Day: April 26, 2008

One Dozen Notes on Our Manic Capital Markets

One Dozen Notes on Our Manic Capital Markets

1) I think Ambac is dreaming if they think they will maintain their AAA ratings. Aside from the real deterioration in their capital position, they now face stronger competition. Buffett got the AAA without the usual five-year delay because he has one of the few remaining natural AAAs behind him at Berky. (Political pressure doesn’t hurt either… many municipalities want credit enhancement that they believe is worth something.)

2) I read through the documents from the Senate hearings on the rating agencies, and my quick conclusion is that there won’t be a lot of change, particularly on such a technical topic in an election year. And, in my opinion, it would be difficult to change the system from its current configuration, and still have securitization go on. Now, maybe securitization should be banned; after all, it offers an illusion of liquidity liquidity in good times, but not in bad times, for underlying assets that are fungible, but not liquid.

3) I am not a fan of Fair Value Accounting. But if we’re going to do it, let’s do it right, as I suggested to an IASB commissioner several years ago. Have two balance sheets and two income statements. One set would be fair value, and the other amortized cost. It would not be any more work than we are doing now.

4) Now, some bankers are up in arms over fair value, and I’m afraid I can’t sympathize. If you’re going to invest in or borrow using complex instruments that amortized cost accounting can’t deal with, you should expect the accounting regulations to change.

5) Just because you can classify assets or liabilities as level 3 doesn’t mean the market will give full credibility to your model. Accounting uncertainty always receives lower valuations. It as if the market says, :These assets will have to prove themselves through their cash flows, we can’t capitalize earnings here. The same applies to the temporary gains from revaluing corporate liabilities down because of credit stress. If the creditworthiness recovers, though gains will be reversed, and good analysts should lower their future earnings estimates when bond spreads widen, to the degree that present gains are taken.

6) The student loan market is interesting, with so many lenders dropping out. This is one area where the auction-rate securities market initially hurt matters when it blew up, but there was a feature that said that the auction rate bonds could not receive more than the student lenders were receiving. So, after rates blew out for a little while, now some the auction rate bonds are receiving zero (for a while).

7) After yesterday’s post, I mused about how much the high yield market has come back, and with few defaults, aside from those that should have been dead anyway. With liquidiity low at some firms, there will be more to come. Personally, I expect spreads to eclipse their recent wides as things get worse, but enjoy the bear market rally for now.

8) Many munis are still cheap, but the “stupid cheap” money has been made. Lighten up a little if you went to maximum overweight.

9) What’s the Big Money smoking? They certainly are optimistic in this Barron’s piece. One thing that I can find to support them is insider buying, which is high relative to selling at present. And, even ahead of the recent run, hedge funds (and many mutual funds) had been getting more conservative. Guess they had to buy the rally. On the other side, there is a sort of leakage from DB plans, as many of them allocate more to hedge funds and private equity.

10) Does large private equity fund size lead to bad decision making? I would think so. Larger deals are more scarce, and so added urgency comes when they are available. Negotiating for such deals is more intense, and the winner often suffers the winner’s curse of having overbid.

11) I am not a believer in the shorts being able to manipulate the markets as much as some would say. It’s easier to manipulate on the long side. Here is a good post at Ultimi Barbarorum on the topic.

12) Financials are the largest sector in the S&P 500.? Perhaps not for long… they may shrink below the size of the Tech sector at current rates, or, Energy could grow to be the largest.? Nothing would make me more skittish about my energy longs.? The largest sector always seems to get hit the hardest, whether Financials today, or Tech in 2000, or Energy in the mid-90s.

Blog Notes

Blog Notes

I just upgraded the blog and all of its software to WordPress 2.5.1. It should allow me to do more with the blog in terms of format flexibility and a few other things. It should improve the overall stability of the blog, as well as a few things that should make the blog harder to hack. Oh, I got my descriptive permalinks back. Yay! 🙂

If you notice anything going wrong, or if you have a suggestion for the blog, please let me know. I have tried to get clicking on the top banner to return to the front page, but I am afraid I can’t figure it out. On a positive note, I’ve never had a spam problem at my blog. Between Akismet and moderating all initial comments, I have been able to screen all spam. We’ll see how well that works in the future.

