Category: Value Investing

Book Review: The Dao of Capital

Book Review: The Dao of Capital

Jacket.aspxHave I said this before: this is a tough book to review.? Much as I am in sympathy with Austrian Economics, I am not in sympathy with Daoism.

When I came to Christ at age 16, the major rival for my heart was Daoism, not the Catholicism that I grew up with.? My main difficulty was that Catholicism did not speak with a single voice on critical matters — one priest would say this, another that.

Daoism has an advantage in some ways because it seems to describe the world; the world is cyclical, and often a condition gives way to its opposite.

But Daoism, though descriptive of what happens, is amoral, as is much of radical libertarian thought.? A system without rules is no system.? There have to be rules for a good nation to exist.? On economics, there have to be ways to prosecute fraud.? There have to be ways to protect property rights.? That can’t happen without a strong, if limited, government.

Capitalism does not derive from Daoism, but from the laws of Moses, and the words of Jesus.? “Thou shalt not steal.” has impact, because it implies property rights.? 70% of the parables of Jesus involved money, and assumed that people were free to do with their resources as they saw fit.

Daoism did not develop capitalism.? It was a creation of the Christian West.? Was everything perfect in the way it was worked out?? No.? There were many mistakes, and much dispropriation of cultures that had no concept of private property.

Other Problems

The book would have been better without the constant repetition of foreign words.? It is pretentious to make readers learn a bevy of foreign words.

Minsky is better than the author makes him out to be.? At least Minsky sees how financing gets warped through the boom-bust cycle.

I believe that most financial crises occur because of government interference, but not all of them.? Men are greedy/envious/fearful enough to create self reinforcing cycles in the absence of government interference.? Look at the Creation more generally.? There are many species that ceased to exist long before Mankind became dominant.? In the same way, there have been many crises that have occurred in the absence of government interference.? “Man is born to trouble, as the sparks fly upward.”

Practical Upshot

In the last two chapters, he comes out in favor of the Q-ratio and the price-to-book style of value investing, plus quality.?? Both good ideas, but both require patience, which is in short supply among aging baby boomers.? The question to the reader is how long you are willing to wait.? That is the big question of much investing, and how to answer the question — the book says wait.? I agree, but it is tough to hold a lot in cash in a bull market.

Who would benefit from this book: It is a good book, though I doubt that many can follow the advice.? If you want to, you can buy it here: The Dao of Capital: Austrian Investing in a Distorted World.

Full disclosure: The publisher sent me the book after asking me if I wanted it.

If you enter Amazon through my site, and you buy anything, I get a small commission.? This is my main source of blog revenue.? I prefer this to a ?tip jar? because I want you to get something you want, rather than merely giving me a tip.? Book reviews take time, particularly with the reading, which most book reviewers don?t do in full, and I typically do. (When I don?t, I mention that I scanned the book.? Also, I never use the data that the PR flacks send out.)

Most people buying at Amazon do not enter via a referring website.? Thus Amazon builds an extra 1-3% into the prices to all buyers to compensate for the commissions given to the minority that come through referring sites.? Whether you buy at Amazon directly or enter via my site, your prices don?t change.

 

 

 

Three Dimensions, and Printed, but not Real

Three Dimensions, and Printed, but not Real

Okay, let’s run the promoted stocks scoreboard:

Ticker Date of Article Price @ Article Price @ 12/9/13 Decline Annualized Splits
GTXO

5/27/2008

2.45

0.014

-99.4%

-60.9%

 
BONZ

10/22/2009

0.35

0.001

-99.6%

-74.2%

 
BONU

10/22/2009

0.89

0.001

-99.9%

-79.4%

 
UTOG

3/30/2011

1.55

0.001

-99.9%

-93.0%

 
OBJE

4/29/2011

116.00

0.350

-99.7%

-89.1%

1:40

LSTG

10/5/2011

1.12

0.015

-98.7%

-86.2%

 
AERN

10/5/2011

0.0770

0.0001

-99.9%

-95.3%

 
IRYS

3/15/2012

0.261

0.000

-100.0%

-100.0%

Dead
RCGP

3/22/2012

1.47

0.300

-79.6%

-60.4%

 
STVF

3/28/2012

3.24

0.490

-84.9%

-67.1%

 
CRCL

5/1/2012

2.22

0.028

-98.8%

-93.5%

 
ORYN

5/30/2012

0.93

0.038

-95.9%

-87.6%

 
BRFH

5/30/2012

1.16

0.420

-63.8%

-48.6%

 
LUXR

6/12/2012

1.59

0.015

-99.1%

-95.6%

 
IMSC

7/9/2012

1.5

0.800

-46.7%

-35.8%

 
DIDG

7/18/2012

0.65

0.049

-92.5%

-84.4%

 
GRPH

11/30/2012

0.8715

0.053

-93.9%

-93.5%

 
IMNG

12/4/2012

0.76

0.063

-91.7%

-91.4%

 
ECAU

1/24/2013

1.42

0.330

-76.8%

-81.2%

 
DPHS

6/3/2013

0.59

0.007

-98.8%

-100.0%

 
POLR

6/10/2013

5.75

0.090

-98.4%

-100.0%

 
NORX

6/11/2013

0.91

0.160

-82.4%

-97.0%

 
ARTH

7/11/2013

1.24

0.182

-85.3%

-99.0%

 
NAMG

7/25/2013

0.85

0.785

-7.6%

-19.1%

 

12/9/2013

Median

-97.2%

-88.4%

Market regularities are heartening.? It’s astounding how regular the losses are from promoted stocks.

