Search Results for: "Blame Game"

Blame Game III

Blame Game III

I went on a shopping trip today to buy a desk for my two youngest children (10, 6), both girls.? As I drove, I listened to radio C-Span, because it is “guilt week” for the NPR stations in the area.? In hindsight, I would have rather listened to the begging from the NPR affiliates than what I heard on C-Span.

The program that I heard was hearings on the financial crisis.? All of the testimony fell into the bucket of “not me, there are evil people who tricked us.”? My daughters must have found my negative commentary to be funny.

We have the government that we deserve.? Congress listens to self-interested loonies, rather than seek out those with intelligence that don’t have an axe to grind.? When I wrote the pieces, Blame Game, and Blame Game, Redux, what I tried to express is that there are a lot of parties to blame in our current crisis, and that everyone should ‘fess up their culpability.

With that, I want to add on a few more responsible parties:

29) FICO srcoring enabled loan underwriting to decouple from the local bank investigating the character of the borrower.? There is something lost when the underwriter does not explore the qualitative aspects of the borrower.

30) The fools who wrote that said that it is easy to make money in stocks or real estate.? They always show up near the end of the cycle.

31) Dojo suggests the Prime Brokers — How about the Prime Brokerage business model followed by most banks and investment banks which allowed their speculative clients to go ?nuclear? in any marketplace as long as they had a credit facility and a cell phone. A $10 million hedge fund run out of a basement in Westchester County NY or Orange County CA could control $1 Billion worth of goodies in many cases. Yikes!! A bit severe, but there is some validity there.

32) dlr suggests the FDIC — The bank regulators at the FDIC. It was their JOB to maintain oversight of the banking industry. Every regulator who allowed the banks they were monitoring to giving liar loans, or pick a rate loans, or zero down payment loans, and didn?t call a halt, should be fired for malfeasance. The regulators who had oversight of Washington Mutual and Indy Mac should be fired. And their BOSSES should be fired. Right up to Shiela [sic] Blair. I think that all of the banking regulators deserve blame here, plus the Bush administration, who encouraged malign neglect.

My main point is this: if you are defending your core constituency in this crisis, you are at least partially wrong.? There are so many culpable parties, that few are blameless.

Final note: in many ways, this is a proper comeuppance to US policy that encourages home ownership.? Policy was trying to push home ownership to 70%+, when reality should have said “be happy with a stable 60%.”? Home ownership is not an unmitigated good.? Many cannot truly afford it, and the government tricks them into buying what they cannot afford with reasonable probability.

Blame Game, Redux

Blame Game, Redux

When I write, I don’t always know what will be popular, and what won’t.? Personally, I thought my article
Rethinking Insurable Interest was the more innovative of my two articles last night, but Blame Game made the splash.? Well, perhaps no surprise, the crisis has the attention of all of us.? I just have broader interests; I want to write about a wide number of things.

My readers took me up on my request, and gave me more targets to blame.? Let me expand on them:

21) The Rating Agencies — that was a popular choice.? Yes, the rating agencies messed up.? They always do.? Their job is an impossible one.? Should they be proactive or reactive?? Should they rate over the cycle, or be instantaneous?? Should they care about systemic risk issues?

Where they did err?? They competed for business, leading underwriting standards lower in structured finance.? They overrated the financial guarantors, who were their major clients.? Away from that, they made mistakes, but every firm offereing opinions makes mistakes.? I make mistakes regularly here.

22) Matt give me another party to blame, and I will let him speak for himself: I have one more to add – the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Not only did they fail to regulate the national banks, they also stone-walled State and local governments from bringing suit (claiming jurisdiction, but never following up on claims).

Add to that the divided regulatory structures that encouraged regulatory arbitrage.? That encouraged diminished underwriting standards.

23) Investment banks.? They asked the SEC to waive their leverage limts, and now none of the big guys are left as standalone publicly traded institutions.? They made a lot for a while, and then lost more.

24) Then there were the carry traders who have now gotten carried out on their shields. There were too many players trying to clip uncertain interest spreads, from hedge funds to Japanese housewives?

25) House flippers — whenever investors get to be more than 10% of a real estate market, beware.? Sad, but I heard an ad on the radio for buying residential real estate in order to rent it out.? It is not time for that yet.

26) The quants — they enabled models that gave a false sense of security.? They did not take into account decreased lending standards, and assumed that housing prices would continue to go up, albeit slowly.

They also assumed that various classes of risky business would be less correlated, but when hedge funds and fund-of-funds take many risks, returns become correlated because of investoors enter ing and exiting sectors.

