Category: Value Investing

Growth in Fully Converted Book Value

Growth in Fully Converted Book Value

I’m working on changes in client portfolios (and mine as well, they mirror my portfolio; I eat my own cooking!), and I spend time looking at longer-term returns on a book value basis.? I agree with Buffett; growing book value per share grows market value per share over time.

I write this because I often see companies that are cheap on an earnings basis, but have been so for a while, but have not grown book value per share (after reinvesting dividends) by much.? This comes from non-operating losses and badly-timed buybacks (or, persistent buybacks that don’t take account of current market price).

You can have a business that throws off great free cash flow, and waste it by buying back stock when the market is willing to pay too much, and the company intensifies the mistake.? Better to build up cash, and wait for a better day to buy, when shares are cheap and worth buying.

P/E is a flawed measure because few ask what is done with the E.? Is it used to good ends?? We need to look further and analyze how excess cash gets used for growth.? Stock buybacks are a minimum, but maybe waiting to do stock buybacks at lower prices is better.? Maybe buying out small private companies that can round out a product portfolio are better still.

Regardless, the goal should be to grow book value, adding back dividends.? That is a path toward sustainable growth in stock values.

Value Versus Growth — II

Value Versus Growth — II

One of my readers posted the following comment, and I felt it was worth following up:

I continue to struggle with the Growth vs Value designation (never mind where to invest). According to Buffet’s letter, they are joined at the hip (growth being an important part of value), whereas you indicate that there is a real difference between Value and Growth.

Does “Value” as a category of stock arise from the way it is priced or is it solely dependent upon the condition of the company? Is the “Growth” designation simply a function of the rate of change of earnings (or some other financial measure) or is it related to the eagerness of buyers?

If I am reading you right, you are saying that value applies to a stock (not a company), and that value investing does not require (earnings) growth to be successful, whereas growth investing is paying a premium, and thus requires sustained, substantial earnings growth to be successful (because you are paying so much for the shares).

It always seems like “value” stocks are the one’s investors don’t want (if people are paying a premium, it is not a “value” stock). If few people are interested in buying the stock right now, when the underlying business is fine (or at least unimpaired), why would they be willing to pay more in the future? It seems like that would only happen if earnings grow (so it is a “growth” company?) or if people decide they would like to pay more for the same earnings. Are future buyers going to pay more because they see that earnings simply aren’t falling? Or is most of the return going to come through dividends and/or share buybacks?

This seems like something very fundamental, but the amount of confusing comments (around the internet) about these terms seems second only to confusion related to the term “risk”.

Imagine for a moment that you had the influence over a company such that you forced them to liquidate it.? Going out of business.? Selling everything.? With a company characterized as a value stock, you would make money off of such a venture.? With a growth stock, you would certainly lose.? Growth stocks are going concerns, and need to continue in operations in order to increase their value.? Even a value stock does not generally want to liquidate, but they don’t need to grow much to maintain the value of the enterprise.

With value stocks, most surprises are positive, because expectations are low.? With growth stocks, most surprises are negative, because expectations are high.

Buffett is right.? Value and Growth are joined at the hip.? What he means by that is that a company with predictable growth deserves a higher valuation, with which I totally agree.? The stereotyping of growth and value stocks stems from human prejudices where people segment the market into two or three areas:

  • Buy the fastest growing companies, at any price.
  • Buy growth at a reasonable price.
  • Buy companies that will do okay even if they don’t grow.

Value is a question of price only.? There is no such thing as a bad asset, only a bad price.? I like buying growth companies, and I do so when they are offered to me at bargain prices.? I will pay up a little for a growth company, in the same way that I would pay up for bonds of higher credit quality, while losing a little yield, but not a lot of yield.

This is not to say that all value investing will succeed.? I have my share of failures.? The idea is to tip the odds into your favor by buying things that are out of favor relative to their current assets, or likely future earnings (or free cash flow, for the advanced).