On to tonight’s loser-in-waiting, Makism 3D Corp [MDDD].? This is another company with no revenues, has never earned a dime, etc.? It used to be a company that supposedly was trying to improve cellular telephony, but never earned a dime doing so.? So they bought a UK company that was supposedly working on 3D printing, and surrendered the company to them.

It would be incredibly surprising that a company of three people would be able to overthrow the 3D leaders — DDD and SSYS.? They have invested a lot of time, money, and effort to improve 3D printing, and a startup can beat them with less than a million bucks, and less than a year, with a young undifferentiated staff?? I don’t think so.? Or, as an old-style pinball machine might say, “TILT!”

I don’t buy it, and you should not either.? As with all promoted stock scams, the hard part is identifying who benefits.? My guess is affiliates of the guy who wrote the glowing report.? The company has disclaimed ay responsibility.

In any case, avoid promoted stocks.? Do your own research, and buy stocks that you find attractive.? Don’t buy anything that another is trying to pitch you.

Two zeroes merge, and should we expect a positive result?? I think not.

 

Classic: Become a Smarter Seller, Part 1

Classic: Become a Smarter Seller, Part 1

The following was published at RealMoney, but I don’t know the date.

?I can always find good stocks to buy, but figuring out when to sell is harder.?? (My Mom, when I was much younger.)

 

In some ways, my career in investing has been a happy accident.? Much of my career has been in the insurance industry, working as an actuary.? Being a generalist, with a focus on investments, this helped me to learn a great deal about institutional investing, before doing it myself.

 

At Provident Mutual, now a part of Nationwide Financial Services [NFS], I was the one financial analyst on a committee that chose the managers for a series of multiple manager funds for our pension clients.? I ended up interviewing 30-40 top money managers over a three-year period.? The similarities and differences were interesting.? Two areas that we would always ask about would be their buy and sell disciplines.

 

On buy disciplines, the answers varied considerably.? But sell disciplines were usually pretty similar, falling into three groups:

 

  • Price target met
  • Failure of momentum
  • Fundamentals deteriorate

 

The last of these is squishy, and I would usually ask, ?How can you detect fundamentals deteriorating ahead of everyone else??? This would usually elicit the intelligent equivalent of a mumble.

 

There were a few of the better managers who used what I later called ?The Economic Sell Rule.?? The economic sell rule says that if a manager finds an asset that he likes better than one that he presently holds, he should swap.? That means the manager either intuitively knows what he likes better, or estimates the anticipated rate of return (adjusted for risk tolerance) over the time horizon that he manages, to appraise the desirability of new assets.

 

I ended up calling it the economic sell rule, because each of three rules listed above had problems of their own.? In a market where valuations are crazy, like the late 90s, many price targets get hit.? If the manager is a ?long only? manager, and has to stay fully invested, he can begin to run out of ideas on where to put money to work.? For managers that can go both long and short, there is the problem that as price targets get hit on the long and short side in a sustained market rally, the portfolio gets shorter and shorter.? And in a sustained decline, the portfolio gets longer and longer.

 

This is an implicit bet on mean-reversion, which no doubt happens, but often not soon enough for the clients of the manager, who can lose assets under management as underperformance persists.

 

Failure of momentum could take two forms: valuation-driven managers with price declines below original cost, and momentum-driven managers that would sell when relative strength weakened.? Some valuation-driven managers would often sell any stock that declined more than a threshold percentage, whereas others would do a review at such times to check their investment thesis.? After all, if a manager liked the company before, certainly he should like to buy it cheaper, no?? Unfortunately, the pressure for instant results, measured on a monthly or quarterly basis, can force decisions that are less than fully rational.

 

As one manager said to me, ?If it goes down more than 20% from where we bought it, we obviously didn?t get the story right, so we sell it and move on.?? This is a recipe for turnover and underperformance.? It is normal for stocks that are good long run performers to have 20% drawdowns once a year or so.? Even with good research analysts, the odds of a 20% drawdown are decent, even immediately after a recommendation.? In my own portfolio, after reviewing my thesis, I view 20% drops as buying opportunities.

 

Because I don?t manage money that way, I can?t comment as competently on the momentum-driven managers.? I will only note that they have high turnover rates, and that their trading tends to demand liquidity, rather than supply it.? In future articles, I will comment on the tendency for those who supply liquidity to be rewarded for it.

