National Atlantic Notes

National Atlantic Notes

I have to be careful as I write this post, because I have agreements with my former employer. I will stick with what is publicly understood, and avoid internal knowledge of what my former employer thought when I last worked with them.

Today, after the close, Hovde Capital filed a 13D, seeking to own more than 17% of National Atlantic, and asking for seats on the board of directors. Now, what I want to say to my readers might agree with what Hovde Capital might want. Don’t make too much out of this. First, the New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance might turn Hovde down. Second, realize that any party acquiring 10% or more of any publicly traded company has to file two days after making any trade. That is the signal that I would be looking for.

National Atlantic is my largest holding, and I am aware of other parties considering buying National Atlantic, but they fail the urgency test for me. There’s lots of talk but no action. Don’t take any action off of Hovde’s SEC filing. There are too many uncertainties here, and wise investors will wait for favorable levels for investing.

Full disclosure: long NAHC

The Press Release

The Press Release

David Merkel to Join Finacorp Securities as Its Chief Economist and Director of Research

IRVINE, Calif., Feb. 8 /PRNewswire/ — In an ongoing campaign to provide targeted, value add services to its institutional client base,Finacorp Securities has hired David Merkel, formerly a Portfolio Manager for Dwight Asset Management, and an Equity Analyst for Hovde Capital Advisers. David is both a Chartered Financial Analyst, and a Fellow in theSociety of Actuaries.

Finacorp Securities today announced that David Merkel has joined as its Chief Economist and Director of Research. David has been a long time leading contributor to RealMoney.com, after being invited by Jim Cramer to write there. In addition to this he has acted as a Portfolio Manager to equity, corporate bond and structured product funds. He is also author and
owner of the popular finance weblog Alephblog.com. David’s focus has been equity and bond portfolio management, macroeconomics, derivatives, quantitative strategies, insurance issues and corporate governance. As Chief Economist and Director of Research at Finacorp Securities, David’s chief responsibility will be to develop economic analysis with equity and
fixed income strategies and provide advice to the firm’s sales & trading staff and its client base.

“With the current credit crisis and ensuing market volatility we think it is imperative to offer additional support and insight to our client base. David is a proven professional that has analyzed, and created opportunities in many markets and will help do the same for our client base in this market and those in the future. David’s ability to analyze many of the complex and impaired assets in today’s marketplace including CDOs, SIVs, and Insurance Guarantors will create an immediate value add to our institutional clients. This is very much in line with our philosophy of bringing together the finest personnel in a collaborative environment,” said Ed Prado, President and CEO of Finacorp Securities.

This hiring comes after tremendous expansion by the company of personnel and infrastructure as it established a presence in: Seattle, Portland and Chicago.

About Finacorp Securities

Finacorp Securities is a full service broker/dealer focusing on servicing its institutional clients within the U.S. and select
international markets. The firm operates as a certified Minority-OwnedHispanic Broker/Dealer headquartered in California. Through a combination of its own proprietary systems and third-party partnerships, it provides seamless execution, settlement and custody to institutional fixed income and equity market participants. Finacorp has been built on a tradition of highly personalized brokerage services delivered by professionals harnessing the power of technology and strategic partnership to deliver value-driven securities execution, detailed portfolio analytics, and seamless settlement. Finacorp’s high-touch, high-tech business model represents a comprehensive set of fixed income and equity solutions for
today’s value driven, risk adverse investment professional.

SOURCE Finacorp Securities

Post 500

Post 500

As WordPress counts, this is post 500, though it is only really the 409th post. (A glitch in the software yesterday ate up ten numbers… weird. I had planned on post 500 being near my first blogoversary on 2/20, but it was not to be.) I use the hundred milestones to take a moment to reflect on blogging, and update readers on what is going on in my life, my plans for the blog, and to ask for advice.

For the most part, I just blog now, and I don’t pay too much attention to the statistics on readership and links. I have a decent feel for where I fit into the financial blogosphere, and I know I won’t be the top writer here. I’m not for everyone.

As I have commented before, one of the good points and bad points of my blog is that blog readers really can’t tell what I will be serving up next. My interests are broad, and I like writing about a wide number of topics. I think it strengthens my understanding of the markets, rather than weakening it.