Risk is a question of permanently losing capital.? That is the downside on which all investors should focus.? Though I do lose money on some stocks that I buy, my goal is to lose money on none of the stocks.? If I cover the downside, the upside will take care of the rest, because the goal of a value investor is to not lose money over the long haul.

An Insurance Hedge Fund

An Insurance Hedge Fund

Some friends of mine asked me if I could create an insurance-centric hedge fund.? I said that it was unlikely because I’m not good at shorting.? They pressed me on it, because they knew if I had good longs, with my quantitative skills, I could create a credible short position that might hedge the longs.

Ugh.? I don’t want to do it, but maybe I could make this work.? I certainly could use the revenue.? So what would I focus on in such a fund?

  • Relative valuations
  • Management quality
  • Reserve releases/strengthening from prior year claims
  • Momentum — yeh, momentum.
  • Long-term underwriting profitability

My goal is to make money for average people, not the wealthy, but if that is the only way that my firm can survive, I will set up a hedge fund in the insurance space.? I love insurance; I know it intuitively, but I know that once I? begin to take big bets, I may fail badly.

If you know me well, you know that I only take prudent risks.? I’m not risk-averse, I like taking risks when the odds are in my favor.

So I am puzzled at this point.? I have done better in evaluating the broad markets than the narrow insurance markets, but if I have to be a narrow investor in order to survive, I can do that.

If you have advice for me here, I will receive it with thanks.

The Dream Team

The Dream Team

Imagine for a moment that you put together your own “dream team” of investment managers.? Would you want to know what they are doing as a group?? Well, I compiled my dream team from a list of 59 managers that I respect, and I want to give you their most common holdings as of 6/30/2011:

Count of Manager Company

14

Microsoft

11

GOOGLE INC

9

Bank of America

9

Citigroup Inc

7

BERKSHIRE

7

Goldman Sachs

7

UnitedHealth Group Inc

7

Mastercard Inc.

7

AON CORP

7

Apple Inc

7

PFIZER INC

7

Wells Fargo & Co

6

BERKSHIRE

6

JOHNSON & JOHNSON

6

General Motors Co.

6

SEARS HLDGS CORP

6

LIBERTY MEDIA CORP

6

VALEANT PHARMACEUTICALS INTL

6

CISCO SYS INC

6

ConocoPhillips

5

Kraft Foods Inc.

5

Mosaic Co New

5

Willis Group Holdings PLC

5

SPDR GOLD TRUST

5

LOWES COMPANIES INC

5

Sanofi Aventis

5

LEVEL 3

5

EXPEDIA INC DEL

5

U S BANCORP DEL NEW

5

ABITIBIBOWATER INC

5

Comcast

5

Royal Bank of Scotland Group

5

BP PLC

5

DELL INC

5

Vodafone Group PLC ADR

5

WHIRLPOOL

5

NEWS CORP

5

STATE STR CORP

These are held by a large fraction of the clever managers. Note that Berkshire Hathaway is listed twice because of the A & B shares.? Also note that the Royal Bank of Scotland is preferred shares, and not the common.

But these aren’t the largest holdings of the group of managers.? What might that look like?

Sum of Value Count of Manager Company

14,160,067

4

Coca Cola Co

7,890,391

4

American Express

4,894,639

2

Procter & Gamble

4,792,460

5

SPDR GOLD TRUST

4,783,600

5

Kraft Foods Inc.

3,407,245

1

ICAHN ENTERPRISES LP

3,330,862

9

Citigroup Inc

3,322,015

3

American International Group, In

3,258,955

6

JOHNSON & JOHNSON

3,141,680

1

Female Health Company

3,003,034

5

DELL INC

2,708,540

2

MOTOROLA CORP

2,664,145

4

CHESAPEAKE ENERGY CORP

2,534,143

1

INTL FCStone Inc

2,431,085

1

Interactive Intelligence Inc.