 

Though I never heard a good explanation for having a competitive edge in detecting deteriorating fundamentals, following the fundamentals is the most useful way for developing a sell discipline.? Absent surprises, companies and industries perform better or worse as investors change their estimates.? As the forward-looking estimate of future returns for a company falls below that of prospective purchase candidates, it is time to swap out.? As the forward-looking estimate of future returns for a company rises compared to other companies in a manager?s portfolio, it is time to buy more.

 

Consider when a ?surprise? happens to a company.? Surprises can be positive (e.g., possible takeover, good earnings), or negative (e.g., bad earnings).? After a surprise, is it time to sell, buy more, or wait?? It boils down to how much the surprise affects the manager?s estimate of value for the stock.? (And to some degree, how much it has affected the estimates of others.)? How much has the long-run earning power been affected?? For how much could the company be sold off?

 

Answering questions like these will lead to the estimates of value that can properly inform sell decisions in volatile times.? Using a discipline like this forces a manager to re-estimate a forward-looking estimate of return, rather than let greed or regret drive decision-making.

 

In my next article, I will show how this process has worked in practice for me, together with another technique that some managers use to pick up some incremental return, and reduce risk.

Book Review: Why Stocks Go Up and Down, Fourth Edition

Book Review: Why Stocks Go Up and Down, Fourth Edition

Book Cover

This is a good book to help the inexperienced learn about investing.? It begins by teaching the rudiments of accounting through the adventures of a man and his company who have built a better mousetrap.

He starts the business on his own, but needs more capital.? In the process of growing, he taps bank loans, private investors, public investors, bonded debt, and preferred stock.? All of this is done with simple explanations in a step-by-step manner.

The book then explains bonds and preferred stocks.? At first I was a little skeptical, because this is supposed to be a book about stocks, and the authors made a small initial error in that section.? That was the last error they made.? I became impressed with their ability to explain corporate bonds and preferred stocks, even some arcane structures like trust preferred securities, and other types of hybrid debt.

Now, if I were trying to shorten the book, a lot of those sections would have been cut.? For those that do want to learn about bonds in the midst of a stock book, you get a free bonus.? If you don’t want to spend the time on bonds, you can skip those sections with little effect on your ability to understand the rest of the book.

Then the book turns to trickier aspects of accounting, explaining cash flow from operations, and free cash flow.? It’s all good stuff, but here is my first problem with the book: what is the most common way of giving a distorted picture of earnings?? Revenue recognition policies.? The book does not talk about revenue recognition, and the most basic idea of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles [GAAP], which is revenue gets taken into earnings proportionate to the delivery of goods and services.? With financial companies, revenues are earned proportionate to release from risk.

That brings up another point.? The book is very good for describing the analysis of an industrial company, but does little to describe how to deal with financial companies.? Financial companies are different, because most of the cash flow statement has no meaning.

Then the book moves on to valuation of common stocks, and that is where I have my biggest problem with the book.? Though they mention other means of valuing stocks, their main valuation method is earnings.? The book does not mention price-to-book as a metric, which is a considerable fault.? Price-to-book is the main way to value financials versus ROE, while price-to-sales is a very good way to measure industrials relative to relative to profit margins.

Further, it suggests that P/E multiples should remain constant as a company grows.? I’m sorry, but P/E multiples tend to shrink as a company grows.? This is because the highest margin opportunities are exploited first, and then lesser opportunities.? For the P/E to remain constant, or even expand means that new opportunities are being exploited that have higher margins.? Investors should not count on that.

These mistakes are minor, though, compared to the good that the book does for an inexperienced investor.

Quibbles

Already expressed.

Who would benefit from this book: This is a classic book that will aid inexperienced investors to learn the basics.? Just remember, it is only the basics, and it covers most things, but not all things. It would be an excellent book for one of your relatives or friends that think they know what they are talking about in investing, but really doesn’t know.? If you want to, you can buy it here: Why Stocks Go Up and Down.

Full disclosure: The publisher sent me the book after asking me if I wanted it.

If you enter Amazon through my site, and you buy anything, I get a small commission.? This is my main source of blog revenue.? I prefer this to a ?tip jar? because I want you to get something you want, rather than merely giving me a tip.? Book reviews take time, particularly with the reading, which most book reviewers don?t do in full, and I typically do. (When I don?t, I mention that I scanned the book.? Also, I never use the data that the PR flacks send out.)

Most people buying at Amazon do not enter via a referring website.? Thus Amazon builds an extra 1-3% into the prices to all buyers to compensate for the commissions given to the minority that come through referring sites.? Whether you buy at Amazon directly or enter via my site, your prices don?t change.

Two More Good Questions

Two More Good Questions

I had two more good questions in response to my piece Why I Resist Trends.? Here we go:

I think you have some idea which ones are the best by the discount to intrinsic value. If you were running a business (which you are when you are investing) and you had 10 projects with lets say a minimum return of 5% but a spread of 20% to 5% wouldn?t you first invest in the 20% return project and fund each project in descending order of return. By equally weighing aren?t you equally investing in the 5% and 20% projects? If you were a CEO shouldn?t the shareholders fire you? I know the markets have more volatility than projects due to the behavioral aspects of investing but in my view equally weighting is more important when you do not know much about your investment and less important when you do. I think you know a lot about the companies you invest in. Why not try an experiment. Either in real time or historically take a look at what would have happened overtime if you would have weighed you selections by discount from intrinsic value. I think you will be pleasantly surprised. I and John Maynard Keynes have been pleasantly surprised.

