at very high multiples of earnings. ?I would also rather own slow growth businesses at modest multiples of earnings. ?Ask yourself: where am I getting a reliable stream of earnings and growth relative to what I am paying for the stock?

In general, with growth stocks, never pay more than 2 times the earnings growth rate ?for the P/E of the company.

Often you have to look at companies that are neglected, and I would like to recommend a book to you:?Investing in India. ?The author avoids highly valued companies in India, and aims to invest in companies that are fair to outside minority, passive shareholders.

Look at more stocks than just the highest quality stocks, and look at the valuation tradeoff between highest quality stocks, and lower quality stocks. ?Most value investors accept the lower quality stocks, if their ability to produce value relative to their price is better than that of higher quality stocks.

All that said, part of the question is how long will the high quality stocks have a significant advantage. ?In the US, on average, that advantage has not been long. ?Maybe things are different in India, but maybe not. ?Be careful. ?Remember, the cardinal virtue of value investing is having ?a margin of safety, not cheapness.

Sincerely,

David

Book Review: Reducing the Risk of Black Swans

Book Review: Reducing the Risk of Black Swans

71e0AKDi3XL This is a very short book. I read the whole thing in 40 minutes. ?It has one main idea: what if you could create a less variable portfolio that returns as much as the traditional 60%?S&P 500,?40% Barclays Aggregate blend? ?Wouldn’t you want that?

Most of us would want that. ?I would want earning more at the same level of volatility as the market, but that is another matter.

The authors take us through a variety of backtests, showing us portfolios that did well in the past, if you had invested in them.

They show how investors could have done better by tilting their portfolios toward value socks, small stocks, and international stocks, eventually showing a portfolio invested 60% in 5-year Treasuries, and 40% in stocks that tilt small, value, and international.

Voila! Same returns, with less volatility than the?60%?S&P 500,?40% Barclays Aggregate blend.

But there is a catch here. ?This is the past being amplified — will the future be the same? ?Value stocks are undervalued on average, and small stocks outperform on average, but what if you are in an environment like now, where small stocks are overvalued, value is neutral to undervalued? ?Tilt to value, yes, but maybe don’t tilt small.

Also, with yields so low on five-year Treasuries at 1.65%, that should be reflected into the future for the strategy, so maybe the amount of bonds should be reduced?

The biggest weakness that the book has, and this is true of many books, is that it follows a mean-variance framework. ?The market is far more volatile than a normal distribution, with crises happening far more frequently than a normal distribution would anticipate.

Quibbles

Investing is not a science; it is an art. ?Our principles are vague and subject to many forces beyond our recognition and control.

They make the rookie mistake of describing the calculation of long-term investment returns as a arithmetic mean (Page 16). ?Pros do a geometric mean, which calculates the continuously compounded average return of a buy-and hold investor.

On page 18, their explanation of correlation is weak. ?That said, even great publications like The Economist have blown that in the past, then using my explanation of correlation verbatim (back in the mid-90s).

Summary

This is a good book as it teaches you to tilt you portfolios to value and small companies on average. ?The person who would benefit most from this book is someone who wants to get more out of his investments, but doesn’t want to spend a lot of time on it. ?If you want to, you can buy it here:?Reducing the Risk of Black Swans: Using the Science of Investing to Capture Returns with Less Volatility.

Full disclosure: The PR flack?asked me if I would like a copy and I said ?yes.?

If you enter Amazon through my site, and you buy anything, I get a small commission.? This is my main source of blog revenue.? I prefer this to a ?tip jar? because I want you to get something you want, rather than merely giving me a tip.? Book reviews take time, particularly with the reading, which most book reviewers don?t do in full, and I typically do. (When I don?t, I mention that I scanned the book.? Also, I never use the data that the PR flacks send out.)

Most people buying at Amazon do not enter via a referring website.? Thus Amazon builds an extra 1-3% into the prices to all buyers to compensate for the commissions given to the minority that come through referring sites.? Whether you buy at Amazon directly or enter via my site, your prices don?t change.