2,387,856

1

The Dolan Company

2,334,874

6

ConocoPhillips

2,226,061

7

AON CORP

2,219,531

4

YANDEX N V

2,164,765

9

Bank of America

2,127,572

7

Apple Inc

2,039,403

5

NEWS CORP

1,967,980

3

DirecTV

1,925,312

1

Hallmark Financial Services

1,856,970

14

Microsoft

1,854,213

2

YUM BRANDS INC

1,717,773

1

FEDERAL MOGUL CORP

1,680,880

1

ANGLOGOLD ASHANTI LTD

1,647,336

1

Tandy Leather Factory Inc.

1,643,992

2

Loews Corp

1,642,074

5

LEVEL 3

1,574,105

6

VALEANT PHARMACEUTICALS INTL

1,569,386

3

Citigroup

1,548,083

3

Moody’s

1,511,216

6

SEARS HLDGS CORP

1,410,112

4

CIT GROUP INC

1,404,444

4

ANADARKO PETE CORP

1,398,931

7

Wells Fargo & Co

1,374,090

1

CEMEX S.A.B. de C.V. ADR

1,371,120

2

PENNEY J C INC

1,368,007

6

LIBERTY MEDIA CORP

1,348,721

3

Brookfield Asset Management Inc

1,217,439

2

TRANSOCEAN LTD

1,205,581

1

GENERAL GROWTH PPTYS INC NEW

1,204,046

4

HARTFORD FINL SVCS GROUP INC

1,196,047

2

JEFFERIES GROUP INC NEW

1,196,012

4

FEDEX CORP

1,187,555

11

GOOGLE INC

1,180,466

4

Bank of New York Mellon Corp.

1,159,088

1

BIDZ.com Inc.

1,119,035

3

The Travelers Companies Inc.

1,119,014

3

LIFE TECHNOLOGIES

1,108,718

7

Goldman Sachs

1,107,744

5

Willis Group Holdings PLC

1,096,716

2

Capital One Financial Corp.

1,096,221

1

SPECTRUM BRANDS HLDGS INC

1,094,933

1

FORTUNE BRANDS INC

1,036,654

4

HEWLETT PACKARD CO

1,024,100

4

SENSATA TECHNOLOGIES HLDG BV

1,017,038

1

Walt Disney Company

1,013,005

1

Stamps.com

1,000,693

4

FAMILY DLR STORES INC

That sums up the billion-plus holdings for my favorite managers.? That doesn’t mean that I endorse all of their holdings.? Only 3 out of my 34 holdings were revealed in the top holdings of these highly rated managers.

Full disclosure: long COP, VOD, TRV for myself and clients that get a clone of my portfolio.

Value Versus Growth

Value Versus Growth

Value Investing and Growth Investing are variants of the greater school of Fundamental Investing.? Quoting Buffett from his 1992 Shareholders Letter:

Our equity-investing strategy remains little changed from what it was fifteen years ago, when we said in the 1977 annual report:? “We select our marketable equity securities in much the way we would evaluate a business for acquisition in its entirety.? We want the business to be one (a) that we can understand; (b) with favorable long-term prospects; (c) operated by honest and competent people; and (d) available at a very attractive price.”? We have seen cause to make only one change in this creed: Because of both market conditions and our size, we now substitute “an attractive price” for “a very attractive price.”

But how, you will ask, does one decide what’s “attractive”?? In answering this question, most analysts feel they must choose between two approaches customarily thought to be in opposition:? “value” and “growth.”? Indeed, many investment professionals see any mixing of the two terms as a form of intellectual cross-dressing.

We view that as fuzzy thinking (in which, it must be confessed, I myself engaged some years ago).? In our opinion, the two approaches are joined at the hip:? Growth is always a component in the calculation of value, constituting a variable whose importance can range from negligible to enormous and whose impact can be negative as well as positive.

In addition, we think the very term “value investing” is redundant.? What is “investing” if it is not the act of seeking value at least sufficient to justify the amount paid?? Consciously paying more for a stock than its calculated value – in the hope that it can soon be sold for a still-higher price – should be labeled speculation (which is neither illegal, immoral nor – in our view – financially fattening).

