Category: Value Investing

Of Value to Value Investors

Of Value to Value Investors

As value investors go, I am an inclusive kind of guy.? I’m not doctrinaire about what measures constitute value.? What is the correct model?? Well, if you could gather all of the data successfully, it would be something akin to the model Mike Mauboussin’s Expectations Investing.? The easy shortcuts of value investing are stripped-down versions of this (possibly impossible) model.? Oh, shortcuts?? Here are a few:

  • Price/Earnings
  • Price/Book
  • Price/Tangible Book
  • Price/Sales
  • Dividend Yield
  • PEG ratio (Growth at a reasonable price)

The shortcuts are usable, with some discipline.? I’m not sure about the theory itself: I’m sure it is correct; I’m just not sure it can be implemented.? (Hey, maybe Legg Mason has tried to implement it.? Wonder how they have done with it? 🙁 )

More usable are several speeches from noted value investors.? They won’t tell you what stock to buy, but they will teach you how to think about the equity markets.? So, here are three speeches I ran across recently, from:

From my time writing for RealMoney, I know what motivates most investors is the next hot idea.? Sadly, that does not produce value for investors.? Here and at RealMoney, though I will willingly talk about the stocks that I own, I would rather talk about how to think about portfolio management — thinking rationally about what assets will build the most value in the intermediate-term.? That will give readers much more; they will be able to think independently, and create value on their own, using experts as guides, but not being slaves to any other investor, including me.

Recent Portfolio Moves, and Insurance Company Musings

Recent Portfolio Moves, and Insurance Company Musings

On Friday, toward the end of the day, I added to my position in Cemex, just to rebalance the portfolio and take advantage of undue weakness in the Mexican stock market.

Earlier in the day, though my timing was good, it could have been better, I swapped my exposure in Japan Smaller Capitalization Fund [JOF] for the SPDR Russell/Nomura Small Cap Japan ETF [JSC]. Given that I like JOF, why did I trade? The premium to NAV got too high — it was 10% on an intraday basis by my calculations, so, I traded. Eventually it will go back to a discount of -5% or so, and I will reverse the trade. I still like Japanese Small caps, but I have my limits when it comes to NAV premiums.

Away from that, I am still considering trading away some/all of my RGA for some MetLife, since I think it will be a cheap way to acquire more RGA. I’m glad the separation has finally come for MetLife and RGA; it was only a question of when. RGA is a unique company; unless Swiss Re, or Munich Re, or Aegon wants to spin out their Life Re business, there are no other pure play life reinsurers out there. Reinsurance of mortality in the present environment is a cozy oligopoly, with one former main player, Scottish Re (spit, spit), badly damaged. (Though I lost badly on Scottish Re, I am still grateful that when I figured out what was going on, I was able to sell at $6+/sh. Current quote: 14 cents/sh, and I hope that MassMutual and Cerberus are enjoying themselves. I took enough lumps for my patronage of Scottish Re, so anyone who sold when I did is at least that much better off.)

Pricing power isn’t anything amazing here, because the life insurers in general have enough capital, and are not ceding as much business to the reinsurers. But it is a steady business, and one with barriers to entry — ACE and XL will try to get into the business, and Scor will try to improve its position, but RGA, Swiss Re and Munich Re will be tough to dislodge.

I am looking forward to the next reshaping, and considering industry trends… I’m really not sure which way the portfolio will go, but I am gathering tickers and industry data, and preparing for the next change.

One last note: did you know that I am overweight financials? Yes, but only insurance companies, and Alliance Data Systems. (I still don’t trust the banks, and particularly not the investment banks.) The insurers that I own are cheap to the point where earnings don’t need to grow much to give me good value over the long run, and are largely insulated from any hurricane activity this year. Now, if the winds blow, you can expect that I will do a few trades to take advantage of mispricing among reinsurance companies. That said, Endurance, Aspen, Flagstone, and PartnerRe look cheap to me at present. Endurance looks very cheap… I have owned all four in the past, and will probably own some of them again in the future. But, no major commitments until the wind starts blowing (hurricanes), or if we get to the middle of the hurricane season (say, mid-September), and nothing has happened. Then it would be time to buy. Damage from windstorm tends to be correlated within years — bad years start early, and are very bad. Good years are quiet, and continue quiet with a few storms doing low levels of damage.

Anyway, that’s what I am up to. Got other ideas? Share them with my readers!

