Category: Value Investing

On Investment Ideas

On Investment Ideas

Where do I get investment ideas?

1) I get them from articles I read.? I print them out and put them in a stack, and then I wait.

2) I get them from my industry ranks and Value Line.? I use Value Line’s screener to screen for my favored industries, subject to a financial stability limit and minimum expected returns.? Then I wait.

3) I look through the 13Fs of 77 clever investors every quarter.? I look at all of the new names that none of them have owned in the prior quarter.? I look at all of the companies that my clever investors own 5% of, which they have added 2% of the market cap to their holdings.

4) I look for indicators of change.? I look for companies where management is changing dramatically, and add them to my review list.? Then I wait.

Once I have have part 3 done, my waiting stops.? I quantitatively score all the companies in my portfolio against their competitors, using fundamental, technical, sentiment and other variables.? The main idea is this: buy companies with better prospects than those being sold.

The quantitative process aids my qualitative evaluations, as I analyze new attractive companies.? Many get thrown out because there is a reason for the cheapness.? Others survive and get added to the portfolio, as I sell names that are less attractive.

Now ordinarily when I do this analysis, I don’t share my results.? This time, I will share the competitor list.? Here it is:

AA AAMRQ ACNB ADS ADT ADTN AEGN AEO AFCE AFL AGRO AGU AKAM AL ALSN AMH AMX ANF APC APD APO ARCC ARII ASC ASIA ATHL ATI ATVI ATX AVB AWRE AZSEY BA BAGL BALT BANC BAP BBRY BERK BH BID BIDU BIOF BIOS BMR BNCL BODY BRE BYD CACB CACH CACI CAG CAM CBI CCI CF CHK CHS CLDT CLDX CLR CMCCMSB CNHI CNP CODE COH CPN CPSI CREE CRI CRK CRMT CSBK CSCO CTO CTRP CTSH CTWS CUBE CVC CVI CVS CXO DD DDS DEG DF DISCA DMD DNR DOOR DOV DRC DRI DRIV DRYS DSW DVA DWA EA EBSB ECTE ENDP ENZN EOX EPAM EPL EQIX ESLT ESRX EVBS EVTC EW EXP FCX FDML FI FIVE FL FLIR FLTX FOXA FUR GACR GCBC GD GES GEVA GIL GOGO GRH GTAT GTS HBAN HBI HCBK HCN HCP HDB HDY HFFC HLF HOG HOS HP HPP HUN HW HXM IACI ICA ICE ICUI IDIX IEP IGTE INFA INFY INGR INS INTL INVN IP ISBC ISRG JACK JAZZ JCP JCS JDSU JKS JONE JPM KAMN KFFB KLAC KMT KRNY LEAP LGF LMT LNN LORL LPI LPX LRN LSBK LSTR LVLT LYB MEI MGA MGYR MIND MLR MNK MON MRO MSM MU MYGN MYL NAV NBL NECB NEU NKTR NM NMM NRG NTES NTI NTK NUAN NUE NVAX NWS NWSA NX NYLD OFED OIS OMED OPK ORAN ORIG OUTR P PACB PCLN PCRX PENN PETM PKX PMT PPC PTRY PVA QCOM QLGC QSII QTM RAX RBS REIS RESI RFP RH RHHBY RLD RNWK ROMA RPXC RT S SALE SB SFM SGMS SHOS SIFI SIX SNBC SODA SPRD SQM SRC SRNE SSLT SSNC SSTK ST STC STND STPFQ STSI STZ SUSS SWI SWN SWRL SYKE SYNL TA TCPC TDG TEVA TFSL TGI THOR THR THS TPH TPX TRW TSCDY TSM TSO TSS TTEK TUP TXI TXTR UEPS UIL UMC URS UTHR UTSI VAR VIVHY VLRS VMC VSAT WCG WLFC WMPN WPO WR WSBF WSM XON XOOM XPO XXIA XYL YRCW YUME Z ZIGO ZNGA

Oddly, there are exactly nine competitors for every company in my portfolio.? That should give me a good set of companies to analyze as I sell three or so companies and buy three replacements.? Remember, it is always easier to make binary choices — do I like this better than that, than to try to maximize over a wide realm of choices.

Full disclosure: I own none of the above mentioned companies.? I will probably buy 2-5 of them in the next two days.

Classic: Talking to Management, Part 3: The Competition

Classic: Talking to Management, Part 3: The Competition

This was originally published on RealMoney on April 17, 2007:

The Competition

What are you seeing that you think most of your competitors aren’t seeing? Or: What resource is valuable to your business that you think your competitors neglect?

This question is an open invitation to a management team to reach into its “brag bag” and pull out a few of its best differential competences for display. The answer had better be an impressive one, and it had better make sense as a critical aspect of the business. Good answers can include changes in products, demand, pricing and resources; they must reflect some critical aspect of business that will make a difference in future profitability.