Whether appropriate or not, the term “value investing” is widely used.? Typically, it connotes the purchase of stocks having attributes such as a low ratio of price to book value, a low price-earnings ratio, or a high dividend yield.? Unfortunately, such characteristics, even if they appear in combination, are far from determinative as to whether an investor is indeed buying something for what it is worth and is therefore truly operating on the principle of obtaining value in his investments.? Correspondingly, opposite characteristics – a high ratio of price to book value, a high price-earnings ratio, and a low dividend yield – are in no way inconsistent with a “value” purchase.

Similarly, business growth, per se, tells us little about value.? It’s true that growth often has a positive impact on value, sometimes one of spectacular proportions.? But such an effect is far from certain.? For example, investors have regularly poured money into the domestic airline business to finance profitless (or worse) growth.? For these investors, it would have been far better if Orville had failed to get off the ground at Kitty Hawk: The more the industry has grown, the worse the disaster for owners.

Growth benefits investors only when the business in point can invest at incremental returns that are enticing – in other words, only when each dollar used to finance the growth creates over a dollar of long-term market value.? In the case of a low-return business requiring incremental funds, growth hurts the investor.

In The Theory of Investment Value, written over 50 years ago, John Burr Williams set forth the equation for value, which we condense here:? The value of any stock, bond or business today is determined by the cash inflows and outflows – discounted at an appropriate interest rate – that can be expected to occur during the remaining life of the asset.? Note that the formula is the same for stocks as for bonds.? Even so, there is an important, and difficult to deal with, difference between the two:? A bond has a coupon and maturity date that define future cash flows; but in the case of equities, the investment analyst must himself estimate the future “coupons.”? Furthermore, the quality of management affects the bond coupon only rarely – chiefly when management is so inept or dishonest that payment of interest is suspended.? In contrast, the ability of management can dramatically affect the equity “coupons.”

The investment shown by the discounted-flows-of-cash calculation to be the cheapest is the one that the investor should purchase – irrespective of whether the business grows or doesn’t, displays volatility or smoothness in its earnings, or carries a high price or low in relation to its current earnings and book value.? Moreover, though the value equation has usually shown equities to be cheaper than bonds, that result is not inevitable: When bonds are calculated to be the more attractive investment, they should be bought.

Leaving the question of price aside, the best business to own is one that over an extended period can employ large amounts of incremental capital at very high rates of return.? The worst business to own is one that must, or will, do the opposite – that is, consistently employ ever-greater amounts of capital at very low rates of return.? Unfortunately, the first type of business is very hard to find:? Most high-return businesses need relatively little capital.? Shareholders of such a business usually will benefit if it pays out most of its earnings in dividends or makes significant stock repurchases.

Though the mathematical calculations required to evaluate equities are not difficult, an analyst – even one who is experienced and intelligent – can easily go wrong in estimating future “coupons.”? At Berkshire, we attempt to deal with this problem in two ways.? First, we try to stick to businesses we believe we understand.? That means they must be relatively simple and stable in character.? If a business is complex or subject to constant change, we’re not smart enough to predict future cash flows.? Incidentally, that shortcoming doesn’t bother us.? What counts for most people in investing is not how much they know, but rather how realistically they define what they don’t know.? An investor needs to do very few things right as long as he or she avoids big mistakes.

Second, and equally important, we insist on a margin of safety in our purchase price.? If we calculate the value of a common stock to be only slightly higher than its price, we’re not interested in buying.? We believe this margin-of-safety principle, so strongly emphasized by Ben Graham, to be the cornerstone of investment success.

In theory, growth factors into value calculations.? In practice, growth estimates disappoint.? Fast growing companies have negative surprises, whereas slow growing companies have positive surprises.

Growth stocks have stories.? Value stocks are in the shadows.

Growth stocks are the uncertain future.? Value stocks are the discounted past.

Growth investors expect high ROEs to continue.? Value investors often buy companies with low ROEs, and don’t expect much.? The difference is significant.

What Buffett describes as “Value Investing” is what he learned from Ben Graham.? Margin of safety, buy them cheap.