27) The tax havens and hedge funds.? Hedge funds are weak holding structures for assets.? In a crisis they can be sellers, because they want to lower leverage.

28) Mainstream financial media — CNBC, etc.? They were relentless cheerleaders for the bull markets in stock and housing.? This isn’t a compliment, but financial radio makes CNBC sound cautious.? FInancial radio seems to be a home for hucksters.

And, that’s all for now.? If you have more parties to blame, feel free to respond.? One final note on my point 16, diversification, from the prior post: many quants did us wrong by focusing on correlations stemming from only boom periods.? There are many problems with correlation statistics in finance, but the big problem is that correlations are not stable even during boom times, much less between booms and busts.? In a bust, all risky assets become highly correlated with each other, invalidating ideas of risk control through diversification.

My view of diversification is holding safe assets and risky assets.? High quality short-term debt does wonders to reduce the volatility of results.? Other hedges are less certain.? Nothing beats cash, even when money market funds are open to question.

Blame Game

Blame Game

Some people don’t like the concept of blame.? They view it as useless because it wastes time in looking for a solution.? I will tell you differently.? Blame is useful because it identifies offenders, which is the first step in eliminating the problem.? The trouble is that few have the stomach to get rid of the offenders.

So, as I traveled home from prayer meeting with my children last night, we listened to a radio show discussing the current credit crisis.? This was a good discussion, unlike many that I hear.? But the discussion (on NPR) eventually focused on “who should we blame?”? Okay, here is my incomplete version of who we should blame:

1) The Federal Reserve, especially Alan Greenspan.? For the past 20 years, we couldn’t let the economy have a severe, much less a moderate recession.? Rates were reduced before significant pain was felt by those who had borrowed too much.? The 1% Fed funds rate in 2003 was the pinnacle of that effort.? It created the ultimate bubble; there is nothing left to reflate in 2008 from easy monetary policy.

2) Congress and the Presidency — they encouraged undue leverage in a variety of ways:

a) Fannie, Freddie, the FHLB, and more: Everyone has gotta live in a single family home.? Gotta do that.? Thomas Jefferson’s ideal was that we should encumber future generations so that marginal buyers could live in houses beyond their means.? They compromised lending standards more and more, along with private lenders as the boom went on.

b) The SEC: in a fiat currency world, controlling the currency means controlling leverage of financial institutions.? The SEC waived leverage restrictions on the investment banks in 2004, leading to a boom, and a bust. Big bust.? Ginormous bust — how many large standalone investment banks are left?

c) Particularly the Democrats in Congress defended the GSEs as their own pet project.? I am not bashing the CRA here; I am bashing the goal of having everyone live in a house beyond their means.

d) We offered a tax deduction on mortgage interest, and a limited exemption on capital gains from selling a home.? There is no good reason for these measures.

e) And, the Republicans in Congress who favored deregulation in areas for which it was foolish to deregulate.? Much as I favor deregulation, you can’t do it if you have fiat money (unbacked paper money).? In that case you must restrain the growth of credit.

f) The Bush Jr. Administration — they did not enforce regulations over financial institutions the way that the law would demand on a fair reading.? Again, I’m not crazy about regulation, but unless you have a gold standard, or something like it, you have to regulate the issuance of credit.

g) Their unfunded programs with promises to the future; the states and Federal Government always promise today, and don’t fund it.? Hucksters.

3) Lenders steered borrowers to bad loans.? There was often implicit fraud, and in some cases, fraud.? The lenders paid their staff to do it.

4) Borrowers were lazy and greedy.? What? You’re going to enter into a transaction many times your income or net worth, and you haven’t engaged helpers or friends to advise you?? Regardless of the housing price mania, you should have gone slower, and done more homework.? Caveat emptor — you neglected that.

5) Appraisers were slaves of the lenders who wanted to originate and sell.

6) Those that originated MBS did not check the creditworthiness adequately.? They just sold it away.? Investment banks did not care where a profit was coming from in the short run.

7) Servicers did not demand a high price for their services, making it hard for them to service anything but solvent borrowers.

8) Realtors steered people into buying more than they could rationally afford; I’m not saying they did that on purpose, but their nature was to sell to get the highest commissions.

9) Mortgage insurers and financial guarantee insurers — because of the laxness of accounting rules, they were able to offer guarantees significantly in excess of what they could pay in the deepest crisis.

10) Hedge funds, investment banks and their investors — they demanded returns that were higher than what was sustainable.? They entered into businesses that would not survive difficult times.

