Search Results for: rga reinsurance

Morning Financials Update

Morning Financials Update

Big Movers

Top 20 Financial Stock Movers

Company [ticker] News Price Move
Washington Mutual Inc [WAMUQ] Valuation-insensitive buyers on high volume and no news.

13%

Pacific Capital Bancorp NA [PCBC] Strong buying at the open leads the stock up on no news.

6%

Ashford Hospitality Trust Inc [AHT] No news materially driving the stock price

6%

First BanCorp/Puerto Rico [FBP] No news materially driving the stock price

4%

Radian Group Inc [RDN] No news materially driving the stock price

4%

EastGroup Properties Inc [EGP] Jim Cramer likes it for the yield.? Mentioned on Mad Money.

3%

Advance America Cash Advance C [AEA] No news materially driving the stock price

3%

LoopNet Inc [LOOP] No news materially driving the stock price

3%

Heartland Financial USA Inc [HTLF] No news materially driving the stock price

3%

China Real Estate Information? [CRIC] No news materially driving the stock price

3%

Move Inc [MOVE] Banxquote.com sues them for antitrust reasons.

2%

First Bancorp/Troy NC [FBNC] No news materially driving the stock price

2%

United America Indemnity Ltd [INDM] No news materially driving the stock price

2%

Enstar Group Ltd [ESGR] No news materially driving the stock price

-3%

New York Community Bancorp Inc [NYB] No news materially driving the stock price

-3%

Stewart Information Services C [STC] No news materially driving the stock price

-3%

Waddell & Reed Financial Inc [WDR] No news materially driving the stock price

-3%

Artio Global Investors Inc [ART] Dilution.? Issuing shares to buy back units from principals.

-4%

First American Financial Corp [FAF] Index investors sell off FAF as CLGX remains in the S&P 400.

-4%

Assured Guaranty Ltd [AGO] Determined sellers on light volume and no news.

-4%

Thoughts:

Group Price Movements for this Morning

Real Estate Mgmnt/Servic

1.2%

Reinsurance

0.0%

REITS-Health Care

-0.3%

Commercial Serv-Finance

1.1%

Diversified Banking Inst

0.0%

REITS-Storage

-0.3%

Finance-Consumer Loans

1.0%

Multi-line Insurance

0.0%

Commer Banks-Western US

-0.3%

Insurance Brokers

0.7%

Exchanges

0.0%

S&L/Thrifts-Central US

-0.4%

Life/Health Insurance

0.7%

Property/Casualty Ins

0.0%

Commer Banks-Central US

-0.5%

Other

0.5%

Fiduciary Banks

-0.1%

Invest Mgmnt/Advis Serv

-0.5%

Retail-Pawn Shops

0.4%

REITS-Hotels

-0.1%

REITS-Diversified

-0.5%

Real Estate Oper/Develop

0.4%

Commer Banks-Eastern US

-0.1%

REITS-Single Tenant

-0.5%

Finance-Invest Bnkr/Brkr

0.4%

Grand Total

-0.1%

Finance-Credit Card

-0.5%

REITS-Mortgage

0.4%

REITS-Office Property

-0.1%

S&L/Thrifts-Eastern US

-0.7%

REITS-Regional Malls

0.1%

REITS-Forestry

-0.1%

Finance-Auto Loans

-0.7%

Commer Banks Non-US

0.1%

REITS-Warehouse/Industr

-0.1%

Super-Regional Banks-US

-1.0%

REITS-Apartments

0.1%

REITS-Shopping Centers

-0.2%

Financial Guarantee Ins

-1.1%

S&L/Thrifts-Western US

0.1%

Commer Banks-Southern US

-0.2%

GSEs

-2.3%

I look at these companies for big news events that have occurred since the last close.? Often there isn?t any, but big changes here can be an indication that someone knows something, or there is trading noise.? After that, it is up to the analyst to dig.? Often, the dog that does not bark is the clue, as stocks move up or down on no news, as well as unexplained large spikes in volume, CDS spreads, and implied volatility of options.

Note: If I use the phrase ?better seller,? it does not mean ?sell.?? If I use the phrase ?better buyer,? it does not mean ?buy.?? ?Better seller? and ?better buyer? are bond portfolio manager terms that simply mean that if I were forced to take action on a security, what would I do as a trader in the short run, given the current news.

Disclosure: long ALL NWLI SAFT RGA AIZ PRE CB

Greenspan versus Reality, Part 1

Greenspan versus Reality, Part 1

This article is derived from Greenspan’s latest paper.? Greenspan?s comments are in italics. Mine are in normal type.

Greenspan begins his argument: The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 precipitated what, in retrospect, is likely to be judged the most virulent global financial crisis ever.

Quite a statement, and one that I think is false, at least so far.? The Great Depression was far worse.

Yet the ex post global saving ? investment rate in 2007, overall, was only modestly higher than in 1999, suggesting that the uptrend in the saving intentions of developing economies tempered declining investment intentions in the developed world.? That weakened global investment was the major determinant in the decline of global real long-term interest rates was also the conclusion of the March 2007 Bank of Canada study.5 Of course, whether it was a glut of excess intended saving or a shortfall of investment intentions, the conclusion is the same: lower real long-term interest rates.

The truth was that because central bank policy had not cleared away malinvestment, but had coddled it, when the emerging markets attempted to save more (whether privately or by government fiat), interest rates fell, because there were fewer productive places to invest.

Similarly in 2002, I expressed my concerns before the Federal Open Market Committee that ?. . . our extraordinary housing boom . . . financed by very large increases in mortgage debt ? cannot continue indefinitely.? It lasted until 2006.? (Greenspan footnoted: Failing to anticipate the length and depth of emerging bubbles should not have come as a surprise. Though we like to pretend otherwise, policymakers, and indeed forecasters in general, are doing exceptionally well if we can get projections essentially right 70% of the time. But that means we get it wrong 30% of the time. In 18? years at the Fed, I certainly had my share of the latter.)

Much as I appreciate Greenspan?s possible intellectual foresight in 2002, and his willingness to admit that he was sometimes wrong, I find fault in that he did not act on it.? He kept rates low through 2004, and defended the provision of liquidity by saying it would continue for a considerable period of time.

Clearly with such experiences in mind, financial firms were fearful that should they retrench too soon, they would almost surely lose market share, perhaps irretrievably.? Their fears were formalized by Citigroup?s Charles Prince?s now famous remark in 2007, just prior to the onset of the crisis, that ?When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you?ve got to get up and dance. We?re still dancing.?

Such was life under the Greenspan Put.? Make money while liquidity is cheap.? The Fed has our back, so lend to all but the worst prospects, and sell the loans as quickly as possible.

The financial firms risked being able to anticipate the onset of crisis in time to retrench. They were mistaken. They believed the then seemingly insatiable demand for their array of exotic financial products would enable them to sell large parts of their portfolios without loss. They failed to recognize that the conversion of balance sheet liquidity to effective demand is largely a function of the degree of risk aversion. That process manifests itself in periods of euphoria (risk aversion falling below its long term, trendless, average) and fear (risk aversion rising above its average). A lessening in the intensity of risk aversion creates increasingly narrow bid-asked spreads, in volume, the conventional definition of market, as distinct from balance sheet, liquidity.

In this context I define a bubble as a protracted period of falling risk aversion that translates into falling capitalization rates that decline measurably below their long term trendless averages. Falling capitalization rates propel one or more asset prices to unsustainable levels. All bubbles burst when risk aversion reaches its irreducible minimum, i.e. credit spreads approaching zero, though analysts? ability to time the onset of deflation has proved illusive (sp).

I think Greenspan would benefit from reading my ?What is Liquidity?? series.? Risk aversion is a function of asset-liability matching (as he notes), but also of the degree of certainty of being able to make or meet fixed obligations.

I very much doubt that in September 2008, had financial assets been funded predominately by equity instead of debt, that the deflation of asset prices would have fostered a default contagion much beyond that of the dotcom boom. It is instructive in this regard that no hedge fund has defaulted on debt throughout the current crisis, despite very large losses that often forced fund liquidation.

Good, but your prior policies fostered debt-based finance, because recessions were never allowed to get too deep, and businessmen rationally chose to finance with cheaper tax-deductible debt, rather than expensive equity, because they concluded that the Fed would not allow big crises to happen.