Understanding Insurance Float

Understanding Insurance Float

Warren Buffett has made such an impression on value investors and insurance investors, that they think that float is magic. ?Write insurance, gain float, invest cleverly against the float, and make tons of money.

Now, the insurance industry in general?has been?a great place to invest, but we need to think about float differently. ?Float is composed of two things: claim reserves and premium reserves.

  • Claim reserves are the assets set aside to satisfy all claims that likely will be made as of the current date.
  • Premium reserves are the assets set aside representing prepaid premiums that have not been earned yet.

Claim reserves can be long, short or in-between. ?Last night’s article dealt with long claim reserves — asbestos, environmental, etc. ?Those reserves can be invested in stocks, real estate, long bonds, etc. ?But most claim reserves are pretty short, like a year or so for most personal insurance auto & home claims — those typically get settled in a year.

The there are classes of insurance business that are in-between — workers comp, D&O, E&O, commercial liability, business continuation, etc. ?Investing the claim reserves should reflect the length of time it will take until ultimate payoff.

The premium reserves are very short. ?If premiums are paid annually, the average period for the premium reserves?is half a year. ?If premiums are paid more frequently, the average period for the float falls, but the premiums rise disproportionately to reflect the insurance company’s desire to have the full year’s premium on hand. ?It usually makes sense for policyholders to pay at the longest period allowed — thus, thinking about premium reserves as having a ?duration of half a year on average makes sense. ?Except auto — make that a quarter of a year.

Earnings financed by?float should be divided into two pieces — non-speculative, and speculative. ?The non-speculative returns on float reflect what can be earned by investing in high quality bonds that match the time period over which the float will exist. ?Short for premium reserves, longer for claim reserves. ?So, the value of float is this:

Present value of (investment earnings of high quality duration-matched assets plus underwriting gains [or minus losses]).

This is a squishy calculation, because we do not know:

  • the number of years to calculate it over
  • future underwriting gains or losses

The speculative earnings from float come from assuming that float will stay at the same levels or grow over many years, and so the insurer invests more aggressively, assuming that float will be a permanent or growing thing. ?He speculates by financing stocks or whole businesses using the float that could reduce, or that could become more expensive.

How could that happen? P&C insurance often gets very competitive, and the cost of maintaining float in a soft underwriting environment is considerable. ?Also note the claim reserves mean that the company took a loss. ?That the company earns something while waiting to pay the loss does not help much. ?Far better that there were fewer losses and less float.

Smart P&C insurance companies reduce underwriting in soft markets, and in such a time, float will shrink. ?Let aggressive companies undercharge for bad business, and let them choke on it, while we make a little less money.

Well-run insurers let float shrink – they don’t depend on float being the same, much less growing. ?If it does grow, great! ?But don’t invest assuming it will always be there or grow forever. ?That way lies madness.

Berkshire Hathaway has benefited from intelligent underwriting and intelligent investment over a long period. ?That is not normal for insurance companies. ?That is why it has done so well. ?Float is a?handmaiden to good results, but not worth the attention paid to it. ?After all, all?insurance companies have float, but none have done as well as Berkshire Hathaway. ?Better you should focus on underwriting earnings rather than float.

Underwriting insurance produces premium float. ?Underwriting bad business produces claim reserve float. ?Float is not an unmitigated good. ?Good underwriting is an unmitigated good. ?So focus on underwriting, and not float.

=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-===-

Berkshire Hathaway has been in the fortunate position of having had wise underwriters, and and ability to expand into new markets for many years. ?Guess what, that was AIG up until 2003 or so. ?After that, they could not find more profitable markets to underwrite, and results began to deteriorate. ?They ran up against the limits of their ecosystem.

Buffett is a brighter man than Greenberg; he can consider a greater realm of possibilities in how to run an insurance conglomerate, and the results have been better. ?All that said, there is only so much insurance to underwrite in the world, and big insurers will eventually run out of places to write insurance profitably.