Consider two examples from the insurance industry, both of which are future in nature:

I posed this question to the CEOs of several Bermuda reinsurers, and the answer was: “We don’t think that the profitability of casualty business is as profitable as the reserving of some of our competitors would indicate.” That might have been a bit of trash talk; perhaps it was a word to the wise. I favor the latter interpretation.

Then there was a CEO who suggested that many specialty casualty insurers he competed against had underinvested in claims control. That’s fine in the bull phase of the cycle, but it can spell trouble in the bear phase, when cash flow might go negative and skilled claims adjusters are hard to find.

If you could switch places with any of your competitors, who would it be and why? Alternatively, if you think you are the best positioned, who is next best, in your opinion?

This question usually won’t get an answer in large forums. It’s best saved for more intimate gatherings, because to the wider investing public, most companies portray themselves as the best. Also, in diversified corporations, it’s useful to ask this question of divisional heads rather than the CEO. They have a closer feel for the competition they face on a day-to-day basis.

When answered, this query can yield new research vistas. Who knows company quality better than an industry insider? The response can bring out the unique reasons a competitor is succeeding — and, potentially, what this company’s current management team is doing to challenge the competitor.

Note: The opposite question, “Which companies are not run properly?” will not get answered, except perhaps in one-on-one meetings. Few managements will publicly trash-talk the competition. The few that will do so deserve a red flag for hubris.

As an example, I had an interesting experience while at a financial conference. I was at a breakout meeting where J. Hyatt Brown, of Brown & Brown, was taking questions. Of the insurance brokers, Brown & Brown is no doubt the best managed, and Hyatt Brown has strong opinions and is almost never at a loss for an answer. When my turn to ask a question came up, I said, “OK, you’re the best-run company in your space. Who is No. 2?”

Hyatt Brown looked reflective, paused for 20 seconds and answered that it is was tough to say, but he thought that Hub International (HBG) was No. 2. And now Hub has gone private in a much better deal than Goldman Sachs’ (GS) buy of USI Holdings (USIH), from a quality standpoint. To my chagrin, I didn’t buy Hub off of Hyatt Brown’s comments. I missed a cool 59% in 10 months, but you can’t kiss them all.

What would your competitors have to do in order to reverse-engineer your competitive position? Or, why do you suppose other companies don’t adopt your methods?

This question gets at what management views as its critical differences for business success. The answer had better be a good one; it should be something important, and hard to duplicate. As Warren Buffett might put it, we are trying to determine the size and depth of the “moat” that exists around the business franchise.

If the answer doesn’t deliver an idea that is weighty and makes sense from a competitive standpoint, you can assume that the business doesn’t have a lot of franchise value and doesn’t deserve a premium multiple.

Valero Energy (VLO) is the leading oil refiner in the U.S. It also has the leading position in refining both heavy (high-density) and sour (high-sulfur) crudes, which cost less, leading to higher profit margins. It would cost a lot of money for a competitor to create or purchase the same capacity, assuming it could get all of the regulatory permits to do so.

On a competitive basis, who has the most to lose in the present environment?

Some executives won’t name names, but they might be able to point out what characteristics the worst-positioned competitors don’t have. In commodity businesses, the executive could point at those with bad cost structures. In businesses where value comes from customization, the executive could say, “To be a real player, you can’t just sell product, you must be able to assess the needs of the client, advise him, sell the product, install it and provide continuing service, leading to ancillary product sales.”

As commodity prices move down, the recent acquirers and developers of high-cost capacity fare the worst. With life insurance today, scale is becoming more and more of an advantage. Smaller players without a clear niche focus are likely to be the losers; that’s one reason I don’t get tempted to buy most of the smaller life insurance companies that trade below book value. Given their fixed expenses and lack of profitability, they deserve to trade at a discount to book.

Full Disclosure: long VLO

Classic: Talking to Management, Part 2: Gleaning Financial Subtleties

Classic: Talking to Management, Part 2: Gleaning Financial Subtleties

This was originally published on RealMoney on April 17, 2007:

Financial Questions

What proportion of your earnings are free cash flow, available to be invested in new opportunities, stock buybacks, or dividends?

(Note: The free cash flow of a business is not the same as its earnings. Free cash flow is the amount of money that can be removed from a company at the end of an accounting period and still leave it as capable of generating profits as it was at the beginning of the accounting period. Sometimes this is approximated by cash flow from operations less maintenance capital expenditures, but maintenance capex is not a disclosed item, and changes in working capital can reflect a need to invest in inventories in order to grow the business, not merely maintain it.)

Again, a good analyst has a reasonable feel for the answer to this question. If management oversells its ability to deliver free cash flow, that’s a red flag. With companies that I am short, I often ask about when they will increase the dividend or buy back stock. Alternatively, I ask about the prospective rate of return on their new projects, but more on that in the next section. You can ask a management team outright what proportion of the company’s earnings is free cash flow and then analyze that for reasonableness.

As an aside, you can stay clear of a lot of blowups by avoiding companies that have strong earnings and weak or negative free cash flow. If a company has to plow a lot of cash back into the business to maintain it, it’s often a sign of costs that aren’t reflected in the current profitability of the business. At the edge, big deviations can indicate fraud; for example, I avoided investing money in Enron as a result of this analysis.