Mathematical models that define risk, however, are surely superior guides to risk management than the ?rule of thumb? judgments of a half century ago. To this day it is hard to find fault with the conceptual framework of our models as far as they go. Fisher Black and Myron Scholes? elegant option pricing proof is no less valid today than a decade ago. The risk management paradigm nonetheless, harbored a fatal flaw.

I disagree.? Good risk management is dumb risk management.? Simple rules outperform complex ones over a full market cycle.? Even Black-Scholes is open to question, given better models that reflect fatter tails.? Aside from that, B-S did not materially improve on Bachelier (or actuaries that had discovered the same formula on terminable reinsurance treaties several years earlier).? Black, Scholes, and Merton get too much credit for what was discovered previously.

Only modestly less of a problem was the vast, and in some cases, the virtual indecipherable complexity of a broad spectrum of financial products and markets that developed with the advent of sophisticated mathematical techniques to evaluate risk. In despair, an inordinately large part of investment management subcontracted to the ?safe harbor? risk designations of the credit rating agencies. No further judgment was required of investment officers who believed they were effectively held harmless by the judgments of government sanctioned rating organizations.

Rating agencies offer opinions, not guarantees.? They are a beginning for research, not an end.? No one should rely on any third party when anything significant is at stake; they should analyze the situation themselves.

A decade ago, addressing that issue, I noted, ?There is [a] . . . difficult problem of risk management that central bankers confront every day, whether we explicitly acknowledge it or not: How much of the underlying risk in a financial system should be shouldered [solely] by banks and other financial institutions? ?[Central banks] have chosen implicitly, if not in a more overt fashion, to set capital and other reserve standards for banks to guard against outcomes that exclude those once or twice in a century crises that threaten the stability of our domestic and international financial systems.

?I do not believe any central bank explicitly makes this calculation. But we have chosen capital standards that by any stretch of the imagination cannot protect against all potential adverse loss outcomes. There is implicit in this exercise the admission that, in certain episodes, problems at commercial banks and other financial institutions, when their risk-management systems prove inadequate, will be handled by central banks. At the same time, society on the whole should require that we set this bar very high. Hundred year floods come only once every hundred years. Financial institutions should expect to look to the central bank only in extremely rare situations.?

At issue is whether the current crisis is that ?hundred year flood.? At best, once in a century observations can yield results that are scarcely robust. But recent evidence suggests that what happened in the wake of the Lehman collapse is likely the most severe global financial crisis ever. In the Great Depression, of course, the collapse in economic output and rise in unemployment and destitution far exceeded the current, and to most, the prospective future state of the global economy. And of course the widespread bank failures markedly reduced short term credit availability. But short-term financial markets continued to function.

This was not a once-in-a-century event.? It was produced by weak monetary policy, and weak credit policy, leading to too much private debt being created.? Had the Fed done its duty, and kept monetary policy tighter for longer, we might not have come to this ugly juncture.? This situation is not an accident.?? It could have been prevented by the Fed had it kept interest rates higher for longer.

More as this series continues?

Moat, Float, Growth

Moat, Float, Growth

If you have to invest a lot of money, you have to think differently than the average investor.? The average investor thinks he can easily get in and out of positions.? Really large investors, if they are doing more than indexing, act like private equity investors, realizing that they are buying large chunks of nontradable businesses.? So, when I wrote the piece, The Forever Fund, I wrote it in view of the fact that Buffett’s job is a hard one — most of us have enough trouble generating returns off our small portfolios, but Buffett has to do it in size.

My summary of what he is trying to do can be summarized in one sentence: “A business with a big moat, financed by cheap insurance float, will lead to book value growth.”? Moat — the business possesses sustainable competitive advantages that are significant.? It would be very difficult to reverse-engineer the competitive position of such a business.? Float — ordinarily, property-casualty insurers lose money on operations, but make it up on investing the funds that exist because of the delay in time between premium payments and claims.? Buffett calls that cost “float,” and indeed over the last seven years, Berky has made money on the insurance operations, far from it being a cost.? All the better as he invests the funds generated from insurance operations in businesses that will generate a growing stream of earnings in businesses that have sustainable competitive advantages, such as Burlington Northern and his utility investments.

We hear too much about Buffett the investor, and too little about Buffett the businessman and insurance CEO.? In the old days he was the former — today he is the latter.? He is trying to create a stable of superior operating businesses that can benefit from the cheap financing that the insurance companies generate.

That is a tough job — he is thinking about how he can preserve value forever.? I am reminded of King Solomon who wrote Ecclesiastes, because my family is reading it in family worship presently.? He agonized about how he could preserve what he had built in his life after his death and concluded in sorrow that there was no way to do that.? Again from Ecclesiastes 9:11 [NKJV]– I returned and saw under the sun that?

The race is not to the swift,
Nor the battle to the strong,
Nor bread to the wise,
Nor riches to men of understanding,
Nor favor to men of skill;
But time and chance happen to them all.

Buffett is one among several billion, trying to fight the vicissitudes of this life after he dies.? Like Solomon, he wants what he has built to live a long and prosperous life.? Alas, we can assure nothing even while we live, how much less after we die?? Buffett is likely doing better than most who confront the problem, but the problem remains.

Thus, my view of Berkshire Hathaway is that it is more critical as to who is the CEO/COO rather than who is the Chief Investment Officer.? The greater need is to manage the businesses, rather than manage slack cash for high returns.

-==-=-=-=-=-=-=-=–==–=-==-=–=-=-==-=-

Among all the commentary regarding Berky’s annual report, there has been a dearth of comment about them entering life reinsurance.? Personally, I think their best move would be buying RGA at book value.? (Yes, I own some RGA.)? Why shouldn’t the best life reinsurer be a part of Berky?? There is a talented management team, and the best firm dealing with facultative life reinsurance.? Berky is already reinsuring some major life insurance risks, but who are they reinsuring?

One thing I appreciate about Berky is that they don’t purchase reinsurance.? They size their appetite for a risk relative to their own balance sheet.

-=-===–===-=-===–===-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

On page 7 of the Berky Shareholders Letter, there is a joke about buying higher.? It is really tough to buy more of some stock that you have bought at a lower level.

-==–==–==-==–=-=–==-=-=-=-=-==-=-==-=-

In the long run the risk for Berky is that it gets a manger that does not get? my summary, “A business with a big moat, financed by cheap insurance float, will lead to book value growth.” But in detail, there is the possibility of a loss of focus.? Can Berky motivate managers to perform?

That is the tough question.? While Buffett lives, there is the “You don’t want to disappoint him” effect, but that will disappear after his death.

-=-==-=-=–=-=-=-==-=-=-=–=-==-=-=-=-=-=-

It is impossible to assure? value permanently, but men will try to do it anyway, and fail mostly….

Full disclosure: long RGA

Recent Portfolio Actions

Recent Portfolio Actions

Sorry, it’s been a while since I listed my equity portfolio moves.? I made the following trades yesterday:

New Buys:

  • Chubb
  • Computer Sciences Corp
  • Dominion Resources
  • Northrup Grumman
  • National Presto (beware, less liquid)
  • SCANA Corp
  • Safeway Corp
  • Total SA

New Sells:

  • iShares Brazil Fund
  • General Dynamics
  • Honda Motors
  • Mosaic Inc
  • Nucor
  • Vishay Intertechnology

And over the past few months, I made the following trades:

Rebalancing Buys:

  • Conoco Phillips
  • Mosaic Co
  • PartnerRe
  • Pepsico Inc
  • Safety Ins Group Inc
  • Shoe Carnival Inc
  • Valero Energy Corp
  • Vishay Intertech Inc

Rebalancing Sells:

  • Assurant Inc
  • Companhia De Saneamento Basico Do Estado De Sao Paulo
  • Conoco Phillips
  • Dorel Inds Inc
  • Ensco International Inc
  • Industrias Bachoco SA ADR
  • iShares Inc MSCI Brazil Index Fund
  • Magna Intl Inc
  • Mosaic Co
  • Nam Tai Electronics Inc
  • National Western Life Insurance
  • PartnerRe
  • Pepsico Inc
  • Reinsurance Group Amer Inc
  • Shoe Carnival Inc (2)
  • Valero Energy Corp
  • Vishay Intertech Inc (2)

Thoughts

1)? I try not to trade too much.? For those that are new to my writings, rebalancing buys and sells are meant to bring the positions back to target weight after they have moved 20% away from the target weight.