Full disclosure: Long CX JSC RGA ADS

Abandon the Playbook; Adopt the Global Playbook; Adjust the Playbooks for Valuations

Abandon the Playbook; Adopt the Global Playbook; Adjust the Playbooks for Valuations

It was 7 3/4 years ago that I modified my value investing method to incorporate industry rotation.? That was probably the most significant change to my methods that I made in the last 16 years.? I did it reluctantly, after an analysis of where I had done best over the prior eight years.? I had many significant wins when I had gotten the industry cycle correct.

I commented recently on industry selection.? I want to make two additional points on that here.

1)? Analyze where an industry gets its demand.? Is it domestic or foreign?? If foreign, then use the global playbook.? Instead of looking at GDP growth, look at the growth from foreign demand.? Decouple your reasoning from the traditional view, because in a global economy, things get messy.

2) Even if an industry is driven primarily by domestic demand, often portfolio managers using the playbook may trash the valuation to levels that should be below trough valuations.? These are long-term opportunities, and should be bought.? VIce-versa for companies that have favorable future growth prospects, but the valuation discounts those prospects, and then some.? Those should be sold, even if they are in industries with good prospects.

That’s all for the evening.? I wrote this piece because active managers haven’t been doing well lately.? Uh, in order to do well, one must be willing to brave the possibility of failing (you can’t hug the benchmark), by taking opportunities that others find distasteful.? I benefit because I don’t care about tracking error; I just buy cheap stocks, in industries where the long run value is not appreciated by most investors.

A Comment on SFAS 159

A Comment on SFAS 159

I am ambivalent about fair value accounting standards because they ruin comparability of financial statements across companies.? Recently, SFAS 159 has come into the news because some securities firms used it to book gains because the market value of debt that they issued had fallen.? Four notes:

1) They had no choice, they had to do it.? Their debt has liquid markets — those are level 1 and at worst level 2? liabilities.

2) Many of the assets that they carry have credit risk also.? The pressures that are leading the prices of their debt to fall, are also causing the carrying value of some of their assets to fall as well.

3) If credit markets for their debt improve, they will have to write those liabilities up to higher values.? Even if creditworthiness stays the same, the passage of time will make the liabilities rises in value as they get closer to the ultimate payoff.

4) In bankruptcy, their obligation to pay par does not change.? It is not as if they can pay the reduced market? value to pay off their debt, except through a deal agreed to by the court and plaintiffs.

Look, I don’t like the confusion SFAS 159 creates at this point any more than the next guy, but the gains here will likely reverse over time, absent bankruptcy.? As an analyst, I strip those gains out of income, and I should strip out losses on the asset side that I think will reverse as well.

We can change the way that gains and losses are reported — book, market, model, hybrid… but we can’t change the ultimate cash flows from the business, which is what will ultimately drive the value of the firm.? Be careful and conservative here, as accrual entries get more subjective, they become less trustworthy, and managements on average release more into income from accrual entries than they ought to.

Again, Not Worried About Reinsurance Group of America

Again, Not Worried About Reinsurance Group of America

From the 6/2 RealMoney Columnist Conversation:


David Merkel
Rebalancing Sales, and a Buy
6/2/2008 4:08 PM EDT

Late last week, I had two rebalancing sells, Charlotte Russe and Smithfield. Today, two more, Honda Motor and Nam Tai Electronics. As the market has risen (or, some of my stocks at least), cash has been building up, and I have added some of my own free cash to the Broad Market portfolio. I’m at about 14% cash.

So, it’s time to buy something, though I am waiting on the market to show a little more weakness before I act. But, though dinner may wait, perhaps an appetizer is in order: today I added to my position in Reinsurance Group of America. MetLife finally decides to shed this noncore asset in a tax-free stock swap, allowing current MetLife shareholders to swap their MetLife shares for shares in RGA.

RGA should get a higher multiple as a “pure play” life reinsurer; that will come later. Today was the selling pressure in advance of the new supply. I like the management team at RGA, and think this will allow them the freedom to add value on their own. One other odd kicker… it might allow them to do more reinsurance business with MetLife, because they will be independent and thus truly be a third party.

Position: long CHIC SFD HMC NTE RGA

A few additional notes, for me long only means running with 0-20% cash. I don’t go above 20%; I don’t borrow. Under normal conditions, I like running around 5-7% cash. If the NAHC stake is counted in, (arbitrage gets a pseudo-cash return) then we are at that 20% upper limit.

That leads me to take a few actions — I have bumped up my central band for my holdings by 16%. Translated, the points at which I do buy and sell rebalancing trades has risen 16%, as has my normal position size. Looking back through the years, back to 1992 when I started value investing, my position sizes were 5% of what they are today, and back then I had 10 positions, not 35. There’s been growth. 🙂

My second action was a temporary purchase of some RGA. I doubled my position temporarily, because I think most analysts will smile on the deal, and RGA has always been a good buy at book value.