11) Regulators let themselves be compromised by those following the profit motive.? Many hoped to make money after joining private industry later.

12) America.? We let ourselves become short-term as a culture, encouraging short-term prosperity, regardless of the cost.

13) Neomercantilists — they lent us money, because they wanted they export sectors to grow for political reasons.? This made our interest rates too low, encouraging overinvestment and overconsumption.

14) Average people who voted in Congress, and demanded perpetual prosperity — face it, we elect those that govern us, and there is the tendency in America to love the representative that brings home the pork, while hating Congress as a whole.? Also, we need to bear with recessions, and let them do their work, and not force our government to deal with them.

15) Auditors that did a cursory job auditing financial entities.? As the boom went on, standards got lower.

16) Academics who encouraged a naive view of diversification, and their followers who believe in uncorrelated returns.? In a bad economy, everything is correlated, and your statistics from a good economy don’t matter.

17) Pension and other funds that believed the academics.? It is amazing what institutional investors will fund, given the mistaken idea that correlation coefficients are stable.? Capitalistic economies are unstable by nature!? Why should we expect certain strategies to workallo the time?

18) Governmental entities that happily expanded government programs as the boom went on.? Now they are talking about increased taxes, rather than eliminating programs that are of marginal value to society.? Governments should not rely on increased taxes from capital gains, or real estate tax assessments.

19) Those that twitted “doom-and-gloomers,” and investors who only cared if markets went up.? It is hard to write about what could go wrong in the markets.? Many call you a wet blanket, spoiling their fun, and alleging that you are a short, or some sort of misanthrope.? The system is biased in favor of happy talk.? Just watch CNBC.

20) Me, and others who warned about the current crisis. Perhaps we weren’t clear enough.? Maybe our financial interests made us look like we were talking our books.? I know that I spent a lot of time on these issues, but in the short run, I was still an investor, trying to make money in the markets, hoping that what I feared would not occur.? Now I am getting my just desserts.

This is an incomplete list.? I invite you to add others to the list in your comments.

The Best of the Aleph Blog, Part 7

The Best of the Aleph Blog, Part 7

August-October 2008 was a tough era to blog in as the crisis broke.? It was the height of popularity for my blog, I haven’t had that level of readership since.

Rather than go chronologically, this era lends itself to being topical.

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The Crisis

Nonidentical Twins: Solvency and Liquidity

How Much Can the US Government Guarantee?

Oppose The Treasury?s Bailout Plan

We Need Oversight, and Compensation to the Taxpayers

Don?t Rush It

Let the Current Bailout Die

What A Fine Mess You Have Gotten Us Into

Oppose the Current Bailout Plan, Redux

I tried to fight the bailout.? I do not accept the idea that the bailout helped, regardless of losses of profits, because it skews future actions of those who think they will be bailed out.

The Aftermath of the Crisis

Blame Game

Blame Game, Redux

Blame Game III

There are many to blame from the crisis, including me.? I don’t go in for simple crisis explanations; the crisis was societal, global even.

Market Dynamics

The Fundamentals of Market Bottoms

The Fundamentals of Market Bottoms, Part 2

The Fundamentals of Market Bottoms, Part 3 (Final)

The Fundamentals of Residential Real Estate Market Bottoms

These pieces finished off a series of four for me.? Market dynamics are tough, and most people don’t get them.

Fannie & Freddie

A Way to Make Money Off of Fannie and Freddie

Margin of Safety

Another Look At Fannie and Freddie

If you listened to me, you made money off of the failure, and avoided losses as well.? No joke; I hit that one out of the park, Bill Miller!

Monetary Policy

Inflation for Goods Prices, Attempted Inflation for Housing-Related Assets, but Sorry, No Inflation for Wages

Liquidity for the Government and no Liquidity for Anyone Else

FOMC: Forking Out More Currency

Entering the Endgame for Monetary Policy

A Note on the Greenspan Legacy

NOT Born and Bred in the Briar Patch

The Fed continued its “brain dead” policy, until the crisis broke, and then began to catch up.

Accounting

Analyzing Growth in Firm Value

Accounting Rules Do Not Affect Cash Flows

Illiquid Assets Financed by Liquid Liabilities (Or, why were you playing near the cliff?)

IFRS: Incomparable Flexible Reporting Standards.

A variety of articles dealing with understanding accounting, from a man who has not had a single accounting course in his life, but had to do financial reporting for 12 years.

Stable Value and Money Market Funds

A Proposal for Money Market Funds, and More

A Maximum of One Year of Interest Lost

There are alternative ways of assuring a stable net asset value.