2)? I consumed some cash today, enough to get me inside my 20% cash limit.? I don’t believe in the rally, but I maintain my discipline that I don’t let cash get too large.

3) I tried to take some cyclicality off of the table today.? I end up with a little more insurance, utility, and energy exposure, but less of industrials and basic materials.

4) Assurant and SABESP are still double weights.? The rest of the portfolio is equal-weighted aside from that.

5) In terms of balance sheets, and industry factors, this is my most conservative portfolio ever.

6) I still don’t trust the financial sector aside from insurers here.

7) I had some runners-up in my analyses: ACE AEE EE HELE TFX UGI

8 ) I think my portfolio is cheaper and more defensive now.

9) That said, I also raised my central band by 11% today, raising all of my target weights by that amount.? That makes me more likely to be a buyer than a seller, though the change caused no buys yesterday.

10) Dropping the iShares Brazil Fund seemed to be wise.? The run in the emerging markets has been huge, and Brazil is more export and commodity dependent than most.

Full disclosure (here is the whole portfolio): ADM AIZ ALL CB CNI COP CSC CVX D DIIB ESV GPC IBA LNT MGA NE NOC NPK NTE NWLI ORCL PEP PRE RGA SAFT SBS SCG SCVL SWY TOT VLO

Morning Financials

Morning Financials

I put out a short report each morning on financial stocks, giving a quick summary of the big movers, market tone, and what sub-industries are moving.? I am publishing a copy of it today here as a bonus for Aleph Blog readers.? Enjoy.? Comments welcome.

The information herein and the data underlying it has been obtained from sources that we believe are reliable, but no assurance can be given that this information , the
underlying data or the computations based thereon are accurate or complete or that the returns or yields described can be obtained. Neither the information nor any opinion
expressed constitutes a solicitation by us for the purchase or sale of any security. All prices are indications only.
David Merkel, CFA, FSA 16 July 2009
Morning Financials Update ? Big Movers
Top 20 Financial Stock Movers
Company [ticker]
News
Price Move
MGIC Investment Corp [MTG]
Adj. Loss/Shr $2.86 vs $1.04 Loss Est. Injecting $1 billion into in inactive subsidiary, allowing it to write new business. Wisconsin DOI goes along with it. Fitch Downgrades on Announced Restructuring Plan
12%
Pacific Capital Bancorp NA [PCBC]
No news materially driving the stock price
12%
CVB Financial Corp [CVBF]
Beats estimates. Adjusted EPS 19c vs 10c Estimate
11%
East West Bancorp Inc [EWBC]
Misses estimates. -1.83A v -0.42E. Aggressive credit management being employed — if true, problems may be smaller in the future.
11%
Umpqua Holdings Corp [UMPQ]
Beats estimates. Adjusted EPS 15c vs 9c Loss/Shr Loss Estimate
7%
Commerce Bancshares Inc/Kansas [CBSH]
Beats estimates. Adjusted EPS 49c vs 38c Estimate
7%
MB Financial Inc [MBFI]
Beats estimates. Adjusted EPS 16c vs 26c Loss/Shr Loss Estimate
6%
Charles Schwab Corp/The [SCHW]
Beats estimates 0.20A v 0.18E. Client assets down, which may push future earnings down.
-3%
Developers Diversified Realty [DDR]
No news materially driving the stock price
-5%
Host Hotels & Resorts Inc [HST]
Rated New `Underperform’ At Wedbush. Perhaps some sympathy from Marriott’s bad profit report.
-5%
Federal National Mortgage Asso [FNM]
Allison Says Housing Program Showing Signs of Success. Uh, really?
-5%
MBIA Inc [MBI]
No news materially driving the stock price
-6%
Cousins Properties Inc [CUZ]
Slashes 3Q dividend by 40 percent.
-6%
Stewart Information Services C [STC]
No news materially driving the stock price
-6%
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Cor [FRE]
Allison Says Housing Program Showing Signs of Success. I don’t see that at all.
-6%
First Commonwealth Financial C [FCF]
No news materially driving the stock price
-7%
CapitalSource Inc [CSE]
No news materially driving the stock price
-7%
American International Group I [AIG]
Prudential Said to Resume Talks Over AIG Japan Units. AIG Said to Ask Buyout Funds to Ally With Taiwan Firms on Taiwanese Life Unit.
-9%
Boston Private Financial Holdi [BPFH]
No news materially driving the stock price
-10%
CIT Group Inc [CIT]
US unlikely to aid CIT, which faces a likely bankruptcy. Can an independent commercial finance company survive tough times without a deposit franchise? I don’t think so.
-70%
The information herein and the data underlying it has been obtained from sources that we believe are reliable, but no assurance can be given that this information , the
underlying data or the computations based thereon are accurate or complete or that the returns or yields described can be obtained. Neither the information nor any opinion
expressed constitutes a solicitation by us for the purchase or sale of any security. All prices are indications only.
Thoughts:
? If CIT can?t get help, that means all entities seeking help should expect less help at the margin, or at least more sturm und drang.
? Banks and thrifts are leading and Commercial finance and GSEs are trailing.
? Speculative names doing badly today.
? Survivors in investment banking are picking up more business and profits.
? Rising unemployment is the biggest hidden risk to the financial economy at present. As jobs are lost, people default on more debts.
? Commercial and high-end residential real estate still under pressure.
? The short-term performance model for financial stocks recommends only Reinsurers here. They face lower risk on the asset side of the balance sheet.
? Whether insurers or banks, avoid equity-sensitive names here ? aim at companies that don?t have a high degree of sensitivity to stock market performance.
? The market in the short run is driven off of government policy, which is uncertain.
? Better to play it safe at this point. We have just experienced a very sharp bear market rally. Remember, sharp moves tend to reverse, slow moves tend to persist.
Group Price Movements for this Morning
Commercial Serv-Finance
1.3%
Other
-0.8%
REITS-Regional Malls
-1.3%
Commer Banks-Western US
0.6%
Property/Casualty Ins
-0.8%
Finance-Credit Card
-1.4%
Commer Banks Non-US
0.3%
Finance-Auto Loans
-0.8%
Diversified Banking Inst
-1.5%
S&L/Thrifts-Central US
0.3%
S&L/Thrifts-Eastern US
-0.9%
Commer Banks-Eastern US
-1.5%
Financial Guarantee Ins
0.1%
REITS-Forestry
-1.0%
Multi-line Insurance
-1.5%
Finance-Consumer Loans
-0.1%
REITS-Diversified
-1.0%
REITS-Shopping Centers
-1.5%
Fiduciary Banks
-0.2%
REITS-Health Care
-1.0%
REITS-Warehouse/Industr
-1.9%
Reinsurance
-0.3%
Real Estate Oper/Develop
-1.0%
Life/Health Insurance
-1.9%
REITS-Mortgage
-0.3%
REITS-Office Property
-1.0%
REITS-Apartments
-2.0%
Commer Banks-Central US
-0.5%
Grand Total
-1.1%
Finance-Invest Bnkr/Brkr
-2.5%
Insurance Brokers
-0.5%
REITS-Storage
-1.1%
Exchanges
-2.7%
Retail-Pawn Shops
-0.6%
Commer Banks-Southern US
-1.1%
REITS-Hotels
-3.9%
Real Estate Mgmnt/Servic
-0.6%
Invest Mgmnt/Advis Serv
-1.2%
Finance-Mtge Loan/Banker
-5.7%
REITS-Single Tenant
-0.6%
Super-Regional Banks-US
-1.3%
Finance-Other
-17.4%
I look at these companies for big news events that have occurred since the last close. Often there isn?t any, but big changes here can be an indication that someone knows something, or there is trading noise. After that, it is up to the analyst to dig. Often, the dog that does not bark is the clue, as stocks move up or down on no news, as well as unexplained large spikes in volume, CDS spreads, and implied volatility of options.
Disclosure: long ALL NWLI SAFT RGA AIZ PRE
Problems with Constant Compound Interest (3)

Problems with Constant Compound Interest (3)

This post should end the series, at least for now.? Tonight I want to talk about the limits to compounding growth.? Drawing from an old article of mine freely available at TSCM, I quote? the following regarding talking to management teams:

What single constraint on the profitable growth of your enterprise would you eliminate if you could?

