I’ve written about this before, but if the FSOC wants to prove that they don’t know what they are doing, they should define a large life insurer to be a systemic threat.
It is rich, really rich, to look at the rantings of a bunch of bureaucrats and banking regulators who could not properly regulate banks for solvency from 2003-2008, and have them suggest solvency regulation for a class of businesses that they understand even less.
And, this is regarding an industry that posed little systemic threat during the financial crisis. Yes, there were the life subsidiaries of AIG that were rescued by the Fed, and a few medium-large life insurers like Hartford and Lincoln National that took TARP money that they didn’t need. Even if all of these companies failed, it would have had little impact on the industry as a whole, much less the financial sector of the US.
Life insurance companies have much longer liability structures than banks. They don’t have to refresh their financing frequently to stay solvent. It is difficult to have a “run on the company” during a time of financial weakness. Existing solvency regulation done by actuaries and filed with the state regulators considers risks that the banks often do not do in their asset-liability analyses.
Systemic risk comes from short-dated financing of long-dated assets, which is often done by banks, but rarely by life insurers. I’ve written about this many times, and here are two of the better ones:
- Systemic Risk Stems from Asset-Liability Mismatches
- On the Designation of Systemically Important Financial Institutions
MetLife and other insurers should not have to live with the folly of “Big == Systemic Risk.” Rather, let the FSOC focus on all lending financials that borrow short and lend long, particularly those that use the repurchase markets, or fund their asset inventories via short-term lending agreements. That is the threat — let them regulate banks and pseudo-banks right before they dare to regulate something they clearly do not understand.