I have also said that this blog is not a business, but it is an option on a business. Well, the option came into the money regarding my new position with Finacorp. Today, an announcement will go out over PR Newswire over my new job there. To any of my readers in the regular media: if you read it, and you have a place for it in your publications, it will be much appreciated here.

So where am I going from here in blogging? I will continue to cover current issues, and long term ideas of interest, but I also have a list of articles that I would like to do:

  • Traffic
  • Academic Finance Lies
  • Rescuing Capitalism from Capitalists
  • Flexibility vs Fixed Commitments
  • Fundamentals of Market Bottoms
  • Revisiting DFR
  • Commercial Paper less Two-year Treasury Yields
  • Predicting Inflation
  • Unemployment Risk
  • Risk Management vs VAR vs ERM
  • Central Banks can lose money?
  • The Problem of Taxation

Before I close here, I want to thank my readers, and thank those that refer readers to me. I don’t take anyone for granted here. Your time is limited, and I appreciate that you read/refer to me. Special thanks to Abnormal Returns, Seeking Alpha, Marketbeat, The Big Picture, Random Roger, VIX and More, and more.

If you have suggestions for me, please send them my way. I write about what interests me, but I listen to readers in order to gauge the broader interest in what I write about.

PS — It is good to be employed once again.

Full disclosure: long DFR

Ten Odds & Ends

Ten Odds & Ends

I’ve wanted to post on a bunch of little things for a while, and while it won’t make for organized reading, maybe we can have some fun with it?? Here goes.

1) If Prudential drops much further, I am buying some.? With an estimated 2009 PE below 8, it would be hard to go wrong on such a high quality company.? I am also hoping that Assurant drops below $53, where I will buy more. ? The industry fundamentals are generally favorable.? Honestly, I could get juiced about Stancorp below $50, Principal, Protective, Lincoln National, Delphi Financial, Metlife…? There are quality companies going on sale, and my only limit is how much I am willing to overweight the industry.? Going into the energy wave in 2002, I was quadruple-weight energy.? Insurance stocks are 16% of my portfolio now, which is quadruple-weight or so.? This is a defensive group, with reasonable upside.? I’ll keep you apprised as I make moves here.

2) Reader Steve brought this to my attention: Mark Gilbert at Bloomberg brought attention to a monetary policy game at the San Francisco Fed’s website.? So did the estimable Marketbeat blog at the WSJ.? The game used to be found at this link.? Alas, no more.? Maybe all of the attention crashed the site, after all, the SF Fed can’t afford a heavy-duty website like mine.? Okay, sorry, they get 10x the traffic that I do, more like The Kirk Report.

Perhaps the game was removed over the embarrassment from Gilbert playing the game and applying the current Fed strategy to the game, and finding inflation going through the roof.? Now, for those that want to play a monetary policy game, my current favorite is this one from the Bank of Finland.? In a true American version of the game, we would replace the manic announcer with clips of who else, Jim Cramer.? Nobody does it better.? Oh and for true junkies looking for monetary policy games, here is a list of some of them.

3) Dig the falling long bond.? Worst day since 2004.? Echoing what I said yesterday, there’s a lot of fear in that part of the market, and a lot of foreign interest.? Well, at the 30-year auction, foreign interest was light at the lowest yield since regular auctions began in 1977.? A few strong economic numbers can make fear temporarily dissipate.

4) Here’s what I posted at RealMoney today:


David Merkel
Moody’s Downgrades XL Capital Assurance
2/7/2008 3:34 PM EST

When the main rating agencies begin downgrading the lesser guarantors, the big guarantors are likely not far behind. Moody’s just downgraded XL Capital Assurance from Aaa to A3, and Security Capital Assurance From Aa3 to Baa3 (barely investment grade). Psychologically, the major rating agencies, Moody’s and S&P, have been taking baby steps toward downgrading Ambac, MBIA and FGIC. But first they have to do the lesser guarantors that are in trouble. As I have pointed out before, the major rating agencies are co-dependent with the major guarantors, and that will only throw the guarantors over the edge if hurts them more to leave the guarantors at AAA. That will cost them future revenues to cut the ratings of the major guarantors, but it might save their larger franchises. (Fitch, on the other hand, has less to lose and can downgrade with impunity.)

Now, the effects on the broader insured bond market are probably overestimated. There will be new entrants to take the place of the legacy companies that may have to go into runoff. The holding companies for the major guarantors could die, but a rescue of the operating insurance companies in runoff mode is more likely. Those who own equity in the holding companies or debt claims to the holding companies will not be happy with the results, though.