Companies tend to grow very rapidly until they run into something that constrains their growth. Common constraints are:

  • insufficient demand at current prices
  • insufficient talent for some critical labor resource at current prices
  • insufficient supply from some critical resource supplier at current prices (the “commodity” in question could be iron ore, unionized labor contracts, etc.)
  • insufficient fixed capital (e.g., “We would refine more oil if we could, but our refineries are already running at 102% of rated capacity. We would build another refinery if we could, but we’re just not sure we could get the permits. Even if we could get the permits, we wonder if long-term pricing would make it profitable.”)
  • insufficient financial capital (e.g., “We’re opening new stores as fast as we can, but we don’t feel that it is prudent to borrow more at present, and raising equity would dilute current shareholders.”)

There are more, but you get the idea.

Again, the intelligent analyst has a reasonable idea of the answer before he asks the question. Part of the exercise is testing how businesslike management is, with the opportunity to learn something new in terms of the difficulties that a management team faces in raising profits.

As with biological processes, when there are unlimited resources, and no predators, growth of populations is exponential.? But there are limits to business and investment profits because of competition for customers or suppliers, and good untried ideas are scarce.? Once a company has saturated its markets, it needs a new highly successful product to keep the growth up. Perhaps international expansion will work, or maybe not?? Are there new marketing channels, alternative uses, etc?

Trying to maintain a consistently high return on equity [ROE] over a long period of time is a fools bargain and I’ll use an anecdote from a company I know well, AIG.? I was pricing a new annuity product for AIG, and I noticed the pattern for the ROE of the product was not linear — it fell through the surrender charge period, and then jumped to a high level after the surrender charge period was over.

I scratched my head, and said “How can I make a decision off of that?”? I decided to create a new measure called constant return on equity [CROE], where I adjusted for capital employed, and calculated the internal rate of return of the free cash flows.? I.e., what were we earning on capital, on average over the life of the product.

I took it to my higher-ups, hoping they would be pleased, and one said, “You don’t get it!? You don’t argue with Moses!? The commandment around here is a 15% return on average equity after-tax!? I don’t care about your new measure!? Does it give us a 15% return on average equity or not?!”

This person did not care for nuances, but I tried to explain the ROE pattern, and how this measure averaged it out.? It did not fly.? As many have commented, AIG was not a place that prized actuaries, particularly ones with principles.

As it was AIG found ways to keep its ROE high:

  • Exotic markets.
  • Be in every country.
  • Be in every market in the US.
  • Play sharp with reinsurers.
  • Increase leverage
  • Press the accounting hard, including finite reinsurance and other distortions of accounting.
  • Treat credit default swap premiums as “found money.”
  • Take on additional credit risk, like subprime lending inside the life companies through securities lending.

In the end, it was a mess, and destroyed what could have been a really good company.? Now, it won’t pay back the government in full, much less provide anything to its shareholders, common and preferred.

Even a company that is clever about acquisitions, like Assurant, where they do little tuck-in acquisitions and grow them organically, will eventually fall prey to the limits of their own growth.? That won’t happen for a while there, but for any company, it is something to watch.? Consistently high growth requires consistently increasing innovation, and that is really hard to do as the assets grow.

If True of Companies, More True of Governments

This is not only true of companies, but even nations.? After a long boom period, state and federal governments stopped treating growth in asset values as a birthright, granting them a seemingly unlimited stream of taxes from capital gains, property, and transfer taxes.? They took it a step further, borrowing in the present because they knew they would have more taxes later.? The states, most of which had to run a balanced budget, cheated in a different way — they didn’t lay aside enough cash for their pension and retiree healthcare promises.? The Federal government did both — borrowing and underfunding, because tomorrow will always be better than today.

Over a long enough period of time, things will be better in the future, absent plague, famine, rampant socialism, or war on your home soil.? But when a government makes long-dated promises, the future has to be better by a certain amount, and if not, there will be trouble. That’s why an economic downturn is so costly now, the dogs are behind the rabbit already, running backwards while the rabbit moves forwards makes it that much harder to catch up.

I’ve often said that observed economic relationships stop working when people start relying on them, or, start borrowing against them.? The system shifts in order to eliminate the “free lunch” that many thought was available.

A Final Note

Hedge funds and other aggressive investment vehicles should take note.? Just as it is impossible for corporations to compound their high profits for many decades, it is impossible to do the same as an investor.? Size catches up with you.? It’s a lot easier to manage a smaller amount — there are only so many opportunities and inefficiencies, and even fewer when you have to do so in size, like Mr. Buffett has to do.

“No tree grows to the sky.”? Wise words worth taking to heart.? Investment, Corporate, and Economic systems have limits in the intermediate-term.? Wise investors respect those limits, and look for growth in medium-sized and smaller institutions, not the growth heroes of the past, which are behemoths now.

As for governments, be skeptical of the ability of governments to “do it all,” being a savior for every problem.? Their resources are more limited than most would think. Also, look at the retreat in housing prices, because the retreat there is a display of what is happening? to tax revenues… the dearth will last as long.

Full disclosure: long AIZ

Farewell to John Davidson

Farewell to John Davidson

I wrote the John Davidson series initially because I wanted to explain conditions in the life insurance industry, given the present credit crisis.? As I continued to write, I noticed my bias was coming out, against management teams that stretch/break accounting, in an effort to make money in bonuses through sales.

Alas, in three of the four companies that I worked with closely, this factor was in play.? I sometimes think that companies like that employed me more readily, because they wanted talent, and did not care about my rough edges.? (I’m ugly and opinionated, what can I say?)

The ending of the series was as I intended from the beginning.? I spared readers an extended tour through the obscurities of life insurance accounting, while giving some punch to issues where life insurers test the limits of the accounting.

I have known insurance CEOs like John Davidson, but typically, they haven’t been asset gatherers.? That is part of the reason why I made the holding company private, with a wealthy family behind it.? John Davidson did not focus on asset gathering or investment income.

Brent Fowler — I have met him twice, and perhaps more.? Too often, the bonuses favor simple outcomes like higher sales, without focusing on the quality of sales, which also can be measured, but usually isn’t.? Growth of the top line is easy, growth of the bottom line takes work, but growth of net worth in the long long run is desperately tough.? More often than you can imagine, the integrity of the accouting gets compromised.

With that, I offer you A Day in the Life of John Davidson, in full.

==–==–==-=-=-=–==-=–=-==-=-=-=-==-=–==-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=–==-=-=–==–=-==-=–=-=

The alarm rang.? John shook himself awake, and rolled out of bed.? He dreaded that the day had come, but he was determined to face it like a man.

Things were tough since the credit bubble burst.? Almost nothing worked that way it should, and today the CEO would tell him whether his subsidiary would live or die.

Mega Insurance was a privately owned stock insurance holding company, owned by the Bullards, a wealthy New England extended family.? John Davidson ran one of the life insurance subsidiaries, Wonderful Life.? In the midst of the credit crunch, the holding company was doing triage.? Excess capital at the holding company was there, but not plentiful, and the Bullards did not want to pony up more capital.? As it was, they wanted to make sure that their capital was used in the best risk-adjusted way.

Wonderful Life was a pretty bread-and-butter company as life companies went.? No equity indexed products, no variable annuities ? just a variety of individual deferred and immediate annuities, structured settlements, term and permanent life products sold through their own field force.? They sat in the shadow of their more successful sister company, Whata Life.

Whata Life had most of the lines of Wonderful LIfe, but they sold through independent agents.? They also sold EIAs, Variable Annuities and Life products, and had a group life, specialty heath, and pension business as well.? They had grown dramatically over the last decade, eclipsing Wonderful Life.

John wondered why he had pursued such a conservative course as he drove to Mega?s headquarters.? He felt he could have entered many of the same lines of business, but the fixed costs would have proven too great of a hurdle, and the agency force was not anxious to do it.? Self-recrimination was easy, and John knew it was a weakness of his, so he laid it aside, putting his trust in God.

Arriving at Mega?s headquarters, he met his longtime friend and colleague Peter Farell, the Chief Investment Officer for Mega.? Peter greeted him:

P: Well, I?ve prepared the exhibits that you asked me to.? On the bright side, we didn?t do as much with hybrid securities in your subsidiary, because you asked us not to.? We still have the losses from Lehman, AIG, and many of our positions in financial bonds are trading rather poorly.

J: How are the commercial mortgages?

P: Under stress, but we stopped originating for you in 2005, so you aren?t that bad off.

J: Any bright spots?