I do this in a limited way.? In the corporate bond market we have the technical term “cheap.”? We also have the more unusual technical term “stupid cheap” for bonds that are very undervalued.

When I have a stock that is “stupid cheap” I make it a double weight, if it passes margin of safety and other criteria.? On one rare occasion I had a triple weight.

But I meant what I said? in Portfolio Rule Seven — “Run a largely equal-weighted portfolio because it is genuinely difficult to tell what idea is the best.”? I have been surprised on multiple occasions as to what would do best.? Investing is not as simple as assessing likely return.? We have to assess downside risks, and possibilities that some things might go better than the baseline scenario.

I don’t use a dividend discount model, or anything like it.? I don’t think you can get that precise with the likely return on a stock.? My investing is based on the idea of getting very good ideas, as opposed to getting the best ideas.? I don’t think one can get the best ideas on any reliable basis.? But can you find assets with a better than average chance of success?? My experience has been that I can do that.

So, I am happy running a largely (but not entirely) equal-weight portfolio.? It is an admission of humility, which tends to get rewarded in investing.? Bold approaches fail more frequently than they succeed.

By the way, though Keynes was eventually successful, he cratered a couple times.? I have never cratered on a portfolio level, because of my focus on margin of safety.

On to the next question:

What are the tests you use to check if accounting is fair?

Start with my portfolio rule 5, here’s a quick summary:

Over time, I have developed four broadbrush rules that help me detect overstated earnings. Here they are:

  1. For nonfinancials, review the difference between cash flow from operations and earnings.? Companies where cash flow from operations does not grow and? earnings grows are red flags.? Also review cash flow from financing, if it is growing more rapidly than earnings, that is a red flag.? The latter portion of that rule can be applied to financials.

  2. For nonfinancials, review net operating accruals.? Net operating accruals measures the total amount of asset accrual items on the balance sheet, net of debt and equity.??? The values of assets on the balance sheet are squishier than most believe.? The accruals there are not entirely trustworthy in general.

  3. Review taxable income versus GAAP income.? Taxable income being less than GAAP income can mean two possible things: a) management is clever in managing their tax liabilities.? b) management is clever in manipulating GAAP earnings.? It is the job of the analyst to figure out which it is.

  4. Review my article ?Cram and Jam.?? Does management show greater earnings than the increase in book value plus dividends?? Bad sign, usually.? Also, does management buy back stock aggressively ? again, that?s a bad sign.

Then add in my portfolio rule 6, here’s a quick summary:

Cash flow is the lifeblood of business.? In analyzing management teams, there are few exercises more valuable than analyzing how management teams use their free cash flow.

With this rule, there are many things that I like to avoid:

  • I want to avoid companies that do big scale acquisitions.? Large acquisitions tend to waste money.

  • I also want to avoid companies that do acquisitions that are totally unrelated to their existing business.? Those also waste money.

  • I want to avoid companies that buy back stock at all costs.? They waste money by paying more for the stock than the company is worth.

  • This was common in the 50s and 60s but not common today, but who can tell what the future will hold?? I want to avoid companies that pay dividends that they cannot support.

Portfolio rule 6 does not deal with accounting per se, but management behavior with free cash flow.? Rules 5 and 6 reveal large aspects of the management character — how conservative are they?? How honest are they?? Do they use corporate resources wisely?

On Ethics in Business and Investing

I would add in one more thing on ethics of the management team — be wary of a company that frequently plays things up to the line ethically and legally, or is always engaged in a wide number of lawsuits relative to its size.

I know, we live in a litigious society — even good companies will get sued.? But they won’t get sued so much.? I realize also that some laws and regulations are difficult to observe, and interpretations may vary.? But companies that are always in trouble with their regulator usually have a flaw in management.

A management team that plats it “fast and loose” with suppliers, labor, regulators, etc., will eventually do the same to shareholders.? Doing what is right is good for its own reasons, but for investors, it is also a protection.? A management that cheats is in a certain sense less profitable than they seems to be, and eventually that reality will manifest.

All for now, and to all my readers, I hope you had a great Thanksgiving.

Why I Resist Trends

Why I Resist Trends

Portfolio Rule Seven says:

Rebalance the portfolio whenever a stock gets more than 20% away from its target weight. Run a largely equal-weighted portfolio because it is genuinely difficult to tell what idea is the best. Keep about 30-40 names for diversification purposes.

Rarely is a stock a better idea after it has risen 20%, thus, sell some off in case of mean reversion.? When a stock falls 20%, it is usually a better idea, but to make sure, a review should be done to make sure that nothing has been missed.? Since instituting this rule, I have only had two bad failures over the last 13 years.? One was a painful loss on a mortgage REIT, Deerfield Triarc, and the other was Scottish Re.