What’s your best reinvestment opportunity for free cash flow? Or, what’s your most promising new project?

Questions like this can flesh out the intentions of management and give longer-term investors a new avenue of inquiry in future quarters; follow up on the answers. The idea is to judge whether the new projects are valuable or not, or big enough to make a difference. Another thing that will be learned here is what time horizon management is working on, and whether the investments targeted are cash-consuming or cash-generating.

It’s possible that management might let drop the anticipated rate of return on the new project, or even their target hurdle rates for new projects in general. You can ask for that figure, but don’t be surprised when you get turned down; rather, be surprised if you get it. I wouldn’t hand that information out if I were a company because competitors would like to know that information.

How is the turnover rate for your employees? How many suppliers have left you over the last year? What percentage of your business comes from repeat customers?

These questions can apply to any key relationship that the company has. If the company has difficulty retaining employees, suppliers or customers, that can be a warning sign. On the other hand, it is possible for the company to have too low a “quit rate.” This could imply that it isn’t extracting as much from the relationships as it possibly could.

Consider two examples for insight into how high and low employee turnover can affect a business. The first insurance company I worked for, Pacific Standard Life, had a 50% employee turnover rate. The place was a mess because institutional memory, particularly among mid- to lower-level employees, was forever disappearing. It was a wild ride for me, as the company grew by a factor of 10 in the 3? years I was there, before it became insolvent in 1989 due to a bad asset policy forced on it by its parent company. (Trivia: At $700 million in assets, it was the largest life insolvency of the 1980s. The ’80s were kind to life insurers.)

Then there is a college that I know of that has a turnover rate of nearly zero. Many of the employees there stay because it’s the best place that would have them; they might not have other opportunities. As a result, productivity in some areas is low and new ideas are few.

A healthy organization tends to have at least 5% turnover. Depending on the industry, a turnover rate between 5% and 15% strikes a good balance between institutional memory and new ideas.

The same logic can apply to suppliers. Long-term relationships are good, but there is value in testing them every now and then to see whether a better deal can be struck in price, quality or other terms.

Repeat customers work the same way. Too low a repeat customer rate means that marketing costs will be relatively high. Too high a repeat customer rate, and the company might be missing out on additional profits from a price increase.

Ten Years of Investment Writing

Ten Years of Investment Writing

I’m late on this.? My first foray into public writing on investing was when I started writing at RealMoney on October 17th, 2003.? But how did I get there?

Sadly, almost all of the works of RealMoney prior to 2008 are not accessible.? My first effort was writing Jim Cramer the day after General American Life Insurance failed on August 10, 1999.? He wrote a short piece asking why no one was paying attention to the failure of a major life insurer.? He wanted to know what happened.? I had heard about the failure, and so I searched for more data on it, and I saw Cramer’s article, only one hour old, so I sent him an e-mail as “your friendly neighborhood investment actuary.”

I explained the situation to him in about three hundred words, and lo and behold, my e-mail was featured in a post by Cramer that very day saying how amazing it was that he could get such a cogent explanation that was not available elsewhere on the web.

Not wanting to wear out my welcome with Cramer, I e-mailed him maybe eighty times over the next four years, with occasional e-mails to Herb Greenberg and Howard Simons.? I e-mailed mostly bond market and insurance information.? But in the period from 2000-2003, information on the bond market from an active institutional participant was interesting.? At least, I thought so, and Cramer usually returned my e-mails, as did Herb Greenberg.

In August 2003, after I had taken a job as an insurance equity analyst at a financial services only hedge fund, Cramer e-mailed me, asking me to write for RealMoney.? I don’t have the actual e-mail, but he said something to the effect of “You write better than most of our contributors.? Please come write for us.”

I went to my boss to ask permission, and he refused.? After some pleading on my part, he eventually relented.? That said, when Cramer wanted me to appear on “Mad Money,” he refused, and did not give in.? He did not want the name of his firm associated with Cramer.? I was disappointed, but I understood.

At RealMoney, I wrote about a wide variety of topics as I do at Aleph Blog.? My editor one day called me and after we chatted for a while she said to me, “Did you know that you are our most profitable columnist after Cramer?”? I expressed surprise, and asked how it could be.? She said that I wrote more comments in the columnist conversation than most, and my comments were substantial.? Also, readers would read and re-read my posts, which was rare at RealMoney.

My objective was to teach investors how to think.? I did not want to get into the “buy this, sell that” game.? My most unpleasant memories revolve around bad calls that I made on a few stocks.? I think it was fewer than five stocks, but when you get it badly wrong, passions are heightened.

Cramer and I often disagreed with each other at RealMoney.? I felt I had friends with Cody Willard and Howard Simons, and a few others like Aaron Task, Roger Nussbaum, Peter Eavis, etc.? If I didn’t mention you, please don’t take that as a slight, I just can’t remember everything now.? I thought highly of most of the cast at RealMoney, including the news staff, who would occasionally call me for advice on bonds, insurance, or investing theory issues.