All that said — float is a sideshow. ?Focus on profitable underwriting — that is what drives the best insurers.

 

 

A Letter from a Young Investor

A Letter from a Young Investor

Before I get to the letter, I recommend reading,?You’re Ready for Retirement, but Your Savings Aren’t by Jonathan Clement, if you have access to the Wall Street Journal. ?Main point: if you can work until age 70, do that, and then retire.

Here’s the letter:

Hi David,

A little background about myself. ?I am a 24-year male, and have been working for a little over a year. ?The only knowledge I have on investing is passive index fund investing through the book Bogleheads.? I don’t really look at my holdings other than to re-balance every year.

I am currently investing for retirement by maxing out a RothIRA, maxing out a 401k? (that allows a Brokerage account) and some in a taxable Vanguard index fund.? My holdings consist of the total stock and total bond market index funds (90/10). From my current positions my portfolio return has been 20.6%. I calculated the return by return = (market_change + dividends) / total_money. I don’t know if this is a correct formula. The time frame of my holdings is from Jan2012 – June2014.?

I went to a finance workshop that my church was hosting and there was a panel of finance experts (CPA, lawyer, financial advisor) that were indirectly encouraging active investing over passive investing through personal anecdotes.?

Looking at my current portfolio performance, I have a hard time seeing the value in spending time in learning how to actively invest and about finance in general. Currently, I do not follow up on business and market news nor am I reading any economic/investing blogs or magazines. Again, my only investing knowledge is from the Bogleheads book, and so I feel that active investing would be a daunting task.?

Do you have a comparison of an active investment portfolio’s returns (that uses your 8 portfolio rules) against an index fund (such as the Vanguard total stock market) during a bull and bear market? ?Also, do you have any advice on where to begin learning about active investing in general? How should one invest for different goals, say investing for retirement in 40 years vs. investing for a home purchase in the Bay Area in 5-10 years? I’m having a hard time seeing how I would balance time in regards to learning about investing, advancing my career through outside studying, serving in my local church, spending time to witness to family, friends and co-workers, and communion with God.? It seems like passive investing is a simpler solution with a decent average long-term return of 7%. I know I am young, have a lot to learn about life and sometimes stubborn in my thinking, so any thoughts and/or advice would be greatly appreciated.

These are the questions I will try to answer:

  1. Should you move to active investing, and are there some alternatives that would allow you gain some of the benefits of active investing, without costing you a lot of time?
  2. Do I have a track record that is publicly available?
  3. Where to learn about active investing?
  4. How should I invest if I want to buy a house in the Bay Area in 5-10 years, and how does that differ from investing for retirement?
  5. Is the time put into learning about investing really worth it when I have so many other social and spiritual commitments?

But ?I will answer them in a different order.

Is the time put into learning about investing really worth it when I have so many other social and spiritual commitments?

You can’t be good at active investing without putting time in at least at the level of a hobby, say, one?hour per day, six days a week. ?When I launched into studying investments at age 27, I already had two advantages — A mother who was self-taught in investing (and beat most mutual fund managers handily), and an academic background in economics and finance (which had its pluses and minuses).

But my commitment to learning about investing was one hour per day, six days a week. ?After 5 years, I was an investment actuary, which was pretty rare at that time. ?After 11 years, I was hired into the investment department of a medium-sized life insurer. ?17 years later, I worked for a notable hedge fund. ?23 years later, I started my own firm.

Now, there were some spillover benefits for serving the church. ?I have served on various boards of my denomination, chairing some of them, but my knowledge of finance has been a benefit to many of them, and I have been able to prevent a wide variety of errors. ?Even this week, a Christian group in western Pennsylvania reached out to me regarding a “too good to be true investment,” and I told them it was likely a fraud. ?There are ways that we can serve the church with such knowledge. ?Brothers and sisters that I know come asking for advice, and I do not turn them down.