Miscellaneous Financials

Puncturing Pensions

Residential Real Estate Will Not Have A ?V? Bottom

The Banking Industry Should Learn from the Insurance Industry

Investing in Financial Stocks is Tough

Too Bad for Preferred Stock

Industries Don?t Learn From Each Other on Credit Issues

Financials are tough because there is nothing that stands behind them, except for willingness to pay.

Big Think Pieces

Financial Bloggers: The Conscience of Wall Street?

Finance When You Can, Not When You Have To

Capitalism <> Greed ? Capitalism = Service

Rethinking Insurable Interest

Good pieces all.? Read them at your convenience.? They will still be valuable 50 years from now.

Unchangeable

Unchangeable

When people look at this crisis, they look for simple answers — they want to find one or two parties to blame, not many, a la my Blame Game series.? The economic system is an interconnected web, and it is not easy to change one part without affecting many others.? Intelligent ideas for change consider second order effects at minimum.? This piece, and any that follow under the same title, will attempt to point at things that are not easily done away with.? Some of these will be controversial, others not.

1) Derivatives.? What is a derivative?? A derivative is a contract where two parties agree to exchange cash flows according to some indexes or formulas.? There are some suggesting today that all derivatives must be standardized, and/or traded on exchanges.? That might make sense for common derivatives where there are large volumes, but many derivatives are “out in the tail.”? Not common, and standardization of what is not common is a fool’s errand.

To regulate derivatives fully is to say that certain types of contracts between private parties may not exist without the consent of the government.? Thinking about it that way, what becomes of free enterprise?? Granted, there are some contracts that cannot be considered enforcable, like that of a hit man, arson for hire, etc.? Those are matters that any healthy government would oppose.

What makes more sense is to bring the derivatives “on balance sheet.”? Let the effects of the notional value play out, showing owners what is happening, rather than hiding it.

2) Rating agencies — Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch deserve some blame for what happened, but the regulators needed the rating agencies.? They still do.? The rating agencies make imperfect estimates of relative credit quality for a wide munber of instruments, which then feed into the risk-based capital formulas of the regulators.? To rate such a wide number of instruments means that the issuers must pay for the rating, because there is no general interest for most ratings.

Yes, let more rating agencies compete, but they will find that the “issuer pays” model is more compelling than the “”buyer pays” model.? The concentrated interests of issuers in a rating trumps the diffuse interests of buyers.? Bond buyers need to learn to live with this, and employ buy-side analysts that don’t take the opinion of the rating agencies blindly.? What the analysts at the rating agencies write is often more valuable than the rating itself, though it doesn’t change capital charges.

Rating agencies make the most errors with new asset classes.? Better that the regulators do their jobs and prohibit immature? asset classes where the loss experience is ill-understood.

I don’t think that rating agencies are going away any time soon.? I do think that the government and regulators contemplated this, but concluded that the changes to the system would be too drastic. (Contrary opinions: one, two)

3) Yield-seeking — the desire to seek yield is near-universal.? As a bond manager, I found it rare that a manager would do a “reduce yield, improve quality or certainty” trade.? The pattern is even more pronounced with retail accounts.? They underestimate the value of the options that they are selling, and take a modicum of yield in exchage for lower certainty of return.

Can this be banned, as some are proposing with reverse convertibles?? I don’t think so, there are too many variables to nail down, and too many people in search for a yield higher than is reasonable.? Yield-hogging is an institutional sport, not only one for retail fans to grab.? As one of my old bosses used to say, “Yield can be added to any portfolio.”? How?

  • Offer protection on CDS
  • Lower the quality of your portfolio.
  • Buy all of the dirty credits that trade cheap to rating.
  • Buy securities from securitizations — they almost always trade cheap to rating.? (Ooh! CDOs!)
  • Sell a call option on the securities you hold.
  • Buy mortgage securities with a lot of prepayment or extension risk.
  • Accept the return in a higher inflation currency, assuming that their central bank will tighten.
  • Do a currency carry trade.
  • Lever up.
  • Extend the length of your portfolio.
  • Underwrite catastrophe risk through cat bonds.

Adding yield is easy.? The transparency of that addition of yield is another matter.? Reverse convertibles have been the hot issue recently since this article.? Here is a small sample of the articles that followed: (one, two, three).? Reverse convertibles, and other instruments like them give bond-like performance if things go average-to-well, and stock-like performance if things go badly.? The inducement for this is a high yield on the bond in the average-to-good scenario.

What to do?