Watch for downgrades of the major guarantors. Unless a lot of new capital gets pumped into their operating insurance companies, the downgrades are coming, maybe within a month.

Please note that due to factors including low market capitalization and/or insufficient public float, we consider Security Capital Assurance to be a small-cap stock. You should be aware that such stocks are subject to more risk than stocks of larger companies, including greater volatility, lower liquidity and less publicly available information, and that postings such as this one can have an effect on their stock prices.

Position: none

Now after the close, MBIA offered stock at a 14% haircut to the closing price. ? Let’s see where the price closes tomorrow… it almost boils down to the number of buyers saying, “At a 14% haircut, there’s no way that it will close below that level.? We can buy and flip for an easy profit.”? In this case, though, there are 60%+ more shares after this issuance.? That’s some level of dilution.? MBIA may keep its AAA, but that says little for the value of holding company common stock.

5) One reader wrote me, “mr. merkel — would you care at all to expound on point 2? it’s been the assertion of some that what makes the monoline threat a non-issue is specifically that there IS a harmony of interests in seeing ambac, mbia et al at least get to a point where they can run off their obligations. however, i must admit, i’ve not seen the case made with specificity — that is, what are the interests of the interested parties, and how do they conflict or coincide?”

Point 2 was the idea that a bailout would be tough to achieve, because of differing interests on the part of those being sought to bail out the guarantors. ? Here’s my rationale: different investment banks have differing levels and types of exposure to the credit risks covered by the guarantors.? Coming up with an equitable allocation of concessions would be tough, but not impossible.? Beyond that, you have all of the ways that the guarantors reinsured each other, which further tangles the web of promises.? A bailout could be done, given enough time, and enough angelic third-party experts to divide the pie perfectly.? Time is short here, and I suspect the rating agencies will lose patience, given their need to protect their franchises.

6) At present, the yield curve indicates a 2% Fed funds rate by mid-to-late 2008.? Uh, that’s not what I would do, but it seems pretty likely for now.? What kind of price inflation would get the attention of the Fed here?? Beats me; the slope of the yield curve today is adequate to allow banks to make money; if the Fed waits at these levels, the economy should recover over the next two years.

7) I liked the idea of this post at the American Prospect, but for a different reason.? Since I called the housing bubble very clearly over at RealMoney, and even subprime too, does that mean that I can criticize the Fed with impunity?? Constructively, of course.

8) From another reader, Bamboo: I have not seen much discussion of the statutory capital requirements of the financial guaranty insurers.? It seems that Article 69 of the New York Insurance Law is the critical statute.

Although the rating agencies do not consider mark to market losses in their evaulations of capital adequacy, do they affect statutory capital?

Is there a possibility that the financial guarantors will have to take a premium deficiency reserve for their structured finance business?

I would like to get a copy of article 69, but I can’t find one.? In general statutory regulations are less market-oriented than rating agencies and GAAP.? The problems usually show up faster on GAAP than Stat, leaving aside high growth situations.

9) Another reader, Bill Luby of VIX and More, writes: Hi David,

Once again, kudos for keeping up a consistently high quality of posting here.? Your thinking often sets my brain in motion — in a very good way.

If you don’t mind, I’d be interested to get your take on the current status of the bond insurer problem and how you think it might play out.? In addition to what happens to MBI and ABK, I am also interested in whether you think others with a stronger financial position (AGO?) might make significant gains in this space.

Cheers,

-Bill

Yes, AGO, Dexia (FSA), and Berky all do well from the turmoil.? Strong balance sheets benefit from increased volatility, even as weak balance sheets are harmed.

10) Finally, from Reader Scott, regarding Medicare and entitlements, “David, wondering your thoughts on how the situation gets addressed.? There is no question at all that the equation doesn’t solve, presently.? My current thoughts are that (1) taxes go higher – not even up for serious discussion; and (2) so do trade barriers.? we trade some protectionism, a la Europe, and reduced overall welfare, for a feel-good “leveling” of some of society’s current inequties.? our nation’s most influential demographic, old folks, who vote, are appeased. add to that, perhaps, some guest worker immigration policies.? second class citizens earning second-tier wages.? on balance, we begin looking a lot more like Europe, reversing the cherished myth of American exceptionalism, and staving off acceptance of the twenty-first being the China Century.? Care to comment?