But margin of safety implies that if things go wrong, losses will be small.? This precludes growth investing, because if growth fails losses will be large.? Thus, value investors focus on situations where earnings are high relative to price, with growth likely low, and net worth high relative to market capitalization.

Yes, I understand about moats, and what they imply for growth investing, but given changes in technology, moats aren’t that common over a decade.

As such, I say to you that there is a real difference between value and growth investing.? Value looks for a margin of safety and buys cheap, knowing that growth is uncertain.? Growth assumes that earnings growth will continue, even if the market is getting saturated.

I am happy to be a Graham-and-Dodd value investor.? I don’t need growth to make money.

Weighing Beats Voting

Weighing Beats Voting

Correlations are high.? Risk-on, risk-off drives the market as market players trade ETPs and baskets rather than individual stocks.? Market players worry about policy, and whether it will be inflationary (bullish) or deflationary (bearish).

What an ugly time to be a value investor, and a long-term industry rotator.? The time cycle has shrunk to tiny proportions relative to the likely life of the assets being traded.

But I take heart that it will not always be this way.? As Ben Graham said, “In the short run, the market is a voting machine but in the long run it is a weighing machine.”

Eventually, for industries where the companies are worth a lot more than the current price, there will be buyouts.? For industries where companies are worth less, there may be IPOs.

I believe that correlations will reduce from here.? It may not be dramatic, but they will fall.? Whenever there is a dominant paradigm for asset pricing, there are assets that get mispriced.

My expectation is that there are many companies earning money while trading at a discount to adjusted book that will be bought out by others.

We Eat Dollar-Weighted Returns

We Eat Dollar-Weighted Returns

Why do we do time-weighted returns for analysis of portfolios?? Because we are lazy, and they are simple to calculate.? We don’t want to be bothered with the effects of cash flows.

Besides, mutual fund managers don’t make decisions to move money in and out of their funds.? They should not be held accountable for the actions of their shareholders.

Really?? I think that is only half correct.? The good fund manager takes account of his implicit liability structure.? When will people leave, when will they come?? For almost all funds, investors are trend followers.? And the the greater the degree of volatility, the worse the investors are at following the trend.? Thus a manager of a volatile fund should run with more of a cash buffer, particularly when markets are moving down hard, because he will have more of his clients cashing out.? The manager of a volatile fund should also avoid taking concentrated positions, because when he is doing well, his own buying may drive the stocks he owns up, only to see them fall harder when he is forced to liquidate positions when the market is doing poorly, and shareholders are leaving.? Wise managers concentrate near bottoms, and diversify near tops.

Now for my poster child, the Legg Mason Value Trust.? Bill Miller is a very intelligent guy, and has a very talented staff.? My main criticism of his management is that it neglects the core concept of value investing, which is “margin of safety.”? The core concept is not cheapness, or as Bill Miller was fond of saying “lowest average cost wins.”

Legg Mason Value Trust enthused investors as they racked up significant returns in the late 90s, and the adulation persisted through 2006.? As Legg Mason Value Trust grew larger it concentrated its positions.? It also did not care much about margin of safety in financial companies.? It bought cheap, and suffered as earnings quality proved to be poor.

Eventually, holding a large portfolio of concentrated, lower-quality companies as the crisis hit, the performance fell apart, and many shareholders of the fund liquidated, exacerbating the losses of the fund, and their selling pushed the prices of their stocks down, leading to more shareholder selling.? I’m not sure the situation has stabilized, but it is probably close to doing being there.

But now to the point: what did Bill Miller earn for shareholders?? The earliest date that I could get data for was 3/31/1993, probably due to the creation of EDGAR in the mid-90s.

On a dollar-weighted basis, he earned 2.71%/year for investors through 10/31/2010.? But for those stout-hearted souls that bought and held, they earned 6%+ more, 8.78%.? But those that did that had to be patient, even Stoic, people who had no need for liquidity, and no propensity for panic.? (There is always enough time to panic. 😉 )

Legg Mason Value Trust was a volatile fund, and as such, it is no surprise that the difference between time-weighted and dollar-weighted returns are so large.? But what does this imply about Bill Miller? He beat the S&P 15 years in a row.? But as posts like this point out, did he go from first to worst?