No telling whether buying at 1.0x book will continue to be a good idea in the future. RGA is a well-run company in an oligopolistic industry. The management is smart and conservative. They have international growth opportunities, and now, possible new business from MetLIfe. The moat is wide here. You can’t reverse engineer the #2 life reinsurer in the US and the World.

So, I’m happy with my position here. That said, I may trade away the speculative part of my holdings in the short run, and I may buy some MetLife as well. MetLife is cheap, though not as cheap as RGA, but I suspect when MetLife offers RGA shares in exchange for MetLife shares, they will have to make the tradeoff sweet in order to get some flexible institutional investors to do the swap. Why? MetLife is a large cap stock that is very diversified. RGA is a midcap that is not as diversified. MetLife is a well-respected brand name. RGA? Who?

Insurance is opaque; reinsurance is doubly so. There are no comparables for RGA. MetLife has Pru, Principal, Lincoln National, and a few more. So, I may speculate on MetLife in order to get some cheap RGA. Most likely, I’ll need to see the terms, but if RGA is up a lot tomorrow, and MetLife is not, I may just do the swap.

Note to my readers: one odd thing about my blog is that I write about a wide number of issues. I know I have been doing more on my stock investing lately, but that is partially due to the lack of news on the macro front. That’s the nature of what I do. I am an investor that pays attention to the global economy. I’m trying to make money off my insights, and not merely report on what is happening. I hope some of it rubs off on my readers also, and that you personally benefit from it. For those who find my blog to be a confusing melange — well, that’s who I am, a generalist whose interests are broad.

But, if you like the individual stock coverage, let me know. If you hate it, let me know also.

Full disclosure: long CHIC SFD HMC NTE RGA NAHC LNC

A Good Month — A Good Year, so far

A Good Month — A Good Year, so far

Of the 35 stocks in my portfolio, only 4 lost money for me in May: Magna International, Group 1 Automotive, Reinsurance Group of America, and Hartford Insurance.? My largest gainer, OfficeMax, paid for all of the losses and then some.

I am only market-weight in energy, so that was not what drove my month.? Almost everything worked in May: company selection, industry selection, etc.? My other big gainers were: Charlotte Russe, Helmerich & Payne, Japan Smaller Capitalization Fund, and Ensco International.? I have often said that I am a singles hitter in investing — this month is a perfect example of that.

Now, looking at the year to date, I am not in double digits yet, but I am getting close — I am only 3.6% below my peak unit value on 7/19/07.? My win/loss ratio is messier: 15 losses against 32 wins.? It takes the top 5 wins to wipe out all of the losses.? The top 5: National Atlantic, Cimarex, Helmerich & Payne, Arkansas Best, and Ensco International.? Energy, Trucking, and a lousy insurance company that undershot late in 2007.

The main losers: Deerfield Triarc (ouch), Valero, Royal Bank of Scotland, Avnet, and Deutsche Bank.

I much prefer talking about my portfolio than individual stock ideas, because I think people are easily misled if you offer a lot of single stock ideas.? I have usually refused to do that here; I am not in the business of touting stocks.? I do like my management methods, though, and I like writing about those ideas.? If I can make my readers to be erudite thinkers about investing; I have done my job.

So, with that, onto the rest of 2007.? I don’t believe in sitting on a lead — I am always trying to do better, so let’s see how I fail or succeed at that in the remainder of 2007.

PS — When I have audited figures, I will be more precise.? You can see my portfolio, for now, at Stockpickr.com.

Full disclosure: long VLO AVT NAHC XEC HP ESV MGA GPI RGA HIG OMX CHIC JOF

Industry Ranks

Industry Ranks

Time for another dose of my industry ranks.? Here’s the list, complete with the ideas that are most attractive for me to investigate:

Remember, this uses the Value Line Industries, and it can be used in Value mode (green industries), or Momo mode (Red industries)? I look to buy from the green list, but I have a tendency to let companies that I own that are on the red list hang around.? Momentum tends to persist in the short run, and I have usually trimmed exposure due to my rebalancing discipline.

My next reshaping is not until early July, but I expect that it will be a doozy, because I will redeploy proceeds from National Atlantic, as well as a new slug of cash that I have received.? I’m running at 12% cash now, but if you count in National Atlantic, it is more like 18%.? That has to come down, so in a month or so, I will have to deploy cash.? I’m looking for a downdraft to do it in, but those don’t always come on schedule.