Americans are exceptional, and that is not always a good thing.? We have fewer presuppositions than most of the world, and that leads to innovative solutions, a certain amount of unnecessary chaos, and occasional hubris.? We are probably heading for an era of leveling, but that is not certain.? Historically, it is likely.? Trade may be another matter; we may be getting close to a point where the rest of the world sees the value of freer trade, even if the US goes the other way.? Organized efforts against free trade are weak compared to protectionist eras.

As for old folks that vote, yes, that’s what makes this problem tough.? I’m not into doom and gloom, but I can see a negative self-reinforcing cycle coming.? If Bush, Jr., got smacked over his all-too-cautious attempt at Social Security reform (it would have done almost nothing, but listen to the squeals), can you imagine what true reform of a much bigger problem might entail?? We would need a full blown panic in the debt markets to get focus there, and as for now, foreigners are still very willing to roll over US debt denominated in US dollars.

Full disclosure: long AIZ, LNC

The Boom-Bust Cycle, Applied to Many Markets

The Boom-Bust Cycle, Applied to Many Markets

Every now and then, valuation metrics in a market will get changed by the entrance of an aggressive new buyer or seller with a different agenda than existing buyers or sellers in the marketplace.? Or conversely, the exit of an aggressive buyer or seller.

Think of the residential mortgage marketplace over the last several years.? With an “originate and securitize” model where no one enforced credit standards at all, credit spreads got really aggressive, and volumes ballooned. Many marginal mortgage lenders entered the market, because it was strictly a volume business.? Now with falling housing prices, there are high levels of delinquency and default, and mortgage volumes have shrunk, leading to the failures/closures of many of those marginal lenders.? Underwriting standards rise, as capacity drops out.? Even prime borrowers face tougher standards.? In two short years, fire has given way to ice.

If you’ll indulge another story of mine, I worked for an insurer who had a well-run commercial mortgage arm.? Very conservative.? They did small-ish loans on what I would call “economically necessary real estate.”? See that ugly strip mall with the grocery anchor?? Everyone in the area shops there; that’s a good property.

Well, in 1992, the head of the Commercial Mortgage area had a problem.? The company had only three lines of business, and two lines representing 60% and 20% of the assets of the firm were full up on mortgages.? What was worse, was they didn’t want to even replace maturing loans, because the ratings agencies had told the company that commercial mortgage loans were a negative rating factor.? Never mind the fact that the default loss rate was 40% of the industry average.

He stared down the possibility that he would have to close down his division.? He had one last chance.? He called the actuary that ran the division that I was in (my boss), and pitched him on doing some commercial mortgages.? The conversation went something like this:

Mortgage Guy: I know you haven’t liked commercial mortgages in the past, but my back is against the wall, and if you don’t take my originations, I’ll have to shut down.? You’ve heard that the other two divisions won’t take any more mortgages at all.?

Boss: Yeah, I heard.? But the reason we never took commercial mortgages was that we didn’t like the credit spread compared to the risks involved.? 150 basis points over Treasuries just doesn’t make it for us.

M: Well, because many companies have reduced originations, the spreads are 300 basis points now.

B: 300?! But what about the quality of the loans?

M: Only the best quality loans are getting done now.? I can insist on additional equity, in some cases recourse, and faster amortization.? My loan-to-values are the lowest I’ve seen in years.? Coverage ratios are similarly good.

B: Well, well.? Perhaps I’ve been right in the past, but I’m not pigheaded.? Look, we could take our percentage of assets in mortgages from 0% to 20%, but no more.? At your current origination rate, that would allow you to survive for two years.? We will take them all, subject to you keeping high credit quality standards.? Okay?

M: Thank you.? We’ll do our best for you.

And they did.? For the next two years, our line of business and the mortgage division had a symbiotic relationship, after which, spreads tightened significantly as confidence came back to the market.? We had 20% of our assets in mortgages, and the other two lines of business now felt comfortable enough with commercial mortgages to begin taking them again — at much lower spreads (and quality) than we received.