Now, all that said — no, it is probably not worth your time to learn about active investing. ?I wrote two articles a while ago taking both sides of the argument:

Decide what you want to emphasize in your life and service to God. ?The church benefits from a few “numbers guys” (as some refer to me in my denomination), but it doesn’t need a lot of them, if the group trusts them, and they are wise and upright.

Should you move to active investing, and are there some alternatives that would allow you gain some of the benefits of active investing, without costing you a lot of time?

I don’t think you have to move to?active management — you might move to some sort of tilt on you passive management, though. ?Over the long run, tilting to value stocks and smaller stocks has been a smart idea. ?Cap-weighted indexes have most of their assets invested in behemoths that like Alexander the Great, have “no more worlds left to conquer.” ?Investing a disproportionate amount passively in mid- and small-cap stocks can be a wise idea, as can passive investing with a value bias. ?Two sides of the issue:

But,?maybe wait a while before you add some mid- and small-cap value index funds… valuations are relatively high for small and mid-cap stocks at present. ?I have a hard time finding truly cheap stocks at present.

Where to learn about active investing?

As for books, you could look through my book reviews, and scan for the word “value.” ?You could visit the website Valuewalk.com; I have to admit I am impressed with what Jacob Wolinsky has done — it is the “go to” site for value investing.

You can also read the letters of notable value investors — Buffett, Klarman, Marks, and more…

How should I invest if I want to buy a house in the Bay Area in 5-10 years, and how does that differ from investing for retirement?

Let me tell you a story. ?My congregation is near DC. ?My congregation asked me to manage the building fund, and for years, I beat the market, but DC area real estate still appreciated faster.

At the same time, many congregations in the denomination, had received buildings for low prices, or virtually free, but those were mostly in rural areas. ?So at prayer meeting in January 2009, after losing a large amount of the building fund, I asked God to drop a building in our lap, as I could not see any way that I would ever do it through my investing, good as it was.

Two months later, we bid on a short sale for a house with a church use permit. ?We had the assets free and clear for it, and closed in May 2009.

Here is my point to you: geographically constrained markets like the Bay Area — there is no good way for the liquid stocks and bonds to keep up with real estate price increases.?Buying a house in the Bay Area is a tough matter, and it might make sense to match assets and liabilities.

You might want to try to buy real estate related assets in the Bay Area — not sure how you could do that, but it would be the investment closest to funding what you want to own.

As for investing for retirement 40+ years from now, maintain a posture of 70-80% risk assets, and 30-20% safe assets. ?I have been 70/30 most of my life. ?Optimal is 80/20, but I take more idiosyncratic risk, and 70/30 just feels better to me. ?My investments are more concentrated, and the cash levels out the jolts.

Do I have a track record that is publicly available?

Yes and no. ?I send it to those who inquire after my services, but I will send you a copy after I publish this. ?I’ve done well, but I know that it might be due to chance. ?That said, my clients get the same investments that I have, so my interests are aligned with them, aside from the fee they pay me. ?I have no other compensation from my investment management.

On Several Questions from a Reader

On Several Questions from a Reader

As time has gone along, I realize that my blog is different. ?I do things that most bloggers don’t do, e.g. book reviews, answer e-mails publicly, and a few other things. ?Also, my audience is far more international than most, with a large contingent from India. ?Well, here is another e-mail from a reader in India:

Hi David,

I am a big fan or your articles and read regularly when I get time. I respect you for what you are trying to do with your blog – it is a free education for people like us. I also write a blog but it is mostly a commentary sorts than educating blog like yours.

I am writing to you today because I want to seek out your advice on my portfolio (and my ongoing investment education).?

Screening technique

I normally use Reverse DCF with 15% discount rate, 3% terminal growth rate and future growth assumption of a quarter of historical (5 or 10 years) FCF growth rate. For eg. if historical FCF growth rate of a company is 40%, and reverse DCF suggest market is factoring 10%, that company gets shortlisted.