I have three bits of advice for readers.? First, don’t buy any financial instruments tht you don’t understand well. This especially applies when the party selling them to you has options that they can exercise against you.? Wall Street excels at products that give with the right hand and take with the left, so beware structured products sold to retail investors.

Second, don’t buy any financial product that someone appears out of the blue and says, “Have I got a deal for you!”? Stop.? Take your time, ask for literature, maybe, but say that you need a month or more to think about it.? Haste is the enemy of good financial decision-making.? Instead, do your own research, and buy what you conclude that you need.? Consult trusted advisors in either case.

Third, don’t be a yield hog.? Yield is rarely free.? There are times to take risk and accept higher yields, but those are typically scary times.? At other times, make sure you understand the portfolio of risks that you accept, and that you are being adequately paid for those risks.? Better to have a ladder of high quality noncallable debt, and take some risk with equities than to take risk in a series of yieldy and illiquid bonds that you don’t understand so well.? At least you will be able to know what risks you have, and that is an aid to asset management.

Final Question

This article began as a discussion of things that are very hard to change in the current environment.? I thought of several here:

  • The continuing need for derivatives, and the impossibility of full standardization
  • The continuing need for rating agencies
  • Human nature makes us yield hogs.
  • Wall Street builds traps for investors off of that weakness.

What other things are very hard to change in the current environment?

Book Review: Bailout Nation

Book Review: Bailout Nation

I liked Financial Shock.? But it was kind of like listening to the news on the radio, versus watching it on television, in comparison to Bailout Nation.? What can I say, Barry writes ably and amusingly, without losing erudition.? With help from Aaron Task, the book sings.? Having written for RealMoney, I have experienced the superb editing by editors that understand finance.? (I always enjoyed interacting with Aaron in the CC.)

Also, the writing is simple to understand, but you don’t get a simplistic view of who was to blame, similar to my Blame Game series.? There are a lot of culprits who took advantage of the boom times, leaving themselves and all of us more vulnerable in the eventual bust.

Barry begins the book by describing the normal temptation of nations to bail out large private interests when things go south.? The US resisted these temptations until the creation of the Federal Reserve, an quasi-public entity that I like to say was created so that the Treasury Department could take actions that would otherwise be unconstitutional.

He then describes early bailouts (Lockheed, Chrysler) that set the pattern for what will come later.? But the greater factor that Barry describes are the implicit bailouts where Greenspan threw liquidity at every crisis, which avoided the reconciliation of bad lending decisions.? Great examples include: commercial mortgages in the early ’90s, Mexico and mortgages in 94, Russia/Asia/LTCM in 98, and the Nasdaq in 2000-2.

Liquidity was never absent in the Greenspan era, and debts built up, realizing that since the Fed would protect them, why not take more risk?

The idea backfired on the Fed.? Investors took more risk because they thought the Fed would protect them, and so they leveraged up on investments at narrow spreads over risk-free investments in order to meet return targets.

Any policy that reduces risk-consciousness is a bad one.? Ditto for those that say follow the crowd.

As I have said before, if a country has fiat money, it must also regulate credit.? Conditions in the banking sector deteriorated through the Bush Jr., administration, leading to the credit crises we are seeing today.? Conservative, it is not.

Barry also details the crisis in 2008 as it unfolded, and questions the motives of parties involved, or, why they didn’t act earlier.

Personal Notes

  • The 1996 Greenspan comment on “irrational exuberance” is treated well by Barry.? Greenspan was long on words but short on deeds.
  • Barry could have done more with the Banking crisis 1989-93, which prompted the aggressive Fed policy which is similar to today’s policy.
  • Big as the Federal Reserve is, they certainly did not do their regulatory job with respect to lending terms.
  • Barry agrees with me that the CPI is understated.
  • On AIG, I would note that AIG Financial Products was not the only problem, though it was the biggest.? The domestic life companies had real issues.
  • I was gratified to see how many experts that Barry cited favored increased immigration to the US of those that are wealthy.
  • Finally, on the second to last page, he quotes an obscure economist with a weirdly-named blog.? Hey Felix, yes, he quoted few bloggers, but you missed this one.

All in all, a great book.? If there is a better one to describe the crisis, I will be very surprised.

If you want to buy it you can buy it here:?? Bailout Nation: How Greed and Easy Money Corrupted Wall Street and Shook the World Economy

For one final note, I love the cover of the book where they morph the Wall Street Bull into a pig.? It symbolizes the era we are in in.