P: Well, the long dated GSE debt that we bought when it was under stress was a hit, and the higher quality portfolio that you requested is holding up better than many of the other subsidiaries.? Also, the tactical move to buy a small amount of low investment grade and high yield in November paid off.

John thanked Peter, and considered that maybe he wasn?t as bad off as he thought.? Sure, his division was a slow grower, but it threw off excess cash flow which Mega usually clipped as dividends.? Trouble was, that dividend would be reduced this year.? John paused and remembered what the prior CEO of Wonderful Life had told him regarding dividend reductions to Mega Insurance: ?They fired that guy so fast that his severance check arrived home before he did.?

Checking his watch, the big meeting was in a half hour.? He prayed in his own head and went to the boardroom.

John looked at the deep brown wood.? When he first came to the boardroom ten years ago he was impressed at its seeming splendor, and thrilled to be a new CEO of Wonderful Life.? Today, the thrill was gone and the wood just seemed dark.

?Hiya, Johnny! Howya doin???

With a jolt, John Davidson turned to face Brent Fowler, CEO of Whata Life.? He answered, ?Just fine, Brent, and you??

?Oh, Johnny.? There are always opportunities to be pursued in our business, and we are doing well in exploiting all of them.?

?Indeed, sir.? Congratulations on another good year.?? John choked up a bit as he said this, because he did not get how Whata Life could be so profitable and grow so fast at the same time.

?Thaaank you , Johnny.? If you are in the right place at the right time, the profits just flow, and that is where we aim to be!?

John didn?t have much to say to that, so he bid Brent adieu for the moment, and bumped into Henry Goldsmith, who was the head of Mega?s Bermuda P&C reinsurance company.? He had always found Henry to be a straight shooter, so he smiled as he asked, ?Hi Henry, how goes it on the rock??

Henry smiled and said, ?Not so bad.? No major disasters, so we make a lot.? We just have to leave some of it to the side for future disasters.? And you??

?Could be better, Henry.? The credit crunch is eating at our assets, and growth has been marginal, despite our best efforts.?

?How much money have you lost??

?We?re making money, Henry, but less than last year.? We can?t dividend as much back to Mega.?

Henry?s eyes widened, and he said, ?Oooh.?? My sympathies.? Look, it?s a tough environment; every life company is having a rough time of it.? Just look at AFLAC.? If they can?t make it, no one can.?

?Very true.? Thanks, Henry.?

?Don?t mention it, John.? Hey remember, if things go bad, I?m here for you.?

?Thanks again, Henry.?? John knew that Henry kept his word, so he considered it an offer to help him in his next job search.? Good guy, bad day.? At that moment the head of domestic P&C, Marc Blitztein, walked into the room.? ?Hey, John, old man, how?re you doing??

Marc was the youngest of the subsidiary managers, but he had turned around the flagging domestic P&C division by focusing on new quantitative underwriting tools before most of the smaller competition caught on.

?Good to see you, Marc. How?s business??

?Could be better.? Competition is rough, but we keep finding new ways for people to know us.?

?Indeed you do.? That Zebra mascot of yours is ubiquitous.?

?Ziggy?? What a concept!? It?s amazing what one good idea will do.?? John wished that he had Ziggy.? Maybe that Zebra could sell life policies as well.? Alas, he had no fancy logos or cartoon pitchmen.

John said, ?Well, more power to you.? Worried about this meeting??

?A little.? We aren?t growing the way we used to; we?re only around 10% growth, and loss costs are catching up with us, somewhat.? How about you??

John shook his head.? ?I don?t know.? Things weren?t great prior to the credit crunch, but given the effect on asset values, we are pinched here.? We won?t be able to dividend as much next year.?

Marc looked at him sympathetically, and said, ?I?ve heard what that can mean.? My heart goes with you.?

?Thanks,? said John, distracted as his cell phone bleeped.? It was his wife.

?Hi honey, you won?t believe what John, Jr., did today??

?Uh, dear?? Can I call you back this evening?? The big meeting is about to happen.?

?I?m sorry, dear.? Call me back.? I?m praying for you.? Love you.?

?I love you too dear.? Bye.?

As he turned his cell phone off, he saw that the CEO of Mega Insurance, Brad Baldwin, had entered the room, together with Stan Bullard, scion of the family that owned Mega.? Behind them was the CFO, the corporate actuary, and a person he had never seen before.? John wondered what might be going on, and thought that this would be one bad day.

?Take your seats, Gentlemen.? Brad Baldwin intoned.? John headed for his seat, and realized that one of the heads of the subsidiaries was not yet there.? Where was the head of credit-related insurance, Jan Kimmelman?

As John sat down, Brad said, ?You may note that Mr. Kimmelman is not here.? We fired him this morning, and his subsidiary is going into liquidation, depending on what we believe our best options are in the current economic environment.?

That news sent a chill through the room.? No subsidiary of Mega Insurance had ever been eliminated in its 40-plus-year history.? What else could happen?

Peter Farell, the Chief Investment Officer walked in, saying to Brad Baldwin, ?Your special reports are ready.?? Then, looking at Stan Bullard, he said, ?And yours are ready too.?

This floored John.? He had asked Peter for reports to bolster his case, but what would these other reports show?? The CEO never had extra reports on investments, and Bullard was always silent? what would he have to say?

Before his thoughts were complete, Brad said, ?We will follow our ordinary procedures.? Each one of you will present the report for your subsidiary.? We will do a presentation of our own.? After that we will ask you questions.? Any questions??

Total silence, partly out of shock.

?Fine then. Mr. Goldsmith, your report.?

Henry rose and referred to papers he had previously distributed.? There were shuffling noises for a moment, and he began his report.? Pricing trends were neutral-to-good.? They had pared back in competitive lines, and were expanding in lines where pricing was showing some strength.? Profits were adequate, and reserves were at the high end of reasonable.

John thought that Henry was the best.? He understood the economics of his business, and played the pricing waves like a pro at the top of his game.

At the end, Henry said, ?Though conditions appear good now, and we will aim to do better next year, our profits could be affected by major disasters in the next year.? This is a cyclical business.?

At that, Baldwin said, ?Mr Blitztein??

Marc stepped forward, and began to discourse on competitive dynamics in the P&C business, particularly the short tail areas where they focused, and where the Law of Large Numbers could apply.? They were getting good results in auto and home insurance, and some of their specialty coverages were gaining traction.? Growth was slow, but they thought that the future could be better.

John thought, ?Well good for you.? At least you don?t have asset problems to worry about? can your Zebra character come work for me??? John shook his head.? Henry and Marc were in no danger, and Jan was gone.? Brent was obviously successful, which left him as the scapegoat.? His subsidiary could easily be merged into Whata Life, and most of Wonderful LIfe?s employees dismissed.? Great.? John had been a second father to many of his employees.? They weren?t just numbers to him ? he wanted his employees to benefit from the success of the company.? As it was, he did not see how that would happen, given this meeting.? Bowing his head, he prayed quietly to Jesus.

With Marc?s presentation complete, Brad said, ?Mr. Davidson, it is your turn.?

John looked at Peter, who acknowleged the glance, and then rose to speak to the meeting.? HIs stomach was quivering, but he knew he must give it his best.

Smiling, John showed how Wonderful Life had been executing better than other companies with similar product mixes.? Internally, he knew it was a weak argument.? In the back of his mind he could hear, ?Why didn?t you enter other lines of business??? He pointed out the relatively low cost nature of the dedicated field force, and how surrenders were lower and mortality ratios as well.

As he talked about industry conditions, he looked around the room.? Goldsmith, Farell, and Blitztein were giving him full attention, but Baldwin and Bullard looked bored.? Brent Fowler sat there, playing with his Blackberry.

He thought to himself, ?Okay, time to take the bull by the horns,? and then said, ?Peter prepared these final exhibits for me at my request.? If you don?t like what I have to say here, blame me, not Peter.?? He looked at Peter, who gave a small smile, then Baldwin and Bullard, who looked vaguely puzzled.

?In early 2007, we began making our asset portfolio more conservative.? We felt we were not getting compensated for taking risks on lower investment grade bonds, junk bonds, and even commercial mortgages.? We further emphasized industrial and utility bonds over financials, difficult as that was to do.? We accelerated that process in early 2008.? This cost us yield, be we aimed for safety in what we thought was a bad environment.? We do not think it is time to begin taking risk in a major way now, but we do believe we are ready to make more money when the bond markets reliquefy.? We have begun edging back into junk bonds and low investment grade corporates.?