I also try to invest in companies with 5 years avg ROCE of more than 25% – assumption being management being prudent and high quality will generate good returns on capital available to them.

When I am done screening the stocks, I read their previous 2-3 annual reports to get the feel of the business, how do they money and what are the underlying risks etc. I also read their commentaries on the business prospects and any extraordinary or hidden/ contingent charges they might have. I try to find out what makes the business earn so consistent results.

The screen I use normally allow me to avoid the folly of forecasting. I avoid making an elaborate model and try to forecast future earnings and cash flows. I just try to buy the security at a good discount to what my Reverse DCF model suggests.

Selling strategy

Now, lot of my stocks (8/13) have doubled in 1-3 years duration. I, as a rule, take out my capital when my stock doubles i.e sell half of my holdings. I assume that whatever I have thought about the future prospects of the business could be wrong. Some of my stocks are trading below the level I took out my capital and some of them have turn out to be multi-baggers. What are your thoughts on this selling strategy.

I also have issues with a stock if it has been on my watchlist and has run up a bit. I think this is anchor bias everyone talks about. But I still want to know your thoughts. Do you buy in a single trade or do you build your position slowly.

One more thing, I know you write a lot about portfolio structure, what do you suggest to do if the business you have made the highest allocation to is generating lower returns and vice-versa.

I know I am bothering you a lot, but knowing your thoughts will help me a lot.

I also tried my hands on liquidation analysis that Peter Cundill speaks about in his book – There’s always something to do.

I bought a stock, which was trading way below its liquidation value ( if you buy the entire market cap, sell all the assets at half the prices, and pay off all the liabilities, you still will be left with some cash). I have read their ARs and have found nothing wrong with management, of course their business is not generating lot of profits. I have put a google alert on company’s name if there is some news report or some analysis on the company that may alert me if they’re fraud. So my question is how do you (or a retail investor like me) make sure that management is not fraud or accounts are not cooked.

I know these are lot of questions – that too from a stranger sitting in India but I’ll be happy if you give me some sense of direction – whether I am doing things right or what should I change.

Keep writing and educating,
Thanks,

I don’t use DCF or reverse DCF because of the many assumptions employed in DCF. ?I am happier using simpler techniques like P/E, P/B, P/S, and then trying to critique them considering what I know about the company and industry in question.

As for you insistence on a high ROCE — that can work in India, but is less likely to work in the developed world, because few companies can beat the 25% threshold, that have reasonable valuations.

I take out assets from companies as they rise. ?I do it more regularly and slowly than you do — it is a risk control mechanism. ?On the downside, it is a way to make more money, by buying quality companies when they are down.

For more thoughts on selling, look at my portfolio rules seven and eight.

Regarding watchlist assets that have risen in value, I follow portfolio rule eight, and only buy assets that would be a net improvement to the portfolio. ?Timing will almost never be right, but if you have a favorable?valuation for the asset in question, and a sound balance sheet, you will do well.

Regarding portfolio construction,?I only look at the likely future. ?I will hold onto a company that has done badly, but still offers an opportunity of doing well in the future. ?The objective is to be forward-looking.

I buy positions all-at-once, or as close to it as I can, because a few positions are illiquid. ?There is no reason to delay in investing if your thesis is a good one.

Regarding crooked managements — the first question to ask is how are you going to grow revenues. ?If the answer is at all unbelievable, run away. ?There are other tests:

1) look at their results over many years, and compare it to their commentary. ?Don’t give any credit for one-time (negative) events because over the long run, managements that have too many one time events are bad managements.

2) use statistics like normalized operating accruals to see if the accounting is conservative or liberal.

3) Analyze growth in book value plus dividends versus earnings. ?Growth in book value plus dividends is a better measure of value than earnings is.

4) look at management incentives — the best managers are idealists. ?They love what they do, and would do it for free. if they could. ?You want a management team that is hungry; you son’t want a management team that feels full.

Thanks for writing me, and I hope you prosper in your investing in India.