Full disclosure: long NAHC

Accepting Defeat

Accepting Defeat

Part of being a good investor is recognizing when you have lost, so that you can cut your losses, or focus on what can win in the future. Today, I recognize my loss on National Atlantic. Why today? After talking with a friend who knows more than me about appraisal rights in this situation, in New Jersey, in cash deals there are no appraisal rights allowed, unless specifically granted in the corporate charter. Here is an example from a NJ bank deal.

Ugh. It shouldn’t be this way, but it is. Maybe someone with deep pockets could sue NAHC and its board and management, jointly and severally for fraud, but those pockets aren’t mine. So, I look forward to the merger vote. I will vote my 0.15% of the shares “against,” but I realize the NAHC management plus the arbs hold enough shares to win. Personally, I really dislike the disinformation that they have written in their definitive proxy regarding runoff; they paint a scenario that does not ring true with my knowledge of the insurance business.

$6.25/share — It could be worse, right? No, probably not. 🙁

Full disclosure: long NAHC

Facilitating the Dreams of Politicians

Facilitating the Dreams of Politicians

I’m a life actuary, not a pension actuary, so take my musings here as the rant of a relatively well-informed amateur.? I have reviewed the book Pension Dumping, and will review Roger Lowenstein’s book, While America Aged, in the near term.

First, a few personal remembrances.?? I remember taking the old exam 7 for actuaries — yes, I’ve been in the profession that long, studying pension funding and laws to the degree that all actuaries had to at that time.? I marveled at the degree of flexibility that pension actuaries had in setting investment assumptions (and future earnings assumptions), and the degree to which funding was back-end loaded to many plan sponsors.?? I felt that there was far less of a provision for adverse deviation in pensions than in life insurance reserving.

I have also met my share (a few, not many) of pension actuaries who seemed to feel their greatest obligation was to reduce the amount the plan sponsor paid each year.

I also remember being in the terminal funding business at AIG, when Congress made it almost impossible for plan sponsors to terminate a plan and take out the excess assets.? Though laudable for trying to protect overfunding, it told plan sponsors that pension plans are roach motels for corporate cash — money can go in, but it can’t come out, so minimize the amount you put in.

The IRS was no help here either, creating rules against companies that overfunded plans (by more than a low threshold), because too much income was getting sheltered from taxation.

Beyond that, I remember one firm I worked for that had a plan that was very overfunded, but that went away when they merged into another firm which was less well funded.

I also remember talking with actuaries working inside the Social Security system, and boy, were they pessimists — almost as bad as the actuaries from the PBGC.

But enough of my musings.? There was an article in the New York Times on the troubles faced by some pension actuaries who serve municipalities.? For some additional color, review my article on how well funded most state pension and retiree healthcare plans are.

Pretend that you are a financial planner for families.? You can make a certain number of people happy in the short run if you tell them they can earn a lot of money on their assets with safety — say, 10%/year on average.? Now within 5 years or so, promises like that will blow up your practice, unless you are in the midst of a bull market.

Now think about the poor pension actuary for a municipal plan.? Here are the givens:

  • The municipality does not want to raise taxes.
  • They do want to minimize current labor costs.
  • They want happy workers once labor negotiations are complete.? Increasing pension promises little short term cash outflow, and can allow for a lower current wage increase.
  • A significant number of people on the board overseeing municipal pensions really don’t get what is going on.? It is all a black box to them, and they don’t get what you do.
  • You don’t get paid unless you deliver an opinion that current assets plus likely future funding is enough to fund future obligations.
  • The benefit utilization, investment earnings, and liability discount rates can always be tweaked a little more to achieve costs within budget in the short run, at a cost of greater contributions in the long run, particularly if the markets are foul.
  • There are some players connected to the pension funding process that will pressure you for a certain short-term result.

Even though I think pension plan funding methods for corporate plans are weak, at least they have ERISA for some protection.? With the municipal plans, that’s not there.? As such, more actuaries and firms are getting sued for aggressive assumptions, setting investment rates too high, and benefit utilization rates too low.

The article cites many examples — New Jersey stands out to me because of the pension bonds issued in 1997 to try to erase the deficit they had built up.? They took the money and invested it to try to earn more than the yield on the bonds — the excess earnings would bail out the underfunded plan.? Well, over the last eleven years, returns have been decidedly poor.? The pension bonds were a badly timed strategy at best.