?The bad news from this is our spreads on investments were pinched to the point where we will not be able to pay as big of a dividend in 2009 that we paid in 2008.? Nonetheless, we believe we are better positioned for long term growth.?

As he sat down, he prayed.? ?That was my best shot,? he thought.? Baldwin simply said, ?And now you, Fowler, finish up.?

Brent Fowler took a very different tack from John Davidson.? He pointed to the considerable growth in premiums ? indeed, he was near the top in the industry in percentage terms.? He talked about new products that were gaining market share, and the considerable profits they were gaining from new and existing business.? Fowler concluded by saying, ?There are always opportunities in Life Insurance and Annuity marketing if one simply opens his eyes and grabs hold of them.?

John noticed that much of the growth came from new variable annuity products with secondary guarantees, and EIAs, but aside from that he thought, ?I?m sunk.? His profits are up and mine are down.? He?s the successful risk-taker, and I?m just a stodgy loser.?? He waited to hear what would come next from Baldwin and Bullard.

Brad Baldwin began by saying, ?Thank you gentlemen.? This has been a hard environment for all of us, and your efforts are appreciated.? Unfortunately, at this time, we must assess what is working and what is not.? We must??

?Brad.? Allow me.? Stan Bullard stood up and said, ?Gentlemen, I am younger than all of you, but I am the chosen leader of the Bullard extended family.? My Grandfather and Father built this business, and I have no intention of letting it fail.? Times are tough, and we may need to take tough actions.?

Looking at the CFO and Corporate Actuary, he continued, ?I?ve studied the history of our company, and tried to understand our culture.? I may be young, but I recognize the value of wisdom accrued of lifetimes.? Our culture has been relative decentralized and free.? We have allowed subsidiaries to set their own accounting policies and their own investment strategies.? That might be fine during boom times, but it is never acceptable during times of economic crisis.? Since we can?t predict when crises will come, that means these policies are not ever acceptable.?? Looking at Peter Farell, he said, ?From now on, all investment policy will be determined by our Chief Investment Officer, Peter, in consultation with the CEO and the Board of Directors.?

Looking at the CFO, he added, ?Also, accounting will be centralized as well.? Because of deviations from accepted accounting practices, we must standardize accounting across all of our subsidiary companies.?

John wondered at that statement.? ?Deviations?? Huh?? he thought.

Brad picked up the conversation, and added, ?There is more.? Let me introduce our guest, Caleb Matmo.? As a private stock company, our risk analyses are a little behind the rest of the industry.? We have Statutory and Tax valuation bases, but we do not do GAAP as publicly traded companies do.? Our one bow to GAAP is the debt covenants with our bankers, which thankfully we have no difficulty complying with.?

?Mr. Matmo and his firm have pored over our financials and our businesses in detail, in order to understand the risks involved, and give us a feel for whether we are taking too much risk relative to the returns that we receive.?

John wished his Chief Actuary, Greg, was with him. Greg was conservative, but not foolishly so.? It would be useful to have an independent perspective on this new consultant.

Caleb Matmo stood up and said, ?For over one decade, my firm has been evaluating insurance risks and I beieve that we have a good process.? We use a rigorous actuarial risk model, and we give little credit to financial risk models as are commonly used by hedge funds.?

?Maybe Greg would like this,? thought John.

?Pass out the reports, Miss Kendall.?? A young lady passed out three reports, two from Peter Farell and one from Caleb Matmo, to each person at the meeting.

?Before I go on,? Brad Baldwin said, ?I need to tell you about our defunct financial guarantee insurer.? We have put it into runoff.? Given that we have removed the manager, we will need a manager to manage the runoff, until it is so small, that we sell it off.? Marc and Henry, either one of you may manage the runoff, or you could recommend external managers to us.

John looked at the handouts, and thought, ?You know, maybe I have a chance here.?

?Cash flow is the blood flowing through the circulatory system for businesses,? said Caleb Matmo.? ?This is true of any sort of company, but with a financial company, the answer is tricky, because one has to take into account the change in capital required to support the business.? Also, with insurers, we try to equalize reserving, so that conservatism or liberalism gets stripped out.? This applies to both assets and liabilities.?

John thought about it.? ?Hmm ? I always said to my Chief Actuary, Greg, ?No negative surprises.? We must not over-report earnings.?? Let?s see what happens next.?

Matmo continued, ?Working with your actuarial staffs and with Peter, we have constructed a new accounting basis that reflects your ability to dividend to Mega.?

?Uh, oh,? thought John.

?But in the process, we have reflected standardized procedures for reserving, and capital levels as well.? Where the regulatory capital basis is too lenient we raised the level of capital necessary to support the business.? Companies should not dividend back funds necessary to support the business, even if the regulators might let them do it.? Think of the recent demise of your financial guarantee insurer as an example.? They sent ample dividends to the holding company, and all the while their business was deteriorating.?

John thought, ?True enough.? So maybe dividends to Mega aren?t everything???

Stan Bullard said, ?Mr. Matmo?? It?s time for a break.? After we come back, summarize your comments regarding each insurance subsidiary, and then Brad and I will take it from there, with your help.?

?Of course, Mr. Bullard.? said Caleb Matmo.

John got up and stretched.? He was bewildered at the turn of events, but he picked up the reports and headed to the Mens room.? ?Time for analysis, but I need relief,? he thought.? The room went many different directions, but John ignored it.

John was the first to make it to the Men?s room.? Finding the most distant stall, he bolted the door, and said to himself, ?This is what you get for having too much tea.?? Not long after that thought, he heard the bathroom door open, hearing the voices of Brent Fowler and Henry Goldsmith.

HG: I don?t know how you do it, Brent.? Isn?t life insurance supposed to be a slow growing business?

BF: If you motivate your sales force effectively, life insurance can be a growth business.? There are always ways to sell policies and add assets effectively if you just spot the opportunities and seize them. v I have a motivated sales cuture that thrives on the challenge of doing more ? beating our prior best performance!

HG: I get it, Brent.? But what if underwriting suffers?? In my end of the insurance business, fast growth and bad underwriting go hand-in-hand.

BF: We watch our underwriting carefully.? Our agents are our first line of defense in underwriting.

HG: But how do they balance the objectives of growth and safety? ? that seems tough, particularly with long-dated contracts.? Mine are short, so I don?t have to worry so much.

BF: That balance is one of my secrets, and why I have done so well?.

The voices trailed as they left, to be replaced by the voices of Marc Blitztein and Peter Farrell.

PF: Your simple investment needs are a plus for you in this environment.

MB: Thanks, but what of the rest?? How is John doing?

PF: John?? God bless him, he?s the responsible one.? He pulled in his horns, hurting immediate profitability before the crisis began.? Brent, on the other hand, continued to be a yield hog.? I can?t tell you how big his current unrealized capital loss is, but he is stubbornly focused on current income, because his bonus is largely based on that.? John?s bonus is the same, but he cared more about the long-term safety of the company.

MB: That?s John alright? they don?t make many like him, and I hope he survives this.

PF: Me too? I really like his style.

Their voices drifted off.? John wondered if he should leave, when he heard three more voices ? Stan Bullard, Caleb Matmo, and Brad Baldwin.? John thought, ?Grand Central Station??

BB: I appreciate your work, Mr. Matmo.

SB: And I as well.? For a relative neophyte like me, you have made our decisionmaking process clearer.

CM: Thank you both.? I have simply tried to think like a businessman, and analyze the need for free cash flow, which is often obscured in insurance organizations.

BB: You have made it clear to me.

SB: And me as well, though it is a pity that we will have to eliminate one of our life companies and merge it into the survivor.

CM: We must focus on the risk-adjusted growth of free cash flow.? That is the lifeblood of our business, and with out that companies die.

As they exited the Men?s room, John left the stall, thinking, ?I do not know what is going on, but if I am going out, I am going out with the flags flying.? I have done my best for this firm; I have nothing to be ashamed of.?? He washed his hands, and returned to the conference room.

John was ready to make his defense to those assembled.? He had a grim determination akin to a gladiator going into his last fight.? He bowed his head and prayed.? Looking up, he saw Brent Fowler looking at his packet from Caleb Matmo.? It was an odd sight, because he had never seen Brent scowl before.? It made him curious about about his own packet, and so he began to look at it more closely.