Sincerely,

David

One More Note on Failure

One More Note on Failure

Recently, we had a problem at the Merkel house: a toilet overflowed and the water did not shut off, flooding the room, and leaked into the basement. ?Why did this happen? ?Two things went wrong at the same time:

  1. The toilet needed to be plunged, because there was a blockage preventing water discharge, and
  2. The flapper malfunctioned, and so water continued to flow.

If only one of these problems had happened, we would have had an ordinary problem. ?I can plunge a toilet, easy. ?I can hear the toilet singing, and know that the flapper is up, jiggle the handle, and end the problem.

Most of the time, when we plan against failure, we look at solutions that address single failures. ?We do not contemplate two things going wrong at once.

Yet, when we look at big failures in investment, there are often?two things that went wrong at the same time. ?Usually it follows a pattern like this:

  1. Take a risk that in ordinary times often works out, but
  2. You don’t get that times are not ordinary, and so the odds are actually stacked against you.

I have several examples for this. ?Taking on debt to buy a house was a wonderful strategy until overall debt levels to finance housing got to high, but at that time, the momentum effect of rising house prices was sucking people into buying houses, because they thought it was easy money.

Financial stocks were the market leaders for many years up through 2007, as investors assumed that ordinary risk control would protect the banking system. ?But what happens when debt levels are too high, so that many debts are incapable of being paid?

As Warren Buffett has said (something like), “We get paid to think about the things that can’t happen.” ?Multiple failures leading to large bad results are worth thinking about. ?So what aren’t we thinking about now?

  • Failures in retirement security systems as the Baby Boomers age.
  • Failures in government debt as overleveraged governments can’t make debt payments.
  • Inflation rises rapidly as the economy revives amid increased lending from banks.
  • Deflation persists as the central?bank tries to force-feed credit to an already overleveraged economy.

(There are many patting themselves on the back thinking that the Central Banks and Governments got us out of a crisis, when they only delayed the crisis. ?High nominal debt levels relative to GDP create their own crisis.)

I would encourage you to think about your investments, and ask the following questions:

  • Are there hidden factors that could lead to a big failure? ?(Think of what happened to mortgage REITs in 2008 when the repo market crashed.)
  • How well would the investment?fare if inflation went up significantly?
  • How well would the?investment?fare if real interest rates?went up significantly?
  • How well would the?investment?fare if?we hit another patch where financing is not available? ?Can the investment self-fund?
  • How much future prosperity does the current price of the investment embed in its valuation?

I know, glum words. ?But this might be a good time to look at what you own, and ask how survivable it is under stressed conditions.

All for now.

The Reason for Failure Matters

The Reason for Failure Matters

When I was a young actuary, say in the early 90s, my boss came to me, and gave me an unrequested lesson. ?He said something to the effect of:

Most pricing actuaries make assumptions. ?Well, I test assumptions. ?That involves checking how actual results are coming in?expected, but in the early phases of a new product, you are living under the law of small numbers — you don’t have enough data to be statistically credible. ?You should still do the statistical analysis, but I take it one step further.

I pull the first 10-20?claim files and look at the cause for the claim. ?If the qualitative causes are not chance events, but are indications that the business is being sold improperly to those who know they are close to death (or disability) and evade the limited underwriting of the group coverage, that means the group is low quality, and the program should be discontinued, or severely modified.

He then told me about some credit life insurance that the company was offering through two well known, prestigious banks, and how the deaths were coming in from non-random causes: AIDS, Cancer, Drowned in the Hudson River, Murder, etc.

He fought to get that insurance line shut down, and it took him five years, as the line manager argued there was not enough experience. ?The line manager tried to get my boss fired, and finally, the line manager was fired. ?But if the company had listened early they would have lost $10M. ?As it was, they lost several hundreds of millions of dollars.