But still I resist trends.? Human opinion is fickle, and most of the time, there is overreaction.? As a guard, on the downside, I review new purchases to make sure I am not catching a falling knife.

Much of it comes down to time horizons — my average holding period is three years.? If the asset has enough of a margin of safety, the management team will take action to fix the problems.? That is why I analyze management, their use of cash, and margin of safety.? A stock may seem like a lottery ticket in the short run, but in the long run it is a share in a business, so understanding that business better than most is an edge.? How big that edge is, is open to question, but it is an edge.

Another reason I resist trends is that industry pricing cycles tend to reverse every three years or so, offering opportunities to firms that possess a margin of safety in industries that are not in terminal decline, like most newspapers, bricks-and-mortar bookstores, record stores, video rental stores, etc.? (The internet changes almost everything.)

The second last reason why I resist trends is practical — experience.? Most of my best purchases have suffered some form of setback while holding them — were they bad stocks?? No, time and chance happen to all, but a good management team can bounce back.? It offers me an opportunity to add to my position.? I made a great deal of money buying fundamentally strong insurers and other companies during the crisis, sometimes with double weights.

The last reason is an odd one — the tax code.? Short-term gains are disfavored, and also cannot be used for charitable giving.

So why not take a longer view?? I can tell you what you would need to do:

  • Focus on margin of safety (debt, competitive boundaries, etc.)
  • Analyze how management uses free cash (acquisitions, dividends, capital investments, buybacks)
  • Analyze industry pricing trends, at least implicitly.
  • Look at the accounting to see if it is likely to be fair (there are a few tests)
  • Look for cheap valuations, which may have ugly charts.? People have to be at least a little scared.

That takes effort.? I am by no means the best at it, but I do reasonably well.? I avoid large losses without having any sort of automatic “sell trigger.”? Most of my initial losses bounce back, to a high degree.

With that, I wish you well.? Have a great Thanksgiving!

Two Good Questions

Two Good Questions

My last post, On Investment Ideas, Redux, received two good questions.? Here they are, with my answers:

When using your quantitative factors, do your normally compare an investment idea relative to its sector, industry, or a custom comp group? I have dabbled in quantitative factor models in the past, and normally I start with an index, group by sector, and then compare each company relative to its sector (I use valuation metrics, liquidity, technical factors such as relative strength and price relative to moving averages, earnings volatility, earnings estimates revisions, balance sheet metrics, beta, and a proprietary risk/reward metric). How do you go about making the data relevant?

I try to look at what is overplayed and underplayed among factors and industries, and adjust my weightings accordingly.? I look for companies that add to economic value relative to price? I look for companies that may benefit from an industry turnaround or a corporate turnaround.? I look for pricing power, and how that is changing.

My industry and factor models are not integrated.? I use industries as a screen, but I look for value via valuations and factors.? Consult my eight rules for more on this.

I make the data relevant by letting my scoring model highlight promising ideas, and then killing those that are qualitatively bad ideas.

The second question:

Do you think the insurance company meme, while historically profitable, has now been over-exposed by yourself, AIG, Berkshire, etc?

Seems like the barriers to entry throughout the financial industry have collapsed (dis-intermediation by whatever name), and the trade looks pretty crowded. Every industrial concern has a financial arm as widely reported.

I have noticed a lot of de-mutualization of insurance companies, a lot of M&A / consolidation activity, and obviously asset management (new competitors) has grown all over the place. The financial sector (as a percent of the S&P) is back near all time highs.

Is the insurance meme now a crowded trade?

There have been others talking about this idea long before me, notably Tom Gaynor of Markel, a few of the CEOs in Bermuda, Eddy Elfenbein, etc.? There are significant barriers to entry on this trade:

  1. Insurance is not a fast growth industry.? As such, many investors ignore it.
  2. Insurance is not sexy.? Few buy insurance companies as a result.
  3. Insurance is the most complex industry from an accounting standpoint, if you exclude investment banks.? Few follow it in detail.
  4. Insurance profits are volatile in the short-run, but consistent in the long-run, for conservatively run insurers.? People get scared out of insurance stocks from the volatility.

Demutualization is a plus for the publicly traded insurance industry, because it makes the more industry more economic.? That said, there are few large mutuals likely to demutualize anytime soon.? They know that they have got it good.? Good pay. Little oversight.? Why change a good thing?

I would look at it this way.? Since capital easily flows into insurers, be skeptical when insurers with short liabilities have price-to-book over 1.5x.? For life insurers, and those with long liabilities, get skeptical when the price-to-book is over 2.0x.

We’re not there yet, but we are getting closer.? My exposure to the insurance industry is still significant, but well below my peak, where buying discounted insurance shares was easy money, and with far less risk than buying banks.? Banks were the better choice in this scenario, but insurers would have made it through uglier scenarios.? Less leverage and credit risk.

I have not always been a fan of insurance stocks.? In the 90s, I never owned them, because many took too much risk in investing.? Today, those bad old days are gone, and underwriting is designed to make a profit, on average.? And in an environment where many stock valuations are stretched, the valuations of insurers are reasonable.? The only question is whether capital levels are so high that competition on premium levels will be brutal.