Before John could dig in too deeply, Stan Bullard said, ?Mr. Matmo, please complete your report.?

Caleb spoke up and said, ?Insurance accounting is tricky.?? Looking at Henry and Marc, he added, ?For short-tail P&C reinsurance and insurance, okay, not so tricky, particularly if your asset policies are conservative, as it is for both of you.? Your reserves validate themselves every year, and you have reserved prudently.?? Henry and Marc visibly relaxed and smiled to each other.

Caleb turned to the other side of the room and looked at Brent and John.? ?Life insurance is tougher, much tougher,? he said, ?The long tail nature of the business, and the lower asset quality, together with hard-to quantify guarantees makes the accounting much more difficult.? Also, the risk-based capital rules are a little weak in some areas, making economic decisions difficult for executives that rely only on those metrics.? Beyond that, how one values policy options and illiquid assets makes quite a difference.? Also, reinsurance treaties can obscure the underlying economics of the business.?

John quickly looked at Brent.? He had never seen Brent?s face turn red before.? There was a sense of anger spouting from his brow.

Caleb continued, ?We have in front of us polar opposites in terms of the two insurance companies held by Mega Insurance.? One is extremely conservative, and underappreciated.? The other has been liberal in accounting and actuarial practices, and has grown like a weed.?

Brent Fowler stood up and said, ?I resent that.? My company has topped the industry in volume growth over the past five years.?

Brad Baldwin looked him in the eye and said, ?Sit down, Mr Fowler. Mr. Matmo is not done yet.? Caleb??

?If I may, let me characterize the difficulties at Whata Life.? 1) Their aggressive asset portfolio has the company as a whole underwater on a mark-to-market basis.? 2) Though the RBC guidelines indicate the company is fine, our risk-based capital model, which is tougher, indicates that Whata Life is in need of more surplus. Why?? 3) Whata life financed much of their growth through selling off much of their statutory profits through reinsurance treaties.? If the volume growth ever stops, so do their profits.? 4) They have systemically mishedged their options exposure, leaving a deadweight loss that the accounting presently papers over.? 5) All of this allow Whata Life to grow rapidly on a thin capital base when measured properly.?

?Whata Life made money in the past, but correcting their accounting to reflect release from risk (eliminating reinsurance), derivative pricing, and likely future losses, their profitability has been decidedly subpar.?

John tried to not smile, but the sight of Brent Fowler gritting his teeth was astounding to see.

?As for Wonderful Life, we have few difficulties.? They chose the conservative ways to reserve, and so their earnings are a worst case estimate of profitability and dividend capacity.? Their products and assets are simple, and so our adjustments are positive, but not large.? The rest is in your packets in detail.? Please review it and give us your comments.?

Brad Baldwin Stood up and said, ?Thank you, Mr. Matmo.? As you all know, these are tough times.? We cannot afford to be imprudent.? We passed Mr. Matmo?s analysis by two other actuarial consulting firms, and they agreed with his analysis.? Our decision is complete.? Mr. Fowler, you are being replaced by Mr. Davidson, and the two firms will be merged.?

Brent Fowler spouted, ?You can?t do this! You will hear from my lawyer!?

?Consult your employment contract and be wise, Mr. Fowler, lest this be a termination for cause, as we might have reason to apply.? said Brad.

Brent stormed from the room, and John, widening his eyes, wondered at the matter.?? Henry said, ?Way to go , John.?? Marc added, ?Man, you survived.?

Stan Bullard took the floor saying, ?Yes, John survived, but now he has the tough task of reforming Whata Life.? Conserve the good, and eliminate the bad.? Don?t rely on the parent company.?

John looked at Stan with concern.? Stan answered, ?John, we know you.? Just don?t ask for a lot as you reconcile matters at Whata Life.?? John relaxed and sighed.? He quietly thanked Jesus, and said, ?I will do my best, as always.?? Brad said, ?That?s all that we expect. Have at it, John.?

The meeting dispersed.? Marc offered the use of Ziggy, which John readily accepted.? Henry offered operational help with Whata Life, though John knew that he could do better.

After many congratulations, John left the room, and picked up his cell phone.? Punching in the phone number, his wife answered, and he said, ?Hi dear, so what did John, Jr. do today??

To What Degree Were AIG?s Operating Insurance Subsidiaries Sound? (8)

To What Degree Were AIG?s Operating Insurance Subsidiaries Sound? (8)

Continuing profitability / Is this strictly an investment problem?

2007 Net Income 2008 Net Income 2007 Net Operating? Income 2008 Net Operating? Income Surplus Increase net of Capital Contributions and divs Yellow Column less Realized Capital Gains
Total P&C

5,563

733

7,210

654

(353)

Total Life

3,404

(23,218)

7,206

2,819

(29,539)

(1,840)

Total

8,967

(22,485)

14,416

3,473

(29,892)

Net Underwriting Gain 2007 Net Underwriting Gain 2008 Net Investment Gain 2007 Net Investment Gain 2008
Total P&C

2,189

(1,939)

3,783

2,485

Take a look at the above two tables.? For the P&C OISs, investment results were worse in 2008, but the really big swing was in underwriting, where profits were around $4 billion lower than 2007.? My summary figure for core P&C statutory earnings in 2008 is the -$353 million highlighted in green.? That is the surplus increase net of capital contributions and dividends.? I.e., how much did the value of the companies fall as a result of the year operations — $353 million.

For the life companies, I did the same calculation, but netted out realized capital losses, which should not recur, for a core statutory loss of $1.84 billion.? I can’t split that entirely into underwriting and investments, as with P&C, but taking out the realized capital gains approximates it.

My main point here is that 2008 was a bad year for AIG’s OISs even without the investment losses.? Not enough to take any of the main OISs into insolvency by itself, but bad still.

Articles and other issues

More holding company liquidity out of thin air: receiving a $800 million loan from American General Finance, a wholly owned subsidiary, in exchange for giving the subsidiary $600 million in capital to satisfy a debt covenant.? Wonderful, American General Finance is somewhat less creditworthy to bondholders of the firm, and the AIG holding company gets cash.

AIG attempts to raise cash and reduce leverage through the sale of subsidiaries that are in relatively good shape:

The price talk doesn’t look that great.? Counting in Hartford Steam Boiler, premium prices are certainly not being realized.

In general, the simplest units to sell are the simplest ones to value.? They have the easiest models for analyzing likely future free cash flows, or distributable earnings.? I have said before that when a company is in a crisis, and has to sell off assets, that it makes a great deal of difference what kinds of assets they sell off.? If they reach for the dirtier assets, and wish to keep the clean ones, it is usually a sign of confidence in the future.? If they sell the good assets, because that is all they can do, they are just stalling for time, and hoping that a better day arrives.? Hope is not a strategy, but that is what seems to be going on here.

Now, as for Maurice Raymond Greenberg’s claim that he had nothing to do with the wreck of AIG, let me simply say that he should shoulder a lot of the blame.? Most of the increase in leverage occurred under his watch.? AIG was a decidedly more risky investment when he left than in the late 80s, when the balance sheet had virtually no debt.? He encouraged a fear-based culture that was very bottom-line oriented for the quarterly earnings estimate, even to the point of buying finite reinsurance to manipulate the results.? He pushed for an aggressive culture at AIG Financial products, and he got one.? He may not have been there for the worst of it, but he certainly sowed the seeds of future trouble.

Summary

To what degree were AIG’s operating subsidiaries sound? Answer: aside from the mortgage insurers, the P&C subsidiaries were basically sound, though with some issues such as capital stacking, affiliated assets, etc., as mentioned above.? The non-mortgage P&C subsidiaries didn’t have a great 2008, but they would have survived as standalone entities.

The life and mortgage subsidiaries are another matter.? Without the help of the US Government, many of them would have failed.? Even now, given the levels of affiliated assets, capital stacking, deferred tax assets, etc., they are not in great shape now should there be another surprise.? Profitability is likely to be lower in the future than in the banner years of the middle of the 2000s decade.

The US government acted for multiple reasons on AIG.? Among them was to protect the other life insurers of the US from getting surcharged in order to pay for the costs going to the guarantee funds, along with systemic risk issues at AIG Financial Products (which was much bigger).

If AIG did not have AIGFP, and no bailout from the US Government, the company as a whole would have come under severe stress, and some of the life and mortgage subsidiaries would have gone into insolvency, but the company as a whole would probably have survived.