Now, most of my readers don’t care much about insurance, but this tale is meant to illustrate that reason for losses matters as much, and sometimes more than the absolute amount lost. ?Now to illustrate this for a different and perhaps more timely reason:

Wups, wups,?wups,?wups, pop, Pop, POP, Yaaaaaauuughhhh!

Maybe I am growing up a little, but I am trying to have better titles for my articles. ?The subheading above would have been my title. ?But let me explain what it means:

The credit cycle tends to be like this: in the bull phase, a long period (4-7 years) with few defaults and low loss severity followed by a bear phase, a shorter period (1-3 years) with high defaults and high loss severity. ?This is a phenomenon where history may not repeat exactly, but it will rhyme very well.

In the bull phase of the credit cycle there are a few defaults, but when you analyze the defaults, they occur for reasons unrelated to the economy as a whole. ?What do the failures look like? ?Fraud (think Enron), bad business plans from a megalomanic (think Reliance Insurance, ACH, Southmark, etc.) , a sudden shift in relative prices (think Energy Future Holdings), etc. ?Bad banking — think Continental Illinois in 1984.

In the bull phase, companies that fail would fail in any environment. ?But now let’s talk about the transition between the bull and bear phase — that is the “pop, Pop, POP.”

As the credit cycle shifts, a few companies fail that are closely related to the crisis that will come. ?They are your early warning. ?Think of the subprime lenders under stress in 2007, or the failure of Bear Stearns in early 2008. ?Think of LTCM in 1998, or the life insurers that came under stress for writing too many GICs [Guaranteed Investment Contracts] in the late 80s and invested the money in commercial mortgages.

As the cycle moves on defaults become more closely related to the financial economy as a whole. ?Fed policy is tight, and a bunch of things blow up that borrowed too much money short term. ?This is when the correlated failures happen:

  • Banks, mortgage insurers, and overly leveraged homeowners default 2008-2011.
  • Dot-coms fail because they can’t pay their vendor finance.
  • Mexico and the mortgage markets blow up in 1994.
  • Commercial mortgages blow up in the early 90s.
  • LDC loans blow up in the early 80s.

To the Present

The present is always confusing. ?I get it right more often than most, but not by a large margin. ?We have companies threatening to fail in China?and?Portugal, but I don’t see much systemic lending risk in the US yet, aside from what is leftover from the last crisis.

It is worth noting that deleveraging has occurred more in word than in deed over the last five years. ?Yes, debt has traveled from public to private hands, but that only defers the problems, as governments will either have to inflate, tax more, or default to deal with the additional debts.

I am not trying to sound the alarm here. ?I am trying to tell you to be ready. ?During the intermediate phase between bull and bear, the weakest companies fail from unrecognized systemic risk. ?Personally, I think I have heard the first ‘pop.” ?It is coming from nations that did not delever, and that may suffer further if the bad debts overwhelm the banking systems.

Are you ready for the bear phase of the credit cycle? ?Screen your portfolios, and look for weak names that will not survive a general panic where only the best names can get credit.

What to do when Valuations are High?

What to do when Valuations are High?

A letter from a reader:

Hi David,

What would you recommend for a long only equities portfolio?

I too think the market may be overheating, but as always, it’s impossible to tell when the party will end. I would have said the same thing last year this time as well.

This is what I am doing now:

  1. Cash is presently 16% of my portfolio.? I let that fluctuate between 0-20%.? I try to be fully invested during crises, and build up some cash when valuations are extended. ?16% means valuations are high, but they could get higher — we aren’t at nosebleed levels.
  2. I have more invested in foreign companies than I normally do.? Around 40% of the portfolio is in foreign companies, which are at present undervalued relative to similar US companies.
  3. Emphasize companies with strong balance sheets, in industries that will not go away.
  4. I own cheap stocks.? The median valuation of the stocks that I own is around 10x earnings, and 1x Net Worth (Book Value).

This isn’t sexy, and if the market roars ahead, my clients and I will underperform.? But if there is a reason that emerges that causes the market to fall, my clients and I will do better than most.