My view is this: it will be difficult for the general public, and even institutional investors to warm up to insurance stocks to the degree that they make relative valuations unreasonable.? But if they do, I will be gone.? Somebody give me a spank on the seat if we get another era like the mid-2000s where insurers trade well above their book value, some above 2.0x, and I don’t sell.

I failed to sell as much as I should in 2007.? This time, I will be more measured.? As for now, my overweight on insurers is still a reasonable and likely profitable trade.? But as valuations go up, I will lighten the boat.

On Investment Ideas, Redux

On Investment Ideas, Redux

Would I disclose proprietary ideas of mine?? I’ve done it before.? Why would I do it?? Because it would take a lot to make the ideas usable.? Remember my commentary from when I was a bond manager: I was far more open with my brokers than most managers, but I never gave them the critical bits.

So a reader asked me:

Any chance you could expand on what quantitative metrics you are using to compare potential investments? Could you also name a few of the 77 13fs you track? Thanks

I will go above and beyond here.? You will get the names of all 78 — here they are:

  • Abrams
  • Akre
  • Altai
  • Ancient Art
  • Appaloosa
  • Atlantic
  • Bares
  • Baupost
  • Blue Ridge
  • Brave Warrior
  • Bridgewater
  • BRK
  • Capital Growth
  • Centaur
  • Centerbridge
  • Chieftain
  • Chou
  • Coatue
  • Dodge & Cox
  • Dreman
  • Eagle Capital
  • Eagle Value
  • Edinburgh
  • Fairfax
  • Farallon
  • Fiduciary
  • Force
  • FPA
  • Gates
  • Glenview
  • Goldentree
  • Greenhaven
  • Greenlight
  • H Partners
  • Hawkshaw
  • Hayman
  • Hodges
  • Hound
  • Hovde
  • Icahn
  • Intl Value
  • Invesco
  • Jana
  • JAT
  • Jensen
  • Joho
  • Lane Five
  • Leucadia
  • Lone Pine
  • M3F
  • Markel
  • Matrix
  • Maverick
  • MHR
  • Montag
  • MSD
  • Pabrai
  • Parnassus
  • Passport
  • Pennant
  • Perry
  • Pershing Square
  • Pickens
  • Price
  • Sageview
  • Scout
  • Soros
  • Southeastern
  • SQ Advisors
  • Third Point
  • Tiger Global
  • Tweedy Browne
  • ValueAct
  • Viking Global
  • Weitz
  • West Coast
  • Wintergreen
  • Yacktman

What I won’t tell you is what I do with their data, because it is different from what most do.? But you can play with it.

Then you asked about factors.? Here are my factors:

  • Price change over the last year
  • Price change over the last three years
  • Insider buying
  • Price-to-earnings, both current and forward
  • Price-to-book
  • Price-to-sales
  • Price-to-free cash flow
  • Price-to-sales
  • Dividend yield
  • Neglect (Market cap / Trading volume)
  • Net Operating Assets
  • Stock price volatility over the last three years
  • Asset growth over the last three years
  • Sales growth over the last three years
  • Quality (gross margins / assets)

Now that I have “bared all,” I haven’t really bared all, because there is a lot that goes into the preparation and analysis of the data that can’t be grasped from what I have revealed here.? To go into that would take more time than I can spend.? That’s one reason why as a corporate bond manager, I would share more data with my brokers than most would do, because I knew that the last 20% that I reserved was the real gold.? That I would not share.

Beyond that, there are my industry rotation models, which I share 4-6x per year, and then my qualitative reasoning, which makes me reject a lot of ideas that pass my quantitative screens.

That’s what I do.? It’s not perfect, and my qualitative reasoning has its faults as well.? I encourage you to develop your own theories of value, as Ken Fisher encouraged me to do back in early 2000.? Develop your edge, with knowledge that you have that few others do.? I’ll give you an example.

I understand most areas in insurance.? I don’t get everything right, but it does give me an edge, because insurance accounting and competition is a “black box” to most investors.? Insurance has been one of the best performing industries over time, but many avoid it because of its complexity and stodginess.

Behind the hard to understand earnings volatility, there is sometimes a generally profitable franchise that will make decent money in the long run.? But few get that, and that is an “edge” of mine.? Develop your own edge.

That’s all for now.? Invest wisely, and be wary, because the market for risk assets is high, and what if the Fed stops supporting it?? Make sure your portfolio has a margin of safety.

Classic: Talking to Management, Part 5: Understanding Major Shifts

Classic: Talking to Management, Part 5: Understanding Major Shifts

The following was published at RealMoney on April 20th, 2007:

The Changing Business Environment

What do you think is the most important change happening in the competitive environment at present?

This query can highlight emerging issues and demonstrate how the company is adjusting to the changes. Again, you need to compare the answers of various managers against each other; an odd answer could either be ahead of the pack or out of touch. If you think the answer makes sense, it can open up new questions that further enhance your understanding of the industry and the role that the company you are interviewing plays in it.