It’s important to try to look through the windshield, and not the rear-view mirror in investing.? Analyze the motives of current participants, new entrants, and their likely staying power to understand the competitive dynamics.? I’ll give one more example: the life insurance industry was a lousy place to invest for years.? Why?? A bunch of fat, dumb, and happy mutual companies were willing to write life insurance business earning a minimal return on capital.? As another boss of mine once said, “It doesn’t take mere incompetence to kill a mutual life insurer; it takes malice.”? Well, malice, or at least its cousin, killed a number of insurers, and crippled others in the late 80s to mid 90s.? Investment policies that relied on a rising commercial real estate market failed.

But that was the point to begin investing in life insurers.? They began pricing capital economically, and the industry began insisting on higher returns as a group.? Many mutuals demutualized, and the remaining large mutuals behaved indistinguishably from their stock company cousins.? The default cycle of 2001-2003 reinforced that; it is one of the reasons that the life insurance industry has had only modest exposure to the current difficulties afflicting most financials.? After years of being outperformed by the banks, the life insurers look pretty good in comparison today.

I could go on, and talk about the CDO and CLO markets, and how they changed the high yield bond and loan markets, or how credit default swaps have changed fixed income.? Instead, I want to close with an observation about a very different market.? Who likes Treasury bonds at these low yields?

Well, I don’t.? At these yield levels the odds are pretty good that you will lose purchasing power over a 2-3 year period.? Then again, I’m a bit of a fuddy-duddy.? So who does like Treasury yields at these levels?

  • Players who are scared.
  • Players who have no choice.

There is a “fear factor” in Treasury yields now.? Beyond that, there is the recycling of the current account deficit, which is still large relative to the issuance of Treasuries.? The current account deficit is large, but shrinking, since the US dollar at these low levels is boosting net exports.? As the current account deficit shrinks, Treasury yields should rise, because foreign demand has been a large part of the buyers of Treasuries.? The Fed can hold the short end of the curve where it wants to, but the long end will rise as the current account deficit shrinks.

I think the current account deficit does shrink from here, because the cost of buying US debts, and not buying US goods is getting prohibitive.? Also, fewer retail buyers will take negative real yields.

That’s my thought for the evening.? Analyze the motives of other players in your markets, and don’t assume that the current state of the market is an equilibrium.? Equilibria in economics are phantoms.? They exist in theory, but not reality.? Better to ask where new entrants or exits will come from.

Five Thoughts on the Financial Guarantors

Five Thoughts on the Financial Guarantors

The Financial Guarantors are receiving a lot of attention these days, and for good reason.? I want to offer a few observations to give my own take on the problem:

1) With structured finance, the initial choice is “Do we ask a financial guarantor to bring the credit up to AAA, or do we do it through a senior-subordinate structure?”? A senior-subordinate structure has classes of lenders with differing rights to payment.? The AAA, or, senior lenders only take losses after the subordinate lenders (who are receiving higher yields) have lost all of their money.? In the present environment, S&P and Moody’s have been downgrading subordinates, and even some senior bonds in senior-sub structures.

This should lead to downgrades of MBIA and Ambac, eventually.? The rating agencies can’t keep downgrading bonds that are similar to those guaranteed by MBIA and Ambac, without downgrading them as well.? Remember, MBIA and Ambac were late to the party; their bonds are disproportionately weak because later lending standards were weaker.

2) The main difficulty with a bailout of the guarantors is that most interested parties have different interests.? That said, the beauty of a bailout is that the guarantor can sit back and pay timely principal and interest, while waiting for better times to come.

3) Did the rating agencies force the guarantors into the CDO business?? I’ve heard rumors to this effect, but it would be pretty easy to prove or disprove.? Look at when MBIA and Ambac entered the business, and look at the commentary from the rating agencies around it; if they are trumpeting diversification, then it is likely that they pitched it to the guarantors.? If not, then the guarantors did it on their own.

4) Even in a bailout of financial guarantors, current shareholders may find themselves diluted beyond measure.? Given current political pressures, those risks are elevated; remember that management teams want to keep their jobs, and that regulators have some say in that.

5) As I noted today at RealMoney:


David Merkel
Considering the “Margin of Safety”
2/5/2008 11:07 AM EST

Tim, I like your stuff, since I am a value investor. Be careful with XL Capital. The challenge is estimating what sort of guarantees they face from Security Capital Assurance. When I looked at them last, the potential payments could be huge — potentially larger than XL’s net worth, but hey, that’s the financial guarantee business. I looked at XL during my last portfolio reshaping — Finish Line also, and could not get past the potential risks. I had easier plays to go for, with less uncertainty, if also lower upside. I don’t try to hit home runs, so it makes it easier for me to not buy the stocks that are optically stupid cheap, but might have balance sheet issues. Cheap means that a company will have the capability to carry their positions through a downturn; it’s part of the “margin of safety” that we require.