On The Ron Smith Show Today

On The Ron Smith Show Today

The invite came late today, but in the 4PM (Eastern) hour, I will be on The Ron Smith Show.? For those in the Baltimore area, that’s 1090 on the AM dial.? For those over the internet, go here, and click the “Listen Live” button.

What will we be talking about?? Alan Greenspan’s editorial that I replied to here, and which FT Alphaville picked up on twice.? (Incidentally, here is where my “Blame Game? (one, two) series is located.

Also, we will be discussing the WSJ article, Obama, Geithner Get Low Grades From Economists.? Now economists have enough egg on their faces from the current crisis, so maybe their ability to judge should be weighed in the balance as well.? I’m not crazy about the actions of the Fed or the Treasury during either the Bush, Jr. or Obama Administrations.? As with my Blame Game series — there is more than enough blame to go around.? The real question is whether policymakers aren’t digging us into a deeper eventual hole, which I think they are.


And then we’ll talk about whatever else the callers want to talk about.? It’s fun and fast — the hour just blows by.? More to come later — I have pieces on AIG, Berky, and a few other things in the hopper.

Oh, one more thing, from jck at Alea: U.S. Household Net Worth: Down $11.5 Trillion in 2008. I definitely questioned the growth in national net worth when I was writing for RealMoney.? My main argument was that incurring debt to buy the assets was artificially inflating their vale, and when debt levels normalized, net worth would drop as well.

Greenspan the Excellent Obfuscator

Greenspan the Excellent Obfuscator

When I did my “Blame Game” series, I put Alan Greenspan near the top of the list for his mismanagement of monetary policy over his tenure, always bringing back the punch bowl too fast, and never letting enough marginal entities go into insolvency.? His tenure corresponds to the fast climb in the total leverage of the US economy.? When debtors realize that the Fed will not deliver any real pain, they quickly pile on the debt, leading to the overleveraged condition we are experiencing now.

In a WSJ editorial today, Greenspan has the temerity to say that his monetary policy did not cause the housing bubble:

There are at least two broad and competing explanations of the origins of this crisis. The first is that the “easy money” policies of the Federal Reserve produced the U.S. housing bubble that is at the core of today’s financial mess.

The second, and far more credible, explanation agrees that it was indeed lower interest rates that spawned the speculative euphoria. However, the interest rate that mattered was not the federal-funds rate, but the rate on long-term, fixed-rate mortgages. Between 2002 and 2005, home mortgage rates led U.S. home price change by 11 months. This correlation between home prices and mortgage rates was highly significant, and a far better indicator of rising home prices than the fed-funds rate.

First, small differences in correlation coefficients are not adequate to test a hypothesis.? Second, the low Fed funds rate touched off a flurry of adjustable-rate home loans, which Greenspan himself inadvisably endorsed at one point.? The adjustable rate loans became a much larger part of the residential mortgage space than ever before.? Greenspan does not cite figures for his mortgage rate claim — I am guessing that he is comparing fixed rate mortgages to Fed funds, which is not the right metric here, given the large amount of floating rate issuance.

U.S. mortgage rates’ linkage to short-term U.S. rates had been close for decades. Between 1971 and 2002, the fed-funds rate and the mortgage rate moved in lockstep. The correlation between them was a tight 0.85. Between 2002 and 2005, however, the correlation diminished to insignificance.

As I noted on this page in December 2007, the presumptive cause of the world-wide decline in long-term rates was the tectonic shift in the early 1990s by much of the developing world from heavy emphasis on central planning to increasingly dynamic, export-led market competition. The result was a surge in growth in China and a large number of other emerging market economies that led to an excess of global intended savings relative to intended capital investment. That ex ante excess of savings propelled global long-term interest rates progressively lower between early 2000 and 2005.

As I noted at RealMoney during 2004-2006, the yield curve flattened the hard way, with the Fed raising rates, and the long end falling.? I noted that China was acting as a second central bank for the US, stimulating as the Fed withdrew stimulus.? But the Fed did little to counteract China’s influence; they could have been more aggressive, and acted faster.? They could have tightened margin requirements or bank capital requirements.? They just plodded, and continued to let overall leverage in the economy get out of whack.

Low global interest rates were just a sign that the global marginal efficiency of capital was eroding.? There was overinvestment, and not enough understanding in the neomercantilistic countries to realize that they were flooding the world with their goods, as their purchasers flooded them with credit.

Yes, the credit policies of other nations were a factor, but it does not excuse the mismanagement of monetary policy by Greenspan, where private and public debts were allowed to build up to record high ratios of GDP, threatening the health of the financial system, and the Fed did little to nothing about it.