After Hurricane Katrina and other storms in 2005, ratings agencies toughened up their risk models, and catastrophe modeling companies increased their frequency and severity estimates. This created an even greater squeeze in the 2006 property reinsurance markets than what the losses of capital alone would have caused, as happened to the 2005 property reinsurance market from losses suffered in 2004. New entrants in the reinsuring property risk space found that they could write only half of the premium that their more seasoned competitors from the class of 2001 could. Further, property-centric writers found the capital required went up more for them than for their more diversified competitors.

There was less effective capital in property reinsurance at the end of 2005 than at the end of 2004, even though surplus levels were higher on net. Those who recognized the change in the rules of the game caught the rally in the stock prices as the price for reinsurance went up more rapidly than most expected for the 2006 renewal season.

What laws, regulations, or pseudo-regulations (such as debt ratings criteria) would you most like to see changed?

This is another attempt to understand what most constrains the growth of the enterprise (see Part 1 for a different angle on the question). The answer should be something that is reasonably probable, or else the management is just dreaming.

For an investment bank like Goldman Sachs (GS), an answer could be, “We want the ratings agencies to agree with our view of our risk management models, so that we can get a ratings upgrade and lower our funding costs.”

For a steel company in the early 2000s, the answer could have been, “The government needs to enforce the antidumping duties better.”

A media or branded goods company today might say, “Better efforts by the government to reduce piracy both here and abroad.”

For companies under cost pressure, such as General Motors (GM) and Ford (F), the answer could be, “A better labor agreement that includes changes in the union rules, so that we can improve productivity.”

What technological changes are most driving your business now?

Technology often benefits its users more than its creators. Prior to computers, it took a lot more people to run banks and insurance companies. Now financial companies are a lot more efficient and hire fewer people than they used to as a result of the change. You as the analyst want to know about the next technological change that will lower costs or create new products in order to forecast increases in growth of profitability.

There are other technological changes, but the biggest one recently in business terms is the Internet. The creation of the Internet has changed the way people search for information. World Book Encyclopedia was owned by Berkshire Hathaway (BRK.A), which thought it had a pretty good franchise until Microsoft (MSFT) and others came out with their own cheaper encyclopedias on a CD-ROM. Now even these are getting competed away by Wikipedia.

Who else is being harmed by the Internet? Newspapers are under threat from all sides. Classified ads have been marginalized by eBay (EBAY), Craigslist, Monster (MNST), etc. Regular advertising has been siphoned off by Google (GOOG), Yahoo! (YHOO) and others.

What cultural changes are most driving your business now?

Cultural changes affect demand for products. As more and more women entered the workforce, demand increased for prepared foods and dining out options. Demand decreased for Tupperware parties and things sold door-to-door.

Cultural changes can also lower the costs of an operation. Outsourcing has lowered costs and improved time coverage for call centers, computer programming and many other service functions. The willingness of nations to embrace the cultural change of capitalism creates new markets that previously did not exist.

One more example, again from insurance: Insurance became a growth product when extended family ties weakened and nuclear families became the standard. Now as nuclear families break down and are replaced by a greater proportion of singles without children, some insurance markets are weakening (life) and others are strengthening (annuities, personal lines, individual heath and disability).

What regulatory changes are most driving your business now?

Before you talk to management, you should know the answer to this one. But what matters here is that you know that they know, too, and more importantly, are building that into the plans for the business.

To get you started, consider the possible impacts of some changes on a few industries. For a pharmaceutical company such as Merck (MRK) or Pfizer (PFE), this could be a change in the way that drugs get approved. It might be a larger political change, such as the recent election of the Democrats, which is expected to produce a change in Medicare reimbursement rates.

Increases in environmental regulation can affect the profits of extraction businesses significantly, whether agriculture, mining, silviculture, energy exploration and production and more. If it becomes easier to unionize, that can affect wage rates and productivity even more as work rules bite into effectiveness and flexibility of work; both of these can lower profits in labor-intensive businesses.

Now, these are pretty obvious examples, and most examples here will be obvious, because most regulation is done openly. The answers that a management gives can be a test as to whether they themselves know what is going on.

Sometimes the answers get a little more subtle. In personal lines insurance, it took analysts a long time to catch up with the safety trends that were bringing down the frequency and severity of losses, particularly graduated licensing for young drivers. Internally, the companies had figured it out long before they told the analyst community. The analysts who asked why severity and frequency of loss were so good and got an answer that allowed them to “connect the dots” to the regulatory change realized that there was a secular, not cyclical, change going on. Thus they were able to make money buying personal auto insurers, because the trend was likely to extend to more states.

Mergers and Acquisitions

Without naming names, what types of business alliances do you think could be most valuable in the future?

This helps flesh out competitive strategy. Managements will be reluctant to part with details, but usually are willing to explain their approach to supplier agreements, joint ventures and so on.

The answer to this question can also highlight the “missing pieces” for the current business, and how the management team is trying to source them. It can also shine a light on new products and services that management is considering.

Is it cheaper at present to grow organically or through acquisitions?