One more note: I get a lot of spammers that register for my blog from Russia and Poland. If you are based in Russia or Poland, and are a true reader of my blog, send me a note, because I am going to block certain domains from registering at my blog.

The Sea Change in Bonds

The Sea Change in Bonds

The bond market has had quite a shift since the last Fed meeting. What are the common themes?

  • Outperformance of credit, especially high yield.
  • Return of the carry trade.
  • Tax-free Munis have run.
  • Underperformance of Treasuries (longer= worse), and foreign bonds, particularly carry trade currencies like the Yen and Swiss Franc.

The willingness to take risks in fixed income has returned, particularly in the last two weeks. I don’t want to tell you that this is a trend that won’t reverse… it might reverse. Remember that bear market rallies tend to be short and sharp, and that the credit bear market in 2000-2002 had several legs. Leg one may be over for this credit bear market, but that doesn’t mean the credit bear market is over; there are still too many unresolved credit issues in housing, builders and investment banks.

Now, to flesh out the changes, I looked at the total returns on 15 major ETFs in different sectors of the bond market. Here are the returns since 3/19:

  • HYG — High yield Corporates + 4.47%
  • DBV — Carry trade fund +2.83%
  • MUB — National Municipals +1.10%
  • LQD — Investment Grade Corporates +0.99%
  • FXE — Euro currency Trust +0.29%
  • BIL — Treasury Bills -.06% (Negative on T-bills?!)
  • AGG — Lehman Aggregate -1.03%
  • SHY — Short Treasuries -1.18%
  • TIP — TIPS ETF -2.85%
  • IEI — 3-7 yr Treasuries -3.41%
  • FXF — Swiss Franc Currency Trust -3.44%
  • BWX — Intl. Gov’t Bond Fund -3.49%
  • IEF — 7-10 yr Treasuries -3.74%
  • TLT — 20+ Treasuries – 4.87%
  • FXY — Yen Currency Trust -5.30%

What a whipping for safe assets. Perhaps the Fed will be happy that they helped engineer the whacking. Then again, the TED spread is still high, and the change might just be a normal shift in sentiment after the panic leading up to the last FOMC meeting. Interesting to see both the return of the carry trade and credit spreads outperforming the move in Treasuries.

For those that follow my sector recommendations, I would be lightening, but not exiting credit positions in the near term. I’m in the midst of considering my other sector recommendations, and will report on this soon. For more on this topic, refer to:

Before I close, one large negative area where there is excess supply: preferred stock of financial companies.? There is a lot floating around from balance sheet repair efforts where they didn’t want to dilute the common.? (That’s the next act.)? I would stay away for now, but keep my eyes on selected floating rate trust preferreds, to leg into on the next leg down.

Book Review: Beating the Market, 3 Months at a Time

Book Review: Beating the Market, 3 Months at a Time

A word before I start: I’m averaging two book review requests a month at present. I tell the PR people that I don’t guarantee a review (though I have reviewed them all so far), or even a favorable review. They send the books anyway.

Included in every book is a 2-6 page summary of what a reviewer would want to know, so he can easily write a review. Catchy bits, crunchy quotes, outlines…

I don’t read those. I read or skim the book. If I skim the book, I note that in my review. Typically, I only skim a book when it is a topic that I know cold. Otherwise I read, and give you my unvarnished opinion. I’m not in the book selling business… I’m here to help investors. If you buy a few books (or anything else) through my Amazon links, that’s nice. Thanks for the tip. I hope you gain insight from me worth far more.

If I can keep you from buying a bad book, then I’ve done something useful for you. I have more than enough good books for readers to buy. Plus, I review older books that no one will push. I hope eventually to get all of my favorites written up for readers.