Anyway, keep it up, and let’s see if we can’t make some money on our value investing.

Please note that due to factors including low market capitalization and/or insufficient public float, we consider Security Capital Assurance and Finish Line to be small-cap stocks. You should be aware that such stocks are subject to more risk than stocks of larger companies, including greater volatility, lower liquidity and less publicly available information, and that postings such as this one can have an effect on their stock prices.

Position: none

?XL was downgraded recently as a result of those guarantees.? I would be cautious here.

-=-=-=-=-=-

Summary: there is still downside risk here.? Avoid the financial guarantors, and economic areas affected by the overleveraging of our credit markets. ? Stick with companies that have strong balance sheets.

An Economist at Last — Life Changes for David

An Economist at Last — Life Changes for David

I started my business career as an actuary.? For an actuary, though, I had an unusual background — I wasn’t a math or a statistics major, I was an economics major, though admittedly, one with a lot of math.? You can’t get through the Ph.D. courses in econometrics without a lot of math.? In my business career, I’ve put my economics background to use, and added to it through studying finance.? Now, I studied much of the finance and economics of risk literature back in grad school, and developed a healthy dislike for MPT, the CAPM, and suchlike.

I grew up in a home where my self-taught mother used her head and picked stocks.? She did it quite well, too, and continues to do so today.? I figured that I could do it too, and over the past fifteen years, have done so.? Perhaps my major theme would be “hunt for value, and don’t be afraid to have a portfolio that looks weird.”? My studies of finance in my post-academic days were practical in nature, analyzing ways of beating the market, or reducing risk, realizing that any strategy can become overused, and useless.

After leaving my former employer, I’ve done a bunch of things — writing, consulting, etc.? Now it is time to focus.? I have taken a job as Chief Economist and Director of Research for Finacorp Securities, based in Irvine, California.? Their main focus is serving the investment needs of municipalities.? I have three main tasks:

  • Publish research that encourages clients to trade with us.
  • Provide research for internal staff and clients, enabling staff to serve clients better.
  • Build an asset management franchise for our clients around my value investing, and bond investing.

Beyond that, aid in the management of the firm where possible.? Now, I’m not changing locations; I am still based near Baltimore.? What I do can be done from anywhere, so long as I can connect to the Internet.
I have already produced a draft version of a newsletter for our institutional clients.? I am making preparations to?offer equity asset management services to clients.? What form that will take is still open.

That said, it is interesting at this point in my life to finally have the word “Economist” in my job title, as well as “Chief.”? In one sense, this dovetails well into my interests, as those who read my blog will know.? I write about the intersection of macroeconomics and investing.? That’s what I do.? It allows me to keep my interests broad, while solving a wide array of practical problems.? I have sometimes said that I am an investment omnivore.? That’s not quite true, but I like to wander across the investment wilderness, and gather disparate data, gaining good conclusions about the total investment landscape.

Anyway, that is what I am up to now.? To the extent that our newsletter or investment services might be open to individuals, I will let you all know.? I thank you all deeply for your support of me.

PS — I may be on FOX Business Wednesday between 12 and 2PM Eastern.? This is uncertain at present.? We will see.

All or Nothing at All

All or Nothing at All

I had some “down time” today (taking my third child to junior college), when I could sit and think about some of the issues in the markets, when all of a sudden, a weird correlation hit me.? Similarities between:

  • The near bankruptcy of the Equitable back in the early 90s.
  • Neomercantilism
  • The relationship of Moody’s and S&P to MBIA and Ambac.

Now, I write as I think, so at the end of this, I hope to have a theory that links all of these.? For now, let me tell a story.