Investment implications

My view of AIG is this: the common stock will go out worthless, or nearly so.? Preferred stakes will be compromised at best.? Beyond that, I am less certain.? I look at two types of debt securities and wonder, though.? I am planning on doing a review of the funding agreement-backed notes, and perhaps a closer look at American General Finance notes after the first quarter is reported.

The tough part is we don’t know what the government will do.? If their main goal was stabilizing AIGFP, and that job is nearly complete, then if the value of AIG as subsidiaries get sold appears to not support the preferred stock, the government might walk, and not throw good money after bad.? At that point, bonds of the holding company would suffer further, because the insurance commissioners will carefully watch any dividending up to the AIG holding company.? They got bailed out once.? They will be watching more closely from now on, because lightning doesn’t often strike twice in the same place.

My basic view is take a conservative posture on AIG securities.? There are many competing interests, some political, some economic, fighting over the corpse of this once great company.? Be wary of investing in the capital structure of AIG.

A Day in the Life of John Davidson, Part VII

A Day in the Life of John Davidson, Part VII

Cast of Characters, in order of appearance

  • John Davidson ? Protagonist, CEO of Wonderful Life
  • Peter Farell ? Chief Investment Officer for Mega Insurance, the holding company for all of the operating subsidiaries.
  • Brent Fowler ? CEO of Whata Life
  • Henry Goldsmith ? CEO of Mega?s P&C reinsurance subsidiary
  • Marc Blitztein ? CEO of Mega?s domestic P&C insurance
  • Brad Baldwin ? CEO of Mega Insurance
  • Stan Bullard ? Scion of the family that owns Mega
  • Caleb Matmo ? Runs a firm that analyzes insurance financial statements, consulting for Mega

=–=-==–=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=

John was the first to make it to the Men’s room.? Finding the most distant stall, he bolted the door, and said to himself, “This is what you get for having too much tea.”? Not long after that thought, he heard the bathroom door open, hearing the voices of Brent Fowler and Henry Goldsmith.

HG: I don’t know how you do it, Brent.? Isn’t life insurance supposed to be a slow growing business?

BF: If you motivate your sales force effectively, life insurance can be a growth business.? There are always ways to sell policies and add assets effectively if you just spot the opportunities and seize them. v I have a motivated sales cuture that thrives on the challenge of doing more — beating our prior best performance!

HG: I get it, Brent.? But what if underwriting suffers?? In my end of the insurance business, fast growth and bad underwriting go hand-in-hand.

BF: We watch our underwriting carefully.? Our agents are our first line of defense in underwriting.

HG: But how do they balance the objectives of growth and safety? — that seems tough, particularly with long-dated contracts.? Mine are short, so I don’t have to worry so much.

BF: That balance is one of my secrets, and why I have done so well….

The voices trailed as they left, to be replaced by the voices of Marc Blitztein and Peter Farrell.

PF: Your simple investment needs are a plus for you in this environment.

MB: Thanks, but what of the rest?? How is John doing?

PF: John?? God bless him, he’s the responsible one.? He pulled in his horns, hurting immediate profitability before the crisis began.? Brent, on the other hand, continued to be a yield hog.? I can’t tell you how big his current unrealized capital loss is, but he is stubbornly focused on current income, because his bonus is largely based on that.? John’s bonus is the same, but he cared more about the long-term safety of the company.

MB: That’s John alright… they don’t make many like him, and I hope he survives this.

PF: Me too… I really like his style.

Their voices drifted off.? John wondered if he should leave, when he heard three more voices — Stan Bullard, Caleb Matmo, and Brad Baldwin.? John thought, “Grand Central Station…”

BB: I appreciate your work, Mr. Matmo.

SB: And I as well.? For a relative neophyte like me, you have made our decisionmaking process clearer.

CM: Thank you both.? I have simply tried to think like a businessman, and analyze the need for free cash flow, which is often obscured in insurance organizations.

BB: You have made it clear to me.

SB: And me as well, though it is a pity that we will have to eliminate one of our life companies and merge it into the survivor.

CM: We must focus on the risk-adjusted growth of free cash flow.? That is the lifeblood of our business, and with out that companies die.

As they exited the Men’s room, John left the stall, thinking, “I do not know what is going on, but if I am going out, I am going out with the flags flying.? I have done my best for this firm; I have nothing to be ashamed of.”? He washed his hands, and returned to the conference room.

Recent Portfolio Moves

Recent Portfolio Moves

Since I wrote my last portfolio update two months ago, it is time for a new report.

New Buys

  • PartnerRe
  • Allstate
  • Assurant
  • Nucor
  • Genuine Parts
  • Pepsico
  • CRH
  • Alliant Energy

New Sells

  • Avnet
  • Lincoln National
  • YRC Worldwide
  • CRH
  • Jones Apparel
  • Assurant
  • Group 1 Automotive
  • Smithfield Foods
  • MetLife
  • International Rectifier
  • Cemex
  • Officemax
  • Universal American

Rebalancing Buys

  • Shoe Carnival
  • Charlotte Russe
  • Devon Energy (2)
  • RGA
  • SABESP
  • Ensco International (2)
  • Industrias Bachoco
  • Magna International
  • Valero
  • Kapstone Paper
  • Hartford International (3)
  • Cimarex Energy
  • Lincoln National
  • Smithfield Foods
  • Allstate
  • ConocoPhillips (2)
  • Tsakos Energy Navigation

Rebalancing Sells

  • PartnerRe
  • Safety Insurance
  • Devon Energy
  • Ensco International
  • Hartford Financial (3)
  • Kapstone Paper
  • Cimarex Energy
  • Nam Tai Electronics (2)
  • Honda Motors (2)
  • Lincoln National (2)
  • ConocoPhillips
  • Charlotte Russe
  • Shoe Carnival

I’ve had a lot of trades over the past two months, which is normal for me when volatility rises.

I have been asked by a number of parties why I don’t write about the insurance industry in this environment, given my past experience.? My main reason is that I have left it behind.? When I became a buyside insurance analyst, I had strong opinions about what made a good or bad insurance company.? For the most part, those opinions were correct, but there is a fundamental opaqueness to insurance.? One truly can’t analyze it from outside.? No boss would hear that, even if true.

I benefitted from the cleaning up of insurance assets 2002-3, and thought that the cleanup had persisted.? Largely, it has, but many life companies rely too heavily on variable products for profitability, and as the market has fallen, profits from variable products have fallen harder.? Thus my mistakes with Hartford, MetLife and Lincoln National.

That brings up two other possibilities where things can continue to go wrong in life insurance.? If fees are permanently reduced the companies might have to write down the deferred acquisition costs [DAC] that they capitalized when originally writing the business, if the expected cumulative fees are less than the DAC.? The second issue is hedging the guaranteed living benefits.? I will never forget the look that the CEO of Principal Financial gave me when I asked him how well the futures/options hedges during a month where the S&P 500 is down 20-30%.? It was not a pleasant look.? Not that that scenario could ever happen. 😉

My picks in pure P&C insurance have fared better.? Safety Insurance is a solid company; so is PartnerRe.? Would that I had done more there, and less in life companies, especially the equity sensitive ones.

So what do I hold today among insurers?

  • Allstate
  • Assurant (bought after the marginally bad earnings announcement)
  • Hartford (yes 🙁 )
  • PartnerRe
  • Reinsurance Group of America
  • Safety Insurance

Yes, I am overweight insurance, and I have paid the price, particularly with Hartford.? There is an uncertainty connected with life insurance holding companies about the ability to upstream dividends to service debt.? That uncertainty only appears in bear markets, and all the hubbub over optimizing the capital structure is so much hooey.? Assurant is in better shape because it ceased buying back stock because of the (somewhat bogus) investigation of a few of their executives.

Two final notes to close.? I had a bad October, worse than the S&P 500 by a significant margin.? My exposures in life insurance and emerging markets drove that.? Second, I may have my first equity client, and so I may be curtailing some of my discussion of individual names in my portfolio, and deleting my portfolio at Stockpickr.com.? My clients come first.

Full disclosure: long ALL AIZ HIG PRE RGA SAFT SCVL CHIC COP HMC NTE XEC KPPC ESV DVN TNP VLO MGA SBS CRH LNT PEP GPC NUE (what have I left out?!)

Theme: Overlay by Kaira