Enough about my review process; on with the review:

When the PR guy sent me the title of the book, I thought, “Oh, no. Another investing formula book. I probably won’t like it.” Well, I liked it, but with some reservations.

The authors are a father and son — Gerard Appel and Marvin Appel, Ph. D. They manage over $300 million of assets together. The father has written a bunch of books on technical analysis, and the son has written a book on ETFs.

Well, it is an investing formula book… it has a simple method for raising returns and reducing risks that has worked in the past. The ideas are simple enough that an investor could apply them in one hour or so every three months. I won’t give you the whole formula, because it wouldn’t be fair to the authors. The ideas, if spun down to their core, would fill up one long blog post of mine. But you would lose a lot of the explanations and graphs which are helpful to less experienced readers. The book is well-written, and I found it a breezy read at ~200 pages.

I will summarize the approach, though. They use a positive momentum strategy on three asset classes — domestic equities, international equities, and high yield bonds, and a buy-and-hold strategy on investment grade bonds. They apply these strategies to open- and closed-end mutual funds and ETFs. They then give you a weighting for the four asset classes to create a balanced portfolio that is close to what I would consider a reasonable allocation for a middle aged person.

Their backtests show that their balanced portfolio earned more than the S&P 500 from 1979-2007, with less risk, measured by maximum drawdown. Okay, so the formula works in reverse. What do we have to commend/discredit the formula from what I know tend to happen when formulas get applied to real markets?

Commend

  • Momentum effects do tend to persist across equity styles.
  • Momentum effects do tend to persist across international regional equity returns.
  • Momentum effects do tend to persist on high yield returns in the short run.
  • The investment grade buy-and-hold bond strategy is a reasonable one, if a bit quirky.
  • Keeps investment expenses low.
  • Gives you some more advanced strategies as well as simple ones.
  • The last two chapters are there to motivate you to save, because they suggest the US Government won’t have the money they promised to pay you when you are old. (At least not in terms of current purchasing power…)

Discredit

  • The time period of the backtest was unique 3/31/1979-3/31/2007. There are unique factors to that era: The beginning of that period had high interest rates, and low equity valuations. Interest rates fell over the period, and equity valuations rose. International investing was particularly profitable over the same period… no telling whether that will persist into the future.
  • I could not tie back the numbers from their domestic equity and international equity strategies in the asset allocation portfolio to their individual component strategies.
  • I suspect that might be because though the indexes existed over their test period, tradeable index funds may not have existed, so in the individual strategy components they might be done over shorter time horizons, and then used indexes for the backtest. This is just a hypothesis of mine, and it doesn’t destroy their overall thesis — just the degree that it outperforms in the past.
  • They occasionally recommend fund managers, most of whom I think are good, but funds change over time, so I would be careful about being married to a fund just because it did well in the past.
  • If style factors or international regional return factors get choppy, this would underperform. I don’t think that is likely, investors chase past performance, so momentum works in the short run.
  • Though you only act four times a year, that’s enough to generate a lot of taxable events if you are not doing this in a tax-sheltered account.
  • It looks like they reorganized the book at the end, because the one footnote for Chapter 9 references Chapter 10, when it really means chapter 8.

The Verdict

I think their strategy works, given what I know about momentum strategies. I don’t think it will work as relatively well in the future as in the past for 3 reasons:

  • There is more momentum money in the market now than in the past… momentum strategies should still work but not to the same degree.
  • International investing is more common than in the past… the payoff from it should be less. There aren’t that many more areas of the world to go capitalist remaining, and who knows? We could hit a new era of socialism abroad, or even in the US.
  • Interest rates are low today, and equity valuations are not low.

Who might this book be good for? Someone who only invests in mutual funds, and wants to try to get a little more juice out of them. The rules on managing the portfolio are simple enough that they could be done in an hour or two once every three months. Just do it in a tax-sheltered account, and be aware that if too many people adopt momentum strategies (not likely), this could underperform.

Full disclosure: If you buy anything from Amazon after entering through one of my links, I get a small commission.

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