His neglect of the core idea in value investing, margin of safety, allowed him to do well as the lending bubble expanded, and low quality companies prospered.? But when the tide went out, he was found to be swimming naked.? Far from following Buffett’s principles, or Graham’s, he was just a growth investor masquerading as value investor because “he bought them cheap.”? And they got a lot cheaper, and he had to sell them cheaper still.

So what are the lessons here?

  • Focus on margin of safety in investing.? Analyze balance sheets.
  • Avoid investing in popular funds, even excellent managers make mistakes when lots of money is coming in.
  • Stick to your knitting.? Don’t engage in all manner of fancy logic once you achieve success.? Stay humble.
  • Remember that your timing in investing makes a difference.? Don’t be quick to add to a winning fund.? Better to find a fund with good ideas that is temporarily underperforming.
  • Buy-and-hold often beats the average investor over the long haul.? Some traders might do better, but have you developed that skill?
  • Avoid managers that say a lot of clever things, but can’t deliver on returns.

So be wise, and realize, you are still responsible for your investment success or failure, even if you hand it off to others.

Maturing Into Your Valuation

Maturing Into Your Valuation

I read an interesting article today called Dead Stocks Walking. Good article, but I want to point out a few things the article missed.

The article deals with large companies that had moderately high valuations, but were still growing.? Today, they are growing more slowly, but their valuations have decreased, and the stock price hasn’t moved much.? What gives?

Without saying it, the article describes the transformation from large cap growth to large cap value for the largest companies.? They have reached the limits of the carrying capacity of their niche in the economic ecosystem, and they now grow far more slowly.

There is a second issue — though many companies earn far more than they did in the past, many waste money by buying back stock, rather than retaining the funds, retiring bonds, or handing out dividends.? Managements that buy back stock should have a firm handle on the value drivers, such that they only buy back stock at a discount to the firm’s private market value.

So, a reason many of these stocks treaded water, was that free cash flow was misused.? Beyond that, they were reaching the ecological limit of their company’s habitat.

I own, and my clients own several of the companies mentioned in the article.? This is a good time to own these stable companies, when they throw off low double digit earnings yields.? And who knows, they may grow earnings and free cash flow from here.

On Investment Contests

On Investment Contests

I received a question from a friend of mine and want to give an answer:

Background: I teach high school physics.? In my AP class, I have some cross-registration with the Micro-econ & Personal Finance classes.? In those classes, they play the “Stock Market Game” in which they’re given $25k and compete for the semester for the highest total.? Inevitably, discussion of economics, stocks, and that game finds its way into my class where I am incapable of _not_ getting involved.

Problem 1: The game only lasts for a semester (4 months).? Result: very short term thinking

Problem 2: The teacher pushes stock-chart reading, “200 day average vs 50 day average”, looking at price movements, etc.? There is little (if any) balance sheet reading, company growth investigation, or stock price evaluation going on.

Relevance for here: The kids immediately turn to penny stocks thinking to make a quick buck- “If I buy 50,000 shares of this company at $0.25, I can sell it for a huge profit when it goes up to $0.50.

Question: Do you have any recommendations for short quips / talking points to reveal their folly to them??

(I had a kid last year almost not graduate when he became so enamored with playing the stock market that he thought he could “crack the code” and make a fortune off penny stocks.)

I have only experienced one good investment contest in my life.? It was in 1983-1984, when Value Line sponsored a contest offering significant prizes.? They did something unique: they divided the market into 10 groups sorted on volatility, and told investors that they had to pick one stock out of each of the ten groups.

Brilliant. this eliminated the ability of people to just pick risky stocks, and bet on getting lucky turning the whole thing into chance.

A portfolio of ten equally-weighted stocks demonstrates more ability than a single pick.? For any single stock, or concentrated portfolio that does well, the answer should be that they got lucky, as humans see it.