I take more risk when the market is in the tank, and less when everyone thinks things are great. ?This is particularly true when policymakers like the Fed are triumphant over high valuations, and low yield spreads.

This is a time to take less risk, in my opinion, but not a time to take no risk.

When Was the Last Time We Had Two Down Days in a Row?

When Was the Last Time We Had Two Down Days in a Row?

I met with some board members from the local CFA Society for lunch today. ?I commented, “When was the last time you saw two down days in a row?” ?The answers ranged from at least a month, to sometime in May. ?I use the S&P 500 as a measure, as most professionals do, and the answer is June 24th. ?Admittedly, one of those declines was very small, but if you want to go back further, there were three down days in a row ending on June 12th.

This teaches a?lesson: in a bull market, most professionals get skittish, and are looking for the turn, and think the market is running mindlessly higher without respite.

For investors that have reduced risk, sensing overvaluation, the continued rise in prices numbs the senses, and makes things seem worse than they are for those that are trying to beat the market.

Why do I write this? ?We all need to take ?step back and focus on first principles. ?What are our goals for clients? ?What time horizon are we looking at? ?Why are we looking at day-to-day performance?

Far better to try to analyze what is being neglected, than agonize over past performance.

Book Review: Investing in India

Book Review: Investing in India

51rdhXWu3BL I learned a lot from this book. India is an amalgam of nations inside one country. It is difficult to generalize about investing in India but there are a few themes to follow.

Most companies in India have a dominant shareholder, or family of shareholders. ?As such, though there are some companies like this in the US, the first prism you view any Indian company through is how they treat outside passive minority shareholders, particularly foreign ones. ?If they constantly give minority shareholders the short end of the stick, no matter how attractive the investment, avoid them.

Analysis of corporate governance is paramount, because it is very difficult to take a company over in a hostile manner. ?Assume that the present management will never be changed. ?Does the company still look cheap if the value -destroying management team will remain there?

Analyze capital allocation as well. ?If management?acts like value maximizing businessmen, it could be a good company to invest in. ?If not, avoid.

Structure of the Book

The book is a slow ramp up as far as business goes, talking about culture, politics, economy, and financial structure, before really digging into investing. ?These are good things to learn about, but the amount of time the book dedicates to making practical investment decisions in India is maybe 25% of the book.

The Main Problem

After you read this book, you will realize that without detailed local knowledge, you don’t stand a chance of investing in public Indian companies directly. ?As such, the book is of limited value to most people. ?So, though it is a good book, you probably would not benefit from reading it, aside from learning about Indian culture and government. ?You would have to build up a lot of knowledge about the Indian families who run public corporations in India — which ones are favorable to outside passive minority investors, and which are not.

Aside from that, they mention the website for the book, but it is just a collection of documents for the companies mentioned in the book.

Summary

India is an unusual country with many challenges. ?You will learn a lot about it and its economy reading this book. ?When you are done reading this book, you will likely conclude that investing in Indian companies is best left to local experts like the author. ?The book gives a good framework, but one embarking upon investing in India will need to develop knowledge of which Indian families treat minority shareholders fairly and who do not. ?If you want to, you can buy it here:?Investing in India, + Website: A Value Investor’s Guide to the Biggest Untapped Opportunity in the World (Wiley Finance).

Full disclosure:?The PR flack asked me if I would like a copy, and I said yes.

If you enter Amazon through my site, and you buy anything, I get a small commission.? This is my main source of blog revenue.? I prefer this to a ?tip jar? because I want you to get something you want, rather than merely giving me a tip.? Book reviews take time, particularly with the reading, which most book reviewers don?t do in full, and I typically do. (When I don?t, I mention that I scanned the book.? Also, I never use the data that the PR flacks send out.)

Most people buying at Amazon do not enter via a referring website.? Thus Amazon builds an extra 1-3% into the prices to all buyers to compensate for the commissions given to the minority that come through referring sites.? Whether you buy at Amazon directly or enter via my site, your prices don?t change.

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