Three Long Articles on Three Big Failures

Three Long Articles on Three Big Failures

If you have time, there are two long articles that are worth a read.? The first is from the Washington Post, and deals with the demise of AIG, highlighting the role of AIG Financial Products.? It was written in three parts — one, two, and three, corresponding to three phases:

  • Growth of a clever enterprise, AIGFP.
  • Expansion into default swaps.
  • Death of AIG as it gets downgraded and has to post collateral, leading to insolvency.

What fascinated me the most was the willingness of managers at AIGFP to think that writing default protection was “free money.”? There is no free money, but the lure of “free money” brings out the worst in mankind.? This is not just true of businessmen, but of politicians, as I will point out later.

My own take on the topic involved my dealings with some guys at AIGFP while I was at AIG.? Boy, were they arrogant!? It’s one thing to look down on competitors; it’s another thing to look down on another division of your own company that is not competing with you, though doing something similar.

As I sold GICs for Provident Mutual, when I went to conferences, AIGFP people were far more numerous than AIG people selling GICs.? The AIG GIC sellers may have been competitors of mine, but they were honest, and I cooperated with them on industry projects.? Again, the AIGFP people were arrogant — but what was I to say?? They were more successful, seemingly.

The last era, as AIG got downgraded, was while I wrote for RealMoney.? After AIG was added to the Dow, I was consistently negative on the stock.? I had several worries:

  • Was AIGFP properly hedged?
  • Were reserves for the long-tail commercial lines conservative?
  • Why had leverage quadrupled over the last 15 years?? ROA had fallen as ROE stayed the same.? The AIG religion of 15% after-tax ROE had been maintained, but at a cost of increasing leverage.
  • Was AIG such a bespoke behemoth that even Greenberg could not manage it?
  • My own experiences inside AIG, upon more mature reflection, made me wonder whether there might not be significant accounting chicanery.? (I was privy to a number of significant reserving errors 1989-1992).

In general, opaqueness, and high debt (even if it’s rated AAA), is usually a recipe for disaster.? AIG fit that mold well.

Now AIG recently sold one of their core P&C subsidiaries for what looks like a bargain price.? This is only an opinion, but I think AIG stock is an eventual zero.? Granted, all insurance valuations are crunched now, but even with that, if selling the relatively transparent operations such as Hartford Steam Boiler brings so little, then unless the whole sector turns, AIG has no chance.? Along the same lines, I don’t expect the “rescue” to be over soon, and I expect the US govenment to take a significant loss on this one.

The second article is from Bethany McLean of Vanity Fair.? I remember reading her writings during the accounting scandals at Fannie Mae.? She was sharp then, and sharp now.? There were a loose group of analysts that went under the moniker “Fannie Fraud Patrol.”:? I still have a t-shirt from that endeavor, from my writings at RealMoney, and my proving that the fair value balance sheets of Fannie were unlikely to be right back in 2002.

Again, there is a growing bubble, as with AIG.? The need to grow income leads Fannie and Freddie to buy in mortgages that they have guaranteed, to earn spread income.? It also leads them to buy the loans made by their competitors.? It leads them to lever up even more.? It leads them to dilute underwriting standards.? Franklin Raines’ goals lead to accounting fraud as his earning targets can’t be reached fairly.

One lack in the article is that the guarantees that Fannie had written would render Fannie insolvent at the time the Treasury took them over.? On a cash flow basis, that might not happen for a long time, but it would happen.? Defaults would be well above what was their worst case scenario, and too much for their thin capital base.

The last article is another three part series from the Washington Post that is about the failure of our financial markets.? (Here are the parts — one, two, three.)? What are the main points of the article?

  • Bailing out LTCM gave regulators a false sense of confidence.? They relished the micro-level success, but did not consider the macro implications of how speculation would affect the investment banks.
  • Because of turf and philosophy conflicts, derivatives were left unregulated.? (My view is that anything the goverment guarantees must be regulated.? Other financial institutions can be unregulated, but they can have no ties to the government, or regulated financial entities.
  • The banking regulators failed to fulfill their proper roles regarding loan underwriting, consumer protection and bank leverage.? The Office of Thrift Supervision was particularly egregious in not doing their duty, and also the the SEC who loosened investment bank capital requirements in 2004.
  • Proper risk-based capital became impossible to enforce for Investment banks, because regulators could not understand what was going on; perhaps that is one reason why they gave up.
  • The regulators, relying on the rating agencies, could not account for credit risk in any proper manner, because the products were too new.? Corporate bonds are one thing — ABS is another, and we don’t know the risk properties of any asset class that has not been through a failure cycle.? Regulators should problably not let regulated entities use any financial instrument that has not been through systemic failure to any high degree.
  • Standards fell everywhere as the party went on, and the bad debts built up.? It was a “Devil take the hindmost” situation.? But as the music played, and party went on, more chairs would be removed, leaving a scramble when the music stopped.? Cash, cash, who’s got cash?!
  • In the aftermath, regulation will rise.? Some will be smart, some will be irrelevant, some will be dumb.? But it will rise, simply because the American people demand action from their legislators, who will push oin the Executive and regulators.