The right answer is almost always organic growth. Acquirers usually overpay, particularly in acquiring scale. Intelligent acquisitions are usually small and often private firms, where the sale is negotiated and not an auction. The goal is to gain new core competencies or markets that can grow profits in concert with the capital and other resources that the company can add to their new acquisition.

If a company answers “through acquisitions,” there had better be a reason it has an advantage in acquiring companies that its competitors don’t, which is rare. If it’s the only public company rolling up a sector (again rare), there should be some logic as to what discipline the company exercises in not overpaying for acquisitions.

In the early phase of a roll-up, prices are typically reasonable for the small firms being purchased. As the roll-up proceeds, the acquisitions that are easy, logical and cheap get done first. In later phases, if there is a mania, the hard, illogical and more expensive acquisitions get done.

It’s rare to have a roll-up in which some party doesn’t start overpaying badly at the end. Sometimes that signals the end of the roll-up phase, with a decline in the share price of the overpayer, destroying the value of the currency that it is using to acquire small entities; namely, its stock price.

How important is scale when you consider acquisitions?

Again, acquirers usually overpay for scale. The right answer is usually that it is not important, unless it is a commodity business and the acquirer is the low-cost competitor, and will wrench expenses out of the target company to make the target as efficient as the acquirer.

Summary

The difference between my approach and the approach of most analysts is that I think about the business and its strategy rather than the next quarter or year’s earnings. My methods probably won’t help you make money in the short run but will help you make money in the long run as you identify intelligent management teams that understand how to compete for the long term, rather than those that can manage only next quarter’s GAAP earnings.

Two additional side benefits to doing it my way: First, the management teams will like talking with you. I can’t tell you how many times managers have said they appreciated my businesslike approach to analyzing their companies. Second, it will translate back into an improved understanding of the business you presently work in, as you think about strategic issues there.

Classic: Talking to Management, Part 4: Prices and Products

Classic: Talking to Management, Part 4: Prices and Products

The following was published at RealMoney on April 19th, 2007:

Pricing and Products

Do you think you can pass through price increases in the next year?

Questions like this can highlight management’s competitive strategy and how much excess of demand over supply exists in the current environment. Answers that involve no price increases or price decreases should also explain the reason for that, e.g., technological change.

For example, if you asked this question of a disk-drive manufacturer, he’d probably blink and ask of you, “Where have you been? This business has been so cutthroat competitive that we have been forced to innovate in order to create drives that store more, retrieve faster and at lower cost for more than 20 years! We’ll never get price increases! This business is like Alice and the Red Queen. We have to run as hard as we can just to stay in the same place. Our only hope is volume growth, and thankfully, we have gotten that.”

Answers that boil down to “demand is eroding” or “competitors are irrational” should contain some idea of what management is doing to combat the problem. Sometimes giving up market share to an irrational competitor can be the brightest move; market share can only be rented, never owned.

I can give examples from many cyclical businesses. All mature businesses are inherently cyclical, and stock price performance follows the pricing cycle. At RealMoney, I have already written about this dynamic in insurance, steel and cement. To give one more example, consider the airlines. As so many of them slipped into bankruptcy early in the 2000s, most of the bankrupt carriers were forced to shed capacity. As they shed capacity, pricing got incrementally better and then a whole lot better, leading to the outperformance of airline shares.

What are your plans for dealing with emerging substitute products?

Sometimes a market comes under threat from a new competitor with a new business model. Usually threats like this begin with simple products with relatively low returns on equity.

For example, when the steel minimills came into existence, they provided only the lowest-quality steel products. Over time they expanded their products to capture more of the value chain in the steel business, and this placed increasing pressure on the integrated steel companies, many of which crumbled under competition from the minimills.

Had the competitive threat been met early, the integrated companies could have minimized the threat by adopting the tactics of the minimills.

Do you have any complementary products in the works that open up new markets for you?

Much of the time, growth happens through a willingness to explore offering products and services that are one step removed from existing offerings. This could be a new marketing channel, offering the product internationally, extending the brand, offering services that complement the product, etc. Often a move like this precedes growth in profitability; it means that executives are looking for low-risk ways to expand the franchise.

Going back to my favorite insurance company, Assurant (AIZ), it’s constantly looking for new ways to create new products and services that lever off an existing core competency. For example, it’s No. 1 by a large margin in force-placed homeowner’s insurance.

When a homeowner with a mortgage doesn’t make a payment on his or her homeowner’s insurance, the mortgage company is at risk if a disaster happens. After a grace period of two to three months expires, the mortgage company buys a homeowner’s policy from Assurant or another carrier and bills the homeowner at their next mortgage payment. The development of force-placed homeowner’s insurance led to new product lines in force-placed auto insurance and renter’s insurance.

The first business developed as a result of relationships with mortgage lenders that wanted their interests protected if property insurance slipped out of force (not a good sign for the creditworthiness of the loan). The same applies to auto lenders. It also applies to large multifamily unit management companies, which want the integrity of their apartments protected. Those who live in apartments are much more likely today to damage the units than in prior decades, and increasingly landlords require it.

Full Disclosure: still long AIZ

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