As it was, in the Value Line Contest, I finished just short of getting a prize.? My returns were less than a percent behind the lowest winner.

Now as to what you should do, dear friend, in the short run, momentum matters more than valuation, most of the time.? The teacher may be giving them the right advice for the contest.? Personally, I would go to the teacher, rather than the students, and tell him to do a contest more like Value Line did.? If he needs help with the volatility groups, I can provide the data.

But the two main things to point out on penny stocks is this: 1) Most people investing in penny stocks lose a lot of money, because the stocks seem cheap, but they have little in assets or earnings relative to their price.? 2) There are penny stock promoters who tout penny stocks so that others will buy at a higher price, so they can sell to them, and the new buyer can experience the losses.

If the contest is structured properly, it should have a minimum capitalization limit, and a diversification requirement.? Tell the other teachers to consider this.

On Penny Stocks (2)

On Penny Stocks (2)

Yesterday, I received a pitch in the mail for a penny stock.? They should put a big red X over my address, but alas, they don’t.

Now for all of my prior penny stocks that I have been written about, all have done horribly.

Now we have AER Energy Resources [AERN] which has done horribly, and does not file financial statements, having “gone dark.”? From a research note on the web, this is what they said:

Please be advised that VictoryStocks.com has been paid $1,300,000 by Sanaz Trading Inc. to perform promotional and advertising services for a one month profile of AER Energy Ressources Inc. which services include the issuance of this release and the other opinions that we release concerning AERN ? VictoryStocks.com has not investigated the background of Sanaz Trading Inc. the hiring company. Anyone viewing this newsletter should assume the hiring party or , affiliates of the hiring party own shares of AERN of which they plan to liquidate, further understanding that the liquidation of those shares may or may not negatively impact the share price. VictoryStocks.com has received this amount as a production budget for advertising efforts and will retain amounts over and above the cost of production, copywriting services, mailing and other distribution expenses as a fee for our services. As such, our opinion is neither unbiased nor independent, and you should consider that when evaluating our statements regarding AERN. VictoryStocks.com is owned by: FreePennyAlerts, LLC, 40 East Main Street, Suite 572, Newark, Delaware 19711. Questions regarding this release may be sent to Editor @ VictoryStocks.com.

I only ran into that scam because I Googled Lone Star Gold [LSTG], and that popped up.? Lone Star Gold is a negative income negative net worth stock.? A promoter for Lone Star Gold snail mailed me, complete with handwriting and excess staples, but the horrid disclosure in teeny tiny type was this:

IMPORTANT NOTICE AND DISCLAIMER: This paid email advertisement by XXX (hereafter “XXX” does not purport to provide an analysis of any company’s financial position, operations, or prospects and this is not to be construed as a recommendation by XXX, or an offer to sell or solicitation to buy or sell any security. Lone Star Gold Corp. (hereafter “LSTG”), the company featured in this issue, appears as paid advertising. Mermaid Finance Ltd has paid $1,768,000 for the dissemination of this info to enhance public awareness for LSTG. Although the information contained in this advertisement is believed to be reliable, XXX makes no warranties as to the accuracy of any of the content herein and accepts no liability for how readers may choose to utilize it. The information contained herein is based exclusively on information generally available to the public and does not contain any material, non-public information. 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Each promoter paid more than a million bucks.? Given the light level of trading in the stocks, and the low share price, the promoters were trying to do a significant pump-and-dump.? Personally, I think it would be really tough to squeeze over $1 million off of these tiny horrible companies, but maybe I don’t know the revenue model so well.

As I frequently say, “Don’t buy what someone want to sell to you.? Buy what you have researched, and what you think has value.”? Ignore penny stocks, with all of the ads that are on the web.? Short them if you dare.? These are horrible companies; any stock that has someone paid to promote it is a sell.? Sell, sell, sell!

This could not be simpler, so ignore the touts that promote penny stocks.? Short them if you dare, “the market can remain insane longer than you can remain solvent,” as Keynes said.

Penny stocks are for losers who dream of great gains.? They get the losses that they deserve.

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