In my view, these were my best posts written between August and October 2013:
I completed the last of my “Manager” series, on being an investment risk manager:
This is the bizarre story of how I pulled a win out of an impossible situation against my own management, and a major life insurer.
On the time that I correctly modeled a complex structured security, and the client wouldn’t listen to reason
The time that I did a competitive study of the most aggressive life insurers, and how it did not dissuade my client’s management team from trying to imitate them.
A bevy of little tales about odd investment tasks that I succeeded with, and how many of them did no good for my clients.
With quotations and links to the source documents, I show what Ben Graham really said in the article commonly cited to say that he gave up on value investing.
A summary article of many of my prior articles on how to avoid being defrauded.
Alternative investments are like regular investments, but they are less liquid, more opaque, and have higher fees.
Where I answer Mark Cuban the one time he tweeted to me. Really!
Why companies should let their filings with the SEC speak for them, and abandon the media.
On game theory, and how it affects politics and civil wars.
On how good investment theories fail for periods of time, and then come roaring back when most people know they will never work again.
On seeking a margin of safety, when very little seems safe
I interact with a groundbreaking paper on endowment investing — a very good paper, and I give some ways that it could be improved.
Do you want to do better in investing? Make fewer decisions, and make them count.
In which I take on Nassim Taleb’s views on how to reduce risk in investing, and show which half of his valid, and which half are fantasy.
What I contributed to Tom Brakke’s project for young investment analysts — what do I think they should know?
In institutional portfolio management, the two hardest things to do are to buy higher than your last buy, and sell lower than your last sale.
Countries are firms that produce claims on assets and goods
65% of the time, the rules work. 30% of the time, the rules don’t work. 5% of the time, the opposite of the rules works.
ge + E/P > ilongest bond
The tech market washes out about every eight years or so. The broad market, which is a more robust beast, washes out far less frequently. My question: are these variants of the same phenomenon?
When do employee and corporate incentives line up? Ideally, incentive schemes should reward people with a fraction of the additional profitability that resulted from the additional work that they did. Difficulties: measurement impossible in many cases, people could receive a bonus when the firm is not profitable, neglects synergies (both positive and negative).
Financial intermediation reduces volatility. In bull markets, demand for financial intermediaries drops.
Leverage and risk eventually transfer to the least regulated
The more that markets are united through derivatives, the more systemic risk is created.