I resisted the idea of starting a blog.? I said to my editors at RealMoney, “The Columnist Conversation is my blog.”? But in early 2007, while trolling the comment streams on Jim Cramer’s blog, and making comments defending him, a number of readers told me that I was one of the best writers on the site, so why didn’t I emerge from Cramer’s shadow?

I thought about this hard for about a month, and then I did it, after doing my research.? I created Aleph Blog, with the first post coming on 2/17/2007, and the first real post on 2/20/2007.? That first real post was prescient, and laid out a lot of what would happen in the bust.

But as I started, the Shanghai Market crashed, and Seeking Alpha pushed one of my posts to the top of their front page.? Cody Willard pushed another post of mine to his media contacts.

I was off and running without doing that much to advertise my blog.? I appreciated that because I think the best way of advertising my blog is to write good content.? I don’t generally like to quote large amounts of the writing of others, and add a few comments from me.? To me, that seems lazy.? I would far rather spend some time, and give you my thoughts.? I’m not always right, but I am always trying to give you my best.

After ten months of blogging, I stopped contributing to RealMoney because I liked the editorial freedom that bloggng offered.? I was never writing for RealMoney in order to get paid, so not getting paid at Aleph Blog was not a problem.

At Aleph Blog, I write about what resonates within me.? That usually produces the best results, though because I write about a wide variety of topics, some people don’t know what to expect of me, and aren’t interested in what I write.? I understand that, and I am not unhappy with a smaller audience.

What I did not expect when I started blogging was that I would do:

  • Book Reviews
  • The Education of a Corporate Bond Manager
  • The Education of a Mortgage Bond Manager
  • The Education of an Investment Risk Manager
  • The Rules

and other series at my blog.? I did not consider that I might be a conference blogger for notable institutions like Bloomberg and the Cato Institute.

I also did not realize that I would take aggressive stances against a wide number of semi-fraudulent financial practices like penny stocks, structured notes, private REITs, and a wide variety of other bad investments.

It’s been a lot of fun, and I did it to give something back.? With great power comes great responsibility, and that is why I blog.? Nothing more, nothing less.

May the Lord Jesus Christ bless you.

Thanks for reading me.

David

What a Tweet Valuation!

What a Tweet Valuation!

I don’t have a strong sense on the valuation of Twitter, but I want to share with you forty companies with valuations similar to that of Twitter as of the close on November 7th.

MKTCAP_24191_image002

Twitter’s valuation was around $25.9 Billion at the close of regular trading on 11/7.? The private equity sponsors must be jumping for joy, as they got more than they expected on the IPO, and even more, if the price of Twitter holds up past the time of their lockup, when they can sell their remaining shares.

Twitter has no profits, and trades at 10 times book value, versus 2.3x on their competitors here.? Price-to-Sales is around 50, versus 1.8 for competitors here.

There is one thing certain here, there is a lot of profits growth expected out of Twitter.? It has to go from negative profits to positive, and then soar thereafter.? That would justify the valuation.

But how likely is that?? There are few companies that ever do that.? So be wary and avoid Twitter stock, realizing there is a small chance that it might be worth its present valuation, much less more.

Full disclosure: no positions in any companies mentioned here.

Classic: Talking to Management, Part 1: The Big Questions

Classic: Talking to Management, Part 1: The Big Questions

This was originally published on RealMoney on April 16, 2007:

“I am a better investor because I am a businessman, and a better businessman because I am an investor.” — Warren Buffett

One of the things I try to do in my investing is analyze the quality of a management team. Though this is a squishy discipline, if I can be approximately right in this endeavor, I can add a lot of value.

I want to share with you the questions I ask management and the reasons I ask them because I believe they’re useful even if you never come face-to-face with a real live C-suite dweller. They cover six major areas:

  • general topics
  • financial
  • competition
  • pricing and products
  • changing environment
  • mergers and acquisitions

I try to analyze sustainable competitive advantage and the ability of managements to generate and use free cash flow, among other factors. (As an aside, in the insurance industry, I can kind of tell management quality by “feel.” I have worked for good and bad managements, and I know their characteristics intuitively.) I try to see if managements are economically rational, are focused on building long-term profitability and act in the interests of the outside passive minority investors who own their shares.

Personally, I am in favor of small-shareholder capitalism. By this, I mean that small investors should have the same access to management, not least of all through quarterly (and other) conference calls held. This view is partly driven by the inadequate questions asked by sell-side analysts.

Too often, sell-side analysts focus on the short run and qualitative variables in their models. The short term is overanalyzed, so I try to look to the longer term. That means most of my questions are about strategy. I try to figure out if the managements in question are — again — economically rational, focused on building long-term profitability and acting in the interests of the outside passive minority investors who own their shares. Or do they act for reasons other than maximizing value for mom and pop, a.k.a. you and me?

Though most of us are outside passive minority investors, pretend for a moment that you are a private-equity investor. There’s value to be had in understanding how an investor in the business would benefit in the absence of a secondary market for ownership interests. The value derived by a private-equity investor feeds slowly to the public equity investor in the short run but directly in the long run.