When I was younger, I worked for AIG in their domestic life companies.? While I was there 1989-92, the life insurance industry was undergoing a lot of troubles from overinvestment in mortgages and real estate.? Many companies were under stress.? A few went bankrupt.? One big one was probably insolvent, and teetered in the balance — the Equitable.? I was the juniormost member of AIG’s team.? I have a lot of stories about what happened, and why AIG lost and AXA won.? If readers want to read about that, I’ll write about it.? For now though let me mention what I did:

  • Produced an estimate of value of the annuity lines in four days.
  • Estimated the “hole” in reserving for the Guaranteed Investment Contract line of business (accurate within 10%, according to the writedown they took later)
  • Wrote an analysis of AXA that indicated that we should take them seriously (probably ignored).
  • Analyzed the Statutory statement, the Cash Flow testing, and Guaranteed Separate Account filing (Reg 128), and came to the conclusion that the latter two were in error.? (Those filings, I later learned, forced the NY department to
    tell Equitable that it had to find a buyer, because they could not believe the rosy scenarios.)
  • Analyzed the investment strategies that the Equitable employed in the late 80s.? (They doubled down.)

Two years after that, I was at the Society of Actuaries annual meeting, where I met a well-known actuary who had worked inside the corporate actuarial area of the Equitable during the critical years.? I.e., he watched and analyzed the assets and the liabilities as they arose.? The conversation went something like this:

David: What was it like working inside the Equitable during that period of fast growth?

Corporate Actuary: It was amazing.? It took everything we could do to stay on top of it, and still we fell behind.

D: Didn’t you think that perhaps you were offering guaranteed rates that were too attractive?

C: We wondered about it, but with money coming in, everyone felt great about the growth.? We simply had to find ways to productively deploy all of the cash flow.

D: But wait.? Didn’t the investment department have a difficult time investing all of the proceeds?? With that much money coming in, the likelihood of making severe errors would be high.

C: Were you a bug on the wall at our meetings?? Yes, that is exactly what happened.? The money came in faster than we could invest it prudently.

D: Wow.? I thought that was what happened, but it amazes me to hear it confirmed.

They offered free options, and surprise, investors took them up on them.? They couldn’t make enough to fund the promises, and undertook a risky strategy in the late 80s that I called “double or nothing.”? The strategy failed, and they almost went broke, except that AXA bought them, pumped in a little capital, and then the real estate market turned.

What’s my point here?? Twofold: one, rapid growth in financial institutions is rarely a good thing; it usually means that an error has been made.? Two, there is a barrier in many financial decisions, where responsible parties are loath to cry foul until it is way past obvious, because the cost of being wrong is high.

So what of my other two cases?? With the neomercantilists, which I have written about more at RealMoney, they entered into the following trade: sell goods to the US and primarily take back bonds.? This suppressed inflation in the US, and lowered interest rates, because their bond buying reduced the excess supply of bonds.? In one sense, through export promotion, the neomercantilistic countries sold their goods too cheaply, and then had little current use for the US Dollars, since they did not want their people buying US goods.? So, they took the money and bought US bonds, probably too dearly.? Certainly so, after taking the falling US Dollar into account.

With the major rating agencies and the major financial guarantors, they are locked in a co-dependent relationship, one that I highlighted in a RealMoney article three years ago.? The financial guarantors are next to a cliff, and the rating agencies have a choice:

  • The guarantors are clearly in trouble, but how bad is it?? Do we push them over the edge to save our franchise, at a cost of a lot of forgone revenue in the short run?
  • Or do we sit, wait, and hope that things are not as bad as the equity markets are telling us?? This could preserve our ability to make money, and the government is giving us pressure to go this way, for systemic risk reasons.? Besides, someone could bail them out, right?

Ugh, I went through this back in 2001-2002, when the rating agencies changed their methodology to become more short-term in nature.? Funny how they always do that in bear markets for credit.

So, what’s the common element here?? Each situation has a major financial entity at the core.? Underpriced goods or promises were made in an effort to attract revenue.? When the revenues came too quickly, errors were made in deploying the revenues, whether into goods or bonds.? The faster and the larger the acquisition of the revenues, the larger the problem in deployment.

In each of these situations, then, there is a cliff:

  • Do the rating agencies push the guarantors over?
  • Does the NY department of insurance force Equitable to find a buyer?
  • Do neomercantilistic nations keep sucking down dollar claims in exchange for goods, importing inflation, or do they finally give up, and purchase US goods, and slow down their own economies, and the inflation thereof?

This is what makes practical economics tough.? Cycles that are self-reinforcing eventually break, and when they break the results can be ugly.? Why else are credit cycles long and benign in the bull phase, and short and sharp in the bear phase?