Now, like auditors. who are paid by the companies that they audit, so it is for the pension actuaries — and there lies the conflict of interest.? One of my rules says that the party with the concentrated interest pays for third-party services, so it is no surprise that the plan sponsor pays the actuary.? I’m not sure it can be done any other way, unless the government sets up its own valuation bureau, and tells municipalities what they must pay.? (Now, who will remind them about Medicare? 😉 )

The suits against the pension actuaries and their firms could have the same effect as what happened to Arthur Andersen.? These are not thickly capitalized firms, and many could be put out of business easily.? For others, their liability coverage premiums will rise, perhaps making their services uneconomic.

Finally, the flat markets over the last ten years have exacerbated the problems.? Partially out of a mistaken belief that the equity premium is large (how much do stocks earn on average versus cash), actuaries set earnings rates too high.? The actuarial profession offers some guidance on what rate to set, but the reason they can’t be specific is that there is no good answer.? With all of the talk about the “lost decade,” well, we have had lost decades before, in the 30s and 70s.? Even if the statistics are correct for how big the equity premium is, equity performance comes in lumps, and in the 80s and 90s, when we should have taken the returns of the fat years and squirreled them away for the eventual “lost decade,” instead, politicians increased benefits as if there was no tomorrow.

The states and smaller government entities have dug a hole, and they will have to fill it somehow.? Lacking the ability to print money, they will raise taxes as they can, and borrow where they may.? We are seeing the first pains from this today, but the real crisis is 5-10 years out, as the Baby Boomers start to retire.? You ain’t seen nothin’ yet.

On Industry Selection

On Industry Selection

Recently I received an e-mail:

David,
Always enjoy your blog – very thought provoking, and I’ve learned a lot from reading you across a variety of topics. Assuming I haven’t missed this in an older post… one thing you mention as a key investment strategy is finding the right industry at the right time, and I’ve never seen a very good explanation of how one goes about that. In one of Jim Cramer’s recent books he offered a sort of stylized graph outlining a general playbook to that effect – I’ll send it to you if you’d like – but I’d like to get a primer on how you go about industry over/underweights.

Thanks and Best,
JC

It made me think that I should go through my basic principles of industry selection, and explain them.? JC mentions Cramer’s “playbook” — that’s the classical guide to what industries do best in an “ordinary” business cycle.? Personally, I think Cramer’s views on industry selection are more complex than that, largely for the reason that I don’t follow the “playbook” in any strict sense: global demand is more important than US demand alone for many industries.? The old playbook is no longer valid, until we get a totally integrated world economy.? (Side note: we will never get that — some war will upset the globalization — it is the nature of mankind.)

Anyway, I have four basic tenets when looking at industries:

  • Buy strong companies in weak industries when the industry pricing outlook seems hopeless.
  • Buy moderate to strong companies in strong industries where the earnings power and duration are underestimated.
  • Underweight/Ignore/Short industries where pricing power is likely to be negative for several more years, and especially industries that are in terminal decline.
  • Avoid fad industries.? There are P/E levels that no industry can grow into.

My best example of #1 is the P&C insurance industry in early 2000.? Total gloom.? I bought a lot of The St. Paul then.? Another example: Steel in 2001-2002.? I bought Nucor.

For #2, think of the energy industry — current stock prices embed oil prices far below current levels.? Or, think of the life insurance industry — low P/Es, but the demographic trends are in their favor.

On the third one, think of newspapers, whose richest revenue sources are getting eaten up by the internet.

For the last one, think of the internet/tech bubble 1998-2000.? Very few companies that were hot then are at higher prices now.

I share the results of my industry model once a quarter at minimum.? But I don’t use my model blindly.? For example, lending financials and housing have been cheap for some time, but I have avoided them.? They are cheap for a reason.

My main model uses the Value Line ranking system, and uses the nominal rank, and how it is different from the average historical rank.? It can be used in two ways: highly rated industries can be analyzed to see where the pricing power is not reflected in the stock prices yet.? Low rated industries should be analyzed for the possibility or reversal due to undeserved hopelessness.

But you can create your own model just from a series of index prices.? The idea is to look at industries that either have strong momentum that you think is deserved, or industries with weak momentum where things seem very bad but not terminal.? You can even modify it to look at industries that have bad performance over the past 3-5 years, but have rebounded over the past 6-12 months.

Behind all of that, remember my rule: sharp movements tend to mean-revert, slow, grinding, fitful movements tend to persist.? Things that are too certain tend to disappoint, while those things that are less certain tend to surprise.

One reason I have done well over the past 7+ years is that I have been willing to let my industry selection vary considerably from where the indexes have been.? If you think that you have insight into the longer-term earnings power of industries, then take your opportunity, and deviate from market weightings.

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