Then sit back and read through these questions. Prepare to ask them of the managements of the companies in which you are currently a shareholder. Imagine the answers, or even try to get them.

And adjust your holdings accordingly.

General Questions

What sustainable competitive advantages do you have vs. your competitors?

As with most of my questions, I usually have a reasonable idea of what the answer is likely to be. Part of my question is to test the competence and veracity of management. If it trots out some answer that is nonsense, that is a big red flag to me.

Given that most of the time I invest in mature industries, I want to hear answers that tell me the company has an expense advantage over competitors. That can be easily verified. Other possible answers include exclusive distribution agreements, patents, technological advantages and company culture.

Once I hear the answer, I try to analyze how much it makes sense. Has the company really created a “moat” that protects its profits from competition, or is it trying to fool me? I don’t always get a sharp answer, but the exercise is always valuable. Uncertainty leads to doing nothing or to a smaller position, which is always appropriate when you don’t have a big edge.

For instance, longtime readers know that I am a long-term bull on the diversified insurance company Assurant (AIZ). In most of Assurant’s business lines, it is the No. 1 or No. 2 provider in the businesses in which it chooses to compete. Part of that stems from locking up exclusive distribution arrangements, some from proprietary technology that would be difficult and prohibitively expensive to reverse-engineer.

To give another example, Allstate (ALL) and Progressive (PGR) are leaders in customer segmentation, leading to individualized pricing of personal lines coverage. Other major personal lines companies are playing catch-up, and the smaller mutual companies are losing many of their most profitable customers.

So these companies have a clear advantage, which management should be able to communicate quickly.

What single constraint on the profitable growth of your enterprise would you eliminate if you could?

Companies tend to grow very rapidly until they run into something that constrains their growth. Common constraints are:

  • insufficient demand at current prices
  • insufficient talent for some critical labor resource at current prices
  • insufficient supply from some critical resource supplier at current prices (the “commodity” in question could be iron ore, unionized labor contracts, etc.)
  • insufficient fixed capital (e.g., “We would refine more oil if we could, but our refineries are already running at 102% of rated capacity. We would build another refinery if we could, but we’re just not sure we could get the permits. Even if we could get the permits, we wonder if long-term pricing would make it profitable.”)
  • insufficient financial capital (e.g., “We’re opening new stores as fast as we can, but we don’t feel that it is prudent to borrow more at present, and raising equity would dilute current shareholders.”)

There are more, but you get the idea.

Again, the intelligent analyst has a reasonable idea of the answer before he asks the question. Part of the exercise is testing how businesslike management is, with the opportunity to learn something new in terms of the difficulties that a management team faces in raising profits.

How are you planning on growing the top line?

This can be a trick question, particularly for industries in which pricing power is nonexistent. When there is no pricing power, the right answer is to focus on the bottom line and not sell underpriced business. The answer here can reveal whether the executive is a rational competitor and whether he has the courage to be honest with the analyst.

The sell side has a bias toward top-line growth, which is wrong in my opinion. Actions that improve the expense structure are just as important as new sales. Good managements have a consistent focus on the bottom line, whether it grows the top line or not.

Particularly in financial businesses, there is a tradeoff between quality, quantity and price. In good markets, you can get two out of three. In bad markets, you can only get one out of three, and if that one is growth in sales or origination, watch out. That business is a candidate for profit shrinkage, and possibly insolvency.

Good managements know when to step back from their markets when competition is irrational. In the short run, that may hurt the stock price, but in the intermediate term, it will keep them in the game. In the long run, it will help the stock price when the pricing cycle finally turns and a few stupid competitors are weakened or bankrupt from their past mispricing of business.

Full Disclosure: long AIZ

Book Review: The Manual of Ideas

Book Review: The Manual of Ideas

L9781118083659 I’m a value investor, and one that is not doctrinaire about a narrow set of principles.? Yes, I like my eight rules, but they are broad principles that admit a lot of flexibility.

The Manual of Ideas introduces readers to a wide number of ways to source investing ideas that may offer value.? There are nine main areas that they highlight:

1) One can invest in a small number of stocks that are worth more dead than alive.? Net-net stocks show places where the downside is minimal, and profits could be made if either the company turns around or liquidates.

2) Sometimes companies obscure their value because they do multiple things.? The company would be more valuable broken into its constituent parts, which would get a higher? valuation in aggregate.

3) You can follow the magic formula, and buy stocks that have high returns on equity and low P/E ratios.

4) You can own stocks managed by talented managers, and I admit that maybe 7 of the 37 stocks I hold fall into that bucket, and I will not readily sell them.? The question is how you find those managers.? That’s not easy, and involves industry knowledge which is not available to all.

5) You can own stocks owned by smart investors, and I admit that I track this every quarter.? I get a lot of good ideas from them, but I like to look at the ideas that are cold, because they offer more potential.