A few final notes:

  • Accounting rules and regulatory rules were in my opinion flawed, because they allowed for gain on sale in securitizations, rather than off of release from risk, which means much more capital would need to be held, and profits deferred till deals near their completion.
  • This could never happened as badly without the misapplication of monetary policy.? Greenspan enver let the recessions do their work and clear away bad debts.
  • Also, the neomercantilistic nations facilitated the US taking on all this debt as they overbuilt their export industries, and bought our debt in exchange.
  • The investment banks relied too heavily on risk models that assumed continuous markets.? Oddly, their poorer cousin, the life insurers don’t rely on that to the same degree (Leaving aside various option-like products… and no, the regulators don’t know what is going on there in my opinion.)
  • The insurance parts of AIG are seemingly fine; what did the company in was their unregulated entities, and an overleveraged holding company, aided by a management that pushed for returns and accounting results that could not be safely achieved.
  • The GSEs were a part of the crisis, but they weren’t the core of the crisis — conservative ideologues pushing that theory aren’t right.? But the liberals (including Bush Jr) pushing the view that there was no need for reform were wrong too.? We did not need to push housing so hard on people that were ill-equipped to survive a small- much less a moderate-to-large downturn.
  • With the GSEs, it is difficult to please too many masters: Congress, regulators, stockholders, the executive — all of which had different agendas, and all of which enoyed the ease that a boom in real estate prices provided.? Now that the leverage is coming down, the fights are there, but with new venom — arguing over scarcity is usually less pleasant than arguing over plenty.
  • As in my blame game series — there is a lot of blame to go around here, and personally, it would be good if there were a little bit more humility and willingness to say “Yes, I have a bit of blame here too.”? And here is part of my blame-taking: I should have warned louder, and made it clearer to people reading me that my stock investing is required because of the business that I was building.? I played at the edge of the crisis in my investing, and anyone investing alongside me got whacked with me.? For that, I apologize.? It is what I hate most about investment writing — people losing because they listened to me.
Neomercantilism and Sloppy Central Bankers

Neomercantilism and Sloppy Central Bankers

When I wrote for RealMoney, one of my continuing themes was that the Federal Reserve was less relevant because neomercantilistic nations like China (and perhaps OPEC nations) had reasons for promoting exports to the US that were less than economic.? As such they would buy US fixed income in order to facilitate their exports.? What could be sweeter?? You send goods; we send promises, denominated in our own currency.

With that, I want to point to a short post from Marginal Revolution.? Like me, he takes the “modified Austrian” view that the bubble was caused not only by the Fed, but also by the neomercantilists, both of which I fingered in my “Blame Game” series.? Buying longer dollar-denominated debt stimulated mortgage rates more than the Fed could, because under normal conditions the Fed can only affect the short end of the yield curve.

PS — What a long day, to NYC and back.? I appeared on Fox Business News show “Happy Hour.”? They said I did very well.? If I get video I will post it here.? As I have said before, time on live television goes fast.? The four minutes seemed like the blink of an eye.? At the end, Liz asked me for a third stock, and I blanked out, so I said Assurant, a company that I love, but don’t currently own.? I will own it in the future.? I meant to say Pepsico, but it just didn’t come to mind.

I also had dinner with my friend Cody Willard after the show.? Though our rhetoric is different, we basically agree that the actions of the government in the bailout offer much possibility/potential for favoritism.? Also, that it is easy to start a bailout, and hard to end one.

Let the government chew on this: Pepsico issued $3.3 billion of corporate debt yesterday.? For a company with recession-proof products and a Aa2/A+/AA- balance sheet, for them to pay 4%+ over Treasuries is astounding.? Liquidity?? What liquidity?? If financing needs are outside the A-1/P-1/F1 CP box, there is no help.? Not that there should be help, but the corporate bond market is a truer indicator of our stress than the money markets, which still aren’t in great shape.

Full disclosure: long NUE PRE PEP

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