A Practical Reason to be Aware of ETF Activity

A Practical Reason to be Aware of ETF Activity

In investing, it is important to understand what industries the companies in which you invest are in.? There are several reasons for this:

  • Companies within an industry tend to face the same cost pressures.
  • Companies within an industry tend to face the same revenue drivers.
  • Companies within an industry tend to face the same regulators and political pressures.
  • Companies within an industry tend to face the same behavior from debt-financers and equity investors.

Now, some companies have competitive advantages that are difficult to replicate, but those are not plentiful.? It is no surprise then that equity performance within industries tends to be tightly correlated.

Now consider ETF activity.? The largest ETFs cover whole stock markets, or sectors containing many industries.? The trading can drive the prices of many stocks regardless of the fundamentals in the short run.? The ETFs allow for simple decisions to be made.? “Financials stink; sell the XLF.”? “Technology stinks; sell the XLK.”? “Energy and materials will do well here, buy the XLE and XLB.”

The thing is, in each of those sectors, there is a lot of variation.? Is there a reason to worry about financial companies that focus on mortgages?? Yes.? Does that have anything to do with insurers?? Aside from mortgage, financial and title insurers, no, it doesn’t.? What do chemicals have to do with base metals?? Not much.? Do refiners and E&P companies benefit similarly from a rise in the price of oil?? No, it is the opposite; one buys oil, the other sells.

ETF trading activity can be a benefit to the fundamental investor.? When your companies come under pressure from ETFs because ETF holders sell indiscriminately and the company that you own is not a party to the macro phenomenon that is leading to the selling, it is time to buy a little more.? When your companies rise because ETF buyers buy indiscriminately and the company that you own is not a party to the macro phenomenon that is leading to the buying, it is time to sell a little.

ETFs simplify decision-making for many investors.? Sophisticated investors will avoid the simplification and drill down the economics and the industries and companies that they own, leading to greater profits in the long run.

The Fiscal Elephant in the Room

The Fiscal Elephant in the Room

WSJ budgetThose that know me well know that I have been following the entitlements issue for over 15 years. I feel that the leadership of the American Academy of Actuaries has blown it royally over this whole period, and before, through and before the Greenspan commission (his worst legacy). We had a chance to warn the nation, and did not do it. We allowed actuaries who could do the math, but didn’t understand the politics, to write in our journals, and talk to Congress, and suggest that everything would be fine.

Well, things are fine now, and they might be fine for the next president, but they won’t be fine by the 2020 election.

I am talking about Medicare/Medicaid. Unless there are significant changes made, there is no way that we can afford the promises that have been made.? The graph from the Wall Street Journal (from this fine article), on the right, depicts spending excluding interest.? Including interest payments makes the graph worse, and more so as time goes on.? In general, Americans don’t like sending more than 20% of GDP to the Federal Government.? By 2020, that will no longer be possible to avoid, unless significant changes are made.

This is the same issue that faces every state in the nation (except Wisconsin) and the Federal Government over their retiree health care programs; they didn’t set aside money for the future payments, but decided to pay-as-it-goes.? Now, what choices are there to remedy the situation?? Not many good ones:

  • Raise taxes significantly.
  • Raise the age for Medicare eligibility to 75 or so (don’t phase it in).
  • Means-test eligibility (lousy incentives there, as it is for Medicaid)
  • Eliminate part D now, while there is no imperative to keep it.
  • Create a reimbursement system that forces the creation of a two-tier medical system.? For the elderly, it will mean limited help in their waning years.? Treatments for expensive prolonging of life will have to come out of private sources.? Call it the Federal Elderly HMO.

The likely solution will involve all five policy options in some form.? How it works out depends on how much political resistance the elderly Baby Boomers will put up.? Another political hurdle: much as I dislike National Health Care, that is a wild card in this mix.? That could be the de facto way that limits the benefit payments that seniors receive.

I’m not into doom and gloom.? I manage money that is invested in stocks, and I have to look for advantage every day.? But we have put off real reform of entitlements for over 25 years, and we continue to do so.? Which of our six remaining presidential candidates is willing to talk about reforming Medicare?? I haven’t heard any of them go that way; it just loses votes.? But when it is hitting us between the eyes twelve years from now, younger people will be incented to vote in politicians that will curb benefits.

My investment implication is this: don’t rely on Medicare existing in its current form past 2020.? Plan today for the medical care you will need then.? Unless you have a funded private plan behind you, that means saving for the future costs.

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