6) Buy teensy stocks that no one follows, that are making money and have legitimate business models.? You can’t put a lot of money to work that way, but if you get it right, it can add value.

7) Buy companies that are undergoing a structural change that adds value.? Example: a petroleum refiner decides to spin off a pipeline Master Limited Partnership.

8 ) Buy highly indebted companies that offer the potential of huge gains if the idea works out.? Screen out companies that are more likely to lose it all.

9) Buy international companies — the scrutiny and competition are less — you may find something genuinely cheap, but make sure they play fair with outside passive minority shareholders.

There are some very good methods here, but what should you decide to pursue?? That is the one weakness of the book.? The book gives you a significant but not exhaustive tour of the ideas behind value investing.? What would have added a lot is an integrated chapter on when it is best to pursue each set of ideas. It is difficult enough for professional investors to know which method is best at a given time, much less amateurs.? The time of investors, both professional and amateur, is limited.? It would be a great aid to figure out how to prioritize the methods or ideas.

Also, more emphasis on margin of safety would have been useful.? We can never get too much of that.

But I would recommend this book strongly to all investors.? It will strengthen your idea generation processes.

Quibbles

Already expressed.

Who would benefit from this book: Most investors would benefit from reading this book.? It will aid them in idea generation.? If you want to, you can buy it here: The Manual of Ideas: The Proven Framework for Finding the Best Value Investments.

Full disclosure: The publisher sent me the book after asking me if I wanted it.

If you enter Amazon through my site, and you buy anything, I get a small commission.? This is my main source of blog revenue.? I prefer this to a ?tip jar? because I want you to get something you want, rather than merely giving me a tip.? Book reviews take time, particularly with the reading, which most book reviewers don?t do in full, and I typically do. (When I don?t, I mention that I scanned the book.? Also, I never use the data that the PR flacks send out.)

Most people buying at Amazon do not enter via a referring website.? Thus Amazon builds an extra 1-3% into the prices to all buyers to compensate for the commissions given to the minority that come through referring sites.? Whether you buy at Amazon directly or enter via my site, your prices don?t change.

Industry Ranks November 2013

Industry Ranks November 2013

Industry Ranks 6_1521_image002

 

My main industry model is illustrated in the graphic. Green industries are cold. Red industries are hot. If you like to play momentum, look at the red zone, and ask the question, ?Where are trends under-discounted?? Price momentum tends to persist, but look for areas where it might be even better in the near term.

If you are a value player, look at the green zone, and ask where trends are over-discounted. Yes, things are bad, but are they all that bad? Perhaps the is room for mean reversion.

My candidates from both categories are in the column labeled ?Dig through.?

You might notice that? I have no industries from the red zone. That is because the market is so high. I only want to play in cold industries. They won?t get so badly hit in a decline, and they might have some positive surprises.

If you use any of this, choose what you use off of your own trading style. If you trade frequently, stay in the red zone. Trading infrequently, play in the green zone ? don?t look for momentum, look for mean reversion. I generally play in the green zone because I hold stocks for 3 years on average.

Whatever you do, be consistent in your methods regarding momentum/mean-reversion, and only change methods if your current method is working well.

Huh? Why change if things are working well? I?m not saying to change if things are working well. I?m saying don?t change if things are working badly. Price momentum and mean-reversion are cyclical, and we tend to make changes at the worst possible moments, just before the pattern changes. Maximum pain drives changes for most people, which is why average investors don?t make much money.

Maximum pleasure when things are going right leaves investors fat, dumb, and happy ? no one thinks of changing then. This is why a disciplined approach that forces changes on a portfolio is useful, as I do 3-4 times a year. It forces me to be bloodless and sell stocks with less potential for those with more potential over the next 1-5 years.

I like some technology stocks here, some industrials, some consumer stocks, particularly those that are strongly capitalized.

I?m looking for undervalued industries. I?m not saying that there is always a bull market out there, and I will find it for you. But there are places that are relatively better, and I have done relatively well in finding them.

At present, I am trying to be defensive. I don?t have a lot of faith in the market as a whole, so I am biased toward the green zone, looking for mean-reversion, rather than momentum persisting. The red zone is pretty cyclical at present. I will be very happy hanging out in dull stocks for a while.

That said, some dull companies are fetching some pricey valuations these days, particularly those with above average dividends. This is an overbought area of the market, and it is just a matter of time before the flight to relative safety reverses.

The Red Zone has a Lot of Financials; be wary of those. I have been paring back my insurers, but I have been adding to P&C reinsurers.? What I find fascinating about the red momentum zone now, is that it is loaded with cyclical companies.

In the green zone, I picked almost all of the industries. If the companies are sufficiently well-capitalized, and the valuation is low, it can still be an rewarding place to do due diligence.

Will cyclical companies continue to do well?? Will the economy continue to limp along, or might it be better or worse?

But what would the model suggest?

Ah, there I have something for you, and so long as Value Line does not object, I will provide that for you. I looked for companies in the industries listed, but in the top 5 of 9 balance sheet safety categories, and with returns estimated over 12%/year over the next 3-5 years. The latter category does the value/growth tradeoff automatically. I don?t care if returns come from mean reversion or growth.

But anyway, as a bonus here are the names that are candidates for purchase given this screen. Remember, this is a launching pad for due diligence, not hot names to buy.

I?ve loosened my criteria a little because the market is so high, but I figure I will toss out lot when I do my quarterly evaluation of the companies that I hold for clients and me.

Industry Ranks 6_19997_image002

Full Disclosure: Long SYMC, DOX

On Fat Tails

On Fat Tails

I’m reading an investment book that is arguing for market timing.? I’m not impressed with the line of argumentation so far.? I just finished a chapter where the authors pointed out that security price movements are more volatile that the normal distribution would admit.

This is a well known result, or at least it should be well-known.? What I hope to contribute to the discussion is why the tails are fat, and skewed negatively.? There is a famous saying in investments:

Cut your losses, and let your winners run

I regard this saying as vapid, because I have had so many investments where the price action was bad initially, but ended up being incredible investments.? I have also had companies stumble after prior gains, and persevere for greater gains.? Intelligent asset management does not react to the past, but analyzes future prospects, and looks at current margin of safety.

But imagine a situation where many parties have their plans, and they are all similar.? I’ll give a few examples:

  • Institutional investors decide in 1986 to follow the momentum, but be ready to sell if the momentum breaks.? They want upside, but want to protect the downside.
  • Japan was a total momentum market up through 1989, and the reverse thereafter.? Loose monetary policy was an aspect of that, as was a loss of fear, warrant speculation, etc.
  • Those investing in hot emerging markets in the mid-90s did not recognize valuations getting stretched, and the inability of the countries to maintain stimulative policies amid falling currencies.
  • The guys at LTCM were geniuses until they weren’t.? They had no idea of the risks they were taking.? They did not have an ecological view of investing.? Essentially, they thought liquidity was free, until the jaws of the trap snapped shut, and they died.? Taking a concentrated position is a risk, because the investing typically pushes up the price.? When you are so big in a position that you are affecting the market price, that is a bad place to be for two reasons: 1) if you sell, you drive down the price for future sales, and 2) you no longer know what the fair price would be if you weren’t there.
  • Aside from that with LTCM, their brokers mimicked their trades, accentuating the boom-bust, but the brokers had risk control desks that forced them to sell out losing trades, which further hurt LTCM.
  • Think about residential mortgage bonds in 1994.? So many players thought that they had mastered the modeling of prepayment risk only to find amid a Fed tightening cycle that many wanted to limit their interest rate risk as rates skyrocketed, fueling a self-reinforcing panic.
  • Consider tech stocks 1998-2000.? Momentum ran until the sheer weight of valuations, together with insolvencies, crushed the market as a whole, and tech stocks more.? Think of European financial institutions getting forced by regulators to kick out US stocks in September 2002, putting in the bottom.? Regulators almost always act too late, and exacerbate crises, but they should do that, because worse things would happen if they didn’t.? (Later = bigger crisis, Earlier = Some Type II errors, regulating where it was not needed).
  • Finally, consider the housing/banking crisis in the US 2005-2009.? People bought homes with a lot of debt financing, and short-dated debt financing.? Banks levered up to provide the financing.? Shallow credit analysis allowed banks to take on far more risk than they imagined.? It all ended in a trail of tears, with many personal, and not enough corporate bankruptcies, with the taxpayers footing the bill.

In each of these cases, you have correlated human behavior.? The greed of investors gives way to fear.

Now if you are thinking about Modern Portfolio Theory, where market players have perfect knowledge, this doesn’t make sense.? These crises should not happen.? But they happen all too regularly, and I will explain why.

Men are not greedy as much as they are envious.? This leads to mimicking behavior when things are going well.? Those not currently playing want a piece of the action, and so they imitate.

Modern Portfolio Theory implicitly assumes that market players don’t react to the actions of other market players, but that is false.? Most market players don’t think; they mimic.

That is what leads to fat tails, because when people move as a herd, you get dramatic price moves.? Because fear is a greater motivator than envy, that is why the big downward moves are almost always greater than the big upward moves.

Add into that the credit cycle, because gains on credit-sensitive bonds are small, but losses are huge when they occur.? The distribution of outcomes has a long left tail.

The main point here is that price movements are non-normal because market players act as a group.? Their behavior is correlated? on the downside, and to a lesser extent on the upside.

Among other things, this means Modern Portfolio Theory is wrong, and needs to be severely modified, or abandoned.? It also means that we need to watch the credit cycle, and speculative activity to get a sense of how committed the hot money is to risk assets.? Hot money follows trends.? Cold money estimates likely returns over a market cycle, and invests in the best ideas when they are out of favor.

I don’t think timing the market is easy.? I do think that fundamental investors have to look at whether they have a lot of opportunities, or few, and vary their safe assets opposite to opportunities.

So beware the fat tails — we haven’t had a lot of volatility recently.? Maybe we are due.

To Young Analysts

To Young Analysts

I write this because my friend Tom Brakke is putting together a book.? He wrote a series that started with a letter to a young analyst.

I have sympathy for those that are starting out in finance.? It’s tough.? My own route to where I am today was longer than most. In some ways, I have advantages, because I worked inside regulated financial firms, and I saw the pathologies that exist within them.? But here was my path:

  • Junior Actuary
  • Actuary for Annuity Lines
  • Investment Actuary for tihe Pension Line
  • Investment Actuary for the Annuity Line
  • Mortgage Bond Manager, and Risk Manager
  • Corporate Bond Manager, advising the Chief Investment Officer on insurance issues.
  • Buy-side Analyst of Insurance Companies for a hedge fund
  • Chief Research Analyst for a minority broker-dealer
  • Principal of Aleph Investments, LLC

Look, it’s tough to be inexperienced.? I’ve been there.? I really wish I understood the accounting rules, and laws/regulations regarding insurance better, when I was new to my work.? That said, I wish the older guys would have handled the issues better, and not made a neophyte deal with tough issues without advice.

It’s hard, but to the extent that you can, think about analytical issues at their most broad and qualitative levels.? Anyone can put numbers into a formula, but few can understand what the numbers and formulas mean.? Formulas are abstractions, and like all abstractions, they distort reality.? The analyst that can adjust the model to reflect reality will be far ahead of the one that “plugs and chugs.”

A Picture is Worth 1000 Words

Let me tell you about one of my greatest failures.? My division at AIG had a new CEO, and he was an actuary.? We felt like we had lifted from the basement into the stratosphere.? I went to the new CEO, and showed him my proposal for crediting rates.? Most of the presentation was visual, with many graphs.? It was stunning; I walked out of the meeting knowing that I had deeply convinced the CEO.

He was fired the next week by M. R. Greenberg.? He did not understand the politics of AIG, and questioned one of Greenberg’s deeply held convictions.

And so, young analysts, you may do superior work, and it ends up being nothing for reasons outside your control.? What should you do?? Keep up the good work, because most of the time, good work triumphs.

Study the Greats

For what it is worth, I am a lifelong learner.? Though I try to develop my own methods, I study the methods of others.? There is no “not invented here” attitude at Aleph Investments.? Rather, it is more akin to the mid-90s Microsoft motto: “We embrace and we extend.”

I have studied many different types of investors, and many different types of investments.? The breadth of understanding can allow you to analyze odd situations, where the rule books may not have opined yet.? It is good to be curious, and learn things a jump or two outside your circle of competence.? That is what expands your circle of competence, and deepens your knowledge at the core.

Learn the Tools

Even if it just being an Excel expert, learn your tools well.? If you can, be the “local expert” on how to get the most out of the common bits? of software used for analysis.? I still remember the looks on the faces of guys 20 years younger than me as a I showed them how to create deeply nested string functions that solved critical problems in a small space.\

Get the CFA Charter and More

It’s not that the CFA Charter confers great knowledge — I drifted through it with little difficulty.? Your mileage may vary.? But it does give a reasonably balanced treatment of the settled finance literature, while teaching ethics.? The ethics part is important.

Many of us want to “make good,” while few want to “do good.”? But what if the key to prosperity it putting the client’s interests first?? Even on Wall Street, as a corporate bond manager, I looked out for the interests of my brokers.? By being willing to help when they were in trouble, it brought me more than enough “good deals” because they wanted to help a friend who wasn’t playing for the last nickel on every deal.

Investing is a people business.? Do you make your clients happy?? Do you explain to them what you are doing?? Do you answer their intermittent questions?? Even the dumb ones?? If you aim for the good of others, good things will come back to you.? It may seem less direct than most marketing, but it is far more sticky.

As Jesus said, inverting Hillel, “Do unto others as you would have others to do to you.”? As Buffett said, “Don’t do anything you wouldn’t want to see on the front page of the newspaper.”? Jesus was more complete — do what is in the best interests of your clients, and ethical problems go away.

Conclusion

As an acquaintance of mine once said, “This is the greatest game in the world, and they pay us to play it.”? True enough, though many of us are in the top decile of ability, we compete against those in the top percentile.? It’s a tough world, and the competition means risk-adjusted profits are few.? Maybe we should all be wealth managers, sucking alpha out of the tax code, until the government changes the rules.

Be aware that in mid-life you might wonder what good your life has been.? Aiding the efficiency of capital markets is a good thing, but it may seem thin relative to jobs that obviously help other people.

A defense to that is managing money for the good of others, and not just for yourself.? Modest fees, where you have your own assets invested alongside your clients, is a great thing to do, and assures clients that you care for them.

“Care for them,” those words strike me.? Most amateur investors buy near the top and sell near the bottom.? We can be their shepherds, holding their hands during the bad times, and telling them to calm down during the good times.? We can try to limit their risks so that they do not panic or get greedy.

There is real good to be done people and institutions as an investor, but the first thing to learn is control yourself, and all of your emotions.? Once you do that, you can do